In chapter 4, the empirical analysis focuses over time and across states and districts using presidential election data (1948–2016), Senate election data (1966–2016), gubernatorial election data (1966–2016), and House election data from all 435 districts (1972–2010). In chapter 5, their analysis shifts from across to within states and districts in an effort to directly test the turnout bias by looking at the change in vote share as a product of changes in turnout. In chapter 6, their analysis focuses on US House elections from 2000 to 2010. Regardless of how the authors slice the data, the main finding persists: there is no partisan bias related to turnout.

Why is there no support for the conventional wisdom? *The Turnout Myth* offers two empirical explanations. The first is related to the magnitude of the turnout difference between Democrats and Republicans and how it affects the candidates' vote share; the second is tied to "peripheral voters" who are motivated and respond to short-term forces of a specific election. The multitude of short-term forces that drive peripheral voters to the polls include media and social simulations that increase voters' interest in a particular election, issue debates within the elections, and candidates' appeal. Short-term forces "mobilize the participation of those with a weak sense of citizen duty, less interest in public affairs, and little emotional commitment to any political party—the principal driving force in U.S. elections" (p. 112). *The Turnout Myth* argues that short-term forces and the distinction between core versus peripheral voters is crucial to understanding why the conventional wisdom fails.

If there is no turnout bias, then what explains vote choice in high—and low—turnout elections? Building on seminal work from Angus Campbell and Donald Stokes, Shaw and Petrocik explain turnout fluctuations and vote choice as functions of voters' political interest and engagement. They argue that turnout fluctuations are driven by "peripheral" voters who are less partisan and "blow with the political wind, padding the margins of candidates advantaged by current conditions" (p. 13). Turnout rates matter, but higher turnout will help whichever party benefits from what is going on; that is, by the direction of the short-term forces.

The Turnout Myth draws on other factors that help explain vote choice, which are related to short-term forces such as incumbent approval, economic performance, and campaign spending. The authors show that these factors are more correlated with vote choice than turnout. Institutional factors, such as the type of the ballot form, are also found to explain turnout oscillations. The authors discuss the effect of presidential elections on House elections. If someone votes for the Republican presidential candidate, that person is more likely to vote for other Republican candidates running for lower offices down the ballot: an example of classic coattail voting. Coattail voting causes a surge in votes for the party of the leading presidential candidate. However, it is a short-term force because most of the time, after the election, the vote share for that party declines in the following midterm elections.

Normatively, high turnout is considered to be a desirable outcome in a democracy. However, as Shaw and Petrocik show, there is no systematic link between election outcomes and turnout levels. They conclude that the conventional wisdom—that Democrats win when turnout is high—is not true. *The Turnout Myth* provides readers with thorough insight on what makes the American voter tick and so may inform campaigns' persuasion and mobilization strategies.

Let the People Rule: How Direct Democracy Can Meet the Populist Challenge. By John G. Matsusaka. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 312p. $29.95 cloth.
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— Joseph Lacey, *University College Dublin*
joseph.lacey1@ucd.ie

Over the last 20 years, the study of direct democracy (i.e., referendums) has grown dramatically. On balance, the evidence clearly suggests that mechanisms of direct democracy, when well designed for the right kinds of political systems, can be a desirable and effective way of doing democracy (better). John G. Matsusaka does not buck this trend. His book assembles a vast swathe of evidence from political science and political history, occasionally adding his own new data in useful places, to produce an elegant and richly informed set of arguments for the adoption of direct democracy at the national level in the United States. The book is written in an accessible style for a wide audience. Those unfamiliar with debates on direct democracy will enjoy an eye-opening account, while the initiated will find novel insights and much to admire.

The hook that quickly sucks in the reader is Matsusaka's promise to take the populist claim seriously: that the people have been disempowered by a largely unaccountable elite of legislators, bureaucrats, and judges. According to Matsusaka, the standard explanations for the rise of populism—that it is the result of economic shocks or a rise in nativist sentiment produced by the politicization of migration—miss the fact that populists are giving voice to a long-standing and deeply felt democratic malaise (as suggested by 60 years of longitudinal evidence from the American National Election Studies opinion survey; pp. 2–4).

The first part of the book provides wide-ranging evidence in support of the democratic critique behind the populist challenge, documenting the (largely necessary) rise of the administrative or regulatory state (chapter 1); the (largely unnecessary) empowerment of the Supreme Court as a de facto lawmaker (chapter 2), and the

substantial lack of congruence between voters preferences in congressional districts and their representatives' voting behavior (chapters 3 and 4).

