

further democratization. For Schwedler, a focus on the lack of progress toward democracy underappreciates the effects of restructuring of political space on political parties even in the absence of democracy. Moreover, the focus on institutional structures and behavioral patterns cannot directly explain *ideological* moderation. Schwedler defines such moderation “not as behavioral change, but as change in ideology from a rigid and closed worldview to one relatively more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives” (p. 22).

Thus, her book compares the effects of the limited political openings in Jordan and Yemen on the restructuring of public political space. She finds that the Jordanian IAF became more ideologically moderate over time, but the Yemeni Islah did not. The variation between the two cases results from the restructuring of political space that changed: The political opportunity structures for Islah and the IAF, the internal group structures, and their boundaries of justifiable ideological action within the interplay of cultural narratives of Islam, democracy, and national unity. These dimensions also influenced each other.

As part of the critique of transitology, *Faith in Moderation* could help us move to the next step of exploring politics in the “gray zone” of autocracy from the analysis of “stalled democratization,” with its reification of non-democratic regimes, to a focus on authoritarian *dynamics*. Although Schwedler elucidates the effects of institutional change on opposition groupings, a key variation between the two cases lies in the different natures of authoritarianism in Jordan (a consolidated monarchy) and Yemen (the merger of two republics). She does note this contrast (p. 64); however, she could make more of this structural difference in explaining her other preferred variables—internal party structure and the mechanism of ideological change.

She rightly points out that the cultural dimensions of political contestation are underspecified by structural approaches and provides us with valuable information on the processes of ideological debate in the IAF and Islah. However, she downplays the degree that those debates were strongly influenced—if not determined (but not predetermined)—by regime-led structural changes. The histories of both regime and opposition in Jordan and Yemen enter her analysis (especially in Chapter 2); however, she perhaps too quickly discards notions of path dependency in favor of exploring ideological change in the 1990s in Chapters 4 and 5.

Another area where ideological change may be more strongly influenced by institutional structures than Schwedler argues lies in the issue of cooperation between Islamists and other opposition groups. She notes the issue of the imbalance in power between the Jordanian and Yemeni regimes and the Islamist opposition groups (e.g., p. 182) and the relationship between each party and their domestic Islamist rivals (in Chapter 6). However, how the two parties relate to non-Islamist opposition groups could be

explored further. She explains that cooperation between Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party was strongly influenced by the vicissitudes of the ruling General People’s Congress (p. 188). However, a similar analysis of IAF—leftist cooperation in Jordan (p. 174)—fails to elaborate on the gradual reversal in the balance of power between the 1950s, when the Jordanian monarchy’s chief rivals came from the left, to the 1990s, when the IAF, and its parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood, led the opposition forces. Such a change does a great deal to explain Islamist “moderation” because it came from a position of relative strength (at least vis-à-vis other opposition groups). On a technical note, all veto powers over the elected lower house in Jordan were in the constitution well before the 1991 National Charter—a document with normative, but not legal, standing (p. 100).

Schwedler offers an important contribution to the literature on democratization in the Middle East as well as to our study of Islamist political parties. Students of other regions who rely on the “inclusion-moderation” thesis should also take notice of this work. She rightly explores the assumption that structural change leads to unmediated ideological change. Moreover, she contributes to our knowledge of two commonly cited moderate Islamist groups. She also brings the often understudied case of Yemen into our discussions. Her exemplary diligence in the field gathering interviews and internal party documents should be commended.

Faith in Moderation should work its way into the reading lists of graduate courses on Middle East politics. Schwedler’s more analytical approach means that she does not present the histories of the IAF and Islah chronologically but rather thematically, which may limit the book’s utility for undergraduate audiences. However, her exercise in conceptual unpacking, which blends social movement theories and transitology, should help Middle East studies rejoin debates in comparative politics.

Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. By Peter H. Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 380p. \$74.00 cloth, \$28.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071289

— Jennifer L. McCoy, *Georgia State University*

Peter Smith set out to write a textbook and ended up compiling an original database of Latin American democracy from 1900 to 2000. Analyzing a century of democratic change, Smith has written an impressive book that is accessible to undergraduates, a great literature review for graduate students, instructive for policymakers, and a significant contribution to scholarly understanding of a complex phenomenon. All of this is done with a lively and jargon-free writing style.

