

## Anti-Semitism in Poland: survey results and a qualitative study of Catholic communities

Marek Kucia\*, Marta Duch-Dyngosz and Mateusz Magierowski

*Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland*

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After first outlining the notion of anti-Semitism, the predominant survey method used for researching it, and the history of the presence and the current (near) absence of Jews in Poland, this article gives the results of different surveys of various kinds of anti-Semitism in this country, including the authors' own, and discusses the findings of their qualitative study – focus group interviews with members of three different Catholic communities from three different cities. The qualitative study confirmed the hypothesis that imagined and stereotypical rather than real Jews are the objects of modern anti-Semitism in Poland, while real historical and stereotypically perceived Jews are the objects of its religious and post-Holocaust variants. The roots of religious anti-Semitism lie in the not entirely absorbed teachings of the Catholic Church on the Jewish deicide charge. Religious anti-Semitism supports modern and post-Holocaust kinds of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism is rooted in poor education, lack of interest in the Jewish history of Poland, lack of inter-group contact, and persisting stereotypes of Jews. Among the various Catholic communities of Poles, there are considerable differences in attitudes to Jews. The qualitative study also revealed a methodological deficiency in the standard survey questions intended to measure anti-Semitism, which are sometimes understood as questions about facts rather than about opinions.

**Keywords:** anti-Semitism; Jews; Poland; Catholic Church; surveys; group interviews

### Introduction

#### *Anti-Semitism: the notion and research*

Anti-Semitism is one of those notions that have many definitions, none of which everyone accepts, yet there is broad agreement on what the term encompasses. Generally, anti-Semitism means hostility to or prejudice against Jews (Oxford Dictionaries 2012). The governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies that deal with anti-Semitism define it as a (mis)perception of prejudice against, hostility to, hatred towards, and rhetorical and physical acts against Jews or those regarded as Jews and/or their property, institutions and facilities.<sup>1</sup> In psychology, and also sociology, anti-Semitism is understood as anti-Jewish hostility, which may result and has often resulted in prejudice, discrimination and hatred, which in turn may lead and has often led to anti-Jewish acts, particularly the Holocaust (cf. APA [2005] 2007). In social research (mainly in surveys), anti-Semitism is operationalized as agreement with or expression of opinions

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\*Corresponding author. Email: [marek.kucia@uj.edu.pl](mailto:marek.kucia@uj.edu.pl)

that are considered anti-Semitic and characteristic of various kinds of anti-Semitism (Smith 1993; Simon and Schaler 2007; ADL 2009; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). Thus, the statement “Jews are responsible for the death of Christ” is used to measure the presence of *religious anti-Semitism (anti-Judaism)* with its central “charge of deicide” that was part of the Church’s teaching from its early times until the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) (Flannery [1965] 1985; *Nostra Aetate* 1965). The opinions “Jews in our country have too much influence,” “Jews have too much power in the business world,” and the like serve to assess the extent of *modern anti-Semitism* that involves a belief in Jewish undesired and often secret omnipotence (Arendt [1951] 1958). The statements “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era” or “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust” are used to account for what might be called *post-Holocaust anti-Semitism*. The sentence “Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians” is one of those used to assess what has been called *new anti-Semitism*, comprising unjustified criticism of the Jewish state (Laqueur 2006). These items used in social surveys have been subjected to methodological criticism. Most importantly, the item concerning too much Jewish power or influence was criticized for not being a pure measure of anti-Semitism, since it contains an evaluative or empirical component – whether Jews have proportionately more power/influence than their share of the population (Weil 1987, 174–175). Although social scientists also employ other methods and techniques for measuring anti-Semitism through surveys (Krumpal 2012; Sułek 2012a), the questions on agreement/disagreement with these and other statements are the widest-used in national and cross-national projects.

### ***Poland and the Jews***

Poland is unique with regard to the Jews and anti-Semitism. For centuries, as the Kingdom of Poland, the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, and under the partitions, it was home to the largest and most significant Jewish community in the world (Dubnow 1918; Weinryb 1973; Davies 1981). In Poland the Jews, who had fled medieval Western Europe due to hostility and pogroms, lived in relative peace. They mostly resided in cities and towns and occupied mainly middle positions in society, as bankers, craftsmen, doctors, managers, lawyers, and shopkeepers. With modernization, some became industrialists, while many shifted to the working class. Some assimilated (to varying degrees), while the majority retained Jewish culture and religion. The relationship between the Jews and non-Jews in old Poland and for the most part later could be characterized as “peaceful isolation” – living side by side, without conflicts, but with little knowledge of the culture of the other group, with strictly designated spheres of contact (Cała 2012, 196).

The settlement of Jews in a Christian country that after the Counter-Reformation became a stronghold of Catholicism was accompanied by a rise in religious anti-Semitism (anti-Judaism) that proved persistent. Not until much later did the Catholic Church in Poland adapt the teachings of the Second Vatican Council on the charge of deicide. Another anti-Judaic superstition – the belief in ritual murder (blood libel) – was and remains vivid, particularly among the rural population (Tokarska-Bakir 2008). Paintings representing the ritual murder can still be seen in the cathedral at Sandomierz and could be seen in the monastery in Kalwaria Zebrzydowska.

Modern (political) anti-Semitism did not arrive in (what had been) Poland from Western Europe until the late nineteenth century, after the wealthier and educated strata of Polish Jews had begun to assimilate, acculturate and integrate into (non-Jewish)

Polish society (Cała 2012). Political anti-Semitism developed particularly well among the rising Polish nationalists in the lands under the Russian partition. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed successive waves of anti-Jewish violence (pogroms) that spread into the Polish lands under Russian rule from mainland Russia. After Poland had been restored as a state in 1918, political anti-Semitism, targeted at both traditional and assimilated Jews, became a key characteristic of the rightist ethno-nationalistic parties, mainly National Democracy (*Narodowa Demokracja* or *endecja*). It was also propagated by many of the Roman Catholic clergy. Anti-Semitic sentiments and acts (e.g. discrimination in universities and professions and an economic boycott) reached its peak in Poland during the Great Depression in the 1930s.

Before the Second World War, the Republic of Poland was the country with the largest Jewish population in Europe – over 3.1 million by religious self-identification in the national census of 1931, which was almost 10% of the country's 31.9 million inhabitants, of which the Roman Catholic Poles constituted a majority of 24 million (GUS 1939, 26). At the outbreak of war in 1939, the estimated number of Jews in Poland was 3.3–3.5 million (Stankowski and Weiser 2011, 15), which remained almost 10% of the estimated 35.3 million of the country's population (GUS 1939, 10). During the war 2.7–3.0 million Polish Jews, that is 77–91%, perished, mostly in the death camps, concentration camps, labour camps and ghettos that Nazi Germany established and operated in the occupied country, but also in executions by the Germans in or near the places where they lived as well as in mass or individual murders or due to denunciation by the Catholic Poles.<sup>2</sup> The ghetto in Poland's capital city of Warsaw and the death camps in Treblinka, Bełżec, Sobibór, and Kulmhof (Chełmno nad Nerem) as well as the concentration and death camps in Auschwitz and Lublin-Majdanek became the largest annihilation sites of the Polish Jews. The town of Jedwabne is the (in)famous (and not the only) site where Polish Jews were murdered by their Polish Catholic neighbours (Gross 2001). But murdering or denouncing were not the only acts of Poles towards the Jews during the war. The attitudes of the (non-Jewish) Poles towards the Jews during the Holocaust varied between being perpetrators or accomplices, through hostile, unfriendly, indifferent or compassionate bystanders, to rescuers – unintended or intended, unwilling or willing, paid or bona fide, occasional or long-lasting (cf. Datner 1968; Kłosowska 1988).<sup>3</sup> The non-Jewish Poles (mainly ethnic Poles, but also pre-war Polish citizens of other ethnicities), whose attitudes to the Jews were varied, complex and changing over time, were also victims of Nazi Germany and, at the beginning and end of the war, of the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> Their loss is estimated at 2.77 million at the hands of the Germans and 150,000 at the hands of the Soviets, that is 9%; with 2.7–2.9 million Polish Jews, that is 77–88%, this puts the total loss of Poland's citizens at 5.6–5.8 million, that is almost 16% of the country's entire pre-war population (Materski and Szarota 2009, 9).<sup>5</sup>

The death camps, concentration camps, labour camps and ghettos in German-occupied Poland were also where most of the Jews from other European countries were deported to and where nearly all of them lost their lives. Thus Poland became the country where the Holocaust largely took place, with its most notorious site and symbol – Auschwitz.

