

four types of alliances: 1) aggregation alliance (symmetrical/homogenous); 2) guarantee alliance (asymmetrical/homogenous); 3) deadlock alliance (symmetrical/heterogeneous); 4) hegemonic alliance (asymmetrical/heterogeneous).

In analyzing the nature of these different types of alliances, Cesa is informed by Glenn Snyder's *Alliance Politics* (1997), particularly the alliance security dilemma: the simultaneous fear of both abandonment and entrapment by an ally. In this dilemma, an ally needs to be capable of and willing to help a state achieve its interest, but not so powerful that it can dictate the terms of an alliance. Each of the alliance types will be marked by different levels of fear of abandonment and relative bargaining power, as well as the lasting power of the alliance. In an aggregation alliance, bargaining is marked by an equal exchange of services that will normally end once the two states have achieved their basic objective, whether defensive or offensive. Fear of abandonment is real, but is tempered by the common cause. In a guarantee alliance, the more powerful state is less dependent on the weaker member and so less fearful of abandonment, while the opposite holds for the less powerful state. The more powerful state may also try to strengthen its partner in order to attain more benefit from the alliance and to lessen the fear of free riding. Deadlocked alliances are characterized by mistrust and fear of abandonment and entrapment. Bargaining is more likely to be coercive and may be marked not by a positive exchange of services but, rather, by threats of withholding services, as the two states are fearful not only of losing their ally but also of being pulled into a conflict in which they have little interest. Finally, in the hegemonic alliance, a weaker state is dependent on a more powerful actor that may largely dictate the relationship. The weaker state's need for the larger state's support may require it to adopt positions it would otherwise oppose. Bandwagoning relationships like those described by Stephen Walt, in *Origins of Alliances* (1987), may fall into this category.

While the typologies are interesting, their utility is somewhat limited in that the author does not provide specific, testable hypotheses regarding state behaviors that one should expect in each type of case, but rather provides broad descriptions of the nature of the relationships. Neither do the typologies provide sufficient insight into when state alliances are most likely to form and between which ones. In general, states prefer to be the more powerful partner and prefer allies that are able to both render services and share the objectives of the more powerful state. However, such opportunities may not present themselves frequently. Outside of the typology, ally availability appears to be a major factor affecting alliance choice—a view that the case studies support. In an examination of the types of alliances, it is not clear why deadlocked alliances form—the author notes that the alliance may be “disadvantageous to both” (p. 78). Finally, the author notes that neither

the power relationship nor the congruence of interests between allies is strongly predictive of the staying power of the alliance (p. 227). Nonetheless, the typologies do provide a fairly straightforward framework that can serve as a useful way to categorize alliances.

To illustrate the theoretical typology, Cesa examines four alliances from the eighteenth century: British alliances with the United Provinces (guarantee alliance), France (hegemonic alliance) and Prussia (aggregation alliance), and France's alliance with Austria (deadlock alliance). The case studies themselves illustrate the difficulty of applying broad ideal types to history. In particular, the British alliance with the United Provinces evolved over time as interests began to diverge between the two parties, and the external threat (France) began to recede. It is interesting to note that during the course of that alliance (1702–56), Britain also formed an alliance with France (1716–31), the purported object of the alliance with the United Provinces. Steady conflict across the continent during the time period does provide for frequent shifts in alliances and opportunities to study bargaining, but also makes the consistent application of the typologies difficult.

To conclude, *Allies yet Rivals* does provide a useful typology that could be made stronger with further refinement and effort to produce predictions regarding intraalliance behavior. The case studies are an interesting addition in that they cover an era not frequently used in the study of international relations. The book would have greatly benefited from applications of some of the lessons from the case studies and the typologies to more recent alliances, at least briefly in the conclusion. For example, one area not considered by the theory, but which plays a significant role in the case studies, is the impact that shifts in leadership (the death of monarchs, including wars over succession) had on alliance formation, a topic that would be particularly interesting given recent changes in the Middle East. I do recommend the book to scholars interested in the dynamics of intraalliance relationships as the basic typology provides an elegant way to think about different types of alliances.

Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict. Edited by Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. 285p. \$50.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.
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— Paul Staniland, *University of Chicago*

This is a rare edited volume: thematically coherent and actually worth buying. Its goal is to explain when and where violence breaks out, the mechanisms driving violence, and the consequences of different forms of violence (and nonviolence). Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence's excellent Introduction lays out a “balance of power approach” (p. 14) to violence, which de-emphasizes group-level attributes like ethnic identity in favor of a focus on

the fluid, complex calculations of political actors amid uncertainty. Violence does not emerge seamlessly from political conflict, but instead from shifts in the balance of power and interests between contending forces. Moreover, some types of violence and indeed nonviolence may be more effective at shifting this balance than others.

