

## Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting? An account of Dutch–Republican–Islamic forces interaction in West Java, 1945–49

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*S.M. Kartosuwiryo, famed leader of the long and bloody Darul Islam rebellion which began in West Java in 1948, was a strong supporter of the Indonesian independence struggle and a champion of the Indonesian Republic proclaimed in 1945. This article seeks to understand how it was that Kartosuwiryo came to oppose that very Republic with such violence in 1948–49. Many scholars have sought to explain the origins of the Darul Islam movement in terms of Kartosuwiryo's fanatic Islamist ambition. However, a detailed examination of the circumstances of the revolt's gestation and outbreak indicates that it was a consequence of a complex interplay of historically contingent circumstances rather than any ideological fixity.*

### Introduction

The Darul Islam movement, established in West Java in 1948 to contrast the Dutch occupation of the area, is well known for its transformation in 1949–50 into an anti-Republic rebellion; furthermore, its legacy of violence in pursuit of an Islamic state of Indonesia endures, albeit in different circumstances and modalities, to this day.<sup>1</sup> The rebellion raged for nearly 15 years, expanding in the process to other parts of Indonesia – to Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and Aceh<sup>2</sup> – bringing in its wake enormous loss of life and property damage until it was concluded with S.M. Kartosuwiryo's capture and execution in 1962.<sup>3</sup> The rebellion has usually been

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1 See, for example, Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the state in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 51; and Quinton Temby, 'Imaging an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, 89 (2010): 1–36.

2 See, for example, Zainabun Harahap, *Operasi-operasi militer menumpas Kahar Muzakkar* (Jakarta: Mega Bookstore and Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965); and C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 1

3 It should be noted that Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi, and Ibnu Hajar in South Kalimantan held their positions until Feb.–Mar. 1965. See *Album peristiwa pemberontakan D.I.-T.I.I. di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1978).

interpreted in terms of the long-nurtured and fanatical attempt by its leader, Kartosuwiryo, and his followers to establish Indonesia – or at least West Java – as an Islamic state. But this explanation of just why Kartosuwiryo went into rebellion against the emerging Republic of Indonesia presents a number of problems. For more than two decades, Kartosuwiryo had been a fervent supporter of Indonesian nationalism, and he had played significant roles in the pre-war independence movement, being well known to Sukarno and other major leaders.<sup>4</sup> He was, moreover, a supporter of the Indonesian Republic proclaimed by Sukarno in August 1945. Why then, did he come so fiercely to contest the legitimacy of the state, the existence of which he had for so long strived?

This article proposes to analyse the development of Kartosuwiryo from nationalist to rebel by reconstructing the chain of events between 1945 and 1949, mostly based on archival sources produced by Dutch as well as Indonesian agencies as the events unfolded. Looking beyond the issue of religious fanaticism, regional separatism, foreign interests in unsettling the delicate balance of the new Republic, we propose to focus on the political and military circumstances that led Kartosuwiryo to not accommodate Sukarno's state and instead make of it the new object of his movement's violence.

In the following pages we will introduce Kartosuwiryo's early career in Sarekat Islam party, focusing on his prioritising the establishment of an independent Islamic state of Indonesia without seeking colonial co-operation, his relation to the Japanese authority, and his rise as regional leader of Masyumi in West Java. It is under this mantle that Kartosuwiryo was able to rally support and transform the local party branch into the Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia movement (DI/TII) *cum* army in 1948, and later establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII). In answering the question of how did it happen that a committed nationalist turned into rebel, the article analyses the relation between Kartosuwiryo's DI/TII and the Indonesian Republic's state and army between 1948 and 1950, identifying the key events and dynamics which allowed for the consolidation of the Darul Islam *vis-à-vis* the Republic.

#### *Views of the Darul Islam*

As the rebellion stretched in space and time, international scholars and local actors engaged with the dynamics which had led to the formation of the movement, its popular support, and Kartosuwiryo's leadership. As Darul Islam was from the early days of the Republic an element of concern on the domestic politics agenda, and a sensitive topic until the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, academic discussions pursued in the 1970s–1980s differ little in approach from Indonesian official publications from the 1950s–1960s, stressing the separatist intent of the rebellion and occasionally referring to its religiosity as a convenient tool to gather popular support from the Sundanese population of West Java.

4 Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit 'Aryaguna', 1964), pp. 34–5. In his autobiography, Sukarno recalls (albeit providing an improbable timing): 'in 1918 Kartosuwiryo was a dear friend. We worked side by side with Tjokro [Cokroaminoto] for our country. In the '20s in Bandung we lived, ate, and dreamed together. However as I progressed on nationalistic principles, he worked solely along Islamic principles'. See Sukarno, *An autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 272.

In Dutch eyes, in 1948, Darul Islam was ‘an extreme religious movement, which strives for an absolute Islamic state structure in Indonesia’,<sup>5</sup> but already in late 1949 the press had labelled it as ‘separatist’,<sup>6</sup> and a few months later Van Nieuwenhuijze, a former colonial administrator, explained the movement in terms of local efforts to revive traditional patterns of authority in the wake of deep social transformations.<sup>7</sup> According to one official Indonesian government publication, Kartosuwiryo was merely ‘a political adventurer who always dreamed of power just for himself’, receiving support from ‘foreign’ elements, to the extent that Darul Islam was at times also read as ‘Dutch Infiltration’.<sup>8</sup> The historian Cornelis van Dijk interpreted the rebellion in the Marxist frame of class struggle and economic discontent emerging from badly formulated agrarian reforms, and – like the behaviouralist political scientist Karl Jackson – he argued for Kartosuwiryo’s non-orthodoxy and Sufi–mystic approach to Islam as disproof of his dedication to an Islamic state.<sup>9</sup> In the 1970s, Indonesian army publications saw Kartosuwiryo purely as a political opportunist who took advantage of a weakened Republic in an attempt to realise his long-held dream of an Islamic state.<sup>10</sup> Some more balanced assessment seemed to emerge from Hiroko Horikoshi’s analysis of Kartosuwiryo’s leadership as a mixture of popular mysticism and uncompromising advocacy of Islamic ideals;<sup>11</sup> however, this perspective was not taken up by following scholars.<sup>12</sup> The reality, as we shall see, is more subtle and complex than these simplified views might indicate.

### **Kartosuwiryo and the Indonesian nation**

#### *The early years: From Dutch education to religious anti-colonialism*

Kartosuwiryo’s original intellectual and religious moorings were not deeply Islamic. He was the son of a minor Central Java official employed in the government opium service, and Kartosuwiryo enjoyed a protracted and privileged European-style

5 ‘De Dar-ul-Islam-beweging (Rijk van den Islam)’, Archief van de Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde archieven (1922), 1944–1950 (hereafter AAS), no. 2752, Nationaal Archief, The Hague (hereafter NA).

6 ‘Separatisme – mendjalankan move baru dengan nama Islam’, *Berita Indonesia*, 12 Dec. 1949.

7 C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, ‘The Darul Islam Movement in western Java’, *Pacific Affairs*, 23, 2 (1950): 170, 181.

8 *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat*, ed. R. Roekomy, Soekotjo, S. Aditirto (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), pp. 213, 218; ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika harus merupakan kenjataan’, *Majallah TEMPO*, 25 Feb. 1950: 5.

9 These statements were first presented by Pinaridi and then reported by subsequent writers. See Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 23, 29, 41–8; Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional authority and national integration: Darul Islam in West Java* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1980 [1971]), pp. 22–3, 122; and Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 27.

10 For example, see Moegi Prihantoro, *Penumpasan pemberontakan DI/TII S.M. Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat* (Bandung: Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI], Angkatan Darat [AD], Dinas Sejarah, 1982 [1974]), p. 25. For later re-elaborations of this concept, see Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 50, 52, 54–5, 76; S. Soebardi, ‘Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia’, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 14, 1 (1983): 123–4.

