

# HAYEK'S READINGS OF MILL

BY  
PHILIPPE LÉGÉ

## I. INTRODUCTION

To Friedrich Hayek, only after a lot of trial and error did liberalism appear as a real doctrine, spurred by eighteenth century Scottish philosophers Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. But in the nineteenth century, while the disciples of those thinkers, “mostly economists in the tradition of Adam Smith,” were gathering around the *Edinburgh Review*,<sup>1</sup> “this development was paralleled” by the Benthamite Radicals, “which traced back more to the Continental than to the British tradition” (1973, p. 125).

Hayek therefore insisted on the difference between the “continental” liberal tradition and the “British” liberal tradition. He wished the word “Enlightenment” were not used to refer to “the French philosophers from Voltaire to Condorcet on the one hand, and the Scottish and English thinkers from Mandeville through Hume and Adam Smith to Edmund Burke on the other” (1963, p. 101). To him, this view of the eighteenth century as “a homogeneous body of ideas” had “very grave” and “regrettable consequences” (1963, p. 102).

In Hayek’s opinion, a specific ideological current was to blame for this confusion: “It was in the end, the victory of the Benthamite Philosophical Radicals over the Whigs in England that concealed the fundamental difference” (1960, p. 55). Indeed, Hayek considered that the merging of these two traditions—that of the Philosophical Radicals and that stemming from the theses of Hume and Smith—had given birth in the 1830s to the party “which from about 1842 came to be known as the Liberal Party” (1973, p. 125).<sup>2</sup>

---

PHARE, Université Paris-1. E-mail: lege@univ-paris1.fr. This paper is based on the third chapter of my Ph.D. thesis (Légé 2005b). Earlier versions were presented at the *John Stuart Mill Bicentennial Conference*, April 5-7, 2006, University College, London, and at the *Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economics*, Fairfax, July 10-15, 2006. I would like to gratefully acknowledge Sandra Peart, Bruce Caldwell, and all the participants for their valuable advice and Stéphanie Denève for helping me with the translation. Any mistakes remaining are mine.

<sup>1</sup>This review, founded in 1802, often took stands in favor of the Whigs. By 1818, it had a circulation of 13,500 and had become very influential. Hayek considered that Thomas B. Macaulay, one of the contributors to *Edinburgh Review*, “did [for the nineteenth century] what Hume in his historical work had done for the eighteenth” (Hayek 1973, p. 125).

<sup>2</sup>Actually, this party officially became the Liberal Party in 1847. The expression has nevertheless been used by the press since 1835 (Hobsbawm 1992, p. 47).

Despite this impure origin and “a progressive infiltration by interventionist” elements into this party, Hayek noted that “the dominating influence of liberal ideas in Britain” lasted until World War I, after which “the influence of liberalism steadily declined” (1973, p. 130).

Hayek therefore considered his work as being written right in the middle of a period of decline of liberalism and of western civilization: “The final abandonment of the gold standard and the return to protection by Great Britain in 1931 seemed to mark the definite end of a free world economy” (1973, p. 131). To him, this material decline stemmed from an intellectual perversion that dated back to the nineteenth century. Hayek’s project was to restore the purity of the liberal doctrine as it stood before interventionist “infiltrations” corrupted it. “The two traditions became finally confused when they merged in the liberal movement of the nineteenth century” (Hayek 1960, p. 55).

Hayek defined his “true liberalism” as opposed to “constructivist rationalism.” His project thus consisted in denouncing a number of intellectual errors. But in Hayek’s historical fresco, “constructivist rationalism” was not only an obstacle in the way of “true liberalism”; from the nineteenth century onwards, it became an enemy from within. We will discuss how, according to Hayek, Mill introduced elements of this “rationalism” into the liberal tradition. This is a common vision.<sup>3</sup> But very little attention has been given to Hayek’s readings of Mill.<sup>4</sup> His texts on Mill are little known and will be republished as part of the *Collected Works of F. A. Hayek* with Sandra J. Peart as volume editor.

Since the way he viewed Mill’s role evolved through time, we have chosen to chronologically present the different works he wrote either dealing with or referring to Mill. We will content ourselves with following the evolution of Hayek’s opinion on Mill and to identify which of Mill’s ideas he found “constructivist.” Hayek’s readings of Mill are revealing as to the evolution of Hayek’s thought. Our goal here is not to assess whether Hayek’s criticisms are justified or not but to describe his view of the history of liberalism and the role he assigns to Mill.

<sup>3</sup>For example, Hayek’s intellectual guide wrote:

Mill is an epigone of classical liberalism and, especially in his later years, under the influence of his wife, full of feeble compromises. He slips slowly into socialism and is the originator of the thoughtless confounding of liberal and socialist ideas that led to the decline of English liberalism and to the undermining of the living standards of the English people. . . . Without a thorough study of Mill it is impossible to understand the events of the last two generations. For Mill is the great advocate of socialism. All the arguments that could be advanced in favor of socialism are elaborated by him with loving care. In comparison with Mill all other socialist writers—even Marx, Engels and Lassalle—are scarcely of any importance (Mises 1927, p. 195).

<sup>4</sup>According to Steven Horwitz, “serious work on Hayek and Mill [is] long overdue” (2005, p. 74). In fact, John Gray and Alan Ebenstein have devoted a few pages to the connection between Mill and Hayek. In the fifth chapter of *Hayek on Liberty* (1984), Gray sets out to compare the two author’s theories. However, he uses only part of the available material. The biography of Hayek that Ebenstein published in 2001 is more comprehensive, but it does not contain any real analysis of the ideas presented. In his next work, *Hayek’s Journey* (2003), Ebenstein devotes only two pages to comparing Mill and Hayek. On Mill so-called “scientism,” see also Hollander (1985, pp. 956–58). David Levy and Sandra Peart are working on a text that attempts to explain “why Hayek was so disenchanted with the economic liberalism of Mill” (Levy and Peart 2006, p. 2).