Although it is impossible to do justice to the individual essays, here I outline the core argument of each chapter and then reflect on the research agenda that *Rethinking Violence* represents.

The volume is divided into two parts—the first on the use of state violence and the second on the use of nonstate violence and nonviolence. Part I, on the state, emphasizes how shifts in the international system can trigger different state policies toward internal minorities. Harris Mylonas shows how alliance relationships between states shape the ways that central governments approach their minority populations. His chapter moves beyond the “violence/no violence” binary by exploring policies of assimilation and accommodation, in addition to exclusion (p. 87). Zeynep Bulutgil suggests that shifts in the sponsorship of internal minorities by external states can impel more radical policies among both minorities and the state, explaining variation over time that is unaccounted for by a focus on structural, group-level variables like nationalist identity (pp. 59–60). Erin Jenne’s chapter critically assesses the claim that population exchanges underpin peace by examining the exchanges in the Balkans. She argues that state geopolitical interests shaped the endurance and breakdown of political relations, not local security dilemmas (p. 120).

Bulutgil, Jenne, and Mylonas all use the historical record of Central and Eastern Europe as a comparative laboratory for tracing out the roots of violence, and they agree on the importance of interstate relations in shaping intra-state conflicts. They would all benefit from a richer conception of “the state” because state apparatuses tend to be characterized by internal divisions and cleavages that may affect how they perceive both their interests and their minorities. These authors’ claims about geopolitics are also embedded in assumptions about the mobilization of identity and violence in a very specific context. How well these arguments travel across time and space is difficult to assess, given this particular regional-temporal focus.

Part II involves a noticeable shift in emphasis as the volume shifts to nonstate violence. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Emily Beaulieu use quantitative events data from Western Europe and a case study of Northern Ireland to explore how inconsistencies in state repression can muddle the normal substitution of violent for nonviolent tactics (and vice versa) that activists would otherwise pursue, and indeed increase the likelihood of violence (p. 194). This chapter raises interesting questions, even if the causal mechanisms underlying the bias toward greater violence are unclear. Wendy Pearlman’s chapter delves inside

the political life of an insurgent movement, revealing how fissures and divisions within the Palestinian community during the British Mandate led to suboptimal outcomes; as she plausibly argues, “we must also rethink the nature of the agents” (p. 198).

In Kristin Bakke’s chapter, we are shown how the political links between central governments and regional actors can shape when and how separatist violence arises with illustrations from the Indian Punjab and Chechnya. Bakke’s account is more political than many theories of civil war onset, though its complexities can become somewhat daunting. The argument advanced by Lawrence is that violence is not simply a natural extension of nationalist politics, but instead may have distinctive origins and dynamics. Using cases from the French Empire, she critiques existing conventional wisdoms. She then points to her other research to explain when violence breaks out. The chapter is a useful corrective but can feel more like a preview than a self-contained answer (p. 170).

The chapters by Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran and by Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, though in different parts of the volume, share a focus on the *consequences* of violence and nonviolence rather than its causes. Downes and Cochran explore whether targeting civilians in war pays for states. They find that, on average, civilian victimization has contributed to military victory but crucially note that this effect has declined over time and that in a number of cases, the correlation is not actually causal (p. 47). Chenoweth and Stephan trace out a set of theoretical hypotheses that identify mechanisms through which nonviolence can be more effective than violence in coercing changes from states. This is a valuably provocative pair of essays, though that of Chenoweth and Stephan leaves the reader wanting more research.

This excellent edited volume is state of the art in the field, making it useful as an opportunity to reflect on the broader research agenda represented by the book. There are three issues that echo broader challenges facing the civil war subfield.

First, there is a tension in the book between the macro-level world of state elites and geopolitics (Part I) and the micro-level realm of local conflicts and nonstate calculations (Part II). It is clear that both local- and elite-level dynamics are important in civil conflicts, but this is now the accepted conventional wisdom rather than a new insight. The next task is to persuasively integrate these distinct but overlapping spheres of mobilization and violence. Finding ways of bridging the local and the national, the masses and the elites, remains a goal that has not yet been achieved.