11 Hiroko Horikoshi, ‘The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1942–62): An experience in the historical process’, *Indonesia*, 20 (1975): 74.

12 This view has been seconded and further elaborated upon in Chiara Formichi, ‘Kartosuwiryo’s role in the creation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*), 1927–1949’ (Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009).

education, eventually in medical studies, before his growing attachment to nationalist politics saw him expelled from those studies.<sup>13</sup> Inspired by Cokroaminoto, the charismatic leader of the Sarekat Islam movement – with whom he became well acquainted after 1927, as indeed he had been with Sukarno, a few years earlier<sup>14</sup> – Kartosuwiryo was drawn to engage in Islamic politics, first as a member and Surabaya branch leader of the Jong Islamieten Bond (Association of Young Muslims) and then as member (and later, executive member and party secretary)<sup>15</sup> of Partai Sarekat Islam (Sarekat Islam Party, later PSII – Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia). He became Cokroaminoto's private secretary before serious illness saw him move to live with his parents-in-law in the West Java town of Malangbong, a little over 30 kilometres east of Bandung, a PSII stronghold and a region where he chose to reside and where he developed further his Islamist political thinking.<sup>16</sup>

As PSII predominance on the political scene began to fade in the late 1920s and early 1930s, there was a shift of influence from Cokroaminoto's Islamo-socialism to Agus Salim's Islamism — which at times assumed the form of pan-Islamism. These changes were equally reflected in the party's agenda and in Kartosuwiryo's orientation.<sup>17</sup> For much of the 1930s, the PSII endured deep internal divisions, especially on the questions of its relationship with the more dominant secular stream of nationalism, and of its engagement with the Dutch colonial authorities. But just as the party, in the late 1930s, was beginning to follow a path of reconciliation with mainstream secular parties, Kartosuwiryo, vice-president of the party in 1936, emerged as a significant contrarian. Without formal Islamic schooling, with a poor grasp of Arabic and with little interest in international Islamic scholarship,<sup>18</sup> Kartosuwiryo prodded PSII towards a more explicitly Islamist and exclusionary manifestation of politics. In his view, the history of Sarekat Islam was a slow development of real Islamic consciousness which was now increasingly felt and expressed: 'people ... began to be aware of their duty, the duty to carry out pious deeds most extensively and most completely with strong conviction and faith. No obstacle will scare them, no obstruction will stop them.'<sup>19</sup> For Kartosuwiryo, the supreme guide to behaviour was 'the Book of God and the sound

13 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 21.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 34–5. Kartosuwiryo had been the PSII representative at the meeting, led by Sukarno, which formed the PPPKI (*Pemufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia*), an indication that his political attitudes at that time were rather more ecumenical than they were later to become (Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 398.).

15 *Politiek-Politieel Overzicht* (hereafter PPO) Jan. 1929, in *Politiek-politioneële overzichten van Nederlandsche-Indië*, vol. 2, ed. Harry A. Poeze (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), p. 14; PPO Aug. 1929, p. 177; Anonymous, *SM Kartosoewirjo: Pemberontak atau mujahid* (Jakarta: Suara Hidayatullah, 1999), p. 9; Holk H. Dengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: Langkah perwujudan angan-angan yang gagal* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), p. 8.

16 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 20–3; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran politik proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: Fakta dan data sejarah Darul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), p. 39.

17 On PSII's changing agenda, see 'Persatuan ummat Islam se-dunia', *Fadjar Asia*, 21 Jan. 1930. For a discussion of these changes and how these were reflected in Kartosuwiryo's writings in *Fadjar Asia* in 1928–30, see Chiara Formichi, 'Kartosuwiryo and the Negara Islam Indonesia: Between religious nationalism and pan-Islam', *Indonesia*, 90 (2010): 125–46.

18 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, pp. 21, 27–8; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 24; B.J. Boland, *The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia*, rev. edn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 55.

19 Kartosuwiryo, quoted in Deliar Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia 1900–1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 146–7.

Hadiths'; to procure a truly Islamic environment, what was necessary was 'complete obeisance to and fulfilment of the commands of God and the Prophet by the Muslims'.<sup>20</sup> Strongly, if recently, influenced by local West Java religious teachers,<sup>21</sup> in the view of Emile Gobée, Advisor for Native Affairs, 'certainly very intelligent',<sup>22</sup> a prodigious autodidact ('Kartusuwiryo had no hobbies apart from reading books and writing'),<sup>23</sup> partial to mystical and Sufistic religious ideas,<sup>24</sup> and a man of ascetical lifestyle,<sup>25</sup> by 1935 Kartusuwiryo was even more forcefully advocating that the establishment of an Islamic state should be the main goal of PSII.<sup>26</sup>

Kartusuwiryo was never one to bend to the prevailing winds. As PSII moved to a more engaged and collaborative practice of politics in 1937, Kartusuwiryo made his position clear: the PSII was 'a movement which works and strives for the observance of God's laws, in the way of God as God wishes, according to the example given by the prophet. The P.S.I.I. is nothing other than an Islam-party in the true sense of the word: the P.S.I.I. is a party of God.'<sup>27</sup> Kartusuwiryo's contradiction of the PSII's newly engaged approach to politics, notably its participation with non-Muslim parties in the push for an Indonesian parliament, and perhaps as well his mystical leanings, led to his estrangement from the party and then his expulsion, together with his close associates, in early 1940.<sup>28</sup> Undeterred, he established on 24 March 1940 an internal splinter group, the Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII (Committee for the Defence of the Truth of the PSII),<sup>29</sup> with a dozen or so local branches (formerly PSII ones) in West Java, claimed as the true vehicle of the Sarekat Islam movement and the means of leading the party back to the right path to achieve the Darul Islam.<sup>30</sup> Thereafter he established in 1940 the so-called Suffah Institute in Malangbong, responding in his own way to the mandate given to him by the PSII conference late in 1938 to establish a religious and training centre for party cadres.<sup>31</sup> In time, some PSII branches in Central and West Java evinced some sympathy for Kartusuwiryo's position,<sup>32</sup> though his new party, which emphasised the notion of Darul Islam to the exclusion of nationalism ('the Muslim group which lives in Islamic Society [Darul Islam] does not wish to be devoted to Mother-Indonesia or to anyone else, rather they wish only to be devoted to the one and only

20 Ibid., p. 147.

21 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 28; Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, p. 30.

22 Quoted in *De ontwikkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 4, ed. R.C. Kwantes (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff/Bouma's Boekhuis, 1982), p. 457.

23 Pinardi, *Kartusuwirjo*, p. 37.

24 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 28. These seem to have become more pronounced by the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Ibid., p. 392; and Pinardi, *Kartusuwirjo*, pp. 41–9.

25 Soebardi, 'Kartusuwiryo', p. 124.

26 C.A.O. Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), p. 168.

27 *Soeara P.S.I.I.*, Nov. 1937, *Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche pers* (hereafter *IPO*), 49/1937, p. 800.

28 PPO May–June 1940, in Poeze, *Politiek-politioneële overzichten*, vol. 4, p. 341.

29 'Oprichting van een nieuwe politiek-godsdienstige partij door het KPK-PSII' [11 Apr. 1940], Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën, 1900–1963: Geheime Mailrapporten, 1914–1952, no. 181, NA.

30 *Pemandangan*, 1 Apr. 1940, *IPO* 14/1940, pp. 236–7; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 36.

31 Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 148–9; Poeze, 'Inleiding', in Poeze, *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxix; PPO Jan. 1939, p. 257; PPO Feb. 1939, p. 268; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 38; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 47.