Shortly after the war, in 1946, the number of Jews in Poland (within its new boundaries) was about 216,000, based on registration with Jewish organizations (Stankowski and Weiser 2011, 36), which was less than 1% of the country's population. This was the highest number and proportion of Jews in Poland in its post-war history. In the post-war period, mostly in the late 1940s, but also in the late 1950s and late 1960s/early 1970s, the vast majority of the remaining Polish Jews, Jews-Poles, Jewish Poles, and Poles of Jewish descent (however they identified themselves) left the country

(Berendt 2006; Gawron 2011). A major reason for these emigrations was persisting Polish anti-Semitism that was epitomized by (a) the Kielce pogrom of 1946 (Szaynok 1992; Gross 2006); (b) the stereotype of *żydokomuna* (Judeo-communism) that blamed the Jews for advocating communism, collaborating with the Soviets, and introducing and running the communist system in Poland, particularly the oppressive secret police “UB” (Blatman 1997); and (c) the “anti-Zionist” campaign of 1967–1968 by the Polish communist authorities (Stola 2005). In the 1970s and early 1980s the word “Jews” disappeared from the public discourse (except during the “Solidarity” revolution of 1980–1981, when the workers and intelligentsia, interested in discovering the history suppressed by the communist authorities, began discussing the Polish–Jewish relations) and anti-Semitism was non-visible in the public domain. Since the late 1980s, Polish–Jewish relations and anti-Semitism have become public issues again. The causes of this were the revival of public interest in Jewish history and culture in Poland, the debates on the presence of the Carmelite convent at the former Auschwitz camp in 1984–1992 (Rittner and Roth 1991; Klein 2001) and Jan Błoński’s essay on the attitudes of Poles towards Jews during the Holocaust in 1987–1988 (Błoński 1987; Polonsky 1990) as well as the related later debates on the cross(es) at Auschwitz in 1998–1999 (Zubrzycki 2006) and Jan T. Gross’s books on the massacre of the Jews of Jedwabne by the local Catholic Poles (Gross 2000; Polonsky and Michlic 2003) and wartime and post-war anti-Semitism in Poland (Gross 2006, 2008, 2011; Wokół Strachu 2008). The demise of communism in Poland in 1989 and the successive development of democracy created favourable conditions for these debates. A negative consequence of democratization and the debates was the revival of anti-Semitism in Polish politics, public discourse, and public opinion, which is an odd phenomenon of “anti-Semitism without Jews” (Lendvai 1971).

Today, the number of Jews living in Poland, a nearly mono-ethnic country,<sup>6</sup> is 2000 by single ethnic self-identification in the national census in 2011, plus 5000 by multiple Polish and Jewish self-identification in this census – that is, respectively, 0.006% and 0.014% of the country’s 35.8 million population (GUS 2012, 106, 47). Jewish religious communities in Poland have over 1200 members (ZGWŻ 2012). Jewish cultural organizations have over 3000 members (GUS 2011b). Some Jewish organizations estimate that there are 30,000–40,000 Jews in Poland, that is people who are directly connected with Jewish religion or culture, and that there may be an additional 70,000–100,000 who are of Jewish descent (Historia Żydów w Polsce 2012). As for the people in Poland, only a minority of them can give a more or less accurate number of Jews living in the country today (the majority do not know or are not interested), and there is a sizable group (around 12%) who believe that there are very many Jews still living in Poland.<sup>7</sup>

### *Anti-Semitism in Poland: the survey results*<sup>8</sup>

Even though there are very few Jews, Jews-Poles, Jewish Poles or people of Jewish descent living in Poland, much of the country’s population, the vast majority of which is ethnically Polish, is reported to share anti-Semitic opinions. In cross-national surveys, Poles had the infamy of a nation whose anti-Semitism is the highest or one of the highest. Thus, in 2008 the *Group-focused Enmity in Europe (GFE Europe)* research project by Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011, 57) revealed that almost half of Poles (49.9%) agree with the statement indicative of *modern anti-Semitism* that “Jews in our country have too much influence,” which was the second highest result, following Hungary (69.2%), among the eight nations surveyed. The survey also found that almost three-quarters (72.2%) of Poles, the most of all nations surveyed, share the view

characteristic of *post-Holocaust anti-Semitism* that “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.” The highest proportion of Poles (63.3%) also agree with the statement considered indicative of *new anti-Semitism* that “Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians.” Similarly, in 2008–2009 a survey that was carried out in seven European countries for the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2009) found that 55% of Poles share the opinion expressing the *economic version of modern anti-Semitism* that “Jews have too much power in the business world,” which was the third highest score, following Hungary (67%) and Spain (56%). The ADL survey also found that 55% of Poles agree with the opinion that “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust,” which was also one of the highest results, like in Hungary (56%) and Austria (55%). The opinion expressing *religious anti-Semitism* – “The Jews are responsible for the death of Christ” proved to be shared by nearly half (48%) of Poles, the highest proportion among all nations surveyed.

Our representative survey of Poland’s population carried out in 2010, which used the items designed by the Polish sociologists Datner (1996, 1997) and Krzemiński (1996, 2004a) for their surveys of the country’s population as well as an item of our own design, gave only a slightly better picture of Poles than the cross-national surveys (Table 1).<sup>9</sup> Although the percentage of those agreeing with various anti-Semitic statements was lower than with those in the cross-national surveys, it was still high. It ranged from 16.2% for the item that in our and Krzemiński’s surveys measured religious anti-Semitism (“Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ”), through 19.2% sharing a statement that we designed as indicative of the Polish variety of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism (“Although the Holocaust – the annihilation of Jews – was a big crime, it is good that as a result there are hardly any Jews in Poland”), and 26.8%, 34.1%, 34.2% for Datner and Krzemiński’s indicators of the domestic political, economic, and media-related varieties of modern anti-Semitism (“The Jews in our country have too much influence on (a) political life, (b) economic life, (c) the press, radio and television”), to 45.2% agreeing with the statement that epitomizes the international variety of modern anti-Semitism (“Jews have too much influence in the world”).

The differences in favour of the Poles with regard to anti-Semitism between our data and the results concerning Poland from the cross-national surveys seem to have two basic reasons. First, our (and Krzemiński’s) item concerning religious anti-Semitism and our item measuring post-Holocaust anti-Semitism were phrased in different and not straightforward ways, compared to those used in the ADL surveys. Second, following Krzemiński and Datner, we probed into the modern domestic anti-Semitism in an analytical way through three items that concern specific areas, instead of asking in general whether “Jews in our country have too much influence,” as do Zick et al. Yet 16.2% of Poles agreeing with our (and Krzemiński’s) mild version of the religious anti-Semitic statement, as opposed to 48% agreeing with the ADL’s straightforward deicide statement, is still fairly high. One-fifth (19.2%) of Poles who believe that it is good that because of the Holocaust there are hardly any Jews in the country is frightening, regardless of how much this statement was softened by the phrasing of the item. The quarter (26.8%) through one-third (34.1% and 34.2%) of Poles who share the separate anti-Semitic opinions on “Jews in our country having too much influence” on the three major yet selected areas of politics, economy, and the media is fewer than one-half (49.9%) who agree with the statement concerning “too much influence” in the country in general in the *GFE Europe* survey. Yet when one realizes that in our survey 52.4% of our respondents agreed with at least one of the five statements that express modern anti-Semitism and 21.7% agreed with all five, one may say that the salience of anti-Semitic opinions



Table 1. Responses to anti-Semitic statements in Poland, 2010.

	Political life	Economic life	The press, radio, and television
<i>Do you agree with the statement that Jews in our country have too much influence on ... ?</i>			
I definitely agree	9.2	9.1	6.8
I rather agree	25.1	25.0	20.0
I rather disagree	26.7	24.9	25.9
I definitely disagree	17.9	18.2	19.5
I don't know. I am not interested	8.3	9.3	10.6
I am undecided	3.0	2.9	3.9
Difficult to say	9.8	10.7	13.3
<i>Do you agree with the opinion that Jews have too much influence in the world?</i>			
Definitely yes	13.4		
Rather yes	31.8		
Rather no	23.1		
Definitely no	10.3		
I don't know. I'm not interested	11.9		
I'm undecided. Difficult to say	9.5		
<i>Sometimes one hears the opinion that Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ. Do you agree with this opinion or not?</i>			
Yes, I definitely agree	3.0		
Yes, I rather agree	13.3		
No, I rather disagree	30.2		
No, I definitely disagree	35.0		
Difficult to say. I don't have an opinion on that	18.6		
<i>Sometimes one hears the opinion: "Although the Holocaust – the annihilation of Jews – was a big crime, it is good that as a result there are hardly any Jews in Poland." Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?</i>			
I definitely agree	3.1		
I rather agree	16.5		
I rather disagree	31.6		
I definitely disagree	36.2		
Difficult to say	12.6		

Source: Own data.

Notes: Data in %. Fieldwork by TNS OBOP, 7–10 January 2010. Random-route sample  $N = 1001$  representative of Poland's population aged over 15 years. The maximal statistical measurement error was  $\pm 3\%$  for the estimate of 95%.

in Poland as measured by our survey is very high and not lower than as detected by cross-national research.

Although anti-Semitism in Poland as measured by surveys is considerable, what is optimistic though is that it has decreased over the past years and anti-anti-Semitism (i.e. the rejection of anti-Semitic statements) has increased (Table 2). For all kinds of modern anti-Semitism (but the media-related one), the acceptance of anti-Semitic opinions in 2010 was the lowest in all surveys and the rejection of those opinions was the highest. What is also optimistic is that in 2010, for the first time since those questions were asked, there were more Poles rejecting the anti-Semitic statements than those accepting them (except for the opinion on too much influence of Jews in the world). These changes reflect a wider positive trend in Poland: surveys show that over the past years, the Poles have become increasingly positive (showing sympathy) and decreasingly negative (showing antipathy) to the Jews and (most) other national/ethnic groups (cf. Sulek 2012a, 429). Yet there remains much anti-Semitism and negative sentiment to other groups to fade away.

Table 2. Agreement/disagreement with anti-Semitic opinions in Poland, 1992–2010.

	Survey date			
	May 1992	22–27 August 1996	Autumn 2002	7–10 January 2010
Sample size ( <i>N</i> )	1011	1091	1098	949
Modern domestic political <i>The Jews in our country have too much influence on political life</i>	35/27	39/29	49/37	34/44
Modern domestic economic <i>The Jews in our country have too much influence on economic life</i>	36/25	37/30	47/38	34/43
Modern domestic media-related <i>The Jews in our country have too much influence on the press, radio and television</i>	21/32	28/34	34/47	27/45
Modern international <i>Jews have too much influence in the world</i>	55/16	–	61/20	46/33
Religious <i>Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ</i>	15/71	–	17/69	16/65
Post-Holocaust <i>Although the Holocaust – the annihilation of Jews – was a major crime, it's good that as a result there are hardly any Jews in Poland</i>				20/68

Data Sources: 1992 – Krzemiński (1996, 11, 32–33); 1996 – Datner (1997, 15); 2002 – Krzemiński after Sulek (2011, 879); 2010 – author's own.

