

Coalition Governments, Party Switching, and the Rise and Decline of Parties: Changing Japanese Party Politics since 1993

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Abstract

Since 1993, coalition governments have replaced the 38-year-long, one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) in Japan. Except for one year, from 1993 to 1994, the LDP has remained a key party in successive governing coalitions, but the dynamics of party competition has been completely transformed since the period of the LDP's dominance. Although the LDP has survived to form a variety of coalitions ranging from a minority to an over-sized majority, since 1998 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has continued to counter the LDP governments. The transformation of party systems in Japan accompanies the party switching of legislators and the mergers, breakups, extinctions, and formations of parties. In this regard, the Japanese case provides an interesting example to show how parties attempt to change the dynamics of policy competition by switching and reorganizing. Parties also attempt to shift their policy positions to attract public support and to gain a competitive edge in government formation. Using expert survey data about the policy positions of parties, this study explicates the dynamics involved in the reorganization of parties and the formation of governments.

Introduction

In partisan competition, parties are constrained by their size and positions on politicized issues. Both the relative sizes and positions of parties are critical in determining the consequence of competition. More important, both factors are considered as interactive. Parties can influence the conditions for competition by attracting public attention to particular policy issues, redefining their policy orientation to capitalize on the newly politicized issues, and, if necessary, reorganizing themselves. Formal theorists analyze party competition in multi-dimensional policy spaces in

abstract terms (that is, in the tradition of Downs, 1957; McKelvey, 1976) and comparative political scientists empirically distinguish the policy orientation of parties by using the ideological scaling of 'left' and 'right' so as to explore the consequence of party competition (that is, in the tradition of Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976). However, these approaches have fallen short of exploring the competitive dynamics of party reorganization, along with changes in their sizes and policies. This may be attributed to the absence of empirical cases that stimulate scholarly thinking based on the analyzable data.

The recent Japanese case is a quite rare example of party reorganization among stable democracies. Since 1993, the frequent alteration of governing coalitions has replaced the stable one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that remained in power for 38 years. The LDP was ousted from power for one year but, after the non-LDP coalition government enacted electoral and political financial control reforms, it returned to office in 1994, allying with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had been its major opposition rival. Since then, the LDP has been in office and, since November 1996, has dominated the premiership. Despite a conservative return to power, Japanese party politics has taken on a new look. There has been a recurrent series of mergers, splits, formations, and extinctions of parties, as well as frequent switching between parties by Diet members.

The ups and downs of the LDP *vis-à-vis* the major opposition party have formed a keynote of this apparently complicated transformation. The LDP was invincible, and other parties were in perennial opposition to it from 1955 to 1993. The LDP's spontaneous breakup in 1993 triggered the tilting of the balance of power among parties and underlay the transformation. The so-called 1955 system was abruptly ended, and the LDP had to face a major opposition party that had the potential to assume the reigns of government. Since 1993, the emergence of a major opposition party that is ready for the transfer of power has distinguished the politics of party coalitions from the preceding 38-year-long conservative dominance of the LDP.

The LDP has tried to remain in office, seeking new allies and changing coalition partners frequently since 1994. Observing its struggle for stable rule, one plausible explanation is: the LDP has accommodated its policy positions to changing public demands when facing the major opposition's contest for an office. Examining this possibility, the analysis will identify the major dimensions that constitute the space of policy competition among parties, focusing especially on the plural LDP and the major opposition parties – first, the JSP (later becoming the Social Democratic Party [SDP]),¹ the NFP, and, finally, the DPJ. Using expert survey data on party positions obtained after the general elections in 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005, the results of regression and factor analyses demonstrate the following points. First, the realignment and reorganization of the existing and newly formed parties contributed to transforming

¹ To avoid confusion, the study will henceforth use the name, SDP, including in figures and tables.

and reorganizing the space of policy competition among parties. Second, parties tried to shift and change their positions so that they would be more successful in coalition formation.

Policy competition in coalition politics in Japan

Since 1993, the emergence of a major opposition party that is ready for the transfer of power has distinguished the politics of party coalitions from the preceding 38-year-long conservative dominance of the LDP. Since 1994, the LDP has remained the core party in a governing coalition and has continued to ally with the CGP since 1999. However, the LDP's rule has been far from stable. The non-LDP coalition parties merged into the New Frontier Party (NFP) in 1994, but the NFP broke up in 1997. Since then, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was formed in 1996 as the second largest among opposition parties, has transformed itself into a major competitor for office. The DPJ survived the 1996 general election immediately after its formation, accepted switchers from the vanished NFP, and won 30–40 additional seats in the 2000 and 2003 general elections. In the 2003 general elections, the DPJ won 177 seats, whereas the LDP won 237 out of 480 seats. In the 2005 general election, the LDP won 296 seats at the expense of other parties, including the DPJ, whose seats were reduced to 113. However, this was only a brief interruption. The LDP's landslide coincidentally resulted from Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi's political maneuvering.² After Koizumi's retirement as a winner, the LDP suffered the loss of a large number of seats in the House of Councilors elections in 2007 that ushered in the disgraceful resignation of Shinzo Abe, an heir-apparent to Koizumi, who was replaced immediately by Yasuo Fukuda.

Governing coalitions have frequently changed among minimal winning, (single) minority, and surplus majority coalitions (Table 1). The LDP's minority status in the House of Councilors (HC) is one reason for instability, but the incessant reorganization of parties that accompanied the party switching of legislators has forced the LDP to seek new coalition partners. The extensive transformation of parties and party switching occurred in both the House of Representatives (HR) and HC (Kato and Yamamoto, forthcoming). A non-LDP coalition government enacted the HR electoral reform that has changed the former medium-sized district system (MDS) with a single-non-transferable-vote (SNTV) into a mixed system of a single-member district (SMD) and proportional representation (PR).

The new system, adopted after the 1996 general election, has changed electoral incentives among legislators as well as influenced the subsequent power balance among parties, but this is not the reason for all the changes. The resulting balance of power may

² Koizumi, standing squarely against a majority of his own party, insisted on immediate privatization reform and dashed cold water on his intraparty opponents by pressing for the dissolution of the Diet. The entire LDP jumped on the bandwagon as Koizumi's straightforward approach gained public support during the electoral campaign.

Table 1 *Changes of coalition government from 1996 to 2005 in Japan*

Term	Cabinet	Coalition	the House of Representatives	the House of Councilors
1993.8.9–1994.4.28(263 days)	Hosokawa			
1993.8.9–1994.4.28	Hosokawa	SDP·JRP·CGP·JNP·DSP·NPH·SDL·DRL(8)	minimal winning coalition	minimal winning coalition
1994.4.28–1994.6.30(64 days)	Hata			
1994.4.28–1994.6.30	Hata	JRP·CGP·JNP·DSP·LP(5) NPH(as noncabinet ally)	minority coalition	minority coalition
1994.6.30–1996.1.11(561 days)	Murayama			
1994.6.30–1995.8.8	Murayama	LDP·SDP·NPH(3)	surplus majority coalition	minimal winning coalition
1995.8.8–1996.1.11	Murayama(Reshuffled)	LDP·SDP·NPH(3)	surplus majority coalition	surplus majority coalition
1996.1.11–1998.7.30(932 days)	Hasimoto			
1996.1.11–1996.11.7	Hasimoto I	LDP·SDP·NPH(3)	surplus majority coalition	surplus majority coalition
1996.11.7–1998.7.30	Hasimoto II	LDP(1) JSP·NPH(as noncabinet ally→98.6 dissolution of the coalition partnership)	single minority government	single minority government
1998.7.30–2000.4.5(616 days)	Obuchi			
1998.7.30–1999.1.14	Obuchi	LDP(1)	single majority government	single minority government
1999.1.14–1999.10.5	Obuchi(Reshuffled)	LDP·LP(2)	surplus majority coalition	minority coalition
1999.10.5–2000.4.5	Obuchi(Reshuffled)	LDP·LP·CGP(3)	surplus majority coalition	surplus majority coalition
2000.4.5–2001.4.26(387 days)	Mori			
2000.4.5–2000.7.4	Mori I	LDP·CGP·CP(02.12 dissoluiton of CP→NCP)(3)	surplus majority coalition	surplus majority coalition
2000.7.4–2001.4.26	Mori II	LDP·CGP·CP(3)	surplus majority coalition	minimal winning coalition
2001.4.26–2006.9.26(1980 days)	Koizumi			
2001.4.26–2003.11.19	Koizumi I	LDP·CGP·CP(3)	surplus majority coalition	minimal winning coalition
2003.11.19–2005.9.21	Koizumi II	LDP·CGP(2)	minimal winning coalition	minimal winning coalition
2005.9.21–2006.9.26	Koizumi III	LDP·CGP(2)	surplus majority coalition	minimal winning coalition
2006. 9.26–	Abe			
2006.9.26–2007.8.28	Abe I	LDP·CGP(2)	surplus majority coalition	minimal winning coalition
2007.8.28–2007.9.26	Abe I (Reshuffled)	LDP·CGP(2)	surplus majority coalition	minority coalition