32 PPO June 1939, p. 302; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 48.



God')<sup>33</sup> remained isolated and apart from other Muslim political and educational activity,<sup>34</sup> embracing a vague kind of Muslim socialism.<sup>35</sup> But his nationalist credentials remained strong; in the late colonial period, Kartosuwiryo's political activities earned him two short spells in prison.<sup>36</sup>

In over a decade of political activism in the Islamic party Kartosuwiryo had become well known for his dedication to the Islamic state ideal and his non-co-operation stand: two elements that pushed him to the margins of nationalist political activities at the turn of the decade. At the eve of the Japanese invasion, then, Kartosuwiryo had lost his prominence in the Sarekat Islam party, and there is no evidence that the Suffah was being in any way influential in the Priangan region as an Islamic educational institute. In the short stint of Japan's occupation, Kartosuwiryo would show his ability to co-operate as the perspective of achieving his aim – an Islamic state – seemed obtainable.

*The Japanese occupation and its consequences on Kartosuwiryo's vision of 'Indonesia'*

The Japanese invasion deeply changed the panorama of party politics in the Indies, amidst which transformation Kartosuwiryo seems to have been able to regain an important role.<sup>37</sup> In May 1943, he was reported to be mayor of Bandung,<sup>38</sup> his articles – now advocating co-operation with the Japanese authority to achieve a 'New World' in Islamic terms – were being published again,<sup>39</sup> and by June he had been successful in setting up a MIAI-sponsored *Bait al-Mal* (treasury of the Islamic community),<sup>40</sup> of which he was appointed secretary.<sup>41</sup> As MIAI was gaining socio-political success, the Japanese administrators disbanded it on 2 November 1943 in favour of Masyumi.<sup>42</sup> If we accept Harry J. Benda's suggestion that Kartosuwiryo's *Bait al-Mal* had a role in Japan's decision to dissolve MIAI,<sup>43</sup> it is understandable that he found no position within the newly established Masyumi. This turn, however, did not mark his exit from politics; he reappeared in April 1945 as trainer of the secular *Barisan Pelopor* (Pioneer Corps, established in September 1944 as part of *Jawa*

33 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, *Daftar oesaha hidjrah PSII* (Malangbong: Penerbit Poestaka Dar-oel-Islam, 1940), p. 5.

34 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 39.

35 Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 49.

36 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 398.

37 Kartosuwiryo is not mentioned, however, in the official Japanese reference publication, *Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa* (Jakarta: Gunseikanbu, 1944).

38 'Ketoea Dewan MIAI mengoetjapkan terima kasih', *Asia Raya*, 18 May 1943. Kartosuwiryo was said to be *toean Bandung Kentjo*.

39 See articles published on *Soeara M.I.A.I.* between Mar. and Sept. 1943.

40 The *Bait al-Mal* is a Quranic institution representing a communal treasury into which Quranic taxes were entered and through which the community could support those in need of financial help such as widows, orphans and the poor. For further details on the Japanese-era *Bait al-Mal*, see Harry J. Benda, *The crescent and the rising sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation 1942–1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 144–7.

41 'Gambar soesoenan Baital-mal M.I.A.I.', *Soeara MIAI*, 1 July 1943.

42 Benda, *Crescent and the rising sun*, pp. 145–6; 'Pemboebaran MIAI', *Asia Raya*, 2 Nov. 1943, and 'Madjelis Sjoera Moeslimin Indonesia', *Asia Raya*, 23 Nov. 1943.

43 Benda, *Crescent and the rising sun*, p. 146.

*Hokokai*) in Banten, West Java,<sup>44</sup> which had been infiltrated by a significant number of former PSII members *de facto* expelled from Masyumi.<sup>45</sup>

Although it is not clear that the Indonesian proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 fired and served further to develop Kartosuwiryo's hopes for the eventual attainment of an Indonesian Islamic state<sup>46</sup> – he is said, probably erroneously, to have proclaimed an Islamic state or at least drafted an independence proclamation independently three days before Sukarno's proclamation on 17 August<sup>47</sup> – he clearly began to involve himself more strongly in politics after that moment. With the development of Masyumi as a political party in early November 1945, Kartosuwiryo was appointed as a member of the central executive body.<sup>48</sup> In mid-1946, he remained an enthusiastic celebrator of the national independence proclaimed by Sukarno in August 1945: 'Now, the State and people of Indonesia have been free for almost a whole year,' he stated in 1946.<sup>49</sup> While he was a staunch supporter of '100% Merdeka [Freedom]',<sup>50</sup> he railed at that time against the 'sickness of "fanaticism" which ... can very easily endanger national unity and united struggle'.<sup>51</sup> While he wished that 'the Republic of Indonesia becomes a Republic based on Islam', and despite his conviction that 'only with Islam in the creation of a world of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam) can Indonesian society in particular and all humanity in general be guaranteed salvation',<sup>52</sup> he cautioned that progress towards those goals must be measured and patient. The first step must be to secure the complete independence of the Republic; only then could the social goal of creating an Islamic state and society proceed.<sup>53</sup> True to his belief in popular sovereignty,<sup>54</sup> Kartosuwiryo thought that outcome would be the result of a Muslim majority in the People's Consultative Assembly which would ensure that 'the laws that are made are the Law of Islam'.<sup>55</sup> That meant,

44 'Nama-nama kepala rombongan jang akan dikirimkan keloeroeh Syuu oentoek Hooshi-II', *Indonesia Merdeka*, 25 Apr. 1945: 6.

45 Benda, *Crescent and the rising sun*, p. 266.

46 Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 53.

47 Henri J.H. Alers, *Om een rode of groene merdeka: tien jaren binnenlandse politiek Indonesië 1943–1953* (Eindhoven: Vulkaan, 1956), pp. 73, 240; Effendy, *Islam and the state*, p. 35; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 54; Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, p. 42; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 65.

48 Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 31; Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di pentas nasional 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987), p. 100; H. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar* (Jakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan Alm. K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), p. 352. At the Nov. 1945 Masyumi congress, Kartosuwiryo was secretary of the Executive Committee, and former PSII and Partai Islam Indonesia (PII) members dominated the Central Board, whilst Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah leaders were found only in the *Majelis Syuro*. The *Dewan Partij* included Sukiman as chairman (from his PSII splinter PII), Abikusno (PSII) and Wali al-Fatah (PII) as his deputies, Harsono Cokroaminoto (PSII) and Prawoto Mangkusasmito (SIS) as secretaries. The *Majelis Sjuro* included K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari as chairman, and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K.H. Wahid Hasyim and Kasman Singodimejo as vice-chairmen. See Masjoemi, *Partai Politik Islam Indonesia* (Boekit Tinggi: Dewan Pemimpin Daerah Masjoemi Soematra Barat, 1945).

49 S.M. Kartosoewirjo, *Haloean politik Islam* (Garut: Dewan Penerangan Masjoemi Daerah Priangan, 1946), p. 9.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–8.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

as well, that ‘the Revolution that we hope for is a *Revolution which builds* (constructive) and not a *Revolution that wrecks* (destructive), producing “disturbances” or “civil war” in our own national circle’.<sup>56</sup>

Notwithstanding the fact that he spent much of his time in West Java,<sup>57</sup> Kartosuwiryo had become Masyumi delegate for the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (Central Indonesian National Committee – KNIP) in 1946–47, participating at its first gathering in Solo (February–March 1946) and its second in Malang (February–March 1947).<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, on this second occasion, he was chosen by the KNIP President as one of the 42 members of the *Badan Pekerja* (Working Committee).<sup>59</sup> In July 1947, he was offered the post of deputy Minister of Defence in the new cabinet, apparently at the nomination of the PSII which had recently broken from Masyumi.<sup>60</sup> He declined the position, perhaps because of his distaste at the likelihood of further co-operation with the Dutch<sup>61</sup> and, as well, his fear of the leftist orientation of Amir Syarifuddin’s new government, Amir’s efforts to eliminate Masyumi influence on government,<sup>62</sup> and Kartosuwiryo’s own loyalty to Masyumi.<sup>63</sup> An unflinching champion of the notion that the Republic must seize its full independence from the Dutch, and that the exercise of force and violence would be necessary for that end, he strongly supported the training of auxiliary Muslim-oriented fighting bodies, notably the Hizbullah and Sabilillah, already