## II. THE FORTIES: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CRITICISMS

Hayek made very few references to Mill during the 1930s.<sup>5</sup> He actually started dedicating time to the study of Mill's work in the 1940s, on the occasion of a preparatory research for essays he wrote in London about Saint-Simon and Comte. At that time, he criticized his epistemology,<sup>6</sup> in particular his use of the notion of "law" in social sciences. After quoting an excerpt<sup>7</sup> from *l'Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* by Condorcet (1795) and noting that this quotation is "characteristically" the epigraph of the last book of the *System of Logic* by Mill (1843), Hayek writes: "The idea of natural laws of historical development and the collectivist view of history were born" (Hayek 1941, p. 193 and n. 13).

Hayek considered that Comte's ideas had benefited from Mill's intellectual aura, which allowed them to exert a considerable influence over "European thought" (1941, p. 359). Hayek's target remains Mill's 1843 work: "Mill himself, in the sixth book of his *Logic*, which deals with the methods of the moral sciences, became little more than an expounder of Comtian doctrine" (1941, p. 359). Moreover, Hayek believed that these epistemological errors paved the way for more harmful influences: backing up his demonstration with a letter in which Mill claimed that the "social organization" proposed by Saint-Simonians would be, "under some modification or other . . . the final and permanent condition of our race," Hayek added: "he differed from them in believing that it would take many or at least several stages" (Hayek 1941, p. 296). "We have here undoubtedly the first roots of J.S. Mill's socialist leanings. But in Mill's case, too, this was largely a preparation for the still more profound influence which Comte was later to exercise on him" (1941, p. 297).

Yet, Hayek acknowledged in the same article that Comte's ideas had "finally so revolted J.S. Mill" (1941, p. 258) and, in an article written in the same period and published in the same collection of essays,<sup>8</sup> he recognized that Mill had strongly criticized Comte, whose project he regarded as "liberticide."<sup>9</sup>

Then, in 1942, Hayek wrote the preface to *The Spirit of the Age*, a collection of articles that Mill had first published in *The Examiner* (1830-31). In about thirty pages, entitled "John Stuart Mill at the age of twenty-five," Hayek draws a portrait of the young author. He considers that in 1831 Mill "is a more attractive figure than the zealous sectarian of his early days or the austere and balanced philosopher of mature

<sup>5</sup>See Hayek (1931; 1932, p. 131).

<sup>6</sup>See in particular, Hayek (1941, pp. 193, 295-97, 359).

<sup>7</sup>"Le seul fondement de croyance dans les sciences naturelles, est cette idée, que les lois générales, connues ou ignorées, qui règlent les phénomènes de l'univers, sont nécessaires et constantes; et par quelle raison ce principe serait-il moins vrai pour le développement des facultés intellectuelles et morales de l'homme, que pour les autres opérations de la nature?" (Condorcet, in Mill 1843, p. 832).

<sup>8</sup>"Comte and Hegel" is the third and last part of *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*. In the American preface to this book, Hayek points out that the third study was prepared from notes collected between 1941 and 1944.

<sup>9</sup>Letter to Harriet Taylor dated January 15, 1855. See the *Collected Works* of Mill (vol. 14, p. 294) or Hayek (1951, p. 216). This criticism of Comte's political theses is also developed in *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (Mill 1865). In his autobiography, Mill also claimed that Comte's last work put forward "the completest system of spiritual and temporal despotism, which ever yet emanated from a human brain, unless possibly that of Ignatius Loyola" (Mill 1873, p. 163).

years” (Hayek 1942, p. viii). According to Hayek, “[Mill is] almost at the height of his reaction against his earlier views” and he begins “his career as an independent thinker” (1942, pp. viii, x).

*Mill and Socialism: Harmful but Limited Influences*

It is, however, interesting to notice that Hayek repeatedly kept relativizing this independence by insisting on the new influences to which Mill had been exposed. He considered that Mill had gotten away from the influence of his father and Bentham only to fall under that of the French thinkers (1942, p. vii): “Though he built on the foundation of a strong English tradition, the new structure that he erected upon it added more that derived from foreign than from native source” (1942, p. vii). What are those foreign sources? Hayek reminded that in 1829, Mill became acquainted with the ideas of Comte and the Saint-Simonians and that he met Harriet Taylor in “1830 or 1831” (it is now known that he met her in 1830).<sup>10</sup> “Whatever may have been its true significance for Mill’s intellectual development, [this close friendship] certainly had the effect that he entirely withdrew from social life and became the recluse he remained for the rest of his life” (Hayek 1942, p. xii). Hayek also mentioned Mill’s stay in France when he was fourteen. He quotes an extract from Mill’s autobiography, in which Mill insists on the importance of this journey:

The chief fruit which I carried away from the society I saw, was a strong and permanent interest in Continental Liberalism, of which I ever afterwards kept myself *au courant*, as much as of English politics: a thing not at all usual in those days with Englishmen, and which had a very salutary influence on my development, keeping me free from the error always prevalent in England, and from which even my father with all his superiority to prejudice was not exempt, of judging universal questions by a merely English standard (Mill 1873, p. 64).

Besides this, Mill kept up a correspondence with Saint-Simonian thinker Gustave D’Eichtal. According to Hayek, “[he] spares no pain to convert his young English friend to the new creed” (1942, p. xviii). Hayek noted that in his letters to D’Eichtal, Mill worded “a most thoroughgoing criticism of the whole of Comte’s theoretical and political views,” and added that it was “interesting” that Mill had “immediately laid his fingers on one of the most vulnerable spots in Comte’s political doctrines” (1942, p. xix).<sup>11</sup>

Then, Hayek, who was indeed conversant with Mill’s criticism of Comte, maintains that one can “watch how Mill gradually approaches to the views of the Saint-Simonians, although he never fails to stress that in no circumstances would he become a member” (Hayek 1942, pp. xx-xxi). Of what does this “approach” consist? Talking about *The Spirit of the Age*, Hayek asserts that: “Mill takes from Comte and the Saint-Simonians his leading idea and several details but he uses them for his own ends. What he takes are characteristic aspects of their philosophy of history” (1942,

<sup>10</sup>A few years later, as he was studying their correspondence, Hayek realized that they had met “in the summer or early autumn of 1830” (Hayek 1951, p. 23). What misled Hayek on that point seems to have been the biography of Mill written by Alexander Bain (1951, p. 283, n.1). Also read Mill’s letter dated February 14, 1854.