Note. JCP: Japan Communist Party, SDP: Social Democratic Party, DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan, NPH: New Party Harbinger (Sakigake), Sun: The Sun Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, NFP: New Frontier Party, CGP: Clean Government Party (Komeito), CP: Conservative Party, LP: Liberal Party, NCP: New Conservative Party, Nippon: New Party Nippon, Daichi: New Party Daichi, PNP: People's New Party

plausibly influence the behavior of legislators as well as parties in party competition that takes place in policy space. For example, the DPJ's persistent competence, compared with the NFP's ephemeral life, has been quite unexpected. The DPJ, had ideologically distinct intraparty groups and thus faced the recurrent crisis of split while the NFP, which had been formed by the former non-LDP coalition parties, was considered as more competent *vis-à-vis* the LDP than the DPJ. Figure 1, representing changes in distribution of seats between the LDP and the second largest party, illustrates the process by which the NFP was abruptly disbanded three years after its formation and was replaced by the DPJ, which has been increasing in size. In addition to gains in votes and seats in all elections except the one in 2005, Kato and Yamamoto (forthcoming) explain that the DPJ benefited from office-seeking switching by legislators during most of the periods from 1998 to 2005. The middle-of-the road position in policies has made the DPJ more successful than the NFP in competing with the LDP and attracting policy-seeking switchers. Building on this prior work, we will try to explore the dynamics of policy competition by analyzing relative policy positions of competing parties.

Expert survey data

The expert survey is already an established method used to identify party positions across countries for comparison and has been used by many scholars (Castle and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Laver and Benoit, 2005; Benoit and Laver, 2006; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). Among a variety of methods used to identify the policy positions of political actors (for example, see Laver (ed.), 2001), the expert survey of party policy positions is certainly useful for comparative studies as well as studies of coalition politics. Political scientists as experts scale the policies and ideological positions of parties in each country to compare their positions with those in other countries. The differences in party systems are taken into account and standardized for comparison in the sense that political scientists are assumed to know the party politics of other countries and then scale the parties in a specific country.³

Our method is the same as the one Benoit and Laver (2006) used, which was built on the one by Laver and Hunt (1992). For the analysis of international data, we have obtained the data from 'Expert Survey Results from 47 countries from 2003 to 2004' (<http://www.politics.tcd.ie/ppmd/>). We have also used the Japanese data obtained from the expert surveys from 1996 to 2005 (<http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~katoj/> from which their summary statistics are available). Unlike a one-shot survey in other countries, the Japanese data consist of four rounds of surveys conducted (within three months) after the general elections of 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005, respectively.⁴ For the survey,

³ For the limitation and merit of the expert survey method, see Budge (2000) and Mair (2001).

⁴ Experts were required to respond to mailed questionnaires. The survey questionnaires were sent to a group of members of the Japanese Political Science Association who defined their specialization in any of the following categories: Japanese studies, Japanese contemporary politics, public administration, political institutions, policy studies, interest group politics, party politics, electoral systems, and electoral politics.




Figure 1 Changes in distribution of seats among parties in Japanese House of Representatives, 1993–2005
Note: Adopted and modified from Figure 1 in Kato and Yamamoto (forthcoming).

despite the extensive party changes that are rare among industrial democracies, parties are selected by the same conditions specified by Benoit and Laver (2006). All the parties that gained at least one seat or 1% of the valid votes cast in the nearest preceding election are included in the survey, in addition to the ones that experts consider important regardless of the specified conditions. For example, in the 1996 survey, Sun, a new party formed after the election by defectors from other parties, was included as important. Experts were required to answer party positions on ten policy dimensions as well as from a left–right ideological dimension. Each dimension was scaled from 1 to 20. The most leftist (scaled 1) and rightist (scaled 20) positions are conventionally distinguished so that we can examine how and to what extent party positioning in the policy dimensions corresponds with the ideological positions (see Appendix 1). An implicit assumption here is that the ideological dimension is not comprehensive enough to cover all policy differences, and thus positions are also estimated separately on policy dimensions. Here, nine policy dimensions that were consistently used in the four surveys are included in the analysis.⁵

Regression analysis

The purpose of regression analysis here is to explore the relationship between the left–right ideology and individual policies. While not all policy differences are reduced to ideological positioning, the left–right ideology is most important when judging each party's policy orientation, which constitutes the criterion for partisan competition. Alternatively, a policy difference, which is correlated with the ideological difference, more often determines the result of partisan competition. Table 2 shows the results of five OLS regression analyses in which parties' ideological positions are explained by their policy positions using individual-level data. The data on ideological positions are standardized, whereas those on policy positions are not. Therefore, in this analysis, a regression coefficient is estimated as larger if party positioning on the policy dimension to be analyzed has a larger variance. In Tables 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), party positioning is, respectively, not weighted, weighted by vote, and weighted by seat. Almost the same policy dimensions have statistically significant coefficients in the same year, regardless of regressions (a), (b), or (c). In other words, regardless of weighting by vote or seat, the same policy dimensions better predict parties' ideological positions in the same year. Statistically significant coefficients are found for different policy dimensions from one election year to the next. This implies that the policy dimensions relevant for predicting parties' ideological positions differ from year to

⁵ In the 1996 and 2000 surveys, citizen's rights dimension was included instead of the dimension on immigration policy that was in the 2003 and 2005 surveys. We have conducted the analysis using ten policies in Kato and Kannon (2008), but the results of the regression and factor analyses are principally the same as those here. However, the results of the factor analysis can be interpreted more clearly with nine consistent policy dimensions; thus we exclude the two dimensions that are not included throughout the period. Two dimensions have relatively high-level of correlation with environment and social policy dimensions throughout the periods (see <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~katoj/>).

