

of immigration, surplus labor and poverty, slum creation, land speculation, and capitalist property relations as managed by Bombay's civil and criminal elites. The classic lyrics of a famed 1950s film song, "yeh hai Bumbai, meri jaan," were truly bittersweet.

Has Bombay's cosmopolitanism been meaningful for the majority of its citizens? Has it perhaps been more so for the political and academic classes than the working poor whose sweating toil inspires Sandeep Pendse? Roshan Shahani comments that the Bombay of Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* is not territory but "an imagined topos" wherein Saleem's "misreading and misrepresentation" is an analogue to the variety of ways that Bombay could be perceived. Shahani speaks of "the unrepresentative quality of a 'typical' Bombay experience" (*Mosaic*, pp. 104–5). Perhaps Bombay really was Mayapuri? Gerard Heuze offers a pragmatic suggestion: the city has been constantly expanding, relatively few have been truly "rooted" and thus there was no equivalent in Bombay to those special feelings of particularism identified by Nita Kumar as "*Banarsipan*." Part of the mission of Shiv Sena is to create boundaries and stability.

Cosmopolitanism in the Bombay context may have been a source of stimulation to some, to others a root of unease. If many migrants to Bombay came to escape rustic restraints upon the imagination, far more were driven by economic necessity; having escaped the "idiocy of village life," they were trapped in the idiocy of the city. Their story remains to be told.

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*Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India, 1819–1835.* International Library of Historical Studies, volume 1. By DOUGLAS M. PEERS. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995. xii, 289 pp. \$59.50 (cloth).

Douglas M. Peers's book is a welcome addition to the recent corpus of historical literature that attempts to establish the centrality of the military in British colonialism in India. Peers makes a strong case for the primacy of the colonial armies in the English East Company's rise to political supremacy, and views its rule as a "garrison state." He argues that the characteristic feature of the Company's political culture was "Anglo-Indian militarism." According to Peers, Anglo-Indian militarism derived from the British assumption that Indian society was inherently militarized, and regional elites derived their power through coercion. British officials were of the view that Company rule could achieve political stability only if it established its monopoly over the means of coercion. Peers argues that the militaristic ideology was further reinforced by the British identification of certain external and internal threats to their rule which could be best tackled militarily: threats from Russia, Nepal, Sikhs, Marathas, the Pindaris. Finally, the British drive to legitimize their rule through the creation of an "empire of opinion" in which Indians had to be persuaded to understand the futility of resistance entailed that colonial invincibility be created by the appearance of military strength.

Peers brings out the political implications of setting up a colonial "garrison state." He shows that its foremost ramification was the tension created between the civil and the military officialdom of the Empire. This was manifested also in the strained

relationship between the Company and its Court of Directors in London. The latter viewed the overtly militarized colonial polity as a threat to its authority structure. Peers argues that these problems notwithstanding, the “garrison state” continued to expand its military resources throughout the early phase of the nineteenth century.

Peers is of the view that Anglo-Indian militarism was most threatened in the 1820s (the age of reforms), particularly with the arrival of Lord William Bentinck as Governor General. In this age of military and financial cuts, Bentinck pressed for major reforms in the composition and distribution of the army. But Peers shows that despite Bentinck’s zeal to push for reforms which would change the face of British colonialism, he did not institute a complete break with the tradition of Anglo-Indian militarism. In fact, Bentinck conceded to the argument that the British had to maintain sufficiently strong forces to maintain their position in India because colonial rule was not sufficiently moored in Indian society. Peers argues that despite the winds of change in the 1820s and the 1830s, Anglo-Indian militarism maintained its dominant position within colonial society. It remained an important ideological meeting point of divergent views for the Conservatives, Orientalists, and the liberal imperialists.

The book is based primarily on an exhaustive reading of a wide range of private papers of nineteenth-century governors-general and policymakers. These, along with the Company’s official correspondence compiled in the proceedings of its Home, Foreign, and Political departments, have been analyzed by the author convincingly to substantiate his argument. The dexterous use of this plethora of fascinating material makes the book a scholarly work of high quality and an essential reading for an understanding of both the imperial ideologies that informed the Company rule as well as the details of its politico-administrative functioning.

However, it is rather surprising that a book which makes a strong plea for the centrality of the military in colonial studies has made only a casual use of the military consultations of the Company and the proceedings of its Military Department. The rich military source exists for all the three presidencies and the records start from as early as 1770. Also conspicuous by their absence are the Secret Military Consultations of the Company and the wide range of proceedings of its Revenue and Judicial departments, which are replete with details of the military-civil interface in the early nineteenth century.

At one level, the discussion on military matters in the judicial and revenue consultations of the Company validates Peers’s argument about the centrality of the military in the political evolution of the Company. But at another level, such records question Peers’s basic assumption about the militarized colonial state and indigenous society pitted antagonistically against each other. They reflect the variety of ways in which the Company army was used as a forum to mediate between regional elites and negotiate with the local people, so that by the early nineteenth century the military began to encompass within its ambit the social and cultural domains of a variety of social groups.

This image of the army embracing indigenous society is in contrast to Peers’s understanding of an invincible military sustaining an awesome colonial state. Thus the military, judicial, and revenue records of the Company question the book’s basic assumption about the gnawing gap between a “garrison state” and a society which Peers argues sustained Anglo-Indian militarism. Surely then, the reasons for the British interest in Anglo-Indian militarism need more complex explorations.

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