Notes: Data in %. All samples representative of Poland's population aged over 18 years.

### ***Differences in the Catholic Church, among the Catholics, and among regions in Poland***

Given the fact that the vast majority of Poland's population adheres to Catholicism – 88% were reported to have been baptized in the Catholic Church by the end of 2010 (GUS 2011a, 133, 115), one is tempted to treat the results of national surveys as more or less representative of all Catholics in the country. Yet the Catholic Church in Poland and its adherents are highly diverse, not merely by the amount of participation in religious practices.<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, as the survey on anti-Semitism that we conducted in 2010 showed, the declared attitude to religious faith and religious practices does not differentiate too much the respondents' acceptance of anti-Semitic statements.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, our survey found huge regional disparities in this regard.<sup>12</sup> The regional differences are also noticeable in declared and factual religiosity (ISKK 2011). What, however, is more important is that the Church and the Catholics in Poland differ as to and are oftentimes divided on the understanding of Catholicism and Polishness, the vision of Church–state relations and the role of religion in society as well as their opinions on and attitudes towards the past as well as the Jews. The main division is between the adherents to the traditional, conservative and nationalistic “Closed Church” who express anti-Semitic opinions at times, on the one hand, and the people who prefer the modernist, progressive and universal stance of the “Open Church” that is also open to Catholic–Jewish and Polish–Jewish dialogue, and critical of anti-Semitism, on the other (cf. Michlic 2004; Zubrzycki 2005). The “Closed Church” is epitomized by the “media of Father Rydzyk” – “Radio Maryja”, the “Nasz Dziennik” daily, and “TV Trwam”, which were established and are directed by a

controversial monk, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. Many of the lay adherents to the “Closed Church” belong to the Families of Radio Maryja (*Rodziny Radia Maryja*) – groupings of the audience of the “media of Father Rydzyk” in various parishes. The leaders of the “Closed Church” include the President of the Conference of the Episcopate of Poland, Archbishop Józef Michalik and Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódź. The “Open Church” is championed by the progressive lay Catholic intellectuals from the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia (*Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej*) and such media as the “Tygodnik Powszechny” weekly, the “Więź” and “Znak” monthlies, and the “Znak” publishing house. Their most prominent representative is Tadeusz Mazowiecki, once the editor-in-chief of “Więź”, a key advisor to the “Solidarity” trade union and movement (1980–1981), and the first non-communist prime minister in the then Soviet bloc (1989–1991). Among the prominent lay members of the “Open Church” was Jerzy Turowicz, the founder and editor-in-chief of “Tygodnik Powszechny” and Stefan Wilkanowicz, once the editor-in-chief of the “Znak” monthly, both of whom were involved in Catholic–Jewish and Polish–Jewish dialogue. Among the episcopate, Primate Józef Kowalczyk, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek and the late Archbishop Józef Życiński were the key representatives of the “Open Church”. The Polish episcopate as a whole has been open towards the Jews and Judaism and has taken various activities to deal with anti-Semitism in the country.<sup>13</sup> Yet most individual bishops and their subordinate clergy have been reluctant to teach the lay Catholics along those lines, which does not help combat anti-Semitism and enhances the division between the “Open” and “Closed” Church (cf. Michlic 2004).

The fact of a strong diversity of the Catholic Church and Catholics in Poland and the survey results showing that, on the one hand, the attitude to religion does not differentiate (too much) the acceptance of anti-Semitic opinions, and, on the other, these perceptions vary considerably between the regions led us to research the attitudes to Jews, particularly the agreement or disagreement with various anti-Semitic statements among the Catholics in Poland through a qualitative study of the selected different Catholic communities from various regions of the country.<sup>14</sup>

### ***The qualitative study: objectives, goals, and hypotheses***

There were three objectives of our study: first, to develop a qualitative interpretation of the quantitative results of Poland’s representative surveys on anti-Semitism in the context of Catholic communities; second, to assess and account for differences in attitudes to Jews and anti-Semitism among different communities of Catholics; and third, to validate the survey questions.

As regards the first objective, we wanted to know what people mean when they say they agree or disagree with anti-Semitic statements, what their other expressions of anti-Semitism are, whom people mean when they refer to Jews, and what the roots of and relations among the various kinds of anti-Semitism are. We anticipated that when people agree with the anti-Semitic statements, they are genuinely expressing their anti-Semitic opinions, that they may also exhibit other anti-Semitic views, that when they say the “Jews”, they do not mean real ones, but imagined and stereotypical ones (socially constructed out of the available anti-Semitic stereotypes), that the anti-Semitism of present-day Poles has roots in the memory of negative experiences of Polish–Jewish relations before the war as transmitted from generation to generation, and that the various kinds of anti-Semitism are interrelated through their object of reference – the imagined or stereotypical Jew.



As for the second objective, given the differences within the Catholic Church and among Catholics in Poland, we were curious to what extent and why there exist differences in attitudes to Jews, particularly in acceptance or rejection of anti-Semitic statements among varied Catholic communities. We expected that belonging of a given community to the “Closed Church” or the “Open Church” would impact the community’s attitudes to Jews and anti-Semitism. We anticipated that a community that belongs to the “Closed Church” would be negative about Jews, would tend to agree with anti-Semitic opinions, and would even express such opinions spontaneously, whereas a community that is part of the “Open Church” would be positive about Jews and would reject anti-Semitism. As the survey research revealed regional differences in anti-Semitism in Poland, we also expected that the Catholic communities that we chose for our qualitative study in various regions of the country would have the regional characteristics in this regard. We anticipated to find out a mutual dependence in expressing or rejecting anti-Semitic opinions between the region of a community and the community’s belonging to the “Closed Church” or the “Open Church”.

Regarding the third, methodological objective, in searching for a qualitative interpretation of anti-Semitic statements among different Catholic communities, we wanted to validate the questions that are used in surveys to measure anti-Semitism. We expected that the questions would be understood as intended by their designers, that is, as manifestations of anti-Semitic views of various kinds.

## Methodology

### *Selected communities and their background*

We selected for our qualitative study three different Catholic communities characteristic of three cities in different regions of Poland: (1) the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (*Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej*) in Kraków, (2) the Radio Maryja Family (*Rodzina Radia Maryja*) in Rzeszów, and (3) the intellectuals associated with the Catholic University of Lublin and the curia of the archbishop in Lublin, the late Rev. Józef Życiński (1948–2011), who are, as the archbishop was, involved in Polish–Jewish and Catholic–Jewish dialogue.

The cities that we chose for our study are the centres of the respective regions (*województwa*). The Kraków region (*Małopolskie*) lays in southern Poland. The neighbouring Rzeszów region (*Podkarpackie*) is in the south-east of the country. The Lublin region (*Lubelskie*) borders the Rzeszów region in the north and is in eastern Poland. Two of the regions – the Rzeszów and Kraków ones – belong to the most religious in Poland, both in terms of declared religiosity and as far as the number of those who attend Sunday Mass are concerned, while the Lublin region is above Poland’s average in both respects.<sup>15</sup> Considering anti-Semitism, the Rzeszów region has the highest proportions of people in Poland agreeing with various anti-Semitic opinions, almost two or three times higher than the country’s average, while the Kraków and Lublin regions are usually below the country’s average (Table 3).

Although there exists no empirical data to prove it, one may say that the three regions would have overwhelming numbers of the adherents to the “Closed Church”. The Rzeszów region would probably be the foremost in Poland in this regard. The leader of the Church there, Archbishop Michalik, is believed to be the most pronounced representative of the “Closed Church”. The Kraków and Lublin regions, particularly within their capital cities, would probably have fairly large numbers (but not majorities) of the adherents to the “Open Church”. The Church leader of Kraków, Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz, the former private secretary to Pope John Paul II, is known as a middle-of-the-road person yet

Table 3. Anti-Semitism in Poland and in three selected regions, 2010.

	Percentage of respondents agreeing with anti-Semitic opinions			
	All Poland	Kraków region	Lublin region	Rzeszów region
Modern domestic political	34.2	30.7	31.4	58.3
Modern domestic economic	34.1	31.5	31.6	61.7
Modern domestic media-related	26.8	25.9	26.6	69.0
Modern international	45.2	48.3	34.1	81.7
One of the above	52.4	49.4	38.4	85.4
All modern	21.7	24.7	25.0	49.1
Religious	16.2	13.5	5.7	49.9
Post-Holocaust	19.6	13.7	14.6	55.1
Both, religious and post-Holocaust	8.0	5.8	5.0	30.9

Source: Own data.

the lay Catholics from the “Znak” publishing house and monthly and the “Tygodnik Powszechny” weekly are among the most prominent representatives of the “Open Church” in the country. The Archbishop of Lublin at the time when the study was done, the late Rev. Życiński, was known as the key representative of the “Open Church” in Poland. There were many adherents to the “Open Church” in his surroundings, although the city and region of Lublin – even the Catholic University of Lublin – constitute cases where the adherents to the “Closed Church” are probably in the majority.