Table 2 *Result of regression 1996–2005*

(a) No Weight

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
spending v. taxes	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.05 *	0.03
deregulation	0.03	0.02	0.14 **	0.03	0.14 **	0.04	0.11 **	0.04
deficit bonds	0.04 *	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.04
social	0.07 *	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.13 **	0.03	0.03	0.03
environment	0.07	0.04	0.07 *	0.04	0.14 **	0.05	0.14 **	0.05
decentralisation	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04
US affairs	0.20 **	0.03	0.18 **	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.37 **	0.05
defence policy	0.39 ***	0.04	0.45 ***	0.05	0.36 ***	0.06	0.30 ***	0.05
national identity	0.25 **	0.03	0.16 **	0.04	0.16 **	0.03	0.11 **	0.03
Intercept	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.64
R2	0.87		0.87		0.86		0.81	
Adjusted R2	0.87		0.87		0.85		0.80	
Number	433		375		300		318	

(b) Vote

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
spending v. taxes	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02
deregulation	0.03	0.02	0.14 **	0.03	0.15 **	0.03	0.16 **	0.04
deficit bonds	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03
social	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.19 **	0.03	0.02	0.03
environment	0.05	0.04	0.07 *	0.04	0.28 **	0.04	0.22 **	0.04
decentralisation	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.03
US affairs	0.18 **	0.04	0.18 **	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.36 **	0.04
defence policy	0.42 ***	0.04	0.45 ***	0.05	0.38 ***	0.05	0.23 ***	0.04
national identity	0.28 **	0.04	0.16 **	0.04	0.15 **	0.03	0.10 **	0.03
Intercept	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.58
R2	0.89		0.87		0.82		0.84	
Adjusted R2	0.89		0.87		0.82		0.84	
Number	373		375		300		318	

(c) Seat

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
spending v. taxes	0.02	0.02	-0.06 *	0.03	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.02
deregulation	0.03	0.02	0.15 **	0.03	0.15 **	0.03	0.15 **	0.04
deficit bonds	0.03	0.02	-0.05	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03
social	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.27 **	0.03	0.02	0.02
environment	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.33 **	0.04	0.29 **	0.04
decentralisation	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.03
US affairs	0.15 **	0.04	0.11 *	0.04	-0.05	0.04	0.34 **	0.04
defence policy	0.45 ***	0.04	0.43 ***	0.05	0.37 ***	0.05	0.24 ***	0.03
national identity	0.28 **	0.04	0.26 **	0.05	0.11 **	0.03	0.09 **	0.03
Intercept	0.00	0.52	0.00 **	0.57	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.64
R2	0.84		0.77		0.76		0.80	
Adjusted R2	0.83		0.77		0.76		0.79	
Number	373		375		300		318	

Table 2 Continued

(d) Dummy

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
JCP dummy	-0.29 ***	0.66	-0.28 ***	0.71	-0.10 ***	0.45	-0.23 ***	0.80
SDP dummy	-0.11 ***	0.50	-0.19 ***	0.65	not included	not included	-0.19 ***	0.76
DPJ dummy	-0.10 ***	0.39	-0.16 ***	0.49	0.09 *	0.64	-0.11 **	0.60
NPH dummy	-0.05 *	0.36	—	—	—	—	—	—
CGP dummy	—	—	-0.04	0.46	0.11 **	0.63	-0.09 **	0.59
Sun dummy	not included	not included	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nippon dummy	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.01	0.59
Daichi dummy	—	—	—	—	—	—	not included	not included
PNP dummy	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.04	0.59
LDP dummy	0.03	0.33	-0.09 ***	0.37	0.13 *	0.84	-0.06	0.62
NFP dummy	0.09 ***	0.32	—	—	—	—	—	—
LP dummy	—	—	0.05	0.40	—	—	—	—
CP dummy	—	—	not included	not included	—	—	—	—
NCP dummy	—	—	—	—	0.16 **	0.86	—	—
spending v. taxes	0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.05 *	0.03
deregulation	0.01	0.02	0.10 ***	0.03	0.10 **	0.04	0.10 **	0.04
deficit bonds	0.05 **	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.04
social	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.13 ***	0.04	0.01	0.03
environment	0.09 *	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.14 ***	0.04	0.12 **	0.04
decentralisation	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03
US affairs	0.09 *	0.04	0.13 **	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.33 ***	0.05
defence policy	0.31 ***	0.04	0.28 ***	0.05	0.31 ***	0.06	0.21 ***	0.05
national identity	0.15 ***	0.03	0.17 **	0.04	0.12 ***	0.03	0.05	0.03
Intercept	0.00 ***	0.82	0.00 ***	0.90	0.00	0.59	0.00 ***	0.98
R2	0.89		0.90		0.87		0.84	
Adjusted R2	0.89		0.89		0.86		0.83	
Number	433		375		300		318	

(e) Two Major Parties

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
spending v. taxes	-0.01	0.03	-0.12 *	0.05	-0.06	0.04	-0.04	0.05
deregulation	0.07	0.04	0.11	0.06	0.13 *	0.06	0.20 **	0.09
deficit bonds	0.03	0.03	-0.12	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.06
social	0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.08	0.31 **	0.05	-0.01	0.05
environment	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.37 **	0.07	0.26 **	0.08
decentralisation	-0.06	0.04	0.22 *	0.07	-0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.07
US affairs	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.09	-0.08	0.07	0.31 **	0.09
defence policy	0.55 ***	0.08	0.24 *	0.09	0.34 ***	0.08	0.27 ***	0.08
national identity	0.14	0.09	0.35 **	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.11	0.06
Intercept	0.00 *	1.97	0.00 **	1.35	0.00	1.20	0.00	1.52
R2	0.48		0.71		0.72		0.75	
Adjusted R2	0.44		0.68		0.70		0.72	
Number	128		109		107		85	

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). Among the parties except the ones at the both ends of the left-right dimension, the one with the lowest share of votes in each election is not assigned a party dummy. JCP: Japan Communist Party, SDP: Social Democratic Party, DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan, NPH: New Party Harbinger (Sakigake), Sun: The Sun Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, NFP: New Frontier Party, CGP: Clean Government Party (Komeito), CP: Conservative Party, LP: Liberal Party, NCP: New Conservative Party, Nippon: New Party Nippon, Daichi: New Party Daichi, PNP: People's New Party.

year. However, the chronological pattern of change is almost the same, regardless of regressions (a), (b), or (c) and thus regardless of different ways of weighting. We will interpret the results of same year regressions (regardless of weighting) and then the results of regressions by weighting (regardless of the timing).

Among the economic policy dimensions, only the dimension that contrasts opposition and support for *deregulation* has a statistically significant coefficient in nearly all regressions since 2000. There are only two exceptions to this. One is the dimension that contrasts parties' lenient and conservative attitudes toward *deficit bonds*, which has a statistically significant coefficient in the regression with no weight (a) in 1996. The other is the dimension that contrasts more or less *spending and taxes*, which has a statistically significant coefficient in the regressions with no weight (a) in 2005 and weighted by seat (c) in 2000.

Second, the policy dimensions that relate to international and security affairs have statistically significant coefficients across regressions in all years except the dimension for *US affairs* in 2003. All the regressions in all years have statistically significant coefficients for policy dimensions that contrast opposition and support for active *defense policy* as well as less and more respect for the emperor for *national identity*.

Third, in all regressions (a), (b), and (c) in 2003, both dimensions on *environment* and *social* policies have statistically significant coefficients. The *environment* policy dimension also has a statistically significant coefficient in all regressions since 2000 except the one weighted by seat (c) in 2000.

The regression results for international comparison are presented in Appendix 2(a), where all policy dimensions are included in each of nine industrial democracies. In Japan, the dimension of *spending and taxes* rarely has a statistically significant coefficient, which is in sharp contrast with other industrial democracies, where *spending and taxes* have been most important for the left–right ideological distinction.

The *deficit bonds* dimension was added to the Japanese survey questions, based on the above observation. In Table 2(a), the *deficit bonds* coefficient is statistically significant in the regression for 1996. However, since 2000, the coefficients have been statistically insignificant in predicting an ideological position.

The results of these analyses are simple and straightforward and are thus considered robust. In terms of economic policies, for example, *deregulation* has distinguished well the left-right positions of parties. In sharp contrast to the importance of *deregulation*, the issue of *spending and taxes* was not predicting party positions. The implications of the analyses are consistent with our observations about Japanese politics since the 1990s.