56 Ibid., p. 30. Karl D. Jackson in *Traditional authority, Islam and rebellion: A study of Indonesian political behaviour* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 10, asserts that ‘in his attempt to maintain autonomy and increase the area of his local control, [Kartosuwiryo] seems to have planned an attack on the headquarters of the Siliwangi Division at the beginning of 1946. For this he was arrested and later released by Nasution, the divisional commander’. A Siliwangi publication makes a similar assertion that Kartosuwiryo prepared an attack on Siliwangi headquarters in Malangbong, see *Album kenangan perjuangan Siliwangi*, ed. R.A. Satari (Jakarta: Badan Pembina Corps Siliwangi Jakarta Raya, 1991), p. 294. Given the tone of Kartosuwiryo’s thinking at this time, and the lack of any other specific evidence (Nasution makes no mention of it, even though he himself met Kartosuwiryo around this time [Sektar perang kemerdekaan Indonesia (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat/Angkasa, 1976–82), vol. 6, p. 251]), these reports are probably fabricated.

57 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 58.

58 Deliar Noer and Akbarsyah, *K.N.I.P.: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat. Parlemen Indonesia 1945–1959*, pp. 382–3, 396–7.

59 ‘Sidang Badan Pekerja K.N.I. Poesat’, *Merdeka*, 27 Mar. 1947.

60 *Pelita Rakjat*, 9 July 1947.

61 Kartosuwiryo was well known for his fierce opposition to the Linggarjati Agreement, initialled in Nov. 1946 and ratified by the KNIP in Feb. 1947. The agreement involved Dutch recognition of the Republic as holding *de facto* authority in Java, Madura and Sumatra, and Dutch–Republican co-operation in establishing a federal Indonesia, including the Republic, by 1949. For the text of the agreement, see David Wehl, *The birth of Indonesia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), pp. 146–8. The agreement was bitterly opposed by Masyumi; see R.S. Soeria Santosa to Director-General, General Affairs, 9 Jan. 1946, AAS, no. 2746, NA.

62 See Mohammed Rum, paraphrased interview with George Kahin, Yogyakarta, 23 Nov. 1948, Kahin papers (private), held at George McT. Kahin Center, Cornell University (hereafter Kahin (private)).

63 Soeloeh Ra’jat, 10 July 1947; Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 31; Nasution, *Sektar perang*, vol. 5, p. 50; Kholid O Santosa, *Jejak-jejak sang pejuang pemberontak: Pemikiran, gerakan & ekspresi politik S.M. Kartosuwirjo dan Daud Beureueh* (Bandung: Segi Arsy, 2006), p. 78; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 60. Kartosuwiryo’s close subordinate, Raden Oni, head of the Priangan Sabilillah, had been a strong opponent of Amir’s policies, as defence minister, of attempting to control and channel the political ideas of the army along socialist lines to the detriment of Muslim views (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 59).



established by Masyumi during the Japanese occupation.<sup>64</sup> He was, as Adam Malik, then youthful radical and later vice-president, later recalled, ‘a very able revolutionary .... endowed with an unbending radical, and uncompromising nationalist spirit when it came to dealing with the Dutch colonial regime .... [he] was the first amongst the Indonesian freedom fighters who denounced the Linggarjati Agreement’.<sup>65</sup>

### **Kartosuwiryo in West Java: From Masyumi to Darul Islam**

#### *Masyumi*

By 1947, Kartosuwiryo’s support for Sukarno’s Republic began to fade probably due to the persistent thread of diplomacy in government policy,<sup>66</sup> and despite his previously committed effort to participate in party politics, he once again returned to Malangbong, becoming Masyumi’s regional commissioner for West Java.<sup>67</sup> There he earned the praise of the long-time Muslim nationalist, former Peta<sup>68</sup> commander and former chair of the KNIP, Kasman Singodimejo, on account of his declaration in September 1947 of a holy war against the Dutch (against ‘all who trample on the sovereignty of the Republic and Islamic religion’)<sup>69</sup> following their first ‘police action’ against the Republic in July 1947, and his continuing role in the popular resistance to the Dutch; ‘the Government can only give thanks to the Almighty God that the Republic of Indonesia has such courageous and heroic people as S.M. Kartosuwiryo’, noted Kasman. It was necessary ‘that the Government provide moral, but especially material support to our struggle organisations in the areas occupied by the enemy, such as Malangbong’.<sup>70</sup> One scholar remarked of Darul Islam that ‘the Indonesian government in its initial period at Jogjakarta had no reason to be unfriendly with a movement that excelled in making itself a nuisance to the Dutch’.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, Kartosuwiryo reportedly made efforts to deepen contacts with Muslim figures in other parts of Java and even claimed late in 1948 to have appointed Darul Islam representatives to the Republican government in Yogyakarta.<sup>72</sup>

64 Pinardi, *Kartosuwiryo*, p. 54. Pinardi strongly implies that Kartosuwiryo saw such troops as integral for his press for an Islamic state and not just to defend the Republic from the Dutch. In Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, *Java in a time of revolution: Occupation and resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 220, Anderson erroneously names Kartosuwiryo as first secretary, a position held in fact by Harsono Cokroaminoto.

65 Adam Malik, *In the service of the Republic* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 175.

66 Hiroko, ‘Dar ul-Islam movement in West Java (1948–62)’, p. 69; Effendy, *Islam and the state*, p. 35; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 84. In the 1949 pamphlet *ad-Daulatul Islamiyah*, this frustration surfaced as one of the main triggers behind his actions, as he labelled diplomacy ‘an incurable disease which no *dukun* could heal’; see S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘ad-Daulatul Islamiyah’ (Mar. 1949), ch. 11.

67 Pinardi, *Kartosuwiryo*, p. 32; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, pp. 68–9.

68 Pembela Tanah Air – Defenders of the Fatherland, a volunteer force raised by the Japanese to oppose Allied reconquest of the Indies.

69 ‘Bijzonder Inlichtingen Rapport’ (J.H. Stockmans) [12 June 1948], Archief Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indië 1945–1950 (hereafter APG), no. 997, NA; ‘De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java. CMI publicatie no. 91’ [29 Sept. 1948], AAS, no. 3977, NA. Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 180, notes that ‘the same attitude [concerning *jihād*] could be found amongst other people and organisations such as NU [Nahdlatul Ulama], Muhammadiyah, and Majelis Islam Tinggi in Sumatra’.

70 Kasman Singodimejo [Head of Judicial Affairs section, Ministry of Defence] to Vice-Minister of Defence [Yogyakarta], 22 Oct. 1947, APG, no. 399, NA.

71 Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. xi.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 172; Noer, *Partai Islam*, pp. 180–1. Those representatives were Anwar Cokroaminoto and Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, neither of whom, apparently, was aware that they had been so appointed (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 88; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 557).