Matsusaka raises valid doubts about the likely efficacy of standard proposals for reforming representative politics to address the democratic disconnect, such as more competitive congressional districts (chapter 3). In doing so, he clears the way for developing his core claim that direct democracy at the national level is the most promising solution to the democratic disconnect and, thus, could go some way toward addressing what is true in the populist challenge.

His first step in making this case is a broad account of the use and development of referendums in American states, Europe, and other parts of the world (Part II). Matsusaka demonstrates that direct democracy is very much part of the American story, with 27 states successfully carrying out some form of direct democracy, whereas it is an outlier among industrialized countries in having failed to provide for national referendums.

Part III starts off with six possible proposals for what a national referendum in the United States would look like. Matsusaka believes that the most achievable proposal in the short term is an act of Congress that gives it the right to call for advisory national referendums. More radical proposals would be to allow citizens to call referendums by petition or to make the referendums binding in law (chapter 11).

We are spared a thought experiment concerning how each proposal could play out. Instead, the remaining chapters of Part III provide an account of the benefits and risks of direct democracy in general. Some of the benefits include allowing citizens to choose the policy they want, producing more citizen trust and engagement in politics, and helping settle disputes, including highly salient and emotive issues, like abortion (chapter 13).

In chapter 12, Matsusaka makes a courageous move. He provides a detailed case analysis of two of the most notorious referendums that have stoked the ire of those critical of referendums: California's 1978 Proposition 13 to place limits on state government property-tax–raising powers and the UK Brexit referendum on withdrawing from the EU. By diving into the nuances of the political background and impact of these votes, Matsusaka provides compelling reasons for believing that many of the benefits he associates with referendums did in fact accrue to these cases in some way. Although aspects of his assessments may be challenged, his accounts are sufficiently persuasive to open the reader's mind to what direct democracy might be at its best (if Proposition 13 and Brexit are commonly viewed as modern examples of what it might be at its worst).

The remainder of Part III assesses some common critiques of direct democracy, including the ideas that voters lack competence to engage in direct democracy and that it leads to bad outcomes for minority groups. Matsusaka is convincing in dousing, albeit not eliminating, the force of these standard critiques. The most impressive and definitive chapter in this part of the book is his analysis of large datasets on California referendums, legislative votes, and campaign contributions (chapter 15). The author makes a real addition to the scholarly literature in supplementing and refining existing findings that special interests are decidedly disadvantaged in advancing their interests when it comes to direct democratic votes, whereas they are comparatively successful at doing so in the legislative arena. Part IV concludes with useful frameworks for deciding what issues are best suited to referendums and what are some of the key best practices for designing direct democratic institutions.

Although *Let the People Rule* succeeds in making a powerful case for introducing a national scheme of direct democracy in the United States, it is less successful in its secondary aim of connecting this proposal with the present "populist challenge." Despite the heavy focus on populism as a hook in the introduction, populism scarcely features in the book again. The exception is chapter 10, where the populism of Thomas Jefferson's Democratic Republican Party is presented as the beginning of a long populist tradition in American politics that has served as the catalyst for many of the most far-reaching democratic reforms. In other words, populism is rendered as an agent for positive democratic change in the United States. There thus appears to be an unbridged gap between Matsusaka's historical account and the present reality of populism. If direct democracy is supposed to "meet the populist challenge" (as the book's subtitle suggests), then who are to be the agents of Matsusaka's reforms? Is it the populists themselves as in previous generations? Although it is common for populist parties to include manifesto promises for more direct democracy in Europe and South America, the most prominent populist leaders in the United States (i.e., Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders) have not proven themselves champions of direct democracy or of like reforms in America (a minor exception is Tom Steyer, a short-lasting candidate for the Democratic presidential primaries in 2019). If not the populists themselves, then might some other agent(s) buck the historical trend and become a vector for Matsusaka-style reforms? The content of the book invites the question, and the reader is left wondering about the answer as populism scarcely raises its head again in the narrative.