Until the early 1990s, the LDP, as the single incumbent party, often promoted tax increases to solve budget deficits and, at the same time, tried to repress the issuance of deficit bonds. The second largest party and a perennial opposition party, the DSP, supported tax cuts in spite of the party's leftist ideology. During the prolonged recession, the LDP was forced to accept the issuance of deficit bonds, which was counter to its fiscal conservatism. The DPJ became more critical of deficit finance, which was counter to its more moderate and centrist orientation toward increased public spending. In a nutshell, no party could afford to clearly state its position on the size of public sector – the left could not push high spending without reservations, but the conservative camp could advocate a small public sector only if there was fiscal solvency. This result reflects a

budget stalemate, that is a stalemate in the debate over fiscal orientation among parties in the 2000s. The debt-ridden national budget and the massive, accumulated debt constituted the horns of the dilemma. In contrast, *deregulation*, which predicted the ideological position of parties, has been increasingly important since the early 1990s in identifying their economic policy orientation. Support for deregulation was observed among parties that gave priority to swift recovery from the economic slump and to the restructuring of the economic system. Opposition to *deregulation* was advocated by parties that were more concerned with increased income inequality during the prolonged recession.

Although economic policies do not necessarily predict the left–right ideological positions of parties, the foreign and security policies do. Among them, the coefficient of *US affairs* is smaller and its level of statistical significance is lower than those of the *defense policy* and *national identity* issues, except in 2005 when the security relationship with the United States, more specifically the Iraq issue, was politicized. This result is consistent with the fact that the conservative mainstream of the LDP has traditionally held a pro-US attitude in international security but that an anti-US orientation in international security has been observed in the leftist camp. It is harder to distinguish the left and right positions by *US affairs* than other foreign and security policies.

More politicized policies that discriminate party positions predict better the ideological positions of parties in both economic and foreign and security policies. This result implies that the left–right ideological difference has been an important element in distinguishing party positions and thus in understanding the dynamics of their competition.

The results of regressions weighted with no weight and by vote and seat (Tables 2(a), (b), and (c)) also have a very interesting implication if compared with those in other democracies (Appendix 2 (a), (b), and (c)). This comparison tells us to what extent and in what way the electoral systems as well as election results influence policy differences among parties in Japan. In the case of Japan, the regression model without weight has almost the same level of adjusted R^2 as the one weighted by seat, but the one weighted by vote tends to have a smaller adjusted R^2 . This means that the model weighted by seat has a lower level of explanatory power than the ones without weight and weighted by vote. Among other countries, only the United Kingdom and Australia (that have a single-member-district system [SMD]) have a lower level of adjusted R^2 in the regression weighted by seat than the one weighted by vote. This plausibly implies that a distribution of votes may not be reflected in one of the seats when considering the impact of each party's weight when defining policy differences in terms of the left–right ideology. In the Japanese case, the weight by vote tends to be more underrepresented than the weight by seat.

Observing the election systems in Japan, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the election systems do not necessarily matter. The United Kingdom adopts a system of single-non-transferable vote (SNTV), whereas Australia employs transferable votes. A significant difference in adjusted R^2 is, however, absent in the US case, which has the

same system as the United Kingdom, that is the SMD with SNTV. In addition, the significant difference is not observed in the case of New Zealand, which employs the same mixed system as Japan. While the election systems do not necessarily matter, the proportionality of votes in allocation of seats may explain a cross-national difference. European countries with a proportional representation (PR) system (such as Sweden, Germany, and Italy) do not observe a gap in adjusted R^2 between the regressions that are weighted by seat and vote. Among the countries with the mixed system of the SMD and PR, proportionality is higher in New Zealand than in Japan and this contrast appears to be consistent with the low level of predictive power of policy positions in the regressions weighted by vote than that by seat. In Japan, the mixed system has a lower proportionality than the medium-sized district system (MSD) that preceded it. The New Zealand electoral reform has contributed to increasing proportionality (Gallagher 1998).

Table 2(d) and Appendix 2(d) show the results of regressions for the Japanese chronological data as well as an international comparison that includes party dummies among independent variables. The inclusion of these dummies in the analysis makes little difference to the estimated coefficients, but it does increase the level of adjusted R^2 . The estimation of coefficients is influenced by the assignment of party dummies, that is by which party is excluded from the dummies. We can confirm that the party label has nothing to add to the prediction of a party's ideological position, if the coefficients of all party dummies are statistically insignificant. This condition is held true only for the UK case.

In the regression – Table 2(e) – where only two major parties are included, that is the LDP and a major opposition party (the NFP in 1996 and then the DPJ), the result is different from the regression of all parties. Most notable among the differences is that the coefficient of *national identity* is statistically significant only in 2000 and the one of *US affairs* only in 2005. These results are also consistent with the empirical observations. Neither the NFP nor the DPJ distinguished its position from the LDP's in *national identity* and *US affairs* as much as other parties, such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the SDP. The low level of adjusted R^2 in 1996 corresponds to the fact that the NFP included many defectors from the LDP and was as conservative as the LDP in many policy dimensions.

In conclusion, the result of regression analyses indicates that the left–right ideology represents the party positioning of some, though not necessarily all, policies during the period of party reorganization in Japan from 1996 to 2005. However, the policy positions of parties correlated with the left–right ideology are different from one election year to the other during these periods.

Factor analysis

Specific policy positions of parties usually hinge upon their fundamental policy orientations. If so, what are such fundamental policy orientations? Is the number of scaled policy positions of parties reduced to a smaller number of dimensions that

correspond to the left–right scaling and/or to major policy cleavages that have been politicized? These questions are especially intriguing when parties are reorganizing themselves and the balance of power among them is changing. While the existing policy orientation of parties contributes to forming the dynamics of partisan competition, parties may shift or change their positions so as to give themselves advantages in the formation of governing coalitions as well as in gaining electoral support. Factor analysis is an appropriate statistical technique to answer these questions and enables one to plot party positions in policy space that serves to illustrate party policy competition in general. Here, we will especially focus on the relationship between the changing dynamics of policy space and bargaining among parties in coalition formation.

Table 3 shows the result of factor analysis by Promax rotation (oblique solution; maximum likelihood factor solution). The larger absolute value of loadings between two factors is indicated in bold. Throughout the period, Factor 1 and Factor 2 are defined, as explained below. In Table 3(a), Factor 1 principally represents a left–right ideological difference. *Deregulation*, *deficit bonds*, *US affairs*, *defense policy*, and *national identity* have larger (plus) loadings in Factor 1 throughout the period except in the year 2000 when *deregulation* and *deficit bonds* have larger (positive) loadings in Factor 2. Factor 2 represents a newly formed policy difference that has not been defined along a traditional ideological difference, and *decentralization* has apparently larger (positive) values in Factor 2 in 1996, 2003, and 2005. Again, an exception is observed in 2000 when *decentralization* has a larger absolute value of negative loading in Factor 2.

The 2000 exception can be attributed to the relative party positioning over the policy space. In 2000, all economic policies, *spending*, *taxes*, *deregulation*, and *deficit bonds*, have larger (positive) loadings in Factor 2, whereas *decentralization* has a larger (negative) loading in Factor 2 (than in Factor 1). In other words, only in 2000, does the same factor, Factor 2, influence both economic policies and *decentralization*, although in a different direction. This result implies that, in 2000, Factor 2 includes an element to explain the left–right difference in economic policies as well as one that represents a conflict over *decentralization*. More important, a negative loading of *decentralization* in Factor 2 in 2000 implies that party positions on *decentralization* are apparently the opposite of positions assumed in the left–right difference in economic policies. The peculiar orientation of the Liberal Party (LP) that existed only in 2000 might explain this puzzling result. More specifically, according to the observation of the policy-making process in 2000, the LP was more eager (and thus was frequently scaled) to promote *deregulation* (defined as right) and *decentralization* (defined as left) than the LDP because it was frequently regarded (and thus was scaled) as a more conservative party in the ideological dimension than the LDP. In distinction, the DPJ promotes *deregulation* as much as the LDP but promotes *decentralization* more than the LDP and generally tends to be scaled in a more centrist direction than both the LDP and the LP. The twist in factor loadings is observed only in 2000 when the LP was in existence. Here, party positioning is characterized by a criterion or pattern of party competition.