But Kartosuwiryo had a larger organisational agenda than simply defending the interests of the Republic in its contest against the Dutch. He sought to capitalise upon the administrative chaos and poor communications between Yogyakarta and the local arena which was a consequence of the rapid Dutch military advance across West Java in July/August 1947 – including, eventually, the capture of Malangbong itself<sup>73</sup> – and the Republic's military weakness. Now operating in mobile mode and elaborating his Muslim guerrilla forces from the extensive array of irregular struggle bands and cut-off Republican troops operating in pockets against the Dutch in West Java after the police action,<sup>74</sup> Kartosuwiryo set in motion a scheme that transformed the existing and extensive Masyumi party organisation in West Java as a vehicle for anti-Dutch activities.<sup>75</sup> In late 1947, he changed the name of the Masyumi branch at Garut to that of 'Defence Council of the Islamic Community' (Dewan Pertahanan Ummat Islam). The renamed body, while it took over many of the old branch's statutes, added a strong emphasis on defence against, and opposition towards, Dutch aggression. About the same time, and similarly without reference either to the central Masyumi leadership in Yogyakarta or to the local Masyumi leadership in the Priangan region, the Masyumi branches in Tasikmalaya and Ciamis were similarly transformed into Defence Councils.<sup>76</sup> In all cases the local Hizbullah and Sabilillah forces under the leadership of the former local Masyumi figure Raden Oni Qital were incorporated into the new councils.<sup>77</sup> The local Masyumi leaders, no doubt cowed by Kartosuwiryo's real and assumed local authority – the Dutch spoke of his 'very capable organisational leadership'<sup>78</sup> – subsequently found themselves with no alternative but to acquiesce in what had taken place.<sup>79</sup> Perhaps as a consequence of this organisational invigoration, the Dutch themselves reported high levels of violence in the region by late 1947: 'murder, kidnapping, arson, and plundering'.<sup>80</sup>

73 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 61.

74 For better coordination of their activities, the West Java struggle bands (*badan perjuangan*) had organised themselves late in 1945 into a 'Struggle Leadership Council Headquarters' (Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan) and in early 1946 into a 61-organisation strong Council of the United Priangan Struggle (Majlis Persatuan Perjuangan Priangan), of which the Hizbullah leader Kamran was head. These forces were not part of the regular Indonesian army (Tentara Rakyat Indonesia [TRI], later TNI); Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 56; Horikoshi, 'The Dar ul-Islam movement', p. 67. See also P.M. H. Groen, 'Marsroutes en dwaalsporen: Het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in Indonesië 1945–1950' (Ph.D. diss., Leiden University, 1991), p. 117; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 84; and Usman Jauhari, 'Peranan Hizbullah-Sabilillah dalam perlawanan bersenjata terhadap Belanda di Jawa Barat pada masa revolusi fisik (1945–1959)' (diss., Universitas Padjajaran, Bandung, 1987), p. 51.

75 Kartosuwiryo, it needs to be noted, was not the first to attempt to establish this part of West Java as a purely Muslim region; an earlier attempt, in 1945–46, instigated by Kiai Abdul Hamid of Ciamis, had been defeated by Republican troops ('De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java').

76 'Ontstaan en ontwikkeling der "Madjelis Islam"' [22 Mar. 1949], Archief Ministerie van Defensie. Collectie archieven Strijdkrachten in Ned. Indië (1938–39) 1941–1957 [1960] (hereafter AMD), no. 1125, NA; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 102; Soebardi, 'Kartosuwiryo', p. 118.

77 O.W. Visser to R.S. Soeria Santosa, 12 Aug. 1948, APG, no. 997, NA; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 63.

78 'Ontstaan en ontwikkeling der "Madjelis Islam"'.  
79 Visser to Soeria Santosa, 12 Aug. 1948.

80 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maanden November en December 1947 (eigen berichtgeving)', APG, no. 1081, NA.

Indeed, between September and December 1947, Islamic militias and regular Siliwangi soldiers often clashed, either in a quest for weapons<sup>81</sup> or in reaction to Dutch movements of troops.<sup>82</sup> In early December, the Chief of Police in Tasikmalaya had reported that Masyumi members in the Priangan were gathering weapons by collecting taxes from villagers and also exchanging food supplies for carbines and guns with starving TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Army) soldiers.<sup>83</sup> These weapons were said to be necessary to the establishment of a ‘New State’ (*Negara Baru*), because ‘whilst the government is not under Masyumi leadership, there will be no order’;<sup>84</sup> under the political leadership of Kartosuwiryo, and Oni Qital’s command, Sabilillah troops were conducting military and propaganda activities, to the extent that Masyumi in the Priangan increasingly resembled an independent government.<sup>85</sup>

At the end of 1947, Kartosuwiryo’s Masyumi branch was openly challenging the authority of the Republic on the political level as well as on the battlefield, arguing that the local population did not recognise its authority anymore, and discrediting regular troops in favour of Sabilillah. It is worth noting, however, that this attitude was also embraced by civilians, who trusted Hizbullah/Sabilillah militias more than TNI troops, and consequently provided them with generous material support in the form of food, shelter, clothing and weapons.<sup>86</sup> A study conducted by the Ministry of Defence concluded that Masyumi’s membership in the Priangan recognised that in this chaotic situation, salvation would come only from a leader who would call for a *perang sabil* (holy war) to bring Indonesia to independence.<sup>87</sup>

#### *Renville and its consequences*

It is difficult to overestimate the demoralising – yet, for Kartosuwiryo’s interests, liberating and empowering – effect of the Republic’s entering the Renville Agreement with the Dutch, on 17 January 1948. That agreement – so unpopular domestically that it caused the immediate collapse of the Cabinet responsible for it<sup>88</sup> – required Republic troops to withdraw from West Java across the so-called Van Mook line, the line arbitrarily drawn by the Dutch joining the farthest points of Dutch intrusion

81 ‘Politiek-Economisch Verslag betreffende de residentie Priangan over de periode 1 tot en met 15 September 1947’, Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën, 1900–1963: Rapportage Indonesië, 1945–1950 (hereafter Rapportage Indonesië), no. 327, NA.

82 ‘Politiek Economisch Verslag betreffende de Residentie Priangan over de maand October 1947’, Rapportage Indonesië, no. 327, NA.

83 ‘Politiek Economisch Verslag betreffende de Residentie Priangan over de maand November 1947’, Rapportage Indonesië, no. 327, NA; ‘Perihal Keadaan Tasikmalaya’ [12 Dec. 1947], Arsip Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (hereafter KepNeg), no. 495, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (hereafter ANRI).

84 ‘Laporan tentang keadaan didaerah Tasikmalaya Utara’ [23 Dec. 1947], KepNeg, no. 495, ANRI.

85 ‘Perihal politieke situasi’ [9 Dec. 1947], KepNeg, no. 495, ANRI.

86 ‘Laporan tentang keadaan didaerah Tasikmalaya Utara’.

87 ‘Ichtisar Laporan no. 5, Daerah Priangan, so’al Totalitaire Oorlog’ [Nov. 1947], Arsip Kementrian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, no. 1073, ANRI.

88 Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution*, p. 230. Indeed, Masyumi members withdrew from the cabinet even before the agreement was signed; see Taufik Abdullah, *Sejarah ummat Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1991), p. 375. Abikusno remarked that ‘the Madjelis Sjoero Ulama [Ulama Council] of the Masjumi has declared that the Renville Agreement is *haram* [sinful] shortly after its signing’ (paraphrased interview with George Kahin, Yogyakarta, 20 Nov. 1948, Kahin [private]).

into Republican territory during the first police action (which allowed the Dutch to claim the spaces – much of it under effective Republican control – between those points even after the cease-fire).<sup>89</sup>

More seriously, since Renville recognised *de facto* Dutch control in West Java, the agreement implied that the Republic had effectively surrendered – at least for the time being<sup>90</sup> – its claim of sovereignty in that region.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, Robert Cribb remarks, ‘the Renville Agreement ... gave the army in West Java an opportunity to avoid a fight which it was now far from winning’.<sup>92</sup> That in turn created a sense amongst many fighters in West Java that the Republic had deserted them – ‘that the people of West Java had been unconditionally delivered to the colonial power’<sup>93</sup> – and raised serious doubts that the Republic that had so lamely surrendered to Dutch demands was the same entity, with the same ideals, as that proclaimed in August 1945. That feeling was magnified by a sense in Muslim quarters that the political left had too much influence within that government.<sup>94</sup> Up to that time, the common Indonesian interest in resisting the Dutch in ever more desperate times had blurred the ideological differences between different groups of leaders. But now, in fact, a decisive point had been reached — the definitive realisation by Kartosuwiryo and his close followers that they could not expect the current government of the Republic of Indonesia to seize the freedom which was the *sine qua non* for an eventual attainment of an Islamic state. To that, of course must be added the fact that Kartosuwiryo, as fate would have it, was granted almost a whole year in relative isolation in which there was ‘a very considerable military–political vacuum’<sup>95</sup> to create the administrative machinery and the means of violence to underpin state-like pretensions, something a stronger Republic would never have countenanced.<sup>96</sup>