<sup>11</sup>Letter dated October 8, 1829. See the *Collected Works* of Mill (Vol. 12, p. 36).

pp. xxvii-iii). One can thus recognize the same kind of accusation as that stated a year earlier in "The Counter-Revolution of Science."

But Hayek's most interesting opinion can be found in the last pages of this introduction: "Mill indeed, while sympathizing with the ultimate aims of socialism, *disagreed to the end* with the concrete suggestions for the abolition of private property and [dissented from] their declamations against competition" (Hayek 1942, p. xxx). Hayek, therefore, knew that Mill's ideas did not make him a socialist. Fighting socialism was still one of Hayek's main purposes at that time. In that same period, he was working on the political pamphlet that would make him famous. *The Road to Serfdom*, dedicated to "socialists of all parties," was published in 1944, and within a few weeks, it met with quiet a lot of success in Great Britain and the United States. An abridged version of the book, published in the *Reader's Digest* in August 1945, reached a circulation of more than 600,000.<sup>12</sup> In the introduction, Hayek writes: "If it is no longer fashionable to emphasise that 'we are all socialists now', this is so merely because the fact is too obvious. Scarcely anybody doubts that we must continue to move forward to socialism" (Hayek 1944, p. 3).

The famous assertion which Hayek was referring to was uttered in the 1880s by Sir William Harcourt. In this sentence, the word "socialist" is therefore used in its broadest sense.

When Mill maintained, that he had become a "socialist," he too used the word in a very general sense.<sup>13</sup> What he was referring to was only the ultimate goals of socialism.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, he considered that "the object to be principally aimed at, in the present stage of human improvement, is not the subversion of the system of individual property, but the improvement of it" (Mill 1848, p. 217).

### *Mill and "False" Liberalism*

In order to understand Hayek's opinion about Mill, it is important to describe his first attempt at distinguishing "true" from "false" liberalism. In a paper entitled "Individualism: True and False" (presented in 1945 and published in 1946), Hayek explained that "individualism" has come to describe an aggregation of heterogeneous

<sup>12</sup>To promote *The Road to Serfdom*, Hayek set off on a lecture tour round American universities. For further details on the success of this book, see Ebenstein (2001, chapter 17).

<sup>13</sup>It is to be noticed that this passage earned Mill John Elliot Cairnes's sarcasm: "If to look forward to such a state of things as an ideal to be striven for is Socialism, I at once acknowledge myself a Socialist" (Cairnes 1874, p. 265n).

<sup>14</sup>Mill:

Our ideal of ultimate improvement went far beyond Democracy, and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists. While we repudiated with the greatest energy that tyranny of society over the individual which most Socialistic systems are supposed to involve, we yet looked forward to a time when society will no longer be divided into the idle and the industrious; when the rule that they who do not work shall not eat, will be applied not to paupers only, but impartially to all; when the division of the produce of labour, instead of depending, as in so great a degree it now does, on the accident of birth, will be made by concert, on an acknowledge principle of justice" (1873, p. 175).

Mill agreed with the goal proposed by socialist theories, with the ideal of a different, more egalitarian society; however his work clearly indicates that he differed on the means to reach the goal. See, in particular, Mill (1849, p. 354).

principles. Yet, to Hayek, there are still good reasons for retaining this term, one of them being the fact that the word “socialism” was “deliberately coined to express its opposition to individualism” (1945, p. 3).

Hayek tries to distinguish “true” from “false” individualism. The first one is primarily a theory of society that “accounts for most of the order which we find in human affairs as the unforeseen result of individual actions,” while the second one “traces all discoverable order to deliberate design” (1945, p. 8). Hayek sees the origin of false individualism in “French and other Continental writers,” especially in the Cartesian school which is “the product of an exaggerated belief in the powers of individual reason” (1945, p. 8). He believes that this kind of individualism must be regarded as a source of modern socialism.

Hayek supports the “antirationalistic approach” of British individualism, which he traced back to the works of Mandeville, Hume, Smith, Burke, and Ferguson. The fundamental principle of this kind of individualism is that “it uses the universal acceptance of general principles as the means to create order in social affairs” (1945, p. 19). The interest of society is better served by general rules than by expediency. The point is that Hayek placed Mill on the borderline between the two forms of liberalism:

It was only liberalism in the English sense that was generally opposed to centralization, to nationalism and to socialism, while the liberalism prevalent on the Continent favored all three. I should add, however, that, in this as in so many other respects, John Stuart Mill, and the later English liberalism derived from him, belong at least as much to the Continental as to the English tradition (1945, p. 28).

In this text, Hayek did not provide explanatory elements concerning Mill’s alleged proximity with “socialism” and “nationalism.” But he laid stress on the influence of the “French tradition” which Mill had been subject to when he was young: “Partly because the classical economists of the nineteenth century, and particularly John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, were almost as much influenced by the French as by the English tradition, all sorts of conceptions and assumptions completely alien to true individualism have come to be regarded as essential parts of its doctrine” (1945, p. 11).

Shortly after, Hayek expressed a much more clear-cut opinion. Indeed, in one of the speeches he delivered in April 1947 on the occasion of the foundation of the Mont Pelerin Society,<sup>15</sup> Hayek maintains that “Mill himself, like so many others, soon turned his attention to schemes involving restriction or abolition [of property rights] rather than [their] more effective use” (Hayek 1947b, p. 110). Hayek does not mean that Mill endorsed concrete socialist proposals. But he now insists on Mill’s sympathy with socialism more strongly.