Table 3 Result of factor analysis

(a) No Weight, Promax

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
spending v. taxes	0.05	-0.15	0.13	0.32	0.19	0.06	0.11	-0.01
deregulation	0.81	-0.35	0.37	0.69	0.65	-0.37	0.67	-0.21
deficit bonds	0.56	-0.19	-0.04	0.50	0.17	-0.33	0.37	-0.30
social	0.28	0.71	0.82	-0.23	0.75	0.33	0.50	0.33
environment	0.39	0.66	0.87	-0.10	0.86	0.13	0.73	0.24
decentralisation	-0.38	0.81	0.37	-0.66	0.30	0.69	-0.03	0.80
US affairs	0.93	-0.04	0.82	0.17	0.95	-0.08	0.94	0.01
defence policy	0.76	0.27	0.94	0.07	0.93	-0.12	0.88	-0.01
national identity	0.83	0.16	0.92	0.09	0.71	-0.25	0.73	-0.18
Factor contribution	4.08	2.91	4.22	1.58	4.23	1.14	3.57	0.97
Inter-factor correlation	0.53		0.21		-0.20		0.06	
Number	446		375		300		319	

(b) Vote, Promax

	1996		2000		2003		2005	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
spending v. taxes	0.03	-0.18	0.04	-0.19	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.17
deregulation	0.75	-0.31	0.40	-0.65	0.74	-0.42	0.80	-0.07
deficit bonds	0.46	-0.14	-0.08	-0.48	0.27	-0.39	0.44	-0.29
social	0.14	0.79	0.68	0.41	0.37	0.54	0.40	0.30
environment	0.23	0.77	0.82	0.22	0.60	0.38	0.68	0.31
decentralisation	-0.42	0.80	0.30	0.71	-0.11	0.77	-0.18	0.98
US affairs	0.93	0.02	0.91	-0.26	0.89	0.14	0.93	0.12
defence policy	0.64	0.39	0.95	-0.04	0.91	0.07	0.78	0.13
national identity	0.79	0.24	0.97	-0.11	0.78	-0.12	0.65	-0.13
Factor contribution	3.97	3.56	3.98	1.46	3.56	1.82	3.42	1.35
Inter-factor correlation	0.64		0.15		0.35		0.09	
Number	384		375		300		319	

The Japanese result also has an interesting parallel with the one in international comparison. The dimensions of *social* and *environment* policies have larger (positive) loadings in Factor 2 in 1996, but since 2000 they have larger positive values in Factor 1. This means that both *social* and *environment* policies distinguished party positions along with the newly formed cleavage of *decentralization* in 1996, but were defined by the left–right difference. As a result, only the *decentralization* policy is associated with the newly formed policy conflict represented by Factor 2. Laver and Benoit (2006) report a

parallel shift observed in the results of a factor analysis of the data from 15 democratic countries⁶ between 1989 and the 2000s. In the 1989 expert survey by Laver and Hunt (1992), the analysis elicits factors that influenced *decentralization* and *environment* other than the one that relates to a left–right difference. However, in the 2003/04 survey by Benoit and Laver (2006), *environment* policy is associated with the same factor as the economic policies defined by a left–right difference rather than the factor associated with *decentralization*.⁷ In 15 democracies, *social* policy is also under the influence of the same factor as *environment* policy in the 2000s. The parallel change plausibly occurred in Japan between 1996 and 2000.

The factor analysis in which party positions are weighted by their seat share is presented in Table 3(b) to examine the impact of the formation and dissolution of numerous small parties during the period. Unlike the regression analysis, the results of factor analysis are almost identical regardless of whether they are weighted by vote. There is no reason to believe that larger parties influence the definition and dynamics of policy competition more than smaller parties.

Party plot over policy space

Building on the implications above, party plotting over the two-dimensional space in Figure 2 shows a dynamic change in party competition from 1996 to 2005. The coordinate axes, x and y , measure each party's average scores of Factors 1 and 2, respectively. In other words, the x -axis represents the left–right ideology distinguished by economic and foreign policies, and the y -axis represents a party's position on new issues. The results of factor analysis imply that new issues, such as *environment* and *social* policy, at the beginning of the period were assimilated with the ideological axis until 2005. Therefore, the y -axis consistently represents support for, or opposition to, policy changes in *decentralization* and *deregulation*, which we observed to have emerged from party competition, especially between the LDP and the newly formed parties in the early 1990s. In this regard, the definitions of factors are assumed to be principally the same throughout the period. Parties are plotted over rectangular coordinate axes because inter-factor correlation is generally low, although the analysis uses an oblique factor model.

The positions of the NFP in 1996 and those of the LP in 2000 are very close to the LDP. This is consistent with the observation that both parties that failed to distinguish themselves from the LDP vanished quickly. However, the relative positioning of the LDP and the DPJ has remained the same from 1996 to 2000: the DPJ has been consistently more left and more supportive of *decentralization* than the LDP. There are two interesting findings. First, despite a change in policies that contributes more

⁶ Belgium, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Northern Ireland.

⁷ As already explained, the most important economic policy in determining parties' left-right position is a fiscal policy relating to *spending and taxes* in other democracies and is *deregulation* in Japan.




Figure 2 Location of parties on the average of factor scores (without Citizens' Right and Immigration)

Note. JCP: Japan Communist Party, SDP: Social Democratic Party, DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan, NPH: New Party Harbinger (Sakigake), Sun: The Sun Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, NFP: New Frontier Party, CGP: Clean Government Party (Komeito), CP: Conservative Party, LP: Liberal Party, NCP: New Conservative Party, Nippon: New Party Nippon, Daichi: New Party Daichi, PNP: People's New Party.

to each of two factors, the parties' relative positioning remains the same throughout period. This implies that the parties' shifting in relative positions contributes to the change in factor loadings. Second, although the positions of the LDP and the DPJ differ enough to distinguish between them, they are moving closer together from 1996 to 2005. Because both parties are likely to ally with parties (from center to moderate conservative) other than the JCP and the SDP, they may try to shift their positions to

make them more attractive to potential coalition partners. In this regard, the JCP and the SDP have been alienated from policy competition among other parties.

This consequence may be attributed to their positions on new issues rather than to their leftist ideology. The expert survey data demonstrate that both leftist parties are clearly and consistently against *deregulation*, promoting protection of the *environment* and *social* rights, but are more moderate in supporting *decentralization* (<http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~katoj/>). The data are consistent with the observation that the policy-making process and plotting of parties explain the dynamics of interparty relationships during the period. In 1996, the positions of the JCP and the SDP, especially along the *y*-axis, were much closer to the DPJ. However, they shifted their positions upward along the *y*-axis to nearly the same position as the LDP in 2005. This implies that they have become less supportive of policy changes than the LDP. The result of factor analysis underscores this shift: in 2003 and 2005, the JCP and SDP party positions on *deregulation*, *environment*, and *social* policies were assimilated into the left–right ideological difference, and the *y*-axis (Factor 2) represents their attitude toward only one new issue – *decentralization* – for which their support is as low as the LDP's. Once *deregulation*, *environment*, and *social* policies have been distinguished along the left–right ideological difference and only *decentralization* represents the new policy cleavage, both the JCP and the SDP have ceased to support policy changes. Aside from their leftist ideology, the weakening of their apparent reformist orientation has made them less attractive coalition partners for other opposition parties.

Conclusion

According to the results of regression and factor analyses, from 1993 to 2005, party changes, including party switching, reorganization, and electoral change, influenced which policy differences constituted major conflicts or cleavages in party competition and, alternatively, the existing parties also shifted their positions adjusting to changing conditions for party competition. More important, the interaction with competitive conditions has proven to change the fortune of parties either for the better or for the worse. Both the LDP and the DPJ have tried to cope with the lack of stability throughout the period. The DPJ has been better at exploiting volatility in partisan competition than the LDP: it has made a successful transition from the third party to the second largest party, which may be able to compete with the LDP for office. Among other opposition parties, the JCP and the SDP have been pushed out of the coalition formation game. The two left parties have appeared more united than other parties: the JCP has experienced no switching to or from other parties and the SDP has been untouched by change since its major breakup in 1996. The JCP and the SDP have sought to ally with middle-of-the-road and/or conservative parties in vain. Consequently, the Japanese case carries two counter-intuitive implications on volatility in policy conflicts as well as party competition. First, a volatile situation does not necessarily bring disarray in party competition. Instead, it may often serve to consolidate a new competitive condition.