Kartosuwiryo, like many other West Java *lasykar* (irregular) leaders, refused point-blank to withdraw from West Java with the regular TNI troops, with whom in any case there had been some skirmishing and developing mistrust in preceding months, especially over Hizbullah/Sabilillah efforts to seize or obtain weapons from regular TNI troops.<sup>97</sup> Early in 1948, with his faithful lieutenant Oni, Kartosuwiryo

89 It is estimated that around 29,000 Republican troops withdrew across the line (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 63). See also Dinas Sejarah Militer TNI-Angkatan Darat, *Cuplikan sejarah perjuangan TNI-Angkatan Darat* (Bandung/Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah Militer TNI-Angkatan Darat/Fa. Mahjuma, 1972), pp. 140–7; Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, *Siliwangi: dari masa ke masa* (Jakarta: Penerbit Fakta Mahjuma, 1968), pp. 118–21, 137; Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution*, p. 218.

90 It was expected under Renville – at least by the Republicans – that United Nations-managed plebiscites would be held which would determine whether the territory would form a state of itself or situate itself under Republican rule. The Dutch quickly made it clear that those plebiscites would not be forthcoming; see Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution*, p. 328; and Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s militia and the Indonesian revolution 1945–1949* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991), p. 173.

91 Sudirman, naturally, had ordered that informal troops fill the space left by regular TNI troops (Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 78).

92 Cribb, *Gangsters and revolutionaries*, p. 166.

93 Anonymous source, quoted in Roekomy et al., *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat*, p. 214.

94 Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 56.

95 ‘Notes by George Kahin on Daroel Islam’, Kahin (private).

96 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 20.

97 *Sejarah revolusi kemerdekaan daerah Jawa Barat*, ed. Edi S. Ekadjati (Jakarta: Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1981), p. 179; Jauhari, ‘Peranan’, p. 63.

determined that Sabilillah troops under his control would not join the withdrawal – notwithstanding the fact that these Masyumi-aligned groups defied both the Republican government and their party in so doing, sometimes violently<sup>98</sup> – and that those Hizbullah and Sabilillah troops that had agreed to depart would be disarmed before they left, peacefully or otherwise.<sup>99</sup> Accordingly, around 4,000 locally led Sabilillah and Hizbullah troops in West Java remained in the territory rather than joining in the Siliwangi *hijrah* to Central Java (the movement was so named, at least in part, in expectation of an eventual victorious return, while the parallel with the prophetic endeavour was probably an attempt to sacramentalise their withdrawal as well).<sup>100</sup> The refusal of some TNI troops to hand their weapons to Sabilillah forces before their departure for Central Java earned them a certain opprobrium in Sabilillah eyes,<sup>101</sup> reinforcing the tense relations between Islamic and Republican troops which had been lingering since 1947.

#### *The formation of the Darul Islam*

In the face of the threat represented by Renville, on 10–11 February 1948, Kartosuwiryo held a meeting of 160 Muslim groups, organisations, leaders and fighters in Pangwekusan village, Cisayong, near Tasikmalaya, to frame a general Muslim reaction and strategy in the face of the political and military crisis.<sup>102</sup> There was talk of dismantling the Republic's government if it did not disassociate itself from Renville and creating a new one, based upon Islam. This could, in the words of Kamran, Kartosuwiryo's political comrade of long-standing and senior military commander, 'save the state'.<sup>103</sup> There was discussion of the need to secure the region of West Java as the first step in that process, and of the need for strong leadership in contrast to the weak and deceitful Republican government. Kartosuwiryo sought to calm the mood of the meeting by stating that talk of a coup was inappropriate. The meeting determined to create a Majelis Umat Islam (Council of the Islamic Community) as a provisional Islamic government in West Java which was, in retrospect, the first definitive, though not yet wholly conclusive, step in the formation of

Nasution, as commander of the Siliwangi division, had long struggled to subordinate such irregular armed bands to regular TNI control. See, for example, 'Nasoetion, Abdoel, Haris', AAS, no. 2658, NA; and 'Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS). Afdeling III. Bulletin no. 29. De Bamboe Roentjing beweging in West-Java', AAS, no. 2689, NA.

98 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 19; 'De Dar-ul-Islam beweging', APG, no. 506, NA.

99 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 57; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 64.

100 A.J. Mokaginta *et al.*, *Sedjarah singkat perjuangan bersendjata bangsa Indonesia* (Jakarta?: Staf Angkatan Bersenjata, 1964), pp. 98–9; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 64. Smail notes that 'Hizbullah (i.e. urban Islamic) units generally accompanied the army on the trek to Central Java, while Sabilillah (i.e. rural Islamic) groups did not. The former, like the national leadership of the Masjumi party, were committed to support of the secular Indonesian state. The latter became the core of the anti-Republican *Darul Islam* (Islamic state) movement which had its centre in east Priangan' (*Bandung*, pp. 92–3; see also p. 156).

101 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 65. See also 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi, over de maand Februari 1948', APG, no. 1075, NA.

102 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 65–6.

103 Quoted in Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 66. Kamran had been a senior figure in the West Java Hizbullah; *Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, Siliwangi*, p. 40.



the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII or Islamic State of Indonesia).<sup>104</sup> That Council's task was to coordinate the efforts of Muslim groups in West Java. The meeting also froze the Masyumi party in West Java, although it was not until the Cipeundeuy meeting in March (see below) that Kartosuwiryo and Kamran proclaimed 'the end of Masyumi's role in West Java'.<sup>105</sup> Kartosuwiryo indicated his desire to transform existing Masyumi branches into local defence councils of the kind he had initiated in late 1947, which were clearly meant to serve as the means of organising his embryonic political system,<sup>106</sup> indicating that Kartosuwiryo's ambitions were now aimed at something beyond the level of pure party politics.

The meeting also sought to appoint Kartosuwiryo as 'Imam' of the Muslim community in West Java, and Oni as the Priangan leader of the 'Islamic Army of Indonesia' – purportedly for the defence of the region against the Dutch – authorising the latter to bring together such an army, based around Sabilillah and Hizbullah bands and other Muslim organisations, within three months, with arms collected from villagers.<sup>107</sup> That modest 'army', almost immediately subject to Dutch attack – the first major battle with Dutch troops came just a week later on 17 February<sup>108</sup> – eventually began to aggregate itself in the hilly surroundings of Mount Cupu before moving further south as a consequence of such attacks, to which it vigorously responded.<sup>109</sup> By April, with the failure of Dutch troops to occupy former TNI pockets – and perhaps because of the popular resentment aroused by Dutch attacks<sup>110</sup> – the Darul Islam movement and its military wing had spread through Garut, Sumedang, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Kuningan, Majalengka and even further afield.<sup>111</sup> By the end of 1948, the regions of Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis were thought by the Dutch to be 'chiefly ruled by the TNII [Tentara Negara Islam Indonesia – Indonesian Islamic State Army], the army of the Negara Islam Indonesia (Darul Islam)'.<sup>112</sup> Darul Islam's early successes were to a significant extent a consequence of the ruthlessness with which it sought its ends: 'sabotage of

104 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 33; Santosa, *Jejak-jejak*, p. 95; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 66–7.

105 'Pelaporan no.14/7/48 Perihal Darul Islam' [17 July 1948], 'Dunia Masyumi menghentikan usahanya' [1 Mar. 1948], Arsip Djogjakarta Documenten 1945–1949 (hereafter DjogjaDoc), no. 218h, ANRI.

