

North and his collaborators) that the predatory tendencies of the state and state officials must be limited so that the natural propensity of humankind to truck and barter can flourish. He uses game theory to model this proposition, and his principal aim is to identify an important mechanism whereby the role of representative assemblies can satisfy this requirement in the case of some city-states. In contrast, Grafe is very critical of the NIE position, emphasizing the weakness of its assumptions about spontaneous market forces and the “greed” of an unconstrained state, and she mobilizes extensive evidence from the Spanish and French cases to support and extend this critique.

Likewise, whereas Stasavage tends to endorse with qualifications the claim by historical sociologists that military competition was an important driver of territorial state formation, Grafe offers a nuanced critique based on a more dialectical mode of reasoning, theoretical argument, and historical cases.

A third important difference is that Grafe locates Spanish state formation and market integration in the context of early-modern globalization, noting, in particular, that Spanish colonies in Europe and the Americas contributed far less to the Spanish treasury than is often assumed (distant tyrannies again) and that world market integration was a brake on the integration of the national market. In contrast, Stasavage focuses primarily on domestic fisco-financial politics and does not dwell on colonial or imperial questions. This said, his analysis of the weakness of the Castilian state’s fisco-financial position is similar, but narrower in focus, to that offered by Grafe.

By way of conclusion, I offer five observations based on these insightful, provocative studies. First, the two studies clearly show the limits of methodological ‘nationalism’ (which, to avoid anachronism, can be defined here as taking territorial state formation for granted as the core feature of modern political systems). Both authors follow Epstein (*Freedom and Growth*, 2000) in emphasizing the historical significance of jurisdictional fragmentation in early-modern state formation. In addition, Grafe shows the crucial role of an outward rather than internal market orientation, as well as the importance of core-periphery relations in supposedly unified states; and Stasavage demonstrates that city-states had some crucial advantages over large territorial states, survived far longer than the conventional myth of the Westphalian state suggests, and could also be important sites of technological and economic innovation.

Second, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that the formation of large, centralized territorial states was driven by military competition, Stasavage shows that the access to cheap credit by city-states made it easier to defend cities against inefficient armies that had to be expensively funded by territorial states—at least until military technologies shifted against such defensive tactics.

This historical-sociological interpretation is also criticized by Grafe, both in general terms and for the Spanish case, in part on the grounds that military competition provides an exogenous cause for state transformation that distracts attention from endogenous causes.

Third, both studies show that city-states and/or networks of cities (including those that cross-cut national boundaries) have important roles in limiting the power of national territorial states. Fourth, they also show the importance of forms of political organization, political representation, and public finance in early-modern and modern state formation and, in doing so, illustrate the need for more detailed comparative institutional analysis that combines detailed archival and quantitative analysis with bigger macrohistorical questions. Finally, and generally, these studies show that however well established the conventional wisdoms, there is always scope for revisionism, especially when the authors are armed with novel data sets and alternative hypotheses.

A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. By Gary Goertz and James Mahoney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 248p. \$65.00

cloth, \$29.95 paper.

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— Timothy Pachirat, *The New School*

The critical importance of Gary Goertz and James Mahoney’s well-written depiction of two specific research cultures within quantitative and qualitative social science becomes clearest against the backdrop of the book’s central interlocutor: Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994). Colloquially known by political science graduate students the world over as “KKV,” this highly influential methodological treatise contains at its core two basic arguments: first, that causal inference is the highest, most noble aim of the social sciences and, second, that valid causal inference can be established only through a single, unified logic of inquiry that takes its starting premises and evaluative standards from additive, linear statistics.

Goertz and Mahoney endorse KKV’s first argument but make it the central task of their book to decisively dispute its second. They do so by demonstrating that alongside the dominant additive, linear statistical approach characterized by a search for the average effects of *independent* variables (effects-of-causes), there exists a vibrant and irreducibly distinct qualitative tradition of establishing causal inference through a set-theoretic logic marked by a search for the necessary and sufficient causes of a *dependent* variable of interest (causes-of-effects). For Goertz and Mahoney, “Good science is concerned with both kinds of questions” (p. 41), and, consequently, “there is no set of principles that unifies all social scientific work” (p. 220). This is a clarion counter to KKV’s performative utterance

(John Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962) about a single, unified logic of inquiry, and it would be a laudable leap into better if not “the best of times” in the discipline if every graduate methods class featuring their treatise were henceforth to also assign *A Tale of Two Cultures* as a persuasive rejoinder.