Second, despite frequent changes in legislative members by switching, parties may be able to capitalize on the volatility to make them better off. On the contrary, parties with more organizational stability may well be left behind and be alienated from a coalition formation. This counter-intuitive consequence results from the interaction between parties' policy position taking and the changing dynamics of party spatial competition.

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Appendix 1

Policy scales and their end-points		
<i>Policy</i>	<i>'Left' end point</i>	<i>'Right' end point</i>
Economic (Spending v. Taxes)	Promote raising taxes to increase public services	Promote cutting public services to cut taxes
Deregulation	Oppose deregulation, and delegation of power to private sector	Promote deregulation, and delegation of power to private sector
Deficit bonds	Promote public services, even if this means issuing deficit bonds	Oppose deficit bonds, even if this means cutting public services
Social	Promote policies aimed at creating greater equality for women	Oppose policies aimed at creating greater equality for women
Environment	Promote environmental protection, even if this slows economic growth	Promote economic growth, even if this damages environment
Decentralization	Promote decentralization of decision-making to local bodies	Oppose decentralization of decision-making to local bodies
US Affairs	Oppose close relationship with USA	Promote close relationship with USA
Defence policy	Promote reduced spending on defence	Promote increased spending on defence
National identity	Do not encourage increased respect for Emperor	Encourage increased respect for Emperor
Left-Right	Left	Right

Appendix 1(a): Party positions on policy scales in Japan, 1996

Policy	JCP	SDP	DP	NPH	Sun	LDP	NFP	Ave.
Economic	10.03	8.94	10.37	10.19	10.22	7.84	10.77	9.76
(Spending v. Taxes)	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.21</i>
Deregulation	5.06	8.04	13.90	14.77	14.26	11.65	14.75	11.76
	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.34</i>	<i>0.23</i>
Deficit bonds	7.54	8.51	11.62	12.10	12.10	12.12	12.57	10.95
	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.69</i>	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.21</i>
Social	4.57	5.93	6.26	8.04	12.49	14.86	13.64	9.41
	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.24</i>
Environment	5.06	6.46	7.61	8.38	12.76	14.76	14.52	9.92
	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.23</i>
Decentralization	8.74	7.58	4.99	5.39	8.24	10.69	8.06	7.68
	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.20</i>
US Affairs	3.01	8.79	13.96	14.70	16.76	18.26	17.74	13.30
	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.26</i>
Citizens' rights	4.30	5.74	4.54	6.21	11.01	13.75	11.93	8.22
	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.23</i>
Defense Policy	2.49	5.46	8.83	9.96	14.57	15.65	16.14	10.43
	<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.34</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.26</i>
National Identity	2.01	6.81	10.56	12.92	16.64	18.11	17.33	12.05
	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.29</i>
Left-Right	2.79	7.46	9.68	11.22	14.47	16.01	16.61	11.15
	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.29</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.24</i>

Note: Most left-wing position = 1; most right-wing position = 20. Standard errors are shown in italics. Responses: 72; Response rate: 28.40%

Appendix 1(b): Party positions on policy scales in Japan, 2000

Policy	JCP	SDP	DPJ	CGP	LDP	CP	LP	Ave.
Economic	8.96	9.04	10.25	8.89	8.52	11.58	13.12	10.04
(Spending v. Taxes)	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.79</i>	<i>0.23</i>
Deregulation	5.54	6.65	13.14	9.68	10.29	12.60	16.37	10.60
	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.25</i>
Deficit bonds	8.71	8.19	12.90	6.69	6.69	8.53	13.53	9.32
	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.24</i>
Social	4.54	3.00	4.96	8.47	12.93	12.50	11.81	8.31
	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.25</i>
Environment	5.40	4.94	7.44	9.66	14.99	13.68	13.97	9.98
	<i>0.34</i>	<i>0.34</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.24</i>
Decentralization	8.61	7.60	4.04	9.16	11.61	10.16	6.03	8.16
	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.58</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.22</i>
US Affairs	3.22	6.51	13.33	13.20	17.78	16.59	16.08	12.36
	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.29</i>
Citizens' rights	4.88	4.09	3.83	9.25	14.21	12.27	9.97	8.36
	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.25</i>
Defense Policy	2.34	2.95	8.84	10.53	15.98	15.81	17.16	10.49
	<i>0.21</i>	<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.34</i>	<i>0.31</i>
National Identity	2.25	4.57	10.26	9.09	17.70	17.13	16.81	11.12
	<i>0.22</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.51</i>	<i>0.25</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.32</i>
Left-Right	2.98	5.24	9.53	11.91	15.08	15.89	16.89	11.07
	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.32</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.27</i>

Note: Most left-wing position = 1; most right-wing position = 20. Standard errors are shown in italics. Responses: 60; Response rate: 17.00%

Appendix 1(c): Party positions on policy scales in Japan, 2003

Policy	JCP	SDP	DPJ	CGP	LDP	NCP	Ave.
Economic	8.74	8.86	10.61	9.46	10.14	11.74	9.87
(Spending v. Taxes)	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.78</i>	<i>0.26</i>
Deregulation	3.79	5.53	12.71	10.16	12.95	13.58	9.67
	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.29</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.27</i>
Deficit bonds	7.45	7.64	11.86	8.98	9.54	10.67	9.32
	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>0.76</i>	<i>0.25</i>
Social	8.66	6.93	8.89	12.88	15.77	16.26	11.42
	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.51</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.29</i>
Environment	5.34	5.47	10.26	10.71	15.02	14.60	10.10
	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.27</i>
Decentralization	10.36	8.76	5.03	9.43	10.57	10.32	9.04
	<i>0.68</i>	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.25</i>
Immigration	7.73	6.50	8.50	11.04	14.37	15.26	10.44
	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.27</i>
US Affairs	1.55	3.05	10.67	12.19	17.40	16.96	10.10
	<i>0.14</i>	<i>0.29</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.37</i>
Defense Policy	2.12	2.88	11.57	11.23	17.00	17.04	10.10
	<i>0.23</i>	<i>0.29</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.36</i>
National Identity	3.98	7.37	14.43	12.49	17.67	17.04	12.03
	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.66</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.35</i>
Left-Right	3.10	5.12	11.59	12.22	15.81	16.71	10.58
	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.37</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.31</i>
Sympathetic/Close to Respondent	13.98	11.61	8.91	15.98	11.64	14.59	12.71
	<i>0.81</i>	<i>0.89</i>	<i>0.58</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.91</i>	<i>0.91</i>	<i>0.35</i>

Note: Most left-wing position = 1; most right-wing position = 20. Standard errors are shown in italics. Responses: 58; Response rate: 16.52%