Historically, the three regions we selected belonged to the Republic of Poland before the Second World War and had been the core of the Kingdom of Poland since its establishment in the early eleventh century. Before the war, the areas of today’s regions and their main cities were in majority inhabited by ethnic Poles but also had large Jewish populations. At present, the population of the three regions is predominantly ethnically Polish, with small minorities of Ukrainians in the Lublin and Rzeszów regions, Ruthenians (Lemkos) in the Kraków and Rzeszów regions, and Roma (Gypsies) in all three. There are hardly any Jews living in these regions, except for the city of Kraków that has a small but growing Jewish population.

In each of the three cities, we decided to select for our study one Catholic community that was the most characteristic of the local Church and the regional opinions on and attitudes to the Jews as reflected in our survey. Thus we intended to have sharply varied groups for comparison between different communities and different regions.

In Kraków, we selected members of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia because we assumed that due to the teachings of the Archbishop of Kraków Karol Wojtyła the then Pope John Paul II, and the influence of the Kraków-based progressive Catholic media – the “Tygodnik Powszechny” weekly, “Znak” monthly and “Znak” publishing house, they would constitute a community of the “Open Church” that was open towards Jews and negative towards anti-Semitism.

The Rzeszów Radio Maryja Family was selected as we expected it to be an epitome of a community of the “Closed Church”. We assumed to find in this group an especially clear and strong articulation of negative opinions about Jews, propagated by the ultra Catholic, nationalistic, xenophobic and often anti-Semitic “Radio Maryja” and other media of the controversial Father Rydzyk.

The intellectuals from Lublin associated with its Catholic University and the late Archbishop Życiński were chosen as representatives of the “Open Church”. They included a priest involved in Polish–Jewish and Catholic–Jewish dialogue and activists engaged

in the preservation of Jewish heritage and commemoration of the Holocaust from the “Grodzka Gate – Theater NN” Centre. We anticipated that the Catholic intellectuals from Lublin would exhibit an open and positive attitude to Jews. We expected them to serve as experts who would provide interpretations of the anti-Semitic beliefs and behaviour of numerous Poles.

### ***The qualitative research: methodology and conduct***

We decided to conduct our research via focus group interviews. Those were best suited to meet our research objectives and capture the social entities and processes that we wanted to study. Our qualitative research was prepared and conducted by a six-person research team from the Institute of Sociology of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków: Marek Kucia and his students. The recruitment of the groups was conducted and interviews organized by Jakub Wróblewski, who contacted the leaders of the various communities and through them obtained the agreement of other people to participate in the study.<sup>16</sup> The group interviews were moderated by M. Kucia who was assisted by Mateusz Magierowski. The transcriptions were made by: Patrycja Dewor, Marta Duch-Dyngosz and Agnieszka Michalska. The primary and final analysis was conducted by M. Kucia. The analyses were carried out and analytical reports were written (separately) by M. Duch-Dyngosz and M. Magierowski. We also wrote a report in Polish upon which this article is based.

We conducted our focus group interviews with the members of the three Catholic communities on the following days: (1) the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia in Kraków, on 31 May 2010; (2) the Radio Maryja Family in Rzeszów, on 14 June 2010; and the intellectuals in Lublin on 18 June 2010. Participants in the focus group interviews numbered: in Kraków 6 people (3 women and 3 men), in Rzeszów 9 people (5 women and 4 men), in Lublin 5 people (1 woman and 4 men). Although the number of groups and interviewees was small, it was representative of the selected communities, given their sizes and the qualitative methodology that we applied. We decided to invite people aged over 45 to participate in the interviews. We wanted it to be possible for our participants to have been told by their parents or grandparents about Polish–Jewish relations before, during, and shortly after the Second World War or, for the eldest, for it to be possible for them to have had such direct experiences themselves. We also wanted that the youngest participants to have been mature enough when Polish–Jewish relations and anti-Semitism became public issues in Poland (again) in the late 1980s, during the debates on the convent at Auschwitz and Błoński’s essay that influenced further ones – on the cross(es) at Auschwitz and Gross’s books, which shaped present-day Poles’ opinions on and attitudes towards Jews.

As a result, the participants in the interviews were aged between 48 and 77 years. The Lublin group was on average younger (dominated by those aged just under 50) than the Kraków one (mainly people aged over 60) which was younger than the Rzeszów group (people in their 60s and 70s).

The focus group interviews were conducted along a guide that included the topics and used or drew upon questions from our nationwide survey carried out in January 2010. The Kraków and Rzeszów groups were asked all questions, whereas the expert group in Lublin was requested to answer some of the questions or to comment on them. In what follows, we present and interpret the main findings of our qualitative study concerning anti-Semitism.

## The qualitative study: results and discussion

### *Liking and not liking Jews*

At the beginning of each group interview, we asked the question “Do you agree with the opinion that Poles do not like Jews?”

*The Kraków group* generally expressed an optimistic opinion that was to a degree unrealistic:

[That] is disappearing now. That doesn't exist, never did and never will.

This opinion may be interpreted as an expression of the respondents' rejection of anti-Semitism, or even as a projection of their views on the whole population. Although noble, these views were based on one-dimensional positive images of Polish–Jewish relations before the war and immediately thereafter. These images stemmed mainly from family or own experiences and presented these relations as “civil”, even if there was economic conflict, full of cooperation and manifestations of good neighbourliness and even friendship. There was, however, a fair amount of ambivalence in these images. Thus, one of the men spoke of his family experiences from before the war:

My granddad was a merchant . . . There was cooperation [with Jews]. . . He traded [with them] and at the same time boycotted [them]. ( . . . ) There was an argument ( . . . ) with an economic background.

One of the women spoke of her school friends “of another faith”, just after the war:

We were all very friendly. When we had religious instruction, they didn't take part in that. But no one teased them for that.

Only one of the participants in the Kraków interview cited a negative image of the past, speaking of the “ancient hatred toward the Jews” which he had observed in one of his friends, who, remembering the pre-war times in Kraków, had spoken of how “Jewish lawyers made things tough for Poles.”

The members of the Kraków group articulated the conviction that what they perceived as generally positive Polish–Jewish relations had deteriorated during the war and the communist era:

Up till World War II there was no issue. . . , [until] at a certain point. . . it spiraled ( . . . ) this somehow strange kind of mutual hatred.

After ( . . . ) communism had started, I was older already, I found out about anti-Semitism, but we'd never had it before.

With reference to the present, a few of the interviewees expressed the opinion “I'm sure there are Poles who don't like Jews.” One of the men presented reasons for this state of affairs, making critical remarks:

The first reason is the fact that constantly ( . . . ) Poland is flagellated for Poles not saving a larger number of Jews, ( . . . ) whereas there are marvelous testimonies, ( . . . ) [e.g.] the Ulma family.<sup>17</sup> ( . . . ) The second reason is simply that the State of Israel or certain Jewish circles or organizations, demand damages from Poland, but it is not the current Polish state that took the belongings of those communities or Jewish groups, but that was caused by the Germans and the Soviets, and they should be demanding compensation from those national groups. ( . . . ) The third reason, the main one, is the fact that, after all [throughout] the whole Stalin era ( . . . ) it was mostly Jewish circles with great power to decide on everything.

At the same time, this respondent was of the opinion that “there is no anti-Semitism as such in Poland” and “Poland is really a tolerant country.” These opinions did not sound realistic, also to some of the participants in the discussion. In response, one of the women, speaking about anti-Semitism, agreed that “indeed this phenomenon doesn't

exist,” but added: “there is something like it, unexplained.” She gave the example of a friend who had told her that she would not be going to the Jewish culture festival, and asked why, “couldn’t say”. Another participant in the Kraków interview commented on the “element of old upbringing” which he thought was now disappearing, meaning the widespread stereotype of ritual murder. Our discussant pointed to manifestations of this “old upbringing”: one from the area of primary socialization – a mother warns her children: “if you’re not good, the Jews will put you in their matzo”; and another from the practices of religious education – the catechist priest would take his pupils to the altar with an image illustrating Jews murdering Christian children, in the towns of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska or Sandomierz.<sup>18</sup> This same respondent also mentioned the “characteristic approach” towards Jews in the Polish language, and use of the derogatory diminutive “little Jews (*Żydki*), not just Jews” – an instance of what we would call anti-Semitism in language.

*The Rzeszów group* initially as a whole did not agree with the opinion that Poles do not like Jews. One of the men specified: “not all Poles don’t like Jews, and it’s not all Jews they don’t like.” The disagreement of the entire group with the opinion on Poles not liking Jews, which came to us as a surprise, may be interpreted as a defensive reaction that conceals anti-Semitism. Further comments from the members of this group confirmed this interpretation. Having stated their general positive opinion on Poles liking Jews, the interviewees themselves sincerely expressed negative emotions and feelings towards Jews and openly formulated anti-Semitic opinions. One of the men confessed to hatred towards religious Jews; an emotion which may be interpreted as resulting from not understanding the *Other*:

I just don’t understand them. Yes, I hate Jews. Just something (...) I have, if I see them at their prayer, with those sidelocks, with their identical black hats, I don’t like that about them. I don’t know why.

One woman expressed her own dislike, and that of other Poles, towards the “Polish-speakers”, that is ones those who she believed are crypto-Jews ruling Poland. This was an instance of “generalized anti-Semitism”, that is labelling as “Jews” those one dislikes – a fairly common phenomenon in Poland (cf. Gebert 1991; Krzemiński 2004a). At the same time she noted that she did not harbour negative feelings towards real and ordinary Jews:

Poles have this aversion to that, well ... maybe it’s true ... , that Jews ... In Poland there’s no true Pole-patriot who stands behind the Polish nation. Just those Polish-speakers. You hear these opinions, that they are all Jews. (...) I have nothing against the ordinary Jew, some Jew from Israel ... and that they have their religion – “elder brothers in faith”, as the Pope says ...