Second, the editors focus on explaining the same set of dependent variables—patterns of violence and conflict outcomes—as in most of the recent research on civil war. These are obviously important, but building new concepts

and identifying novel outcomes of interest is critical for the field to move forward. The book does not deal much, for instance, with how violence is linked to the institutions and bargains that underpin authority in areas of conflict or with the consequences of violence beyond victory and defeat. The field needs to seek out innovative new questions, in addition to refining our understanding of existing puzzles.

Finally, the emergence of a mature civil-conflict subfield should not lead to intellectual self-encapsulation. The footnotes might lead an observer to believe that the serious literature on civil conflict began only in the early 2000s. Older research on internal conflict has many flaws, but also enduringly powerful arguments that deserve closer attention. Moreover, rich, relevant literatures on state formation, institutions, social mobilization, militaries, and resource extraction in other subfields and disciplines should be better incorporated into research on civil war.

Despite these cautions, *Rethinking Violence* outlines an ambitious research agenda, one that scholars should use to explore even newer terrain in creative ways.

Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis: A Transnational Perspective. Edited by Wayne Cornelius, David Fitzgerald, Pedro Lewin Fischer, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009. 269p. \$65.00 cloth, \$29.50 paper. doi:10.1017/S153759271100327

— Laura V. Gonzalez-Murphy, *State University of New York at Albany*

CNN's Rafael Romo recently reported that "by at least one measure, illegal immigration is not the problem . . . it used to be for the United States," noting that according to Border Patrol statistics, "the number of arrests of people trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally has decreased sharply in the last five years" ("Border Arrests of Undocumented Immigrants down 58% in 5 Years," in *MAARS News*, May 12, 2011). The federal government, which concurs with Romo, attributes the decline to heightened internal and border security measures—the deployment of a greater number of border patrol agents, employer raids, improved technology for border monitoring, and so on. While researchers have agreed that these measures are a factor, they have not viewed them as the main reason behind the change. They maintain instead that fewer undocumented immigrants have been crossing the border due to the US economic crisis and its impact on the labor market. Researchers have been likewise unconvinced that the economic crisis will result in a mass return migration of Mexicans presently living in the United States, as suggested in several media outlets. Until *Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis*, edited by Wayne Cornelius and his colleagues, however, no systematic research had supported these arguments.

In early 2009, 38 researchers participating in the Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP) based in the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the

University of California, San Diego, in partnership with Mexican institutions, set out to study the town of Tunkas in the Mexican state of Yucatan—a community previously studied by the MMFRP in 2006. Motivated by a desire to further their understanding of the impact of economic downturns on migrants and population movements—a subject largely untouched in the international migration field—the research team conducted 1,031 in-home survey interviews and more than 500 hours of unstructured interviews among Tunkaseños 15 to 65 years of age living in Tunkas itself and in the Tunkaseños satellite communities of Southern California. By means of a systematic combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, for example, cross-section time series data models, the book substantiates the notion that reduced flows to the United States are responding to economic conditions and will likely increase once conditions improve in the country.

One might question the legitimacy of generalizing about Mexican migrant groups on the basis of one particular group. It is important to note, however, as does the MMFRP team, that according to other survey and ethnographic studies conducted in Mexican communities since the late 1980s, Tunkas "is broadly representative of indigenous communities of emigration in southern Mexico" (p. ix). That said, *Mexican Migration* reinforces the classical theoretical explanation for the reasons people migrate, to wit, that migration occurs when a cost-benefit calculation leads individuals to expect positive net returns from migrating. The book offers additional insight—the fruit of a detailed probing of the strategies used by migrants coping with crisis. Findings include the following: 1) Tunkaseños migrate in search of employment in the United States—a group comprising predominantly men—and to be reunited with family members—a group comprising predominantly women; 2) the decision to migrate ultimately depends on the particular circumstances of a given family; 3) the "economic crisis has not spurred substantial return migration" (p. x); rather, Tunkaseños in the United States are determined to weather the storm by depending more heavily on family support networks, reducing living expenses, and sending less money to relatives in Tunkas; and 4) while increased security enforcement encourages Tunkaseños to remain on the American side of the border, it also facilitates internal migration within Mexico by forcing those in Tunkas to seek employment in other, more urban, areas of the country.

These findings are significant in that, as previously stated, they go beyond the classical explanations for migration—properly viewed by some as mere *stimulators* of migration—and delve more deeply into migration dynamics, into the *perpetuators* of migration. In this way, the findings highlight the complexity of the migration phenomenon, considering not merely the economic and political structures inherent in migration but the role played by the values,