The context in which Hayek expressed this criticism toward Mill’s alleged socialism was particular: it was that of the foundation of the Mont Pelerin Society. The main purpose of this think tank consisted in reasserting the true principles of liberalism and “purging traditional liberal theory” (Hayek 1947a, p. 238) of some elements that were considered as going against these principles, namely to remove all

---

<sup>15</sup>Published the following year in *Individualism and Economic Order* under the title “‘Free’ Enterprise and Competitive Order” (Hayek 1947b).

the “constructivist” ideas introduced into the British tradition in the nineteenth century. What was therefore at stake was to convince the intellectuals of how relevant and necessary the distinction between “true” and “false” liberalism was. Hayek insisted on the importance of spreading the ideas advocated by the groups opposed to a “continued movement toward more government control.” The priority was to remedy “the lack of a real program, or perhaps, to a consistent philosophy” of these groups (1947b, p. 107). After quoting Keynes’s famous words on the great influence of the economists and philosophers’ prevailing ideas,<sup>16</sup> Hayek asserted that “he has never said a truer thing” and added:

It is from the long-run point of view that we must look at our task. It is the beliefs which must spread, if a free society is to be preserved, or restored, not what is practicable at the moment, which must be our concern. But, while we must emancipate ourselves from that servitude to current prejudices in which the politician is held, *we must take a sane view of what persuasion and instruction are likely to achieve* (1947b, pp. 108-109, italics added).

The speech by Hayek containing the first exposure of Mill’s “socialism” was delivered in front of the same audience as his speech about the necessity to spread a truly liberal program, “or rather” philosophy. One may also wonder on what material Hayek based his criticism. What work did he do on Mill during this period (1942-1947)? At that time, Hayek was carrying out some research on Mill’s correspondence. For that, he benefited from human and financial help from the London School of Economics and was given access to the Mill-Taylor collection of this University’s library (*The British Library of Political and Economic Science*). In 1943 he published an article in *The Times*’ literary supplement in order to gather some new material or information. After reviewing Mill’s already published letters, Hayek appealed for help:

The London School of Economics, which some years ago acquired some substantial part of the papers left behind by Mill, has conducted a preliminary survey of existing material with a view to the publication after the war of a new collection of his letters . . . These efforts can, however, hardly be successful without spontaneous cooperation from the numerous private owners of such autograph letters. The London School of

---

<sup>16</sup>Hayek was referring to the last lines of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*: The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else . . . Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil (Keynes 1936, pp. 383-84, In Hayek 1947b, p. 108).

A few years later, Hayek used a similar quotation from John Stuart Mill (and referred to Keynes’s sentence in a note): “the lesson given to mankind by every age, and always disregarded—that speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interest of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them” (Mill, in Hayek 1960, pp. 112-13; p. 445, n.14).

Economics will therefore greatly appreciate any offers of the loan of such letters or communications of information which may help in tracing such letters (Hayek 1943, pp. 42-43).

These investigations made in the forties, led to the publishing in 1951 of part of the correspondence between Mill and his wife, under the title *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor*. Therefore, it appears interesting to examine this work in search of clues to the causes of Hayek's change of opinion, or at least of signs that could bring to light the nature of these causes.

### III. THE FIFTIES: HAYEK'S FASCINATION FOR MILL AND HARRIET TAYLOR

#### *Harriet Taylor's Role, According to Hayek*

In his 1951 book, Hayek reminds the reader of Mill's admiration for Taylor (1807-1858) and quotes the passages in which Mill describes his intellectual collaboration with his wife-to-be. Although he generally confines himself to describing the context in which some letters were written, Hayek lets his opinion show on several occasions. In the introduction, for instance, he wonders if Mill's admiration for his wife's intellectual capacities was not a "sheer delusion" and "how far Mill's ideas, and especially his changes of opinion at a critical juncture of European thought, may have been due to this delusion" (Hayek 1951, pp. 14-15). Hayek gives his own answer further down:

I may perhaps here express the conclusions I have formed on the significance of Harriet Taylor in Mill's life. They are, that her influence on his thought and outlook, whatever her capacities may have been, were quite as great as Mill asserts, but that they acted in a way somewhat different from what is commonly believed. Far from it having been the sentimental it was the rationalist element in Mill's thought which was mainly strengthened by her influence (1951, p. 17).

In Hayek's mouth, the word "rationalist" is of course pejorative.<sup>17</sup> He therefore gives up the neutrality he displayed towards Harriet Taylor in the 1942 introduction.<sup>18</sup> As Janet Seiz and Michèle Pujol observe in *The American Economic Review*, "for more than a century, debate has raged over the extent and nature of [Harriet Taylor's] 'influence' on John Stuart Mill" (Seiz 2000, p. 476). Following A. Rossi (1970), they note that two positions have so far prevailed in the debate: "either HTM was declared incapable of having contributed significantly to JSM's thought, or if the aspect JSM's work being examined was one of the scholar disapproved of, 'the disliked element was seen as Harriet's influence'" (2000, p. 476).

The second position is that taken up by Hayek in his 1951 book. Hayek still subscribed to it at the end of his life since he asserted in his final book that "despite

<sup>17</sup>Hayek often used Gladstone's expression about Mill: "The Saint of Rationalism." See Hayek (1951, p. 16; 1988, pp. 65, 149).

<sup>18</sup>"a close friendship which, whatever may have been its true significance for Mill's intellectual development" (Hayek 1942, p. xii).

the great harm done by his work, we must probably forgive Mill much for his infatuation with the lady who later became his wife" (1988, p. 204). What then were the elements that bothered Hayek, and why did they bother him? We said earlier that in his previous work Hayek criticized Mill for epistemological reasons. He believed that the last book of *A System of Logic* (1843) had contributed to the development of "scientist" ideas.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, at the end of his life, Hayek seems to consider that under Taylor's influence, Mill passed from having sympathy with socialism to actually adopting socialist positions.<sup>20</sup>

### *Hayek's Fascination for Harriet Taylor*

Hayek therefore attributed a crucial role to Harriet Taylor; one of the portraits that he reproduced in his 1951 book represents her (p. 128). The caption says "Oil portrait in possession of the Author," that is to say in Hayek's possession.<sup>21</sup> At the end of his life, he maintained that going through Mill's unpublished correspondence had revealed some interesting material, among which was "the peculiarly fascinating correspondance of Mill with his later wife" (Hayek 1994, p. 129). How can this fascination be accounted for? Several clues suggest that it could be due, at least partly, to the similarities between Hayek's and Mill's lives.