Another participant in the Rzeszów interview, supported by the group, claimed that Poles do not like those Jews who “harmed or betrayed the Polish nation”, meaning the alleged collaborators with the Germans – “they were in cahoots with the Germans,” the Jews working in the “NKVD” Soviet secret police – “with Russia”, “in Katyn”,<sup>19</sup> “after the war they bothered the Home Army fighters,” and in the Polish communist “UB” secret police – “in Kielce [they staged] that pogrom ...” These opinions clearly expressed the *żydokomuna* (Judeo-communism) anti-Semitic stereotype. One more of the participants in the Rzeszów interview sincerely expressed his aversion to and contempt for the Jewish “oligarchy” – “Jewish leaders”, understood as financial and political elites of world Jewry, juxtaposed by him with the respected Jewish society as a whole:



Poles don't like, and above all *I* (stress) don't like Jews. (...) Not all of them. (...) And I despise (hateful tone) this outer layer. You can place here the oligarchy, all those Jewish leaders who have . . . , are guided by their own personal interest. However in any case all right-thinking, patriotic Poles I think look with respect at this society that is often kicked around by that same oligarchy.

In no other group and in no other part of our interview were anti-Semitic views expressed stronger, more overtly, and, to our surprise, also more sincerely than in this part of the interview with the Rzeszów group.

*The Lublin group* was of the opinion that the emotional attitude of Poles towards Jews is diverse:

There are those who like them; there are those who don't; there are [also] those who claim that they're not bothered at all.

The members of this group showed how incomprehensible the phenomenon of "anti-Semitism without Jews" (Lendvai 1971) is. Thinking about the reasons for Poles' aversion towards Jews and anti-Semitism, the intellectuals from Lublin mentioned: insufficient education, lack of interest and desire to learn about the history and culture of *Others*, lack of inter-group contact, the stereotypes present in daily life. One of the respondents highlighted the problem of a lack of knowledge:

It seems to me that the main reason that they say they don't like them or don't say, and don't like them, is lack of knowledge (...) of the Jewish world, the Polish-Jewish world, knowledge of contemporary Israel . . . knowledge on the subject of the Jewish religion. [For example], what can you say here about the similarity of the Jewish religion and the Catholic religion (...) After all, in fact the same religion grew out of the same stem.

This participant expressed his conviction on the possibility of reducing, but not entirely eradicating anti-Semitism through education:

If we were to educate more, then (...) anti-Semitism (...) would be reduced to the absolute extreme margin. (...) [Because] it's hard to get rid of such a phenomenon entirely, and I don't believe in that.

Another member of the Lublin group pointed out that dislike towards Jews and anti-Semitism concerned on the one hand "stereotypical Jews", e.g. "Jews-communists" and Jews from the communist secret police *UB*, as well as "specific Jews", e.g. those visiting Poland.

### **Modern anti-Semitism**

In the group interviews in Kraków and Rzeszów, we asked the survey questions indicative of modern anti-Semitism: "Do you agree with the statement that Jews in our country have too much influence on: (a) political life, (b) economic life, (c) the press, radio and television?" and "Do you agree with the opinion that Jews have too much influence in the world?"

*The Kraków group* did not agree with the anti-Semitic opinion about the excessive influence of Jews in Poland on politics, the economy and media. This, however, was not necessarily because of the anti-Semitic character of this opinion. For at least one interviewee this was rather due to a lack of biographical data to allow him to test such an opinion:

I don't agree either, because I'd just need to know all the lineages of various such people to be able to say that.

In fact, this and other similar statements can be interpreted as an expression of latent anti-Semitic views. If this interpretation is accurate, when questions about sharing anti-Semitic views are asked in surveys, acquiring negative responses does not always mean rejection

of anti-Semitism. Thus our qualitative study revealed a methodological deficiency of the questions whether “Jews have too much influence” used in the surveys on anti-Semitism, which contrary to the intentions of the researchers are not always understood by the interviewees as questions about opinions (sharing anti-Semitic views), but are often treated as questions about facts (the number or proportion of Jews), and if so generate inadequate results.

Reasoning in a similar spirit as the interview participant quoted above, one of the respondents was inclined to agree with the view that Jews in Poland had too much influence during communism and to reject this view with reference to the present:

During the Stalin era, the Gomułka era, indeed it was awful. But today (...) I have the impression that it is talking about exaggerated ..., it's not ...

One of the women commented on the stereotypical character of anti-Semitic opinion and clearly distanced herself from it, but noted the lack of explanation of facts:

It goes around, people say that it's just Jews and masons who rule us, and no one's able to say what that is specifically ...

At the end, somebody cited the offensive and anti-Semitic label of the magazine which once defined the Kraków community, but without distancing himself from this tag, which could also mean a self-mocking acceptance of that label:

Or you call Tygodnik Powszechny “Yidovnik” (Żydownik).<sup>20</sup>

In response to the question whether “Jews have too much influence in the world,” two members of the Kraków group definitely agreed while others did not answer but seemed to agree latently, yet the interviewees again understood that they were being asked about facts rather than their opinion on a statement:

In the world, definitely [yes]. In banks, above all in banks. This is a very able nation, which has produced many great people. Yes, in philosophy, music, in other areas, in mathematics and so on, you could say. But they boss the entire finances of the world, and that's no secret.

It is worth noting that the above response, which expressed a definite agreement with the statement of modern international anti-Semitism, alongside the negative stereotype of the Jewish banker, also contains the positive stereotype of Jews as an able nation.

*The Rzeszów group* expressed anti-Semitic convictions about the omnipotence of the “Jewish oligarchy” in Poland and the world before we posed the questions indicative of modern anti-Semitism. Asked whether they agreed with the statement that “Jews in our country have too much influence on political life, economic life and the press, radio and television,” they responded decidedly in the affirmative, not to say enthusiastically, e.g.:

I don't want to be the first, but I think 100% yes. Definitely.

In response to the question “Jews, meaning who?” the participants in the Rzeszów interview responded either by identifying being a Jew with possessing power – “those who govern”, or pointing to the Jewish origins of the rulers of Poland – “Poles who have Jewish roots.” This was another instance of “generalized anti-Semitism” – labelling as “Jews” those one dislikes.

In the context of the discussion on Jewish influences in Poland, one female participant articulated the very strong conviction about the existence of a conspiracy aiming to destroy Poland “physically, psychologically, mentally, and economically too”.

When asked whether they agreed that “Jews have too much influence in the world,” the Rzeszów group expressed their anti-Semitism in unison:

Yes! Definitely! Absolutely!

Being more specific, the interviewees pointed to the influences of Jews in the USA and, especially, their omnipresence in banks:

All those banks. It's just Jews! Jew upon Jew. All of high finance, every one of those banks!

In another part of the interview (concerning religious anti-Semitism), one of the participants named Jewish omnipresence the reason for their omnipotence:

These Jews are all over the world and that's why they have an influence on the politics of the whole world.

Referring to this, another participant cited what was in his opinion an important reason for the Jewish omnipotence:

The source of everything is economic, financial affairs.

### ***Religious anti-Semitism***

All three of the Catholic communities were exposed to an opinion expressing religious anti-Semitism: "Sometimes one hears the opinion that Jews have so many problems because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ." In Kraków and Rzeszów we asked: "Do you agree with this opinion, or not?" In Lublin we asked for comments on why people in Poland share this view.

*The Kraków group* absolutely rejected the opinion expressing religious anti-Semitism:

No.

No, that's absolutely unjustified.

That's some kind of heresy!

There was the sense that the rejection of religious anti-Semitism among the members of the Kraków community resulted from their knowledge of the teachings of the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council. One of the participants expressed this explicitly:

Well, it was like that till not long ago, (...) but the Council clearly stated that it wasn't just Jews who were responsible for the death of Christ.

*The Rzeszów group* did not have such a clear and unambiguously negative opinion on religious anti-Semitism as the Kraków group. Two male participants did not agree with the opinion that the problems which Jews have had or have today, including the Holocaust (about which we asked), was God's punishment for the crucifixion of Christ:

That's not a correct view. You absolutely can't justify anything or explain it by religion. (...) One must be tolerant. Every faith makes sense.

One female participant, however, supported by others, shared the opinion of religious anti-Semitism:

And it was them that crucified Christ and said "let his blood be on us and on our children." (In the background: "and on our sons".) And it's just that that curse somehow in fact ..., they themselves foretold, "the blood on us and on our children." (...) I think that the Holocaust was in fact some kind of punishment for them.

*The Lublin group* was requested to discuss why people in Poland share the opinion of religious anti-Semitism that the problems of Jews result from a punishment from God for the crucifixion of Christ.

One of the discussants, a priest, pointed to anti-Judaism and the responsibility of the Catholic Church for propagating prejudices about Jews as perpetrators of deicide. He admitted: "That was a theological error." He stressed the role of the Second Vatican

Council and the “breakthrough” furthered by Pope John Paul II: “[the Council declaration] *Nostra Aetate* without John Paul II would have been just a piece of paper.” These developments, in his opinion, are leading to a “cleansing of memory” and yet are not reaching all Catholics.