Two omissions also detract from the power of Matsusaka's arguments for adopting national direct democracy in the United States. First, he pays scant attention to the reality of the extremes of polarization defining US national politics. The reader would need more convincing that the same kinds of benefits that are seen to accrue to the use of direct democracy in other contexts (including at the local and state levels in the United States) would similarly

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emerge in the US *national* context. Second, Matsusaka does not attempt to engage in a critical exchange with other nonelectoral proposals for improving on the democratic disconnect. Examples of proposals one would expect to see considered are modest ones like integrating citizens assemblies into the policy-making process, or more radical ones for fully or partially rotating legislatures selected by lottery. A single chapter engaging with such well-developed ideas, explaining the strengths of direct democracy relative to these, would have made for an even richer and potentially more persuasive book.

The Great Migration and the Democratic Party: Black Voters and the Realignment of American Politics in the 20th Century. By Keneshia N. Grant. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2020. 214p. $74.50 cloth, $27.95 paper.
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— Sharon D. Wright Austin, *University of Florida*
polssdw@ufl.edu

African Americans began leaving the South in large numbers during Reconstruction. During and after this time period, millions migrated to other regions of the country in search of civil rights and an improved quality of life. Keneshia N. Grant's new book examines the "Great Migration" of African Americans from 1915 to 1965, when more than six million Black Americans migrated northward in search of economic, political, and social opportunities. She explains that a political analysis of the Great Migration is warranted because "where we live matters… . For Black Americans, the implications of one's location have always been far more serious than an accent or food preferences. Location has meant the difference between slavery and freedom, discrimination and equality, or poverty and economic opportunity" (p. 3). Noting that the Great Migration "was larger than the preceding California gold rush and dust bowl migrations combined" (p. 37), Grant points out the political significance of this resettlement from mostly rural Southern communities to Northern cities, with a focus on Detroit, Chicago, and New York City. These cities were selected because of the varied political outcomes and different challenges faced by Black residents in each. African Americans have achieved strong levels of political power in Detroit and Chicago but not in New York City, for various reasons.

After chapters on "Party Change and the Great Migration" and "Black Migration in American History," Grant turns to a discussion of Detroit, New York, and Chicago: African Americans moved to these three cities, among others, because of "push or pull factors…. Push factors were native occurrences that drove migrants out of the South" (p. 51). Pull factors, such as "expanded opportunities for employment and the potential for higher wages created by war-era growth in the economy" (p. 52), also motivated their migration out of the South. Although they continued to encounter discrimination in the North, they nevertheless gained certain political rights that they were vehemently denied in the South (like voting and the right to serve as appointed and elected officeholders), as well as slightly superior educational and job opportunities. In addition, white politicians and the major political parties solicited Black voter support as their numbers increased in these cities. While reading this well-written, comprehensive account, I thought of my own parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles who left small towns in Mississippi in search of better jobs, housing, and political opportunities in Memphis, St. Louis, and Chicago.

This book has several strengths that make it a useful and informative resource for a widely diverse audience. Above all, it reads like a novel and is a very enjoyable read. It provides an interdisciplinary and qualitative analysis of Black migration that focuses on this question: How did the Great Migration influence American politics in northern cities? *The Great Migration and the Democratic Party* significantly contributes to the fields of political science and African American Studies. Its emphasis on politics enables it to fill a major void, because much of the research on the Great Migration is of a historical and sociological nature. This book is written in the tradition of books like *Going North, Migration of Blacks and Whites from the South, 1900–1950* by Neil Fligstein (1981), *Black Exodus: The Great Migration from the American South* by Alferdteen Harrison (1991), *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America* by Nicholas Lemann (1991), and *The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration* by Isabel Wilkerson (2010).

In chapter 1, Grant points out that "research on migrants' politics is located in works about individual cities or writing about labor and civil rights issues of cities. One of my aims in this book is to create a separate space for consideration of politics during the Great Migration" (p. 13). Grant argues that politicians solicited support from Black voters because they wanted to benefit from the "Black balance of power (BOP)" resulting from the significant Black population growth and voting bloc. Mayoral candidates knew that Black voters would determine election *outcomes* both in the present day and in the future. Grant uses the results from every mayoral election in each of the three cities in her study from 1915 to 1965, thereby determining the strength of Blacks' electoral power. This analysis makes an important contribution, because scholars have experienced difficulties in finding this data. Moreover, each of these cities elected its first African American mayor either during the 1970s (Coleman Young of Detroit) or 1980s (Harold Washington of Chicago and David Dinkins of New York City). This book also explains the grassroots mobilization efforts that occurred in the years preceding these elections, examining the challenges