

In chapters 4 and 5, Lane distinguishes between the processes of governing one's self and engaging in group activities that may constitute self-government in a small group or community context. Building on the work of Berger and Luckmann (Peter F. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*, 1967), Goffman (Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, 1959), and Garfinkel (Martin Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, 1967), Lane discusses the formation of individual political skills, values, and objectives. She is influenced by Goffman's work and integrates his ideas into game theory, focusing on the interactive nature of individuals and groups in the political process.

Lane then links the work of Almond and Verba (Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, 1963) on the formation of political cultures to micro-level processes that become useful in contemporary discussions of complexity theory and game theory. Through a set of descriptions and discussions of individuals and movements, she reformulates the development of political cultures into game theory, emphasizing the complexity of these processes. Bourdieu's definition of "social capital" (Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 1990) is expanded to illustrate the complex nature of the creation of political cultures. A linkage to James Coleman's use of the social capital construct would have enriched this discussion, but Lane relies heavily on the European literature in this area.

In her concluding chapter, Lane returns to "government of the self by the self, and government of a whole by self-governed individuals" (p. 24). Going back to Berger and Luckmann's argument that everyday knowledge is socially constructed, Lane argues,

That everyone is socially constructed is central to the understanding and conduct of self-government because it links the two sides of the equation. A group's self government is broadly dependent on the capacity of its members for individual self government, and the individual's personal psychological architecture will reflect that of those who inhabit the same surrounding web. Human interaction across this lattice is not a well-defined game with clearly posted rules and standardized players, but a creative ongoing interplay in which human choice may change all of the parameters in midstream (p. 170).

This concluding discussion is especially helpful in understanding the interaction between micro-level individual behaviors and system-level consequences, as well as the cyclical influence of each on the other over time. More discussion of the parallel interactions between microeconomics and macroeconomics, however, would have provided a richer context for her argument.

Lane suggests that far too much political theory has been and continues to be rooted in institutions and organizations at the macro level. She is convinced that there is too little awareness of micro-level processes and

their importance. Some readers will agree with Lane, and others may argue that there has been and continues to be a substantial amount of work that focuses on the importance and influence of micro-level activities and processes. The significant postwar growth of survey research in the United States and most European countries provides a rich data resource for analysts and theorists to study micro-level processes. The growing field of political psychology is rooted in micro-level examinations of individual attitudes, behaviors, and engagement, and that literature supports Lane's emphasis on the importance of individual political learning and of the simultaneous constrictions generated by larger political systems and structures.

Even with the caveat that there is a good deal of micro-level work in place, Lane's admonishment to think about the formation of individual values and expectations as an interactive part of the construction and operation of macro-level groups and institutions is timely and should be considered carefully. Just as economists have learned that it is useful to understand both micro-level and macro-level economic behavior, Lane provides a timely reminder to political scientists and political theorists that we need to think about the symbiotic relationship between individual socialization and political learning as the roots of our polarizing political system and then to think about the inducements and constraints that polarization, as one example, puts on individual behaviors and choices. Lane's clear descriptions and interesting examples will provide food for thought throughout the discipline. If he could have gotten through the vocabulary of complexity theory and game theory, Tip O'Neill would have liked this book.

**Insurgent Truth: Chelsea Manning and the Politics of Outsider Truth-Telling.** By Lida Maxwell. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 224p. 99.00 cloth, 26.95 paper.

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— Candice Delmas , *Northeastern University*  
c.delmas@northeastern.edu

In 2010 Chelsea Manning leaked the largest trove of classified documents in US military history. They included the Iraq and Afghanistan War Logs, which revealed massive civilian death tolls and evidence of war crimes, and a cache of embarrassing diplomatic cables. Presenting as male and gender nonconforming while serving in the army, Manning transitioned in prison where she served 7 years of her 35-year sentence before being pardoned. Officials, reporters, and even her lawyers used Manning's gender dysphoria to question her decision to leak. Meanwhile, according to Manning herself (in interviews), and to most of her sympathizers, the two were simply not connected: Manning just happened to be a queer whistleblower. Lida Maxwell's marvelous new book, *Insurgent Truth*, makes a forceful case for the interconnectedness of

Manning's gender nonconformity and her leaks, seeing both as forms of "insurgent truth-telling" against norms of publicity and privacy. (Maxwell's main source materials are the chat logs between Manning and Adrian Lamo, the hacker in whom she confided and who reported her to the FBI.) By disclosing military state secrets and telling the truth about the war, Manning violated the boundaries of publicity. By refusing to hide her sexual orientation and gender identity, she violated the army's demands of privacy, as codified under "Don't Ask Don't Tell." She was discredited on both fronts: bullied by fellow soldiers, court-martialed by the army, disbelieved by the public.