Appendix 1(d): Party positions on policy scales in Japan, 2005

Policy	JCP	SDP	DPJ	CGP	Nippon Daichi	PNP	LDP	Ave.
Economic	8.85	8.91	10.26	9.63	9.95	9.13	11.38	9.67
(Spending v. Taxes)	<i>0.83</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.64</i>	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.24</i>
Deregulation	3.30	5.28	12.38	11.72	10.71	9.46	10.29	9.85
	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.64</i>	<i>0.81</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.49</i>
Deficit bonds	6.91	7.22	12.72	9.61	9.08	8.38	8.85	9.40
	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.82</i>
Social	8.87	6.96	9.45	12.49	11.48	13.18	14.51	11.29
	<i>0.69</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.79</i>	<i>0.77</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>0.69</i>
Environment	5.48	5.38	9.74	10.23	9.30	11.62	12.80	9.80
	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.73</i>	<i>0.74</i>	<i>0.67</i>	<i>0.58</i>
Decentralization	10.53	9.21	5.47	8.93	8.35	9.13	10.58	8.28
	<i>0.81</i>	<i>0.66</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.74</i>	<i>0.78</i>	<i>0.68</i>	<i>0.69</i>
Immigration	7.13	6.09	9.85	10.93	10.90	11.45	13.85	10.49
	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>0.64</i>	<i>0.65</i>	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>0.65</i>	<i>0.65</i>
US Affairs	1.90	3.13	11.63	12.30	10.88	12.30	14.59	10.42
	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.44</i>	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.41</i>
Defense Policy	2.62	3.33	12.57	11.48	11.73	13.92	14.63	17.04
	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.51</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.57</i>	<i>0.43</i>
National Identity	3.83	6.91	14.13	12.61	14.18	15.10	15.88	16.62
	<i>0.58</i>	<i>0.77</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>0.66</i>	<i>0.67</i>	<i>0.68</i>
Left-Right	2.90	4.43	11.65	12.38	12.95	14.28	15.86	16.33
	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.74</i>	<i>0.56</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.43</i>
Sympathetic/Close to Respondent	15.03	11.22	8.97	15.03	13.03	13.87	14.19	11.78
	<i>0.89</i>	<i>0.94</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.82</i>	<i>0.78</i>	<i>0.81</i>	<i>1.04</i>

Note: Most left-wing position = 1; most right-wing position = 20. Standard errors are shown in Responses: 48; Response rate: 12.94%

Abbreviations: JCP: Japan Communist Party, SDP: Social Democratic Party, DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan, NPH: New Party Harbinger (Sakigake), Sun: The Sun Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, NFP: New Frontier Party, CGP: Clean Government Party (Komeito), CP: Conservative Party, LP: Liberal Party, NCP: New Conservative Party, Nippon: New Party Nippon, Daichi: New Party Daichi, PNP: People's New Party.

Appendix 2(a): *No weight*

Country Year of election	Japan 2003		United States 2002		Sweden 2002		Canada 2000		Germany 2002		United Kingdom 2001		Italy 2001		Australia 2001		New Zealand 2002		
	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	
Spending v. Taxes	-0.04	0.03	0.20 ***	0.04	0.33 ***	0.04	0.38 ***	0.04	0.42 ***	0.03	0.19 **	0.05	0.25 ***	0.05	0.31 *	0.15	0.47 ***	0.08	—
Social	0.12 **	0.04	0.33 ***	0.04	0.21 ***	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.29 ***	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.21 ***	0.03	—	—	—	—	—
Environment	0.13 **	0.05	0.20 ***	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.17 ***	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.22 ***	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.36 **	0.11	0.08	0.04	—
Decentralization	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.07 *	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.07	0.00	0.04	—
EU:Peacekeeping	—	—	—	—	-0.10 **	0.03	—	—	0.07 *	0.03	-0.04	0.04	-0.09 **	0.03	—	—	—	—	—
Immigration	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.07 **	0.02	0.35 ***	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.41 ***	0.04	0.27 **	0.08	0.08 **	0.03	—
Northern Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.03	0.04	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deregulation	0.16 ***	0.04	0.14 ***	0.04	0.32 ***	0.04	0.23 ***	0.04	—	—	0.32 ***	0.05	0.08 *	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.20 *	0.08	—
EU:Accountability	—	—	—	—	-0.06 **	0.02	—	—	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.04	—	—	—	—	—
EU:Authority	—	—	—	—	-0.08 *	0.03	—	—	0.07 *	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.01	0.04	—	—	—	—	—
Health Care	—	—	0.10 *	0.04	—	—	0.03	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.05	0.10	0.18 **	0.05	—
US Affairs	0.18 *	0.06	-0.01	0.02	—	—	-0.09 **	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.03	0.08	-0.06	0.03	—
Quebec	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.03	0.01	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deficit bonds	0.00	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Defence policy	0.28 ***	0.06	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
National identity	0.15 ***	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Intercept	0.00	0.53	0.00 ***	0.53	0.00 ***	0.71	0.00 **	0.60	0.00	0.57	0.00 **	0.46	0.00	0.57	0.00	1.86	0.00	0.70	—
R ²	0.86		0.92		0.89		0.91		0.76		0.83		0.83		0.78		0.94		—
Adjusted R ²	0.86		0.91		0.89		0.90		0.75		0.82		0.82		0.76		0.93		—
Number	296		309		356		465		439		171		417		67		116		—

Appendix 2(b): Vote

Country Year of election	Japan 2003		United States 2002		Sweden 2002		Canada 2000		Germany 2002		United Kingdom 2001		Italy 2001		Australia 2001		New Zealand 2002	
	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE	Standardized	SE
Spending v. Taxes	-0.05 *	0.02	0.20 ***	0.04	0.42 ***	0.04	0.36 ***	0.03	0.41 ***	0.03	0.21 **	0.05	0.20 ***	0.04	0.42	0.19	0.51 ***	0.09
Social	0.19 ***	0.03	0.33 ***	0.04	0.19 ***	0.03	0.13 **	0.03	0.36 ***	0.03	0.18 *	0.06	0.16 ***	0.03	—	—	—	—
Environment	0.27 ***	0.04	0.20 ***	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.11 ***	0.03	0.18 ***	0.03	0.20 ***	0.05	0.13 ***	0.04	0.15	0.12	0.02	0.05
Decentralization	-0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.12 ***	0.02	-0.06	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.09	0.03	0.04
EU:Peacekeeping	—	—	—	—	-0.08 **	0.03	—	—	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.05 *	0.02	—	—	—	—
Immigration	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.10 ***	0.02	0.13 **	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.41 ***	0.04	0.16	0.08	0.09 *	0.04
Northern Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.05	0.04	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deregulation	0.17 ***	0.03	0.14 ***	0.04	0.26 ***	0.04	0.24 ***	0.04	—	—	0.27 ***	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.35 *	0.12	0.14	0.08
EU:Accountability	—	—	—	—	-0.10 ***	0.02	—	—	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.13 **	0.04	—	—	—	—
EU:Authority	—	—	—	—	-0.06	0.03	—	—	-0.07 *	0.03	0.14	0.06	-0.03	0.04	—	—	—	—
Health Care	—	—	0.10 *	0.04	—	—	0.02	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.12	0.12	0.20 ***	0.04
US Affairs	0.11	0.05	-0.01	0.02	—	—	-0.06 *	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.03	0.09	-0.12 **	0.03
Quebec	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.07 **	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deficit bonds	0.01	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Defence policy	0.27 ***	0.05	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
National identity	0.13 **	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Intercept	0.00	0.52	0.00 ***	0.53	0.00 ***	0.74	0.00 **	0.61	0.00 ***	0.46	0.00 ***	0.64	0.00	0.47	0.00	2.28	0.00 **	0.70
R2	0.84		0.92		0.86		0.88		0.74		0.80		0.84		0.72		0.90	
Adjusted R2	0.84		0.92		0.86		0.88		0.73		0.79		0.83		0.68		0.90	
Number	296		309		356		465		411		171		417		67		116	