Two other participants in the Lublin interview, lay Catholics, spoke of experiences from their youth which had changed their perception of Jews. One of them mentioned his discoveries of the similarities between the Catholic religion and Judaism and the role of education in battling stereotypes:

As soon as I became interested in Polish-Jewish relations, memory of Polish Jews, memory of [their] world, of life and of the Holocaust, from then on I also began meeting up with Jews and participating in their world . . . in certain events, which . . . come from the religious calendar. Our Christmas is the equivalent of the beautiful Hanukkah holiday. Our Easter is the equivalent of Passover, isn't it. Our Pentecost is the equivalent of Shavuot, etc. And suddenly I realized that in fact we weren't different in any way . . . Just in the way, this little detail, because we're both waiting for the Messiah, except that we believe that this Messiah was on earth two thousand years ago, but we're still waiting for Him, just as the Jews are.

Both participants also recalled their experience of the post-Vatican II teaching about the Jews, when prayers “could still be heard with expressions of the crucifixion of Christ by the Jews”, but they as altar boys were taught the song “‘Twas not nails that held You, but my sin, ‘twas not people who harmed You, but my sin.”

We also asked the Lublin group to comment on one of the findings of our nationwide survey which showed that in the Lublin region, the level of anti-Semitism, particularly religious anti-Semitism, is lower than in the two other regions of eastern Poland – the Białystok and Rzeszów regions (*Podlasie* and *Podkarpacie*), where it is the highest in the country. The priest who participated in the interview said that such results may be, from a pessimistic perspective, the result of “weaker religious awareness” in the Lublin region, and from an optimistic perspective, the result of the effects of the diocese’s Centre for Catholic–Jewish Dialogue and preparatory work among alumni of the clerical seminary in the spirit of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and John Paul II. This participant and another also stressed the role of the presence of the Catholic University of Lublin and its Faculty of Theology. The other interviewee also pointed to the fact that the university had given refuge to the students of Jewish origin expelled from state universities after 1968. Another respondent stressed the “influence of Father Archbishop Życiński”, especially the ritual introduced by him known as “lament”, when clerics and priests as well as lay Catholics go to a Jewish cemetery or the ruins of a synagogue and pray in psalms for the Jews, especially the locals, who fell victim to the Holocaust. This interviewee also spoke of the influence on the consciousness of the inhabitants of Lublin and the region of the “Grodzka Gate” association and many similar non-governmental organizations that work in various towns of the Lublin region for the remembrance of Jewish culture and of the annihilation of the local Jews. This discussant also noted the role of the museum at the former concentration and death camp in Lublin-Majdanek.

### ***Post-Holocaust anti-Semitism***

In each of the groups, we asked a question about post-Holocaust anti-Semitism: “Sometimes one hears the opinion: ‘Although the Holocaust – the annihilation of Jews – was a big crime, it is good that as a result there are hardly any Jews in Poland.’ Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?”

*The Kraków group*, specifically three of its members, did not agree with the post-Holocaust anti-Semitic view. In disagreeing, they first of all pointed to the loss borne by Poland as a result of the annihilation of its Jews:

I don't agree with that, because [I feel] that every country should be multiethnic. (...) Because every people has its worth: Pole[s], Russian[s], German[s], Jew[s].

Diversity is a value.

The slaughter of the Jews was a regressive factor for some areas of life, such as trade, (...) enterprise. (...) A gap developed which Polish society was unfortunately unable to manage. (...) The Jews were a certain model to follow.

They then commented on the inhuman character of the opinion presented to them:

I don't think that [opinion] can be treated seriously, particularly because Jews are humans and we can't say that because they perished we're happy that they perished. They are humans, and that's the key thing.

You can't say "it's good." Everything happened badly.

*The Rzeszów group*, upon hearing the question, in unison rejected the post-Holocaust anti-Semitism statement:

No, no, no, no. (many voices)

I don't agree.

I absolutely don't agree.

When asked "Why not?", they gave numerous arguments referring to humanism, universal ethics and the teachings of the Polish Pope.

A Jew is my brother, just as you are, for example.

People are made by God.

You can't wish anyone death. Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you.

They're our elder brothers in faith, as John Paul II said.

The unisonous, strong and diversely justified rejection of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism by the Rzeszów group was very surprising for us, given the overt anti-Semitic views stated earlier in that interview. This rejection may have resulted from the formulation of the question, in which the first annihilation of the Jews was defined in unambiguously negative terms – "Holocaust [...] a big crime", and then its apparently positive consequences were spoken of – "it's good that", which leads one to doubt whether the consequence was indeed positive.<sup>21</sup> The rejection of the opinion contained in the question may have been caused by wariness at its extremely inhuman character. The opposition to post-Holocaust anti-Semitism in the Rzeszów Radio Maryja Family may, however, also have resulted from their strong Catholic convictions and the positive influence of the teaching of John Paul II, quoted by the interviewees.

The negative answer of the Rzeszów group to our question indicative of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism was especially surprising for us, given that earlier in the interview the same people had unambiguously formulated opinions showing this same kind of anti-Semitism:

Poland was Jewish before the war. In Poland before the war there were I don't know how many million [Jews], but an awful lot (in the background: yes, yes). And if they hadn't just perished at Auschwitz or somewhere in those other annihilation camps, we'd still be a Jewish state.

They'd overjew us.

The latter statement contained the verb *zazydzić*, meaning "to result in taking control of an area or milieu by Jews" (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2012) and has strong



negative and derogatory connotations with regard to Jews (the word does not have counterparts for other peoples). This word, not used in the mainstream Polish today, yet often used in anti-Semitic sources, was, in our opinion, an utmost expression of anti-Semitism.

In spite of the (verbal) rejection of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism in reply to our question, the Rzeszów interviewees also expressed an array of anti-Semitic stereotypes and prejudices in their later statements:

They [i.e. Jews] can be hypocritical.

They can do a lot of bad towards Poles, and not only towards Poles.

When *the Lublin group* heard the question indicative of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism, they were outraged that such opinions could even be formulated:

It's hard to imagine that someone expressed such an opinion entirely seriously.

That's some kind of clinical example which needs to be dealt with using the appropriate therapy. (...) I think that this is a certain kind of some illness which involves ... not loving thy neighbor.

However, the oldest participant in the Lublin interview, stressing the inhuman character of the statement in question, was of the opinion that this kind of view may be shared by people who have experienced personal damage, probably from Jews or people seen to be Jews. She said:

Well, maybe somebody had some specific damage done to them and that's why they think like that (...), although for me it's inhuman.

### ***New anti-Semitism***

Although our survey did not contain questions about new anti-Semitism, in the qualitative study, we asked the members of two communities in Kraków and Rzeszów whether there exists in Poland dislike of Jews caused by a negative attitude towards the State of Israel and its policy towards Palestinians.

In *Kraków*, the majority of the group was of the opinion that there is no aversion towards Jews caused by any assessment of Israel. The interviewees argued that there is no such dislike among Poles, because the policy of Israel towards Palestinians is not important for Poland, and so Poles are hardly or not at all interested in it:

In the current situation, when (...) Europe is almost one state, (...) actually there's very little interest in society, in Poland or in other European countries, over what's happening (...). Whether commandos from Israel go in there on a ship and sort things out, or with another wall, almost like in the Warsaw ghetto, for example in Jerusalem, or something like that, I don't think that has any influence on Poland or any other state. Because I'm not there, that doesn't interest me.

This statement was surprising, not only owing to the moral indifferentism expressed, but also because it contained an analogy between the "safety wall" built by Israel and the ghetto wall erected by Nazi Germany, which may be considered an expression of new anti-Semitism. The statement was also surprising as it cited the incident with the "freedom flotilla for Gaza",<sup>22</sup> which had occurred less than a day prior to the Kraków interview and brought condemnation from the side of the international community and a wave of anti-Israeli demonstrations in various cities of Europe, as reported since the morning by the media.

Not all members of the Kraków group shared the lack of interest in the policy of Israel and moral indifferentism of their colleague quoted above. On the contrary, they expressed a critical position, although not entailing new anti-Semitism:

I personally (...) have a grievance with Israel over the way they act towards Palestinians. As if they themselves don't remember what they went through.

Similarly, citing the practices of the German occupiers was the take of another interviewee. He stated that the events in the Middle East could evoke a negative attitude towards Israel among Poles; yet he did not mention the aversion towards Jews that could result from this:

I think that there are groups [in Poland] which because of the fact that there is this Palestinian-Jewish dispute have a negative view of the State of Israel. Because for example when you observe or read how they [i.e. the Israelis] act: they demolish, right, with bulldozers, destroy, take away water or something – that can create strong opposition. After all the Germans did the same.

In Rzeszów, the group was convinced that Israel's policy towards Palestinians has “very large significance” for the fact that people in Poland do not like Jews. The interviewees were happy to declare themselves as belonging to the group that feels this way – the group of new anti-Semites.

I myself am an example of them. And I have many reservations among other things (...) towards the leadership of that country. And actually only because they destroy the Palestinian nation.

When the man quoted here said this last sentence, others echoed him, saying “They destroy Christianity.” So new anti-Semitism turned out to have a surprising and entirely illogical connection with religious anti-Semitism in the consciousness of respondents.

The member of the Rzeszów group quoted here also drew attention to Israel's connections with the USA, revealing the link between new and modern anti-Semitism:

And here there's also the connection with the United States, where that Jewish oligarchy also has a huge influence.

There was general agreement in the group with these views.