106 Visser to Soeria Santosa, 12 Aug. 1948. Kartosuwiryo's unilateral freezing of Masyumi was apparently rejected or ignored by a number of regional Masyumi branches, including those at Cirebon and Buitenzorg ('De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java').

107 Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, p. 111. A TII document dated 13 July 1948, calling up Hizbullah and Sabilillah troops for the coming struggle as part of the TII, asserted that 'the struggle of the Islamic Community is becoming more expansive and violent by the day, in order to weaken Netherlands imperialism. The Community shall establish an Islamic State of Indonesia, that is free' (bijlage III of 'De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java').

108 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 68.

109 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 57–8, 93; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 86; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 67–8. See also Groen, 'Marsroutes', pp. 124, 132–3.

110 'De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java'.

111 'De Dar-ul-Islam-beweging (Rijk van den Islam)'; 'Islamitische stromingen in de Residenties Priangan en Cheribon [9 June 1948], AAS, no. 2572, NA; 'Verslag West-Java. Over het eerste halfjaar 1948', Rapportage Indonesië, no. 313, NA; see also *Sin Po*, 15 Mar. 1948; *Keng Po*, 1 Apr. 1948.

112 'Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (CMI). Signalement no. 69' [4 Dec. 1948], Rapportage Indonesië, no. 176, NA. See also 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta, Soekaboemi, Tjiandjoer en Buitenzorg over de maand November 1948'; 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng ... over de maand December 1948', AAS, no. 3036, NA.

telephone connections, destruction of bridges, erection of barricades ... kampung burnings, murders, kidnappings and intimidations'.<sup>113</sup>

### Darul Islam and the Indonesian Republic

A few weeks later, on 1–5 March, a second well-attended meeting at Cipeundeuy in Cirebon recognised a need, given continuing negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch, to 'continue the struggle in a different manner', asserted the primacy of the 'Islamic Community' throughout West Java,<sup>114</sup> and called on the Republic to refrain from any negotiations with the Dutch. Failing that, the delegates threatened to recommend the dissolution of the current Republican government and its replacement by a new and more fully democratic one.<sup>115</sup> In that regard, the meeting resolved to make preparations to create an Islamic state, thought all the more pressing given the threatened creation, as part of the Dutch federal project, of a Dutch-sponsored 'state' of Pasundan in West Java, something that eventuated in late April.<sup>116</sup>

Kartusuwiryo was still some distance from a rupture with the Republic. He apparently hoped that his actions could be accommodated by the Republic – not an unthinkable idea in the chaotic and war-torn circumstances – and to that end he contacted the TNI commander Sudirman, demanding that he be appointed as West Java commander of all troops in the region, and that his Negara Islam be recognised as a kind of local experimental state. It may well have been Kartusuwiryo's aim at this point – given the post-Renville negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch and the expected eventual establishment of some kind of federal state – that his Islamic state be accepted by the Republic as a component unit of a larger Indonesian state, without loss of its Islamic identity.<sup>117</sup> Both demands were rejected, although general Republican support for his opposition to the Dutch remained, as well as the material support of money and weapons.<sup>118</sup>

A third conference in Cijoho, Cirebon, commencing on 1 May 1948, began the preparation of detailed Islamic regulations to govern the regions of the 'Islamic State', categorising different territories according to the degree of control exercised by the Islamic State and the extent of the implementation of Islamic law; 'DI' was a region

113 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng ... over de maand December 1948'.

114 A translation of the decisions taken at the Cipeundeuy conference is included in 'Rapport betreffende M.I., N.I.I. en T.N.I.I.' (J.R. Kniphorst) [17 Oct. 1948], APG, no. 997, NA. Indonesian documentation relating to the 1 Mar. 1948 meeting is in 'Surat-surat bulan Desember 1948 tentang rencana keterangan umat Islam (NII)', DjogjaDoc, no. 218, ANRI.

115 Pinardi, *Kartusuwirjo*, p. 58; Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 180; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 68–9.

116 Pinardi, *Kartusuwirjo*, pp. 58–9; Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. 64; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 69. It was noteworthy that the Wali Negara of Pasundan, Wiranatakusuma, had strong Islamist leanings, and was known to have reservations about the lack of a specifically Islamic character in the 1945 Indonesian constitution. The Dutch indeed, spoke of 'an undoubtedly very close relationship between the ideals of the Wali Negara of Pasundan and the struggle of the Darul Islam movement' and that 'his real ideal is an Islamic, completely independent and sovereign state of Pasundan' ('Signalement: De verhouding tussen Wali Negara van Pasoendan Wiranatakoesoema en de Daroel-Islam', AAS, no. 3979); Effendy, *Islam and the state*, p. 36.

117 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng ... over de maand December 1948'.

118 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 71, 88, 219. See also Soebardi, 'Kartusuwiryo', p. 122.

wholly controlled by the NII and ruled under *sharia* law, DII was a region mostly sympathetic to the NII, but still patrolled by Dutch troops and not yet under NII control, and DIII, controlled by the Dutch, an even more peripheral entity, in which Islamic law had no space.<sup>119</sup> It discussed in more detail the regime of Islamic law and state administrative architecture that should prevail in the NII. It also created a Majelis (later Dewan) Imamah, or Council of Ministers, to regulate such fields as education, information, finance and defence to be led by Kartosuwiryo as Imam, as well as a Fatwa Council to determine matters of Islamic law.<sup>120</sup>

In a further effort in early July to seek legitimation from the Republic, Kartosuwiryo sought, through his former Masyumi comrades in Yogyakarta, approval for his plans, only vaguely expressed in his message to them, to establish an Islamic state, in the hope that such approval would bring the Republican government to a similar position. He invited those colleagues to come to West Java for discussions on the steps which might follow, apparently hoping that they might attend a meeting of the Dewan Imamah at which the Islamic State would be proclaimed. According to one Dutch intelligence report, based on the interrogation of a captured senior Darul Islam figure, Masyumi leaders in Yogyakarta were aware of Kartosuwiryo's activities and endorsed them. The Masyumi leader Sukiman was said to have remarked that NII territory would have to be returned later to the Republic, while Abikusno Cokrosuyoso was said to be of the view that such an arrangement would be subject to local wishes.<sup>121</sup> His efforts proved unsuccessful in the end, but demonstrated the importance Kartosuwiryo placed in maintaining some measure of connection with the Republic.<sup>122</sup> Around the same time, Kartosuwiryo reportedly sent representatives to East and Central Java to seek support for Darul Islam's aims, having earlier sent the head of the NII's Information Office in Tasikmalaya, Abdulhadi Ibrahim, as a representative to the Masyumi congress in Madiun in March.<sup>123</sup> At this occasion, leading Masyumi members Wali Alfatah and Kiyai Ahmad Sanusi argued in favour of the creation of a Darul Islam 'as soon as possible' to conclude the national revolution. Interestingly, although the congress took place after the formation of the DI/TII, neither of these two speakers referred to Kartosuwiryo's endeavours.<sup>124</sup>

By late August 1948, for the first time the 'Islamic Government of Indonesia' had proclaimed a total popular mobilisation in the form of a *Jihad fi Sabilillah*, and, by 27 August, it had drafted the constitution of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Qanun

119 Pinardi, *Kartosuwiryo*, p. 59; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, pp. 76–8; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 74–8. See also 'Proces-Verbaal [Rd. Didi bin Rd. Oehap al. Tatang Bahtiar]', AAS, no. 2755, NA; and Visser to Soeria Santosa, 12 Aug. 1948. On the categorisation of Darul Islam zones, see 'De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java'.

120 Pinardi, *Kartosuwiryo*, p. 60; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 89; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 74, 78, 112.

121 'Proces-Verbaal [Rd. Didi bin Rd. Oehap al. Tatang Bahtiar]'.

