

attempt by Cicero to equate himself to Demosthenes, but also his presence in both Cicero's early and late career. Ch. 5 leaves aside the philosophical and political treatises and delves into the question of the letters, positing a contrafactual: what would Cicero's curated collection of letters have looked like? B. surveys Greek letter-collections and epistolography to argue that Cicero would have presented a curated and re-elaborated corpus that would justify his choices at the outbreak and during the war of 49 B.C., conforming to the narrative presented in *Philippics* 2. While the previous chapters had a closely knit narrative and a coherent structure, ch. 5 sits more uneasily in the book: it does not reach the subtle readings and in-depth arguments of the previous analyses. Finally, ch. 6 reviews Cicero's self-quotation of his earlier poetic works in *De natura deorum* and *De divinatione*, thus making them part of the canon. Overall, B.'s book is sometimes too focused on very detailed points of philosophical interpretations, losing perspective on the main argument. However, she convincingly studies Cicero's strategies for textual immortality in his non-oratorical works, which soured as his political career waned. Cicero's genius, as stated by Bishop, 'was not necessarily, or at least not wholly, comprised of some sort of pure, immanent "greatness"' (302). It was Cicero's hard work that allowed him to enter the canon: publish or perish, indeed.

In sum, both books under review narrate the history of Cicero's successful strategy for becoming a literary classic, but also his failure to become a renowned political figure and *exemplum*. They raise debate and suggest new questions, making both books a worthy read. Nevertheless, by focusing too much on Cicero (and reasonably so, since he is the subject of their study), L. B. and B. do not engage with the question of whether Cicero and his career were exceptional. For example, how did Caesar become part of the canon (an answer that would provide a different perspective on the diversity of literary strategies)? Is it possible somehow to free ourselves (at least partly) from the Ciceronian perspective? This is not a moot point, since it would have allowed both authors to frame Cicero's literary output within a larger perspective.

The wealth of information on Cicero's rhetorical and literary output should not let us forget that he was not the only senator publishing and circulating his speeches. L. B. analyses (25) Cicero's refusal to reply to Piso's speech (Cic. *Att.* 3.1.11), but does not delve into the fact that Piso *did* in fact publish his own speech. This debate on the publication of speeches will, in all likelihood, shift with the publication of C. Steel's forthcoming *Fragments of the Republican Roman Orators*, which will provide a thorough view of non-Ciceronian oratory. Likewise, L. B. rightly surveys how Cicero based his career on his rhetorical skills, and promoted such a path as the golden one in his literary output; but he does not take into account H. van der Blom's *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (2016), which shows how other politicians used rhetoric in different ways to further their own successful political careers, showing the diversity of models available to Roman senators of the Late Republic. The Ciceronian corpus is a great heritage; breaking up Cicero's perspective is a hard, but necessary exercise.

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ANTJE JUNGHANSS, *ZUR BEDEUTUNG VON WOHLTATEN FÜR DAS GEDEIHEN VON GEMEINSCHAFT: CICERO, SENECA UND LAKTANZ ÜBER BENEFICIA* (Palingenesia 109). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017. Pp. 277. ISBN 9783515118576. €56.00.

Antje Junghanß explores how three Latin texts (Cicero's *De officiis*, Seneca's *De beneficiis*, Lactantius' *Divinae institutiones*) configure the significance which benefactions that humans bestow upon each other have for communal life. Preliminary considerations concern terminology; Stoic ethics; Roman patronage; and theories of the gift. In her survey of relevant terms, J. brings out well the conceptual variation within this discursive field. Sen. *Ben.* 3.18.1 serves to distinguish a voluntary *beneficium* to a specific individual or group from contractual obligations (*credita*), duties arising from kinship (*officia*) or required service (*ministerium*). Cicero, in turn, makes *beneficium* a subcategory of *officium* and uses a range of near synonyms, such as *beneficentia*, *liberalitas*, *benignitas*, *benevolentia*, *largitio*, *prodigalitas*. And Lactantius redefines this terminological legacy in a Christian key while also valorising further concepts such as *aequalitas*