## Conclusions

Our qualitative study confirmed that it is mostly imagined and always stereotypical rather than real Jews who are the object of modern anti-Semitism, the various kinds of which are, as surveys show, so widely spread in Poland. With regard to domestic anti-Semitism in a country with hardly any Jews today, the anti-Semites construct in their imagination “Jews” who are objects of their prejudice and hatred, thus filling a void for a real object of anti-Semitism. They do so using the available anti-Semitic stereotypes, which they attribute to individuals or groups who, for the most part, neither identify themselves as Jewish nor are even of Jewish ancestry. At present, these are mostly the “Polish-speakers” ruling the country, that is, the politicians who, the anti-Semites believe, are not genuine Poles but “have Jewish roots”. In the past, following the *żydokomuna* (Judeo-communism) stereotype, they were real or imagined but always stereotypical “Jews-communists” who worked in the Soviet “NKVD” secret police or its Polish counterpart “UB”. These were also the Jews “in cahoots with the Germans” – the most absurd creation of anti-Semitic imagination. As regards international anti-Semitism, those who are the object of prejudiced opinions and negative sentiments by nearly a majority of Poles are the stereotypical Jews – the political and financial elites of world Jewry: “those who govern,” the Jewish “oligarchy” and “Jewish leaders”. They are juxtaposed with the real and ordinary Jewish people, be it in the diaspora or in Israel, who are not hated but, on the contrary, respected and even liked. As regards religious and post-Holocaust kinds of anti-Semitism,

our study found that the historical real Jews are their objects. They are, however, perceived through anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Alongside the varying objects of anti-Semitism, our study also revealed different strength and contents of anti-Semitic sentiments. The international “Jewish leaders” were not only “hated” but also “despised”, while the domestic “Polish-speakers” seemed merely “disliked”. The religious Jews were “not understood”, and, hence, probably feared rather than really “hated”. At the same time they were approached with Christian love as “our elder brothers in faith”. The Polish or Soviet “Jews-communists” were said to be “disliked”, but indeed they must be both feared and hated. The historical Jews of Poland were the object of mixed feelings, from a sentimental liking to an economically grounded hatred.

Based on our study, one may also identify the roots of anti-Semitism in Poland. Religious anti-Semitism that is shared by a small minority of Poles and met with forceful rejection by the Kraków group but a mixed response by the Rzeszów group may be attributed, as the Lublin group said, to the not entirely absorbed teachings of the Church on the charge of Jewish deicide; the teachings initiated by the Second Vatican Council and consolidated by Pope John Paul II. The evidence from Lublin, in whose region religious anti-Semitism is the lowest in Poland, shows how important for the combating of this prejudice and other kinds of anti-Semitism the teaching and activity of the local Church leader Archbishop Józef Życiński and clergy as well as the influence of NGOs dealing with Jewish heritage such as “Grodzka Gate” have been. At the same time, the evidence from Rzeszów, in whose region the levels of all kinds of anti-Semitism are the highest in the country, indicates that the persistence of religious anti-Semitism that is not dealt with by the local Church and is enhanced by Radio Maryja and related media supports modern and post-Holocaust kinds of anti-Semitism. Yet these kinds of anti-Semitism also have other roots that our study found: insufficient education, lack of interest and desire on part of many Catholics in Poland to learn about the history and culture of their Jewish *Others*, lack of inter-group contact, and the stereotypes present in daily life. What our study did not confirm, however, was the hypothesis that the anti-Semitism of present-day Poles has roots in the memory of negative experiences of Polish–Jewish relations before the war as transmitted from generation to generation. The memories of the Kraków and Rzeszów groups where we studied this issue were mixed – good and bad, often idealized or mythologized. Also, the groups were too similar in this regard. Further research will, therefore, be necessary to contradict or confirm the negative experience hypothesis.

There were two findings of our study that we did not expect as far as the roots of anti-Semitism are concerned. Both came from the interview in Rzeszów. One concerned international anti-Semitism. It turned out that the perceived Jewish omnipotence derives from the perceived Jewish omnipresence (“Jews are all over the world and that’s why they have an influence on [...] the whole world.”). This observation allows one to formulate the following hypothesis for further research: smaller nations that have lesser influence in the world would be more anti-Semitic than bigger nations with greater influence. The second finding concerned domestic anti-Semitism. Our interviewees tended to identify all those who have held or currently hold (political) power in the country as Jews, that is *Others*, aliens, not genuine and Catholic Poles like themselves. This clearly false view of Polish politicians may be interpreted through the frustration of people who did not have any influence on their country during communism and have been ruled by politicians whom they have not voted for or favoured since democracy was re-established after 1989. This observation allows one to hypothesize that the non-democratic political system

and less proportional representation in the democratic system tend to enhance domestic anti-Semitism.

As far as the relationship among the various kinds of anti-Semitism is concerned, our study confirmed that they are interrelated, irrespective of the kind of group we interviewed. The domestic and international kinds of modern anti-Semitism are related not only through their key belief in the Jews having too much influence, but also through their object – the imagined and stereotypical Jew. The religious and post-Holocaust kinds of anti-Semitism were different in this regard, as in the Polish context they refer to real, albeit historical Jews. Because one of our groups (in Rzeszów) exhibited a considerable amount of religious anti-Semitism and some post-Holocaust anti-Semitism, one may say that these historical kinds of anti-Semitism are interrelated with modern anti-Semitism. The new anti-Semitism that we found in one of our groups (in Rzeszów), although it concerns the Jewish state, happened to be connected to religious anti-Semitism (“they destroy the Palestinian nation” and “they destroy Christianity”). As “they” meant the “Jewish oligarchy” in Israel as well as in the USA, new anti-Semitism also proved to be interrelated with international modern anti-Semitism.

Our study found considerable differences among various Catholic communities of Poles in their attitudes to Jews, particularly in acceptance or rejection of anti-Semitic statements. These differences, particularly for the Rzeszów and Lublin groups, were influenced by two factors – the belonging of a group to the “Closed” or “Open” Church and the amount of anti-Semitism in a region. The Rzeszów group, recruited in the centre of the region where our survey showed the highest acceptance for anti-Semitic opinions in the country, selected to be the epitome of the “Closed Church” and expected to be negative about Jews, to agree with anti-Semitic opinions, and even to express such opinions spontaneously, did prove to be very negative about the Jews, strongly and overtly, not to say enthusiastically anti-Semitic. This was quite shocking to us as our interviewees were otherwise nice and friendly elderly men and women, with sincere Christian convictions. Yet despite their faith and in line with Radio Maryja and the other extreme nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic media of the controversial Father Rydzyk, the group expressed strong modern domestic and international anti-Semitism. Some of its members also shared religious anti-Semitism, which confirmed that the teachings of the Catholic Church rejecting the concept of Jewish deicide have not been fully absorbed in Poland. A few subscribed to new anti-Semitism as well, which seemed to be the extrapolation of modern anti-Semitism. Surprisingly, given the former anti-Semitic utterances), the Rzeszów group thoroughly rejected post-Holocaust anti-Semitism, which may be interpreted as a positive testimony of their faith and humanity.

The Lublin group, recruited in the centre of the region that has below average or the lowest levels of acceptance for anti-Semitic opinions in the country, selected to be the quintessence of the “Open Church” and about whom we were sure that it would be positive about Jews and reject anti-Semitism, did not only prove such, but turned out to be philo-Semitic. Most importantly, the interview with the group revealed the significance of the local Church leader, Church structures, and civic activism in combating anti-Semitism.

The Kraków group, who we hoped would be a representation of the “Open Church”, positive about Jews and rejecting anti-Semitism, proved to be mixed on the assessment of the amount of influence of Jews in Poland, in manifest or latent agreement with the statement that “Jews have too much influence in the world,” forcefully against religious anti-Semitism, in disagreement with post-Holocaust anti-Semitism and fairly indifferent to new anti-Semitism. Most significant was the strong rejection of religious anti-Semitism,

which indicated how thoroughly this group had internalized the teaching of the Catholic Church on that matter. In sum, however, the group was not as “open” and as fond of Jews as we expected.

Our study, namely the interview in Kraków, revealed a methodological deficiency of the standard social science method of researching anti-Semitism. The survey questions whether “Jews have too much influence in the country” proved not always to be understood as intended by researchers. Some interviewees took them as questions about facts (the number or proportion of Jews) rather than about opinions (sharing anti-Semitic views), which distorted the meaning of their positive or negative answers. Thus, our study confirmed methodological criticism by Weil (1987) who argued that the questions about too much Jewish influence are not a pure measure of anti-Semitic prejudice as they contain an evaluative or empirical component. Having found deficiencies in survey questions, we do not, however, deny the value of survey research into anti-Semitism. Since the standard questions have deficiencies, their results should be read with greater care. Those questions also should or at least could be supplemented, if not superseded, by others, such as the ones designed and used by Sułek (2012a, 438), which, as he wrote elsewhere (Sułek 2012b, 209) allow the survey method to defend itself through clarifying its outcomes.<sup>23</sup> As Sułek (2012b, 203) pointed out in reference to Weil’s argument, in the case of Poland, the questions about too much Jewish influence in the country are a pure measure of anti-Semitism given the very small number of Jews in the Polish population. Our study showed that those questions do not always measure anti-Semitism as researchers intended, but they do measure it – those who understood the questions differently displayed latent anti-Semitism. Thus, our study highlighted how much quantitative research needs qualitative research in order to make a greater sense of data. (Table 3).

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### Notes

1. According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “the word antisemitism means prejudice against or hatred of Jews” (USHMM 2012). For the Anti-Defamation League, it is “the belief or behavior hostile toward Jews” (ADL 2001). The US Department of State (2005) considers anti-Semitism to be “hatred toward Jews”. The Department’s report provided to the US Congress (US Department of State 2008) adapts the most elaborate “Working definition of Antisemitism” developed in 2005 by the European Union Monitoring Centre on



Racism and Xenophobia that since 2007 has been used by its successor, the European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights, as well as other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The definition contends: "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities" (EUMC 2005). This definition is followed by various examples of anti-Semitism.