Appendix 2(c): Seat

Country Year of election	Japan 2003		United States 2002		Sweden 2002		Canada 2000		Germany 2002		United Kingdom 2001		Italy 2001		Australia 2001		New Zealand 2002	
	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d	standardize	d
	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE
Spending v. Taxes	-0.05	0.02	0.20 ***	0.04	0.42 ***	0.04	0.34 ***	0.03	0.38 ***	0.03	0.18 *	0.06	0.14 **	0.04	0.13	0.30	0.51 ***	0.10
Social	0.28 ***	0.03	0.33 ***	0.04	0.19 ***	0.03	0.14 **	0.04	0.38 ***	0.03	0.20 *	0.06	0.21 ***	0.03	—	—	—	—
Environment	0.33 ***	0.04	0.20 ***	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.11 **	0.03	0.21 ***	0.03	0.21 ***	0.05	0.17 ***	0.04	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.05
Decentralization	-0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.13 ***	0.03	-0.09	0.05	0.05 *	0.03	-0.13	0.13	0.04	0.04
EU/Peacekeeping	—	—	—	—	-0.08 **	0.03	—	—	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.03	—	—	—	—
Immigration	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.11 ***	0.03	0.12 *	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.35 ***	0.04	0.09	0.12	0.09 *	0.04
Northern Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.09	0.04	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deregulation	0.17 ***	0.03	0.14 ***	0.04	0.26 ***	0.04	0.23 ***	0.04	—	—	0.31 ***	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.32 **	0.16	0.14	0.09
EU/Accountability	—	—	—	—	-0.10 ***	0.02	—	—	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.14 **	0.04	—	—	—	—
EU/Authority	—	—	—	—	-0.06	0.03	—	—	-0.07 *	0.03	0.12	0.06	0.03	0.05	—	—	—	—
Health Care	—	—	0.10 *	0.04	—	—	0.02	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.12	0.18	0.20 ***	0.05
US Affairs	0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.02	—	—	-0.07 *	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.04	0.14	-0.12 **	0.03
Quebec	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.09 ***	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deficit bonds	0.01	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Defence policy	0.27 ***	0.05	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
National identity	0.09 **	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Intercept	0.00	0.57	0.00 ***	0.53	0.00 ***	0.74	0.00 ***	0.64	0.00 ***	0.48	0.00 ***	0.73	0.00	0.47	0.00	3.73	0.00 **	0.74
R2	0.79		0.92		0.86		0.85		0.73		0.75		0.84		0.70		0.90	
Adjusted R2	0.78		0.92		0.86		0.85		0.72		0.74		0.84		0.63		0.89	
Number	296		309		356		434		364		171		360		37		103	

Appendix 2(d): Dummy

Country	Japan 2003		Sweden 2002		Canada 2000		Germany 2002		United Kingdom 2001		Italy 2001		Australia 2001		New Zealand 2002	
Year of election	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE	Standardized coefficient	SE
d1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.22 ***	0.56	—	—	—	—
d2	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.43 ***	0.85	—	—	-0.17 ***	0.92	—	—	—	—
d3	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.75 ***	0.73	—	—	-0.12 ***	0.53	—	—	-0.10 **	0.55
d4	-0.10 ***	0.44	-0.17 ***	0.39	-0.01	0.37	-0.69 ***	0.81	—	—	-0.07 **	0.44	-0.07	1.08	-0.10 *	0.62
d5	not included	not included	not included	not included	not included	not included	-0.68 ***	0.67	-0.07	0.64	0.00	0.46	not included	not included	not included	not included
d6	0.00 *	0.64	-0.03 *	0.54	0.04	0.42	-0.39 ***	0.76	not included	not included	not included	0.52	not included	0.16 *	1.20	0.06
d7	0.11 **	0.62	0.14 ***	0.45	0.13 ***	0.36	-0.45 ***	0.55	0.12	0.65	0.04 *	0.52	0.47 ***	1.33	0.07	0.79
d8	0.12 *	0.83	0.10 *	0.68	0.12 **	0.48	-0.07 ***	0.63	0.04	0.68	0.13 ***	0.59	0.37 **	1.67	0.06	0.82
d9	0.15 **	0.84	0.24 ***	0.67	0.17 ***	0.65	-0.03	0.60	0.06	1.07	0.15 ***	0.50	0.54 ***	1.56	0.15 *	0.92
d10	—	—	0.20 ***	0.76	—	—	not included	not included	—	—	0.18 ***	0.58	—	—	0.23 **	1.20
d11	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.02	0.60	—	—	0.23 ***	0.71	—	—	—	—
d12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.32 ***	0.56	—	—	—	—
d13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.26 ***	0.74	—	—	—	—
spending v. taxes	-0.04	0.03	0.20 ***	0.04	0.33 ***	0.04	0.18 ***	0.03	0.17 **	0.05	0.18 ***	0.04	0.28 *	0.12	0.35 ***	0.09
social	0.11 **	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.12 **	0.04	0.16 *	0.06	0.05	0.03	—	—	—
environment	0.13 ***	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.12 ***	0.03	0.08 *	0.03	0.26 ***	0.06	0.06 *	0.03	-0.09	0.12	0.03	0.04
decentralisation	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	0.04
EU.peaskeeping	—	—	-0.09 *	0.03	0.09 ***	0.02	0.02	0.09 *	0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	—	—	—
immigration	0.06	0.04	—	—	—	—	0.02	0.09 *	0.03	0.04	0.12 **	0.04	0.11	0.07	0.08 *	0.04
notthem/land	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.03	0.04	—	—	—	—	—	—
deregulation	0.11 **	0.04	0.21 ***	0.04	0.19 ***	0.04	—	0.21 **	0.06	-0.02	0.03	0.30 *	0.11	0.10	0.08	—
EU.accountability	—	—	-0.01	0.02	—	—	-0.01	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.03	—	—	—	—
EU.authority	—	—	-0.08 *	0.03	—	—	-0.03	0.03	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.04	—	—	—	—
health care	—	—	—	—	0.02	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.07	0.11	0.13 *	0.05
US affairs	0.09	0.06	—	—	-0.06	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.04	0.07	-0.03	0.03
quebec	—	—	—	—	0.02	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
deficit bonds	0.01	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
defence policy	0.24 ***	0.06	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
rational identity	0.11 **	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Intercept	0.00	0.53	0.00 ***	0.78	0.00 *	0.70	0.00 ***	0.96	0.00	0.91	0.00 ***	0.61	0.00	1.81	0.00 ***	0.93
R2	0.87		0.91		0.91		0.90		0.84		0.91		0.88		0.95	
Adjusted R2	0.87		0.91		0.91		0.90		0.83		0.91		0.85		0.94	
Number	296		356		465		439		171		417		67		119	

<Note> Each of d1 - d12 shows party dummy. The name of each dummy is as below.

Japan : d4; Japan Communist Party, d5; Social Democratic Party, d6; Democratic Party of Japan, d7; Clean Government Party, d8; Liberal Democratic Party, d9; New Conservative Party. **Sweden** : d4; Vansterpartiet, d5; Miljopartiet de Grona, d6; Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet, d7; Centerpartiet, d8; Folkpartiet Liberalerna, d9; kristdemokraterna. **Canada** : d4; Green party of Canada, d5; New Democratic Party, d6; Bloc Quebecois, d7; Liberal Party of Canada, d8; Progressive Conservative of Canada, d9; Canadian Alliance. **Germany** : d2; German Communist Party d3; Party of Democratic Socialism d4; Green Party,d5; Social Democratic Party of Germany, d6; Free Democratic Party, d7; Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, d8; Partei Rachtsstaatfcher Offensive, d9; Republicans, d10; German People’ s Union, d11; National Democratic Party. **United Kingdom** : d1; Plaid Cymru, d2; Scottish National Party, d3; Liberal Democrats, d4; Labour Party, d5; Conservative Party. **Italy** : d1; Rifondazione Comunista,d2; Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, d3; federazione dei Verdi, d4; Democaratici di Sinistra, d5; La Margarita, d6; socialisti democratici italiani, d7; Lista di Pietro Italia del Valori, d8; Lista Pannella Italiani, d9; Union di Centro, d10; Forza Italia, d11; Lega Nord, d12; Alleanza Nazionale, d13; Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore. **Australia** : d4; Australian Greens, d5; Australian Democrats, d6; Australian Labor Party, d7; National Party of Australia, d8; Liberal Party of Australia, d9; Pauline Hanson’ s One Nation. **New Zealand** :d3; Alliance, d4; Green Party of Aotearoa, d5; Jim Anderton’ s Progressive Coalition, d6; New Zealand Labour Party, d7; New Zealand First Party, d8; United Future New Zealand, d9; New Zealand National Party, d10; ACT New Zealand.