While catchy, however, the book’s Dickensian title risks misleading by overstating its scope. A more accurate, though fatally awkward, title might read: *A Tale of Two Subcultures: Set-Theoretic and Additive, Linear Approaches to Causal Inference in the Social Sciences*. Goertz and Mahoney are certainly aware of the existence of other, important subcultures in both the qualitative and quantitative social sciences (p. 4), but generic references to “qualitative and quantitative research” in the book’s subtitle and throughout the text create the danger of an unjustified conflation of “set-theoretic” with “qualitative” and “additive, linear” with “quantitative” to the detriment of distinct alternatives such as interpretive and Bayesian approaches.

Following a brief “mathematical prelude,” which serves as a useful refresher on set theory and basic logic, the bulk of Goertz and Mahoney’s 17 short chapters demonstrates the consequences that follow from their critical distinction between an additive, linear effects-of-causes quantitative approach and a set-theoretic, causes-of-effects qualitative approach. They show in clear prose how these consequences impact nearly every domain of a typical research process oriented toward establishing causal inference, including research design, case selection, concept development, measurement, hypothesis testing, and generalization. The book’s final chapter offers a series of helpful tables summarizing these domains.

Throughout the text, concrete examples helpfully illuminate the implications of working within each research tradition. Most dramatic among them is the stark contrast in the answers that each tradition gave to the question concerning how many votes were lost for George W. Bush in Florida as a result of an early media call of a victory for Al Gore in the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Employing an additive, linear statistical approach, John Lott (“Gore Might Lose a Second Round: Media Suppressed the Bush Vote,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 14 November 2000) found that at least 10,000 votes were lost for Bush. In contrast, utilizing a set-theoretic qualitative approach, Henry Brady (“Data-Set Observations Versus Causal-Process Observations: The 2000 U.S. Presidential Election,” in Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2010) argued that no more than 224 votes could possibly have been lost. Ten thousand versus 224: consequential differences indeed!

Although Goertz and Mahoney largely maintain a discursive and illustrative tone, they also occasionally formulate general rules (p. 210), principles (p. 165), and, presumably for matters they feel especially insistent about,

fundamental principles (p. 153). These formalized sprinklings are not accidental: A large part of their contribution lies in excavating and verbalizing research practices that have remained implicit, undertheorized, and walked rather than talked in the set-theoretic qualitative tradition. Indeed, this work of explicating the implicit creates moments in the text when the authors encourage their fellow set-theoretic qualitative practitioners to abandon the dominant language deployed by their additive, linear quantitative counterparts altogether and to adopt instead a vocabulary more in keeping with their tradition’s own values (see, for example, the discussion of variable-indicator versus concept-data, p. 140).

Such moments are what enable a generative reading of this project as a kind of interpretive anthropology in which the authors, positioned as native informants who self-identify with the qualitative side of the two traditions, seek to describe, interpret, and codify the differences between additive, linear quantitative and set-theoretic qualitative research by examining both existing practices, as well as the metapragmatic speech produced by each tradition about its own practices. Indeed, Goertz and Mahoney explicitly acknowledge the interpretive character of their enterprise, stating that “our two cultures argument is, broadly speaking, an exercise in description and interpretation” (p. 5, n. 2).

Curiously, however, the very interpretive approaches utilized by the authors are intentionally excluded from the scope of the book itself: “[I]nterpretive approaches are not featured in our two cultures argument. . . . Such a book would bring to light fundamental clashes over epistemology and ontology that exist within parts of the social sciences. In this book, however, we focus on scholars who agree on many basic issues of epistemology and ontology, including the centrality of causal analysis for understanding the social world” (pp. 4–5).

I can sympathize with Goertz and Mahoney’s self-aware decision to exclude interpretive approaches; scope conditions, after all, are an essential part of the very qualitative tradition they describe (p. 210), and the exclusion of interpretive approaches undoubtedly makes for a more parsimonious book unmarred by the messy “fundamental clashes” to which they allude. However, by sidestepping these clashes in favor of neatness, the authors forgo a valuable opportunity to make an otherwise superb book even more significant. Just as contrasting set-theoretic qualitative and additive, linear quantitative traditions allow the unstated assumptions and implicit practices of each to materialize, so too would the inclusion of interpretive approaches have elucidated some of the core taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie both set-theoretic and additive, linear approaches.