This thesis, to which Gilles Dostaler first drew our attention, could only be confirmed by taking a close look at Hayek's correspondence, written around 1950.<sup>22</sup> Like Mill, Hayek had long been separated from the person with whom he longed to share his life. He had first married Hella Frisch in 1926. According to Alan Ebenstein, Hayek wrote in his letters dated 1948 to 1950 that the reason why he had not married his distant cousin (Helene) was "because of simple miscommunication" between them (Ebenstein 2001, p. 167). "They remained in close contact after they were married, and considered divorce as early as the 1930s" (2001, p. 168). The war prevented them from seeing each other from 1939 to 1946. Then Hayek "sought a relatively high paying position on the *Committee on Social Thought* at the University of Chicago largely because this would provide the funds to maintain his family in England and himself and Helene" (2001, p. 168). Hayek left his wife in December 1949, sent his resignation letter to the *LSE* in February 1950, and divorced on July 13, 1950. He married Helene Bitterlich and, at the end of the same year, became a lecturer at the Department of Social Sciences of the University of Chicago. As stated by the present editor of the *Collected Works of F.A. Hayek*:

<sup>19</sup>Some epistemological theses that Hayek reproached Mill with (such as the *homo oeconomicus* fiction) already appeared in his article about the method of political economy. Now this article, published in 1836, was written in 1830—that is to say, just *before* his meeting with Harriet Taylor. Moreover, in his autobiography Mill asserts that in 1829 and 1830, "[he] already regarded the methods of physical science as the proper models for political" (1873, p. 132). Mill so-called "scientism" is not derived from Taylor or Comte.

<sup>20</sup>Hayek also wrote that "Mill attributes to Mrs. Taylor's influence ideas which he demonstrably owes to the Saint-Simonians and Comte" (Hayek 1951, p. 297, n.1). But concerning socialism, Hayek later insisted on Taylor's influence: "Harriet Taylor led him more deeply into socialism for a time, then he stayed" (Hayek 1978, p. 6).

<sup>21</sup>This portrait was also reproduced a few years later in the *Collected Works* of Mill. It is again specified in the caption that the painting is in Hayek's possession (Vol. 14, p. 2).

<sup>22</sup>These archives are kept at Stanford University (Hoover Library and Archives).

It may not have been entirely a coincidence that Hayek decided to edit the correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor during this period . . . the similarities of the circumstances of their personal lives may have held some interest. Hayek's trip (accompanied by his new wife) through Italy and Greece in 1954-55, one hundred years after the Mills' own journey, also suggests a connection (Caldwell 2003, p. 297, n. 9).

### *Hayek's Fascination for On Liberty*

For Hayek, the year 1954 bears witness to another fascination. Having written a short preface for Michael St John Packe's biography of Mill,<sup>23</sup> Hayek embarked upon a curious project: to make again the journey that Mill had done exactly a century before. Hayek's motives were different from those of Mill, who had been staying in southern Europe for health reasons: "it might be interesting to repeat the journey after exactly a hundred years with the aim of producing a fully annotated edition of the letters" (Hayek 1994, p. 129). The letters are those written by Mill to Harriet Taylor during this journey. They do not appear in the 1951 book. In fact this journey, financed by the Guggenheim Foundation, never gave rise to the scheduled publication. But Hayek had a second motive for his tour:

In his *Autobiography*, Mill describes how the conception of his book *On Liberty* came to him walking up the steps of the capitol at Rome. When I repeated this on the appropriate day a hundred years later, no inspiration, however, came to me. And as I later noticed, it was indeed not to be expected, since Mill had fibbed: The letters show that the idea of writing such a book had come to him before he reached Rome. Nevertheless, shortly after the conclusion of our journey, I had before me a clear plan for a book on liberty (1994, p. 130).

This book, *The Constitution of Liberty*, was completed in 1959 and published in 1960. When it came out in 1960, it was sometimes compared to *On Liberty* by the British and American press. Hayek's work was thus hailed by Henry Hazlitt as "the twentieth-century successor to John Stuart Mill's essay, *On Liberty*" (*Newsweek*, February 15, 1960).<sup>24</sup> As for Milton Friedman, he considers that *The Constitution of Liberty* shows the deep influence on Hayek of the people he had met at the University of Chicago.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup>This text remains quite vague and offers no new information as to Hayek's opinion on Mill. For instance, Hayek writes: "Hitherto, we have had occasional glimpses of the human being concealed behind what was, it must be admitted, a somewhat forbidding appearance: now, for the first time, Mr. Packe has resurrected a whole personality with all its failings and achievements" (Hayek 1954a, p. xii).

<sup>24</sup>Cited in Ebenstein (2001, p. 187). It is worth remembering that Hazlitt was one of the thirty-six founding members of The Mont Pelerin Society. As for Norman Barry, he considers that "there is little doubt that Hayek's defense of freedom is the most eloquent, persuasive and closely-reasoned since Mill's *On Liberty*" (1979, p. 70).

<sup>25</sup>"I believe the major impact of my relationship with Hayek as well as the influence he derived from the students who were associated with him is reflected in *The Constitution of Liberty*. I do not believe he could have written that book if he had stayed in London. I believe the influence of Chicago was very important from that point of view" (Friedman's letter cited in Caldwell 2003, pp. 297-98, n.11).

The episode at the steps of the Capitol proves the regard (a century later to the day) that Hayek still had for Mill in 1954. It should also be noted that nine of the twenty-eight passages referring to Mill in *The Constitution of Liberty* are noteworthy, among which only two are critical of Mill.<sup>26</sup> Hayek uses quotations from Mill on many occasions and his work even ends with an extract from *On Liberty*.<sup>27</sup>

But at the end of his life, Hayek downplayed his interest in Mill and even declared that he had always been indifferent to this author: “[My] work on the Saint-Simonians in particular led *unexpectedly* to my devoting a great deal of time to, *who in fact never particularly appealed to me*, though I achieved *unintentionally* the reputation of being one of the foremost experts on him” (Hayek 1994 p. 128, italics added).<sup>28</sup>

Hayek’s denying any appeal for Mill does not seem in keeping with the facts. However Hayek seems to have left behind his initial admiration, as many of his criticisms show and as he himself acknowledged: “My many years of work on John Stuart Mill actually shook my admiration for someone I had thought a great figure indeed, with the result that my present opinion of John Stuart Mill is a very critical one indeed” (1994, p. 140). One may wonder about the reasons why he changed his mind in that way; why did Hayek take such an interest in Mill, to eventually criticize him so severely?