The question at the heart of *Insurgent Truth* is "how someone appears legible as a truth-teller in the first place" (p. xi). Maxwell's answer involves, first, an analysis of the "hierarchies of credibility" that permeate society and structure politics and lead to the perception of some people as "unreliable observers of their own marginalization" or "untrustworthy witnesses to their own oppression" (p. xiii); second, she offers a defense of "outsider truth-telling," understood as the set of practices by which members of marginalized and oppressed minorities depict their reality to each other and to the dominant public. Maxwell attentively engages with and contributes to Black, queer, feminist, and critical theory, as she situates Manning within a cohort of outsider truth-tellers that includes Virginia Woolf, Bayard Rustin, and Audre Lorde.

*Insurgent Truth* begins with a discussion of the relationship between democracy and truth in light of outsider truth-telling. The latter challenges the dominant view, often attributed to Hannah Arendt, that democracy depends on factual truth because it provides a prepolitical common ground. Maxwell highlights the antidemocratic aspect of this view, which supports one dominant system of representation and renders "marginalized speakers and unsettling truths about oppression and inequality always already insignificant to the public realm" (p. 9). The central chapters of the book show how outsider truth-tellers' complex pictures of the world create fissures in this supposedly common ground by connecting marginalized individuals and creating spaces for them to imagine how to change the world (chap. 2) and by spurring collaborative, creative experimentation with alternative ways of living (chap. 3). It shows how outsider truth-tellers' anonymity is a way to engage with, not remove themselves from, the public realm (chap. 4) and how their truth creates a "scene" that calls others to imagine new spaces and new ways of what it means to live collectively (chap. 5). Maxwell returns to the relation between democracy and truth in the sixth and final chapter, where she argues that outsider truth-tellers can generate "outsider security"—a new model of genuinely democratic stability—by inciting us to take pleasure and play a role in others' depiction of reality. Maxwell's wonderfully rich and compelling defense of outsider truth-telling will be of interest to social and

political philosophers in general and to scholars of oppression, epistemic injustice, and resistance in particular.

I urge scholars of whistleblowing to pick up the book, too, although Maxwell is ostensibly not interested in intervening in that literature—yet could have fruitfully done so. Maxwell insists that portraying Manning as a whistleblower is a mistake: first because it separates Manning's leaks from her gender nonconformity; second, because the whistleblower model encourages conceiving of the act of truth-telling as "constative and conservative, merely restoring the status quo, rather than performative and productive" (p. 80). Many whistleblowers' truth is deployed in the service of rectifying and stabilizing a given organization, in accordance with its mission and the law. But Manning's truth was an insurgent one because its implication was not that the government ought to conduct war better, in adherence with international law. Instead, she wanted to expose "the endless stream of death and violence and destruction" and unsettle patriarchal militarism ("Chelsea Manning Talks to Larissa MacFarquhar about Life after Prison," *New Yorker Podcast*, 2017).

Nevertheless, Maxwell's contrast between whistleblowers and outsider truth-tellers is arbitrary and ill-advised. Many whistleblowers are cast as outsiders from the moment they blow the whistle. They are discredited and retaliated against, portrayed as disloyal and treacherous. They often lose everything—family, friends, job and future professional prospects, money, and health. When Ron Ridenhour and Hugh Thompson exposed the My Lai massacre, they were attacked as traitors and received death threats. Most Americans did not believe them. While he collected evidence about My Lai, Ridenhour realized that far from being an isolated incident, the massacre was part of a master plan (Thomas Mueller, *Crisis of Conscience*, 2019). He became an outspoken antiwar and anti-imperialism activist.

The treatment of government whistleblowers who illegally stole and disclosed classified information is even worse, because they face the prospect of decades behind bars. (Maxwell never mentions the distinction between legal and illegal truth-telling nor considers that leaks of classified information might endanger national security and the safety of troops and be presumptively problematic.) Daniel Ellsberg, who has become the paragon of whistleblowing and was in many ways an impeccable insider, was vilified and prosecuted by the government for leaking the Pentagon Papers. His truth, like Ridenhour's, was an insurgent one: he revealed not merely the US commission and covering up of war crimes but also their deliberate and systematic planning. Ellsberg has been a fervent antiwar activist and advocate for the freedom of the press ever since.

Similarly, and contra Maxwell's reading, Edward Snowden revealed a deeply unsettling truth. As he makes clear in his memoir *Permanent Record* (2019), he wanted his leaks

to expose the government's capacity to conduct surveillance on an unimaginable scale, not simply the contingent fact that the programs were too intrusive and illegal. His truth generated fissures in the public understanding of publicity and privacy and invited a collective, democratic reimagining of the internet.