The central theme of the book is that Latin American democracy will endure now because it is safe, but it will

endure in a shallow and illiberal form. Smith identifies three cycles of democracy in the twentieth century: the incipient early cycle with four countries (1900–1939); the second cycle adding nine countries (1940–77), and the third cycle adding six more (1978–2000). In contrast to the tumultuous second cycle, when popular representation (and demands) expanded rapidly, threatening established interests and causing backlashes of military authoritarianism, the current third cycle is a “tamed” democracy, resting on negotiated transitions, moderate ideology, and restricted representation. Illiberal democracy is the most pervasive form, reflecting restrictions on freedom of expression and dissent, and police repression. The author expects this form to continue particularly in the more hostile (to democracy) international environment following 9/11.

Like Adam Przeworski et al. (*Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*, 2000) and Larry Diamond (*Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 1999), Smith adopts a subminimalist definition of democracy based on free and fair elections. He then creates four regime types: a) electoral democracy with free and fair elections; b) electoral semidemocracy in which elections are free but not fair (that is, contestation is open, but incumbent manipulates the results) and/or elections are free and fair but the winners do not wield effective power to govern; c) competitive oligarchy in which participation is limited to elites; and d) nondemocracies, or everything else.

Smith then adds the rest of Robert Dahl’s “procedural minimum” by addressing rights and freedoms as a separate variable that, taken together with the electoral dimension, produces a set of configurations of political democracy. Through this analysis, he breaks down the electoral democracy regime type into two subtypes: liberal democracy (extensive guarantees of civil liberties) and illiberal democracy (partial or minimal guarantees of civil liberties).

Every author must decide on a set of criteria to define and measure his or her main concepts, and then apply those empirically. Smith clearly defines his categories, admits subjectivity in his application to certain countries and borderline cases, and does an admirable job in presenting his data in easy-to-read graphs and charts. My quibbles have to do with his conceptualization, application to specific cases, and minimalist writing style that causes confusion in some instances. First, while it is analytically useful to separate the two dimensions of elections and rights in order to assess the relationship between them, it is also difficult to imagine how a government could conduct free and fair elections without protecting certain minimal rights before and during an electoral event. Restrictions on the press and access to the media fundamentally affect the quality of elections, yet here are counted as a separate variable under “quality” of democracy.

The problem with the criteria is evidenced in the cases themselves. Smith does not provide us with the rationale

for individual assignments, and so we have to glean it from occasional side references, or not at all. For example, Venezuela is moved from electoral democracy to semi-democracy in 1999 in Smith’s classification, but why? The 1998 elections bringing Hugo Chávez to power were transparent, and the new government’s dominance of the constituent assembly elected in 1999 was due to the disorganization of the opposition rather than manipulation of the vote. We get a glimpse of his criteria on p. 160 when Chávez is deemed to have convened a constitutional convention “of questionable legality” and page 175 where Chávez is alleged in 1999 to have “succeeded in disbanding the incumbent legislatures.” Yet neither of these has to do with the subminimalist criteria of elections per se, and at any rate, are open to interpretation.

Likewise, we could ask why Nicaragua was considered to be an electoral democracy still in 2000 after a pact between the two major parties severely restricted the ability of third parties to contest for office, or why Chile is put in the loftiest category of liberal democracy when the elected officials did not fully govern, given the reserved domains still in effect from the Pinochet years.

The third quibble has to do with the writing style and clarity. References to electoral democracy get dropped to just “democracy” in some instances, presumably for editorial reasons, yet the residual category of nondemocracy (autocracy) means that the intermediate categories of oligarchy and semidemocracy are also included in the broad category of “democracy” at times, resulting in some confusion. An alternative interpretation would place semidemocracy into a category of electoral authoritarianism, reflecting the judgment that if the minimal criteria of free and fair elections are not met, then the regime does not qualify as any kind of democracy.

The bulk of the book analyzes historical change, institutional issues, and the quality of democracy in the contemporary period, using not only the original data set but also extensive analysis of preexisting data sets on electoral variables, economic and social dimensions, and civil liberties and public opinion. These chapters are most useful for students, providing excellent summaries of historical trends and theoretical developments. Some of the chapters rely on the perspectives of particular authors, such as the transition chapter following closely the *Transitions from Authoritarianism* series (Laurence Whitehead, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe Schmitter) and the freedoms and rights chapter adopting the conceptualization of Fareed Zakaria in “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November/December 1997): 22–43. Some appreciated surprises emerge, though, in the fascinating case studies of the parliamentary debates in Chapter 5; the interesting data analysis in Chapter 8 of political regime type and social welfare and policy performance; and the excellent capsule histories of labor, women, and indigenous movements in Chapter Nine.