We are going to see that the 1960s and ‘70s marked the beginning of a new period during which Hayek no longer contented himself with calling Mill a socialist or holding him responsible for the infiltration of constructivism into the liberal tradition. He also expounded the reasons why he now disapproved of Mill.

#### IV. 1962-1988: A GROWINGLY CRITICAL STAND

In 1962, Hayek wrote the introduction to the twelfth volume of *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* published by Francis Mineka. Behind the customary politeness he displayed in it, the first stirrings of his disapproval can be felt:

During the forty years after his death, he governed liberal thought as did no other man, and as late as 1914 he was still the chief source of inspiration of the progressive part of the West—of the men whose dream of an indefinitely peaceful progress and expansion of Western civilization was shattered by the cataclysms of war and revolution. But even to that development Mill had unquestionably contributed by his sympathies for the rising aspirations of national self-determination and of socialism (Hayek 1962, p. xvi).

<sup>26</sup>In one of these two passages, Hayek deplores Mill’s introduction of the “rationalist” concept of *homo oeconomicus* (Hayek 1960, p. 61). See (Légé 2005b, chapter 5). The second thing that Hayek reproaches Mill for is the notion of “better distribution” of the produce (Hayek 1960, p. 430, n. 9). This criticism is more developed in his later works, as we will see in the next section. See also Légé (2005b, chapters 6, 8).

<sup>27</sup>As explained by Hayek, this extract is the quotation from Humboldt that Mill put in as an epigraph to *On Liberty*: “The grand, the leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity” (Mill 1859, in Hayek 1960, p. 394).

<sup>28</sup>This quotation is extracted from a collection of interviews carried out between 1945 and 1992 and published after his death. The passage which is quoted here dates back to the period between 1984 and 1988.

Here we can recognize the now familiar reproach concerning Mill's alleged "sympathies" for nationalism<sup>29</sup> and socialism. This reproach is all the more justified since Mill's intellectual influence was considerable: "It must probably still be admitted that it is not so much for the originality of his thinking as for its influence on a world now past that Mill is chiefly of importance today . . . there can be no question that his influence is such that to the historian of thought all information we have about Mill's activities, his contacts . . . is nearly as important as his published work" (1962, p. xvi).

### *The Wage Issue*

In the draft copy of an article published in 1968 ("Competition as a Discovery Procedure"), Hayek proved even more critical. His reproaches concerned one particular point:

The classical aim, which, in the words of John Stuart Mill, was "full employment at high wages" can therefore be achieved only by an efficient use of labour which requires the *free* movement of *relative* wage rates. That illustrious man, whose name for this reason I believe will go down to history as the grave-digger of the British economy, chose instead full employment at low wages. For this is the necessary result if the rigidity of relative wages is accepted as unalterable, and attempts made to correct its effects by lowering the general level of real wages by the round-about process of lowering the value of money (1968, p. 88).<sup>30</sup>

By advocating such a dangerous objective as *full employment with high wages*,<sup>31</sup> Mill would therefore be indirectly responsible for the decline of British economy. Hayek did not specify in which context Mill used this expression. In his autobiography Mill maintained that the principle of population stated by Malthus "originally brought forward as an argument against the indefinite improvability of human affairs" was interpreted by the Radicals "in the contrary sense, as indicating the sole means of realizing that improvability by securing full employment at high wages to the whole labouring population through a voluntary restriction of the increase of their numbers" (Mill 1873, p. 94). Therefore, Mill did not deal with the monetary policy but with the economic consequences of birth control. Moreover, Mill's idea that "full employment with high wages" leads to the happiness of the majority has a strong Smithian flavor.<sup>32</sup> And Hayek considers Smith as a true liberal.

<sup>29</sup>According to Hayek, Mill "accepted more of the nationalist doctrines than is compatible with his wholly liberal program" (Hayek 1939, p. 270, n. 9). He criticized "the concessions Mill had made to the nationalistic tendencies" (Hayek 1945, p. 29, n. 26). This criticism is based on Lord Acton's views. It is worth remembering that Hayek was in favor of a European federal system. What Mill said about "nations" is outside the scope of our work, but Levy and Peart highlight the role of sympathy in Mill's discussion about representative self-government (2005, pp. 948-49). See also Varouxakis (2002).

<sup>30</sup>The argument featured in the draft is repeated in the final version of the article (Hayek 1968, p. 88), but the reference to John Stuart Mill has disappeared.

<sup>31</sup>On the contrary, Hayek believed that Smith had discovered what "had become the chief cause of Britain's economic prosperity": "those restrictions on the powers of government which had originated from sheer distrust of all arbitrary power" (Hayek 1973, p. 125).

<sup>32</sup>See Levy and Peart (2005) on the happiness of the majority in classical political economy, in particular on Smith's statement about growth and the attendant high wages (pp. 940-41). Levy and Peart point out the importance of sympathy in Smith's and Mill's system. But Hayek neglects the role of sympathetic behavior.

Hayek nevertheless repeated his criticism of the objective of “*full employment with high wages*” in his later works. Indeed, it can be found again in two articles published by *The Institute of Economic Affairs* in 1975 and 1984. It is, however, interesting to notice that Hayek slightly altered this reproach: in 1975, he wished the expression “full employment”—which he associated to the “Keynesian dream” and to his “inflationist policy” but also to Mill—were “abandoned.”<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, he asserted in 1984 that: “Nobody can claim a moral right to employment at a particular wage, unless there is opportunity profitably to employ him at such wages. The problem today is that access to such employment is denied to him by the monopolistic organizations of his fellows. All opportunities for employment are a creation of the market and the classical ideal of “full employment at high wages” (J. S. Mill) can be achieved only by a functioning market on which the wages offered for different kinds of work tell the worker where, in the circumstances of the moment, he can make the largest contribution to the social product” (Hayek 1984a, p. 318).