Maxwell neglects these insurgent truth-tellers because she starts from a fixed distinction between insiders (privileged) and outsiders (oppressed) and then shows how the latter are not seen as truth-tellers. However, these whistleblowers' experiences suggest a different approach, better aligned with Maxwell's own project of investigating the "institutional, legal, affective and discursive staging of political scenes" (p. xiii). One could take the insider/outsider distinction as malleable and examine the ways in which it is weaponized in support of ruling interests. Through a complex interplay of structures (e.g., army hierarchy), laws (such as the Espionage Act), cultural and political narratives (of loyalty and patriotism), and counter-offensive strategies (portraying the truth-teller as pathological or arrogant, their anonymity as cowardly, etc.), governments cast as outsiders those among them who dare speak the truth. Understanding how these tactics are deployed against *any* dissident would further the transformative, bridge-building project of outsider truth-telling.

### The Bonds of Humanity: Cicero's Legacies in European Social and Political Thought, ca. 1100–ca. 1550. By

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— David Fott , University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
david.fott@unlv.edu

The fruits are plentiful in this study of the uses to which Cicero's thought was put in the Middle Ages, even if the reader is left unsure whether the author has accomplished his goal. That goal, writes Cary Nederman, is to "dislodge[ ] Aristotle from the pride of place accorded to him" in studies of European political thought during its earliest times—and at least to make Aristotle share the spotlight with Cicero (p. 2). Nederman wants "to elucidate quite diverse, and sometimes intellectually competing, receptions and adaptations of Cicero" (p. 5). He hastens to add that he "makes no pretense to track intellectual impact per se" (p. 6), but that statement comes shortly after a claim that Cicero's "impact was far more pervasive" than Aristotle's (p. 2). Does Nederman intend to leave that thesis unsupported by the evidence of his book?

The cause of that difficulty is Nederman's adherence to the method of classical reception studies, which refuses to identify a philosopher's thought as a single entity because uses of that thought always reflect the differing cultural developments of the users' times. There is more than a

whiff of historicism and relativism here, which Nederman wants to combat by denying that everyone who merely mentions Cicero's name should be reckoned a follower of his philosophy. Try as he may, however, the method forces Nederman into an inconsistency, in addition to the one previously mentioned: he claims that he "does not propose to identify any 'true' or 'essential' precept that defines Ciceronianism from the twelfth to the sixteenth century" (p. 11), but chapter 1 is devoted to "a synopsis of the key Ciceronian doctrines that were widely adapted in early European texts" (p. 13).

It is fair, then, to criticize Nederman's account of some of those doctrines. Apparently convinced that there must be a single Ciceronian theory of the origins of human society, he draws on various dialogues by Cicero without observing the varied purposes for which those dialogues were written. For example, *On the Laws* 1.29–30, which Nederman relies on, is part of a passage on natural law that the character Cicero describes as being "for the sake of strengthening republics," yet involving "starting points that have not been well considered and diligently explored" (*On the Laws* 1.37). In other words, Cicero's deepest reflections will likely not be found here. Concerning natural law, *On Duties* is an open letter from Cicero to his troublesome son—not the source from which one should expect the profoundest philosophy. It is inaccurate to suppose that reason and speech dominate all of Cicero's different accounts of the origins of society: note the inspiring "bodily strength and fierceness of spirit" shown by Romulus, first king of Rome (*On the Republic* 2.4). And does Cicero always regard action as superior to contemplation? The famous dream of Scipio, in which those who contemplate reach heaven sooner than those who do not, suggests otherwise (*On the Republic* 6.33, ed. J. G. F. Powell [6.29, ed. Konrat Ziegler]).

In chapter 2, on twelfth-century appropriations of Cicero, Nederman's careful reading of Thierry of Chartres demonstrates his similarity to, and difference from, Cicero. Rufinus follows Cicero on the need for legal systems and natural law. Nederman does not show a strong influence of Cicero on Otto of Freising. Regarding Aelred of Rievaulx, the influence of Cicero's *On Friendship* is clear, but Nederman speculates on the importance of *On Duties* by citing only one passage from it. *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, by an unknown author, reflects clear influence from *On Duties*, and Nederman explains how the author avoids using Cicero on natural reason and law to make his points.

The better-known John of Salisbury is the subject of a cogent chapter 3. John is Ciceronian in a number of respects, and Nederman provides a sharp analysis of the extent to which his teaching on tyrannicide is indebted to Cicero.

Chapter 4 concerns four schoolmen connected with the University of Paris. Nederman finds Cicero responsible for