or *miseriordia*. J.'s Stoa comes across as a fairly uniform school of thought, without significant historical variations, though she is good at identifying important controversies in the scholarly literature. In her account of Roman patronage, she builds on Saller, Lavan and Jehne to survey the instrumental nature of Roman 'friendship' and the wide range of inequalities this term comprised (however euphemistically obfuscated). Finally, J. proposes to understand relationships grounded in *beneficia* in terms of Mauss's theory of gift exchange, emphasising both the (material) contents of the gift and the act of giving as an act of communication. She stresses that the reciprocities inherent in such exchanges strengthen 'community' — without subjecting this central notion to much critical pressure. And while the Maussian framework captures important aspects of Roman practice, her three texts variously maintain that the dyadic reciprocities of concern to Mauss do *not* necessarily result in a desirable community.

For Cicero, J. works out the complementary status of *iustitia* and *beneficentia* as constituting the society-enabling second aspect of the *honestum* — as background to a discussion of *beneficentia*, a topic treated at various moments in *Off.* Cicero's preoccupation with the misuse of resources tends to get downplayed. J.'s discussion of *Off.* 1.48 at 59–60 is a case in point: she underscores that a *uir bonus* must return favours received, but fails to cite Cicero's important rider *modo id facere possit sine iniuria*. Yet the suppressed climax of the sentence contains a radical thought, once placed within the civic ethics of *Off.* For instance, it liberates recipients of favours from a tyrant like Caesar from the need to reciprocate. Far from endorsing the principle of reciprocity as absolute, Cicero imposes restrictions on the circularity of favour and counter-favour. J.'s claim that Cicero is not particularly interested in the ethics of returning favours (57, 63) is therefore also misconceived — not least in the light of her own discussion of those passages where Cicero argues that no-one is ever able to repay the debt we owe to our *patria* and our parents: every citizen, however powerful a patron he might be in his own right, is first and foremost a beneficiary in debt, obliged to return services already received, rather than a benefactor. Simplifying, one could argue that one of Cicero's main objectives in *Off.* is to integrate Rome's 'Maussian realities' within a communal framework that relies upon, but also operates above and beyond bilateral gift exchange.

For Seneca, in turn, the value of the *beneficium* resides in the inner attitude of the giver — and it benefits only insofar as it is an expression of their *uirtus*. The discussion here struggles to go much beyond a summary of the text and has little to add to the existing scholarship, notably Miriam Griffin's magisterial *Seneca on Society: A Guide to De Beneficiis* (2013). But the discrepancy between the Maussian model and how Seneca thinks about benefactions and communal life emerges loud and clear.

Lactantius, finally, assumes that all of humanity desires a just society, but only Christians have the necessary insight grounded in faith to practice the virtues (such as liberal giving in line with the will of God and his care for all) to bring it about. For him, however, the motivation for benefactions is ultimately selfish: such acts are investments in an economy of salvation, with the benefactor banking on God and counting on proper dividends after death (224). Intriguing paradoxes ensue: for Lactantius' religiously motivated *homo oeconomicus*, for instance, nothing is less welcome than Maussian mechanisms of reciprocity in the here and now. For insofar as beneficiaries manage to balance the account, their benefactors lose eschatological credit with God. The severely disadvantaged such as the poor, orphans or widows, who have no hope of repaying kindnesses received, therefore offer particularly promising investment opportunities.

J.'s juxtaposition of Cicero, Seneca and Lactantius thus brings out well how all three authors rethink exchange relations in ways that defy Mauss's logic of the gift. Cicero's civic ethics, Seneca's virtue ethics and Lactantius' religious economy all envision an ideal of (communal) existence that recognises and accommodates, but also operates above and beyond the reciprocities that shape interactions between humans. The finding that some of the most interesting aspects of these texts fall outside or even operate against the theoretical framework invoked at the outset would have benefitted from further reflection.

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