The objective set by Mill was therefore no longer regarded as out of reach, and the expression “full employment” was no longer questioned. Here, Hayek considered that this objective was attainable “by a functioning market,” provided that the role of the trade unions be limited (Hayek called them the workers’ “monopolistic organizations”).<sup>34</sup> His criticism of the “moral right” to enjoy a certain level of wages is in keeping with his favorite theme in the 1970s: the criticism of social justice.<sup>35</sup>

### *Two Conflicting Ideas: Social Justice and Liberty*

And indeed, from that time on, Hayek increasingly focused his criticism of Mill on his moral philosophy. In his article entitled *Liberalism* he said:

John Stuart Mill in his celebrated book *On Liberty* (1859), directed his criticism chiefly against the tyranny of opinion rather than the actions of government and by his advocacy of distributive justice and a general sympathetic attitude towards socialist aspirations in some of his other works, prepared the gradual transition of a large part of the liberal intellectuals to a moderate socialism (Hayek 1973, pp. 129-30).

---

<sup>33</sup>Hayek:

The Keynesian dream is gone even if its ghost will continue to plague politicians for decades. It is to be wished, though this is clearly too much to hope for, that the term “full employment” itself, which has become so closely associated with the inflationist policy, should be abandoned—or that we should at least remember that it was the aim of classical economists long before Keynes. John Stuart Mill reports in his autobiography how “full employment with high wages” appeared to him in his youth as the chief desideratum of economic policy” (1975, p. 278).

<sup>34</sup>The article that is quoted here (Hayek 1984) is entitled “1980s Unemployment and the Unions.” It was published by the *Institute of Economic Affairs* (IEA), shortly after the English miners’ union decided to refuse doing overtime hours, in order to protest against mine closure. This took the form of a partial strike three days a week and, from March 1984, of a general strike of the miners. This movement ended in March 1985 after violent confrontations and without getting satisfaction. We go back over Hayek’s positions on the question of the Trade Unions in (Légé 2005b, chapter 8).

<sup>35</sup>On Hayek’s criticism against social justice, see Barry (1979, pp. 137-43) and Dupuy (1992, chapter 8).

This passage clearly expresses the idea that Hayek repeated throughout the 1970s and '80s: Mill was to blame first for not defending the right liberties in *On Liberty* and secondly for supporting demands for "social justice." Mill's 1859 book was no longer considered as a model. As a matter of fact, Hayek maintained in an interview<sup>36</sup> that "the decline of liberalism begins with John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*" (Hayek 1978, p. 6). For what reason?

In a sense, his argument is directed against the tyranny of the prevailing morals, and he is very largely responsible for the shift from protest against government interferences to what he calls the tyranny of opinion. And he encouraged a disregard for certain moral traditions. Permissiveness almost begins with John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*" (1978, p. 5).

In his major work, *Law Legislation and Liberty*, Hayek reproached Mill for adopting a view of social justice that "leads straight to full-fledged socialism" (1976, p. 77). He based his criticism on the idea that Mill's moral doctrine, utilitarianism, rested upon the assumption that individuals are omniscient. In the texts he wrote in the 1970s and 1980s, Hayek repeatedly maintained that Mill, by trying to defend "social justice," had fostered socialism. Hayek considered that "social justice" was an absurd notion and that Mill had been blinded by three "errors" that reinforced one another:

- (1) The utilitarian doctrine, which, according to Hayek, assumed that individuals were omniscient.
- (2) The classical theory of value, which Hayek considered as an inversion of the true functional relationship of value.<sup>37</sup>
- (3) An erroneous distinction between the laws of production and the laws of distribution.

What Mill and Hayek have in common is the cross-disciplinary aspect of their work. But Hayek disagreed with the way Mill linked the different domains of knowledge. In a text entitled "The Muddle of the Middle,"<sup>38</sup> he reproached him for having introduced "a moral problem" into economics by making his distinction between production and distribution (Hayek 1981, p. 92). This distinction is presented by Hayek as a consequence of "the objective theory of value," which itself rests on ideas borrowed from physics. The ultimate consequence of scientism is therefore the introduction of a "moral problem," that of social justice. What seems to

<sup>36</sup>Hayek (1978) is an interview with Hayek by Robert Bork. See the bibliography for further information.

<sup>37</sup>"Like Marx, Mill treated market values exclusively as effects and not also as causes of human decisions" (Hayek 1988, p. 93). See also Hayek (1984, p. 337).

<sup>38</sup>In an interview, Hayek, who was asked what he thought of Mill's influence, answered that he was precisely working on an article called "Mill's Muddle and the Muddle of the Middle" (1978, p. 10). It was read by Hayek on March 26, 1980, in front of an electoral committee of the conservative party, the *Monday Club*, under the title "The Muddle of the Middle." A new version was presented in February 1981, on the occasion of a conference organized by Liberty Fund in Freiburg. In this text, which was part of a collective work entitled *Philosophical and Economic Foundations of Capitalism*, Hayek went back over the two elements that had supposedly undermined liberalism "during the last quarter of the nineteenth century": "the infiltration of socialism into the Liberal party" and the Conservatives' preference for "expediency" rather than "principles" (Hayek 1981, pp. 89-90).

arouse Hayek's interest in particular is precisely this notion which Mill is supposed to have invented.<sup>39</sup>

## V. CONCLUSION

From the forties onward, Hayek criticized Mill's sympathy with socialism. Yet he tried to distinguish, within Mill's work, between the ideas influenced by Comte's and Harriet Taylor's "rationalism" on the one hand and the ideas that allowed defending liberty on the other. That is why until the sixties his criticism of the *System of Logic* and of the *Principles of Political Economy* went together with a great admiration for *On Liberty*.

As explained earlier, this interpretation gave way to a much more critical opinion in the sixties. Now, Hayek also criticized *On Liberty*. He considered that a "free society" could be worked more "successfully" if "voluntary conformity" prevailed over "original personality." On that point he disagreed with Mill's defense of "spontaneity," "originality" and "individuality" against conformity and "the despotism of custom" (*On Liberty*, 1859). This is fairly ironic for someone complaining about the "bad" influences to which Mill had been exposed.