The boxes explaining terms, methods, and case studies are also a useful pedagogical tool.

A welcome epilogue analyzes trends from 2001 to 2004 and highlights the impact of the post-9/11 world focus on security. The book concludes that although electoral democracy has grown over time, its shallow and illiberal nature is likely to persist for some time, precisely because

it is less threatening to elite interests. With a somewhat unsatisfactory cursory treatment of possible scenarios, Smith also points out that liberal (full) democracy is not protected from erosion to illiberal democracy or even semi-democracy, and that illiberal democracy is neither an inevitable stepping stone to liberal democracy or a guaranteed bulwark against autocratic rule.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. Edited by W. Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, Saleemul Huq, and M. J. Mace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. 319p. \$62.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071290

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Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change moves away from the scientific debate on the environmental impacts of climate change and mitigation strategies to an acceptance of the fact that countries and even localities within countries will have to adapt to changes in their climate. The authors also acknowledge that there will be both winners and losers, again, sometimes within countries as well as across international borders. They also note that there are relative winners and losers, and that losses of life, health, and species must be treated differently from economic losses. Although equity has been an important part of the international debate on climate change policy, previous texts have focused on the question of mitigation and whether developing nations should be allowed to continue emitting greenhouse gasses in order to improve their economic conditions, while developed nations are required to reduce emissions.

This text brings a new perspective to the international debate with its focus on adaptation instead of mitigation. Vulnerability to climate change impacts, according to several of the authors, is not evenly distributed across the globe, and localities differ in their abilities to adapt to the climate changes that are already occurring. The primary question for Adger et al. is one of fairness in national and international policies directed toward adaptation strategies. The value of this text, however, is not its discussion of fairness, which is redundant across chapters and often confusing. Its value is in the wide range of issues related to adaptation that it covers. The book is informative and extremely useful to any political researcher on climate change policy, but it does not contribute to political theory in any meaningful way.

The book is divided roughly into four sections. The first section, "Politics, Science, and Law in Justice Debates," contains two chapters. The first, by Stephen H. Schneider and Janica Lane covers many issues including climate change impacts, intergenerational equity, interspecies

equity, north-south equity, equity in policy challenges, cost-benefit analysis as a policy evaluation tool, the role of scientists, and adaptation strategies. It provides a very useful summary for a reader needing a quick overview of the nonscientific issues related to climate change and is very informative. The second chapter in this section is equally helpful in summarizing an important topic, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Mace, in this chapter, attempts to describe the convention's framework for adaptation and notes that it is not really addressed in any comprehensive way. To address both procedural and distributive justice concerns, Mace notes that the needs of developing countries must drive the policies and the funding. This is a practical chapter and may be the most important chapter in the book for readers who want to understand the Convention on Climate Change and its implications.

The second section is titled "Aspects of Fairness in Adaptation" and the chapters all discuss social justice concerns related to adaptation to climate change. There are five chapters in this section. Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn discuss several conceptions of justice, including those of Amartya Sen (*Choice, Welfare, and Measurement*, 1982), John Rawls (*A Theory of Justice*, 1972), and Robert Nozick (*Anarchy, State and Utopia*, 1974). They question how we might determine what population is the most vulnerable and what should be done. They conclude that a precautionary principle should be used. Leichenko and O'Brien discuss winners and losers due to climate change and point out that the terms are relative so that winners from one perspective might be losers from another. Barnett examines the interaction among security, conflict, climate change, and justice; Baer asks who pays whom; and Leary provides an analysis based on welfare economics. Although there is a great deal of repetition among these articles, with the question of vulnerability being overdiscussed, the chapters offer important and different perspectives on fairness and climate change.

The third section, "Fairness in Adaptation Responses," uses case studies to illustrate concerns and covers both international and intranation policies. Bangladesh, Tanzania, resource-dependent societies (i.e. Botswana), and Hungary are the subjects of the four case studies. Although Bangladesh is always mentioned with reference to climate change impacts, Hungary was a surprising and interesting