The Little Trumpeter (1973), an animated children's version of *Red Detachment of Women*, has a chase on horseback that employs repetitive limited animation. Realism obviously held sway here, but Du shows there is room for allegorizing animals even if they didn't talk.

Du's book is a tour-de-force of animation studies. Her meticulously researched transnational emphasis is welcome for an animation industry that could be, at times, parochial and inward turning. But I wonder what role did the city of Shanghai play in the studio's success? Did this post-colonial space benefit from its previous position as a nexus of cultural production? The jury may be out that "[t]he totalitarian state unexpectedly brought about the golden age of Chinese animation" (7). Perhaps the decline of the SAFS should be mapped on a trajectory of animation production beginning with its inception in 1957 and its apex in the early 1960s.

Daisy Du's book is a richly detailed and theoretically nuanced addition to the growing research on Chinese and transnational animation. *Animated Encounters* evidences the way Chinese animation was, from its early beginnings, intersecting with world animations.

Red China's Green Revolution: Technological Innovation, Institutional Change, and Economic Development Under the Commune

By Joshua Eisenman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 472 pp. $35.00 (paper).

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Joshua Eisenman's new book serves as a stark reminder of the power and influence of the narratives put forth by the Chinese Communist Party. Western scholars see ourselves as critical truth-seekers, but in many instances we have unwittingly parroted Communist tales of questionable validity. This is particularly true for rural China, where endless miles of farmlands and small industry defy easy characterization. For decades, the common understanding of land reform has been directly drawn from William Hinton's *Fanshen*, a book now more appropriately viewed as a work of propaganda. Recently, Xiaojia Hou has shown the story of early success in the lead-up to collectivization to be another false narrative. And now Eisenman's study of the commune demonstrates that the well-known story of farmers in Anhui's Xiaogang Production Team toppling collective farming is also untrue. Writing in accessible prose, Eisenman clearly lays out his argument and key findings, stressing how the commune system, traditionally seen as an economic failure, in fact laid the foundations for China's rapid economic growth in the 1980s. And despite the widely promoted story of Xiaogang farmers banding together to risk their lives to return to household farming, China abandoned the commune system not because of tenacious resistance at the grassroots, but because of political intrigue at the highest levels of power. This book is unquestionably well-researched. Eisenman made full use of existing literature, which includes many local studies arguing for the economic resiliency of the commune. In a time when many scholars obsess over "new" archival finds, Eisenman expertly draws on underutilized statistical data from multiple provinces to revise our understanding of the commune as a national system.

Like many excellent books, this one starts with a question: If Xiaogang farmers were really at the forefront of toppling the commune in 1978, why, then, did a leading opponent of collective farming visit Xiaogang in 1977? To answer this question, Eisenman traces the historical development of the commune system. The start of this process, the initial formation of communes during the Great Leap Forward, will be familiar to many readers. But Eisenman follows this narrative thread beyond the disasters of the Leap, detailing how commune policy shifted over the 1960s in response to factional divides between Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong. Liu favored trusts over communes, hoping to increase centralization in order to extract revenue for heavy industry. Mao, meanwhile, wanted to let communes keep their surpluses to reinvest locally. Despite multiple policy reversals, Eisenman stresses key continuities in the commune after the Leap. Communes had a three-tier organizational structure, with production brigades and production teams under the commune. Households were allowed small private lots, but otherwise earned income as a portion of collective income. Maoism, meanwhile, was the ideological glue that held the commune together.

The topsy-turvy 1960s led to what Eisenman terms the "Green Revolution Commune," which endured until its demise under Deng Xiaoping. These communes were green not because they were environmentally friendly, but because they fueled agricultural growth. Of particular importance was the research and extension program that emerged from the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference in 1970. This program, a vertically integrated network of research centers at the national and provincial level, linked with experimentation centers at the county and commune levels, expanded investments in seeds, fertilizer, and mechanization. Eisenman details a number of important challenges that communes successfully faced in the 1970s, including population growth, decreasing arable land, and capital depreciation as Great Leap-era projects started to crumble. Despite these formidable challenges, China's communes successfully fed an ever-expanding population. Eisenman traces these successes first to the commune's ability to extract high rates of income from households. By taking about half of all economic output for the commune before distributing household income through work points, local leaders were able to invest in and expand production. Here Eisenman rightly points to the importance of Maoism within the commune. Through propaganda and rituals, Maoism pervaded all aspects of commune life. Isolated in communes and under intense social pressure to value the collective over individual interests, commune residents came to accept a low standard of living.

Eisenman's research includes a re-evaluation of the commune's demise. As detailed at the close of the book, the commune was not brought down from below by disgruntled Xiaogang farmers. As scholars should have suspected all-along, the end of collectivization had the same origins as the initial push to collectivize in the 1950s: China's highest leadership. While the political intrigue between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng in the aftermath of Mao's death is well-known, Eisenman brings new life to this narrative by highlighting how Hua's fate was tied to his support for Maoist communes. Once Deng had outmaneuvered Hua, he dispatched like-minded leaders to tour provinces to urge local leaders to abandon the commune system. Only then did Xiaogang farmers speak out against collective farming. Many scholars have been drawn to this tale of grassroots activism shaking the halls of Zhongnanhai, but Eisenman's research demonstrates that this story was simply too good to be true.

For this reason, Eisenman notes his suspicion that some readers will find his book disturbing. As a cultural historian, I fully understand the pitfalls of gauging audience reaction, but I must disagree. Yes, there may be a few who are committed to the story of brave Xiaogang farmers standing up to the Communist Party, but I optimistically believe that the vast majority of scholars will appreciate the opportunity to distance themselves from this false narrative. I recommend this book to anyone who works on rural China. Our common understanding of the commune is based on the disasters of the Leap and China's rapid economic growth after the downfall of collective farming. Eisenman's book fills in the gaps of the commune's history, while convincingly arguing for a reinterpretation its economic legacy.

Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949

By M. Taylor Fravel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 376 pp. $35.00 (cloth).

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Taylor Fravel has written what will undoubtedly be the definitive work on China's military strategy from 1949 to the present, at least until Chinese party and military archives are open to researchers. Fravel sets out to explain when and why China's strategic guidelines (*zhanlue fangzhen*), or military strategy, has changed and in what ways. He identifies nine instances when strategy has changed, with three clear cases of major strategy change (1956, 1980, 1993) and five cases of relatively minor change (1960, 1977, 1998, 2004, and 2014). He argues that major change occurs when a major change in the nature of warfare has taken place and when the Chinese political elite is united. Minor change occurs when the elite is united, but when there has not been a major change in the ways wars have been fought. He notes one major exception to this pattern. That occurred in 1964 when Mao personally intervened to reset Chinese military strategy to lure the enemy in deep. In all the other cases, proposals for changes in military strategy were proposed and worked out by the military high command and approved by the party leadership. He contrasts conventional military strategy, dominated by the military leadership, with China's nuclear strategy, which he convincingly argues has been the sole purview of top political leaders.

Fravel is a political scientist at MIT, and he is concerned to situate his research in the context of relevant studies of civil–military relations, military innovation and diffusion, and aspects of the general qualitative literature in political science. Most of the book, however, is a deeply researched history of military strategy making and the attendant doctrinal changes in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The scholarship is exhaustive. In particular, the coverage of the 1956 strategy is pathbreaking—few have paid much