In fact, Hayek did not change his views but changed his emphasis. He already argued against "the cult of the distinct and different individuality" in a passage of "Individualism: True and False" in which he briefly refers to Mill's *On Liberty* (1945, p. 26). But this criticism grew as time went on. Hayek even wrote that in directing his heaviest attack against moral coercion Mill "probably overstated the case for liberty" (1960, p. 146). He held Mill responsible for the disregard for the prevailing morals. At the end of his life, this charge against Mill (but also against Keynes and Freud) became a dominant theme in Hayek's thought (1979, pp. 161-76).

One can also point out the rhetorical value of denouncing Mill: the expression "Mill himself" is used twice by Hayek and the expression "Even to that development Mill had unquestionably contributed" once. The "Saint of Rationalism" had been corrupted and had become a socialist. If Mill had, which rationalist would not? Mill is used as a demonstration of Hayek's theory about the danger of rationalism.

## REFERENCES

- Barry, Norman. 1979. *Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy*. London: Macmillan.
- Cairnes, John Elliot. 1874. *Some Leading Principles of Political Economy Newly Expounded*. New York: Kelley, 1967.
- Caldwell, Bruce. 2003. *Hayek's Challenge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dostaler, Gilles. 2001. *Le libéralisme de Hayek*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. 1992. *Le sacrifice et l'envie*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Ebenstein, Alan. 2001. *Friedrich Hayek: A Biography*. New York: Palgrave.
- Ebenstein, Alan. 2003. *Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek*. London: Palgrave.

<sup>39</sup>On the relationship between the three critics, see Légé (2005a; 2005b, chapter 6). For an interpretation of Mill's distinction between production and distribution, see Smith (1985).

- Gray, John. 1984. *Hayek on Liberty*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1931. *Prices and Production*. London: Routledge, 1946.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1932. "A Note on the Development of the Doctrine of Forced Saving." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 47 (1): 123–33.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1939. "The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism." In *Individualism and Economic Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 255–72.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1941. "The Counter-Revolution of Science." In *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*. Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979, pp. 183–363.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1942. "J.S. Mill at the Age of Twenty-five." In John Stuart Mill, *The Spirit of the Age*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. v–xxxiii.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1943. "J.S. Mill's Correspondence." In John Cunningham Wood, ed., *John Stuart Mill Critical Assessments, Vol. 4*. London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 40–43.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "Individualism: True and False." In *Individualism and Economic Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 1–32.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1947a. "Opening Address to a Conference at Mont Pélerin." In *The Fortunes of Liberalism*. London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 237–48.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1947b. "'Free' Enterprise and Competitive Order." In *Individualism and Economic Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 107–18.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1951. *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1954. "Introduction." In Michael St John Packe, *The Life of John Stuart Mill*. London: Secker and Warburg.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1960. *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1962. "Introduction." In Francis Mineka, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 12*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1963. "The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume." In *Economic Freedom*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 101–18.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1968. "A Tiger by the Tail, Section 24 (from a draft for 'Competition as a Discovery Procedure')." In *Economic Freedom*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 83–88.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1973. "Liberalism." In *New Studies*. London: Routledge, 1978, pp. 119–51.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1976. *Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1979. *Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free People*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1978. "Hayek interviewed by Jack High." Transcription by *The Idea Channel* ([www.ideachannel.com](http://www.ideachannel.com)).<sup>40</sup>
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1981. "The Muddle of the Middle." In Svetozar Pejovich, ed., *Philosophical and Economic Foundations of Capitalism*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 89–100.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1984. "1980s Unemployment and the Unions." In *Economic Freedom*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 315–55.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1988. *The Fatal Conceit, the Errors of Socialism*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich. 1994. *Hayek on Hayek*. London: Routledge.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992. "Libéralisme et socialisme: le cas anglais." *Genèses* 9 (October): 44–59.
- Hollander, Samuel. 1985. *The Economics of John Stuart Mill*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Horwitz, Steven. 2005. "Friedrich Hayek, Austrian Economist: Review Essay of Caldwell and Ebenstein." *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 27 (1): 71–85.

<sup>40</sup>This interview has been made by the *Oral History Program* in UCLA. It figures in *Nobel Prize-winning Economist*, Armen Alchian, UCLA Charles E. Young Library, Department of Special Collections, 1983. I use the transcription because this book is not available in French libraries.

- Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. London: Macmillan.
- Légé, Philippe. 2005a. "Friedrich Hayek critique de John Stuart Mill: une réflexion sur la notion de justice sociale." *Economies et Sociétés, Oeconomia, Histoire de la Pensée Economique* 37 (October): 1819–48.
- Légé, Philippe. 2005b. *Le libéralisme de Hayek à la lumière de sa lecture de John Stuart Mill*. Thèse de doctorat de science Economique. Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.
- Levy, David and Sandra Peart. 2005. "A Discipline without Sympathy." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 38 (3): 937–54.
- Levy, David and Sandra Peart. 2006. "Discussion, Construction and Evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the Constitutional Order." Paper presented at the Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economics, Fairfax, July 10–15.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1836. "On the Definition of Political Economy, and the Method Proper to It." In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 4*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 309–39.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1843. *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*. In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vols. 7, 8*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1848. *Principles of Political Economy*. London: A.M. Kelley, 1987.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1849. "Vindication of the French Revolution of February 1848." In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 20*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 319–59.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1859. *On Liberty*. In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 18*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 213–310.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1861. *Utilitarianism*. In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 10*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 203–59.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1865. *Auguste Comte and Positivism*. In John M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 10*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 261–368.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1873. *Autobiography*. London: Penguin Classics, 1989.
- Mises, Ludwig. 1927. *Liberalism*, 2nd edition. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1962.
- Seiz, Janet and Michèle Pujol. 2000. "Harriet Taylor Mill." *The American Economic Review* 90 (2): 476–79.
- Smith, Vardaman. 1985. "John Stuart Mill's Famous Distinction between Production and Distribution." *Economics and Philosophy* 1: 267–84.
- Varouxakis, Georgios. 2002. *Mill on Nationality*. London: Routledge.