2. Stankowski and Weiser (2011, 15, 31, 38) quote the following estimates of the demographic results of the Holocaust of the Polish Jews: at least 2.7 million perished, at least 300,000 were saved in the USSR, 80,000–120,000 survived in occupied Poland, including 30,000–60,000 in hiding among Poles, 20,000–40,000 in camps, and 10,000–15,000 in forests or with partisans. Friszke (2003, 42) gives the following estimates: 3 million Polish Jews perished (including 1.8 million in death camps, 500,000 in ghettos and labor camps, and 200,000 in executions), 400,000 were saved in the USSR, and 100,000 survived in occupied Poland. He does not account for the loss of 500,000 Jews. Żbikowski (2011) gives a conservative estimate of the Jewish survivors among the Poles and in the forests – no more than 50,000 – and believes that about 150,000–250,000 Jews must have been murdered or denounced by the Poles. On the fate of the Jews among the Poles, see Engelking and Grabowski (2011) and Sitarek, Trębacz, and Wiatr (2012).
3. Poland boasts the highest number of "Righteous Among the Nations" – the non-Jews recognized by the State of Israel for risking their lives to save the Jews during the Holocaust: 6394 of 24,811 (Yad Vashem 2013). On the other hand, the number of Poles charged and sentenced by the Polish courts for crimes against the Jews was approximately 6000–7000 (cf. Engelking and Grabowski 2011, 12). Both figures, especially the latter, underestimate the actual numbers of rescuers and perpetrators or accomplices, given the numbers of and proportion between the Jews who survived and those who lost their lives due to the Poles.
4. Nazi Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. The Soviet Union followed suit on 17 September. The two aggressors partitioned the defeated country. After the Third Reich had invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the entire pre-war Poland came under German occupation. In 1944 the Soviet troops that were progressing westwards freed Poland from the Germans, but brought oppression to the country and helped establish the communist rule.
5. Materski and Szarota (2009, 30) provide the following breakdown of the 2.77 million (non-Jewish) Polish losses at the hands of the Germans: deaths in prisons and camps – 1.146 million; direct war losses – 553,000; murdered – 506,000; deaths outside of prisons and camps – 473,000; murdered in eastern regions – 100,000; deaths in other countries – 2000.
6. In the census in 2011, people who declared themselves as Polish ethnicity constituted 96.07% of the country's population (only Polish 93.88%, Polish and other 2.19%), other than Polish 3.65%, undetermined 1.07% (GUS 2012, 105).
7. In a survey in 2002, the question "How many Jews live in Poland?" received the following answers (in %): several million – 2.5, several hundred of thousand – 9.0, several tens of thousand – 16.9, several thousand – 24.2, one-two thousand – 6.1, not interested – 26.3, don't know – 15.0 (Krzemiński 2004b, 96). The answers to the question "Do many or few Jews live in Poland?" were the following (in %): very many and many – 27.5, few – 44.9, very few – 6.2, not interested – 13.8, don't know – 7.5 (Krzemiński 2004b, 96).
8. The results quoted in this article come from the surveys conducted through personal face-to-face or telephone interviews with random samples of 1000 or more respondents representative of Poland's or other countries' populations over the age of 15 or 18 years. The maximal statistical measurement error in this kind of surveys is  $\pm 3\%$  for the estimate of 95%.
9. In our survey, the items about Jews and anti-Semitism followed the ones about the memory and meaning of Auschwitz (see Kucia 2013).
10. In our 2010 survey, out of 97% of the respondents over 15 years of age who declared themselves as believers (though not necessarily Catholic), 51% declared they practice regularly, 34% irregularly, and 12% do not practice. According to the Church's statistics, 41% of those obliged (i.e. all baptized into the Roman Catholic Church less children below seven years of age, the ill, and the elderly with limited mobility) attended the Holy Mass and 16.4% received to the Holy Communion on the Sunday the count was done in 2010 (ISKK 2010). Thus those attending the Holy Mass constituted 34% of all baptized and 29% of the entire population of the country while those receiving the Holy Communion counted 13.5% of the baptized and 12% of all Poles.

11. E.g. for the statement “Jews have too much influence in the world,” that was shared by 45.2% of the entire sample, the percentages of those agreeing with it in various categories were: regularly practising believers 47.3, irregularly practising believers 44.7, non-practising believers 38.5, and non-believers 40.7. Pearson’s chi-square = 24.100,  $p = .02$ .
12. The biggest disparity between regions (62.3 percentage points) concerned agreement with the statement “The Jews in our country have too much influence on the press, radio and television,” the smallest (35.0 percentage points) concerned the opinion “The Jews in our country have too much influence on political life.” The average disparity was 48.5 percentage points.
13. In the 1990s and early 2000s in particular, the Polish episcopate launched several initiatives that served Catholic–Jewish and Polish–Jewish dialogue and reconciliation. In 1990 the bishops issued a pastoral letter on Catholic–Jewish relations for the 25th anniversary of the *Nostra Aetate* declaration. In the letter they condemned anti-Semitism. The letter was read in all churches in Poland. In 1991 the episcopate authorized the establishment of the Polish Council of Christians and Jews – the official forum of Catholic–Jewish dialogue and cooperation. In 1994 the bishops authorized the establishment of the Institute for Catholic–Jewish Dialogue at the then Warsaw Theological Academy. In 1997 the episcopate ordered the annual celebration of the Day of Judaism in the Catholic Church in Poland to commemorate the Jewish roots of Christianity. In 2000 the Polish bishops issued the *mea culpa* pronouncement for anti-Jewish prejudices and anti-Jewish actions on the part of the members of the Roman Catholic Community in the country. In 2001 the episcopate held the penitentiary Holy Mass in the Church of All Saints Warsaw to apologize for the crimes committed by the Poles on the Jews in Jedwabne and elsewhere.
14. As in our survey, the first part of our qualitative study also concerned the memory and meaning of Auschwitz.
15. In the 2010 survey, those who declared themselves as believing and regularly practising counted 96.4% in the Rzeszów region (the country’s high), 71.8% in the Kraków region (the second most in the country), and 56.7% in the Lublin region, while the overall country’s result was 51.1%. According to the Church’s statistics, the percentage of the obliged Catholics who attended the Holy Mass on the Sunday in 2010 when the count was done was 66.8% in the Rzeszów diocese (the second highest in the country), 52.3% in the Kraków diocese (the fourth highest), and 38.3% in the Lublin diocese, while the result for all Poland was 41.0%. The respective regions include the respective dioceses but are larger units.
16. We were helped in the recruitment of the Lublin group and the organization of the interview by Rev. Dr Stanisław Fel, associate professor at the Catholic University of Lublin and director of the Institute of Sociology there, for which we offer him our special thanks.
17. Józef and Wiktoria Ulma were a Catholic Polish couple who concealed Jews in their house in the village of Markowa near Rzeszów and helped conceal others. In 1944, after denunciation, the Germans shot the Jews dead. They did likewise to the Ulmas as a punishment for concealing the Jews. The Germans also shot dead the Ulmas’ children and several other villagers.
18. In Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, the picture of ritual murder was removed in the 1960s, on demand of then Archbishop Karol Wojtyła – Pope John Paul II. In Sandomierz, the picture has not been removed, despite severe criticism from various circles, including some Church ones.
19. In 1940, near the Russian village of Katyń and elsewhere, the “NKVD” Soviet secret police shot dead about 22,000 Polish nationals, mostly army and police officers whom the Soviet Union took prisoners during the 1939 invasion of Poland.
20. The noun “żydownik” derives from the verb “żydzić”, which may be translated in this context as “to spread Jewish ideas or influence”. Cf. the verb “zażydzić” discussed further in the context of the Rzeszów interview. “Tygodnik Powszechny” was self-mocking about this anti-Semitic label, issuing a special edition titled “Żydownik Powszechny” (2010) in Polish and English, which included important articles on Polish–Jewish relations that they have published.
21. Post-Holocaust anti-Semitism is contained in the statement “It’s good that as a result of the Holocaust in Poland there are almost no Jews.” This statement is so horrifying that in constructing the question for the survey, which we later used in the group interviews, we were even scared to quote it without a certain mitigation, which thus explains the methodological error contained in the question as shown by the quantitative study.
22. On the morning of 31 May 2010, the Israeli navy halted on international waters a convoy of six ships under various flags sailing with humanitarian aid to Gaza, under an Israeli blockade. As a result of the skirmishes between the Israeli commandos and the passengers of one of the ships,

- pro-Palestinian activists from various countries, several activists were killed, and people were wounded on both sides.
23. Sulek designed three questions – two open-ended and one close-ended – that were asked one after another to samples representative of Poland’s population of more than 15 years in surveys by TNS OBOP in 2002 ( $N = 1009$ ) and 2010 ( $N = 1001$ ): (1) *What groups have too much influence on the affairs of our country?*; (2) *Does any of the national minorities living in Poland have too much influence on the affairs of our country?*; and (3) *How much influence on the affairs of our country do Jews who live in Poland have: too much, right amount, too little?* Apart from using three questions, including two open-ended, Sulek’s approach did not impose on respondents the sole opinion of “too much influence”, but asked instead about “too much or too little influence” in all three questions, and the “right amount” in the close-ended question. The results were the following: Q1 Jews (spontaneous) 2002 – 1%, 2010 – 2%; Q2 Jews (spontaneous) 2002 – 19%, 2010 – 6%; Q3 too much 2002 – 43%, 2010 – 22% (Sulek 2012a). This method (the last question) showed a lower level of anti-Semitic opinions in Poland in 2010 than our survey that used Krzemiński’s questions.

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