Instead, by framing their overall project as pertaining to “qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences” while nonetheless excluding interpretive traditions

entirely, the authors run the risk that their otherwise important argument against a single, hegemonic logic of inquiry within the social sciences might, despite itself, reproduce its own “worst of times” version of hegemony. (Indeed, it is worth noting that the value and understanding of causality within the interpretive tradition remains actively contested. For two recent discussions, see Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes* [2012], especially pp. 49–54, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* [2011]).

The pluralistic multiculturalism advocated by Goertz and Mahoney is thus an uneasy one. Not only does it leave unresolved fundamental tensions between the two traditions they do describe (the distinction between 10,000 votes and 224 votes cannot, at day’s end, be settled by politically correct pleas that we all just get along), it also leaves unmapped the key portions of the terrain that constitute contemporary social science. The shifting and contested borderlands of this uneasy pluralism are exactly where scholars seeking to expand on the authors’ impressive book should take up their own cartographic instruments in order to carry this important effort forward.

Threat Talk: The Comparative Politics of Internet Addiction. By Mary Manjikan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012. 200p. \$89.96.
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— Jose Marichal, *California Lutheran University*

In her book, Mary Manjikan provides a useful analysis of the multiple ways in which the Internet as a social phenomenon can be framed by states and societies, and in particular the varying ways in which the idea of “Internet addiction” can be understood within different cultural and institutional contexts.

Threat Talk compares views on Internet addiction in China, Russia, Taiwan, the United States, and Europe. Manjikan forwards the constructivist view that the Internet is a neutral technology and the purpose and value of this technology is socially and politically constructed. She argues that nation-states have two main competing discourses that govern public understanding of Internet and related technologies. One discourse she characterizes as *threat talk*. This view of the Internet emphasizes the technology as an external danger to the moral, economic, and physical/mental health of a society. A competing discourse sees the Internet through the lens of *opportunity*, or the economic and social advantages inherent in mastering the technology.

The discourse on the Internet that predominates within a culture has important policy implications. Manjikan focuses much of her book on the effects of adopting a *threat* view of the Internet. Threat talk, she argues, is a

discourse of oppression designed “to delimit the scope of usages which were to be accepted as normal and safe” (p. 8). She argues that China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia) has adopted a threat talk discourse of Internet addiction “to help create a set of domestic norms regarding the need for control, restriction and policing of the Internet” (p. 9). In contrast, discussions of Internet addiction in the United States and Europe are more balanced between threat and opportunity.

In Chapter 2, Manjikan draws upon the literature on *antipsychology*, notably the work of Thomas Szasz, to argue for Internet addiction as a socially constructed mental illness. She examines the research done on Internet addiction in China and finds the Chinese government behind much of the funding for its production. She references Ulrich Beck’s concept of the *risk society* to highlight how the Chinese state uses threat talk to construct the Internet as a source of societal ills that distracts users from examining other aspects of Chinese social and political life that might be in need of reform.

Manjikan is careful to note that there are varying grades of Internet addiction threat talk. In particular, she discusses two different disease paradigms for Internet addiction with different implications for public policy. One paradigm is a *universal harm* stance whereby the lure of the threat is too strong for users to resist. This paradigm is akin to an epidemic that requires swift and strong state action and assumes that the users themselves will be incapable of resisting the danger. A second paradigm of threat is the *differential access* model whereby the emphasis is on the users and their ability to resist the threat. In this paradigm, the state identifies users whose usage needs to be restricted (e.g., children in schools) and places blame on individuals for not being able to resist the threat.

The author finds both types of talk present in Chinese society and highlights how they connect to a stream of Internet addiction measures taken by the government in recent years, including a limit on the construction of new Internet cafes, a requirement that online game players register with the state, limits on violence in online game content, and requirements that online game manufacturers provide parents with resources to help their “Internet addicted” child. These measures are legitimated by the government’s construction of Internet addiction as a *securitizing disease* that must be prevented from spreading.

Later in the book, Manjikan draws skillfully on medical sociology literature to situate Internet addiction within a long line of cultural threats throughout history. In this section, she reinforces the idea of Internet addiction as deviant and the addicted in need of *normalization*. I found particularly useful the section where she highlights the different metaphors used to make unwanted Internet use deviant. She discusses the ways in which the Chinese government has sought to portray the Internet as *kidnapper*, as *foreign invader* (via what she calls the *plague doctrine*),