122 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 78–80; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 79. See also 'Proces-Verbaal [Rd. Didi bin Rd. Oehap al. Tatang Bahtiar]'.

123 'De Darul-Islam-beweging en haar betrekkingen met het Islam-blok, in verband met de binnenlandse machtsverhouding op Java. Nefis publicatie no. 107' n.d. [1950], Archive of the Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië, no. 641, NA. 'Darul Islam di Djawa Barat' [23 July 1948], DjogjaDoc, no. 203, ANRI.

124 'Kutipan Pidato2 pada tgl 28/3-'48 (Kongres Masjumi di Madiun) dari 1. Wali Alfatah 2. KA Sanoesi', DjogjaDoc, no. 243, ANRI.

Azasi), although its governance principles were never to be realised to any significant extent.<sup>125</sup> As we have seen, around mid-1948, even as his political idea was rapidly taking shape, Kartosuwiryo was careful to remain in some sort of contact with the Republic in Yogyakarta, and even to obtain some support from it.<sup>126</sup> That attitude was ebbing away towards the end of that year. In early November (Proclamation no. 3), NII announced preparations for total war against 'all enemies of Religion and the State, so that Allah can establish his rule in the midst of the Islamic Community ... of the Indonesian nationality'.<sup>127</sup>

In Yogyakarta, meanwhile, the Republican leaders remained both ignorant and unclear about the significance of both what Kartosuwiryo was doing and what his real intentions might be, notwithstanding the fact that communication between Yogyakarta and Kartosuwiryo's organisation remained relatively good.<sup>128</sup> A Dutch report of September 1948 remarked that 'there is no sign of Republican support for the Darul Islam movement, nor has any action been undertaken on the Republican side to curb this movement'.<sup>129</sup> Simatupang, then a senior officer in the TNI, later remarked that 'prior to the second Dutch attack, we in Jogjakarta had always believed that the people's war in West Java basically supported the Republic, even though its methods did not conform to official policy'.<sup>130</sup> Others saw the Darul Islam as a Republic-supporting bulwark against the Dutch-inspired Pasundan state.<sup>131</sup> There was, perhaps, a sense as well that the Republic would be able to bring the movement under control at a later and more suitable time.<sup>132</sup> The Republic's ignorance was to a substantial degree a consequence of the fact that Kartosuwiryo's communications were intended to be vague, and perhaps even misleading, as he sought to maintain Republic support; in the absence of that clarity it was reasonable to interpret Kartosuwiryo's plans and activities as a means of maintaining his continuing anti-Dutch efforts in the region.<sup>133</sup> He proclaimed in late October the intention to move to Yogyakarta, and to appoint a representative to the Republican capital, measures which were probably as deceitful as they were vague.<sup>134</sup> The relation between Kartosuwiryo and the Indonesian Republic is best described by highlighting the ambiguities that marked it from the creation of the Darul Islam until the formation of the unitary state in 1950.<sup>135</sup> By the beginning of the second part of

125 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 81; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 93; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 104; Jackson, *Traditional authority*, p. 6.

126 'Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 2 van Indonesië [29 Jan. 1949]', AMD, no. 1654, NA.

127 'Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 4 van Indonesië' [9 Feb. 1949], AMD, no. 1654, NA.

128 Amak Sjariffudin, *Kisah Kartosuwirjo dan menjerahnja* (Surabaya: Grip, 1965?), p. 8; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 71, 87; *Mohammad Natsir 70 tahun: Kenang-kenangan kehidupan dan perjuangan*, ed. Yusuf Abdullah Puar (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), p. 185.

129 'Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (CMI). Signalement no. 17' [29 Sept. 1948], AAS, no. 3978, NA.

130 T.B. Simatupang, *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the people's war* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 98.

131 Alers, *Om een rode of groene merdeka*, p. 243.

132 'Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (CMI). Signalement no. 69'.

133 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 81.

134 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

135 In early Oct. 1948 the 'political leadership' of the Ciamis Darul Islam contacted Natsir, Rum and Hatta calling for the Republic's material support in the West Java struggle. It is interesting to see how the

1948, in any case, Republican internal political problems were so grave – the government's plans for military rationalisation had struck trouble, and the communist rebellion at Madiun in East Java erupted in September – that Kartosuwiryo's machinations probably seemed inconsequential by comparison.<sup>136</sup>

An important spur to Kartosuwiryo's ambitions, if only in expanding his range of options, was provided by the establishment by the Dutch of the 'state' of Pasundan, part of a larger Dutch 'federal' strategy to construct local states across the archipelago as counterweights to the Republic. In August/September 1948, Kartosuwiryo reportedly contacted the ailing leader (Wali Negara) of Pasundan, R.A.A. Mocharam Wiranatakusumah, with an offer of co-operation, rejected by the Wali Negara.<sup>137</sup> Around a year later, with the sense of manic irony that suffuses much of the narrative of the revolutionary period, Wiranatakusumah reportedly sought for his part to gain Kartosuwiryo's support in his own vague political endeavours, which included the construction of an Islamic state and the defence of the newly acquired autonomy of his Sundanese region against the Republic.<sup>138</sup> Wiranatakusumah, indeed, some time after the initial establishment of the NII, apparently sought a meeting with Kartosuwiryo, presumably to discuss their mutual interests, which did not exclude consideration of the interests of the Dutch as well.<sup>139</sup> Already in March 1949, Kartosuwiryo had apparently met with a Dutch lieutenant-colonel known as Cassa, at Dutch headquarters in Tasikmalaya to discuss some form of co-operation with the Dutch, which might have included the delivery of weapons from the Dutch to Darul Islam.<sup>140</sup> Even more confusingly, in October 1949 Kartosuwiryo is alleged to have held discussions with the notorious KNIL captain R.P.P. Westerling in the presence of Wiranatakusumah and Anwar Cokroaminoto, Prime Minister of the State of Pasundan, perhaps to explore the prospect of the union of Darul Islam with Westerling's APRA (*Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil* or Army of the Just King) in establishing military (and political) supremacy over the TNI and the Republic throughout West Java.<sup>141</sup>

Darul Islam focused on the relevance of this regional struggle for the sake of the freedom of Yogyakarta. K.H. Zainal Hasan Thoha [leader of Ummat Islam in Ciamis] and Muhammad Nur Lubis [Commander of Tentara Islam Indonesia Bat. III Res. I Div. I] to Dr Mohammad Hatta [Vice President, Republik Indonesia], Mr Muhammad Rum [head of Delegation, Republik Indonesia] and Muhammad Natsir [Minister of Information, Republik Indonesia], 3 Oct. 1948, DjogiaDoc, no. 150, ANRI.

136 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 81–2.

137 'Signalement inzake de neiging van de Darul Islam-beweging om de plaats van de thans verdwenen Republiek in te nemen', AAS, no. 3979, NA.

138 'Politiek-economisch verslag Pasundan van gedelegeerde van de hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon voor Pasundan (Van Diffelen) over de maand Nov. 1949', in *Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen, 1945–1950* (hereafter *NIB*), vol. 20, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J. B. Schouten ('s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1996), p. 709.

139 A Dutch intelligence report of late Aug. 1949 spoke of the sending of 'some contact persons' from 'the Pasundan side' to Kartosuwiryo to seek an unspecified agreement ('Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen afgesloten dd 23 Augustus 1949, 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1259, NA).

140 Sjariffudin, *Kisah Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 8–9; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 90.

141 Sjariffudin, *Kisah Kartosuwirjo*, p. 10. Kartosuwiryo later denied having had any contact with deviant Dutch officers, such as Westerling, nor indeed with any other Dutchmen (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 125). There may have been low-level connections between APRA and Darul Islam which involved the supply of weapons and ammunition to the latter (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 221).



### The fall of the Republic and the rise of the Islamic State

Notwithstanding the significant nuisance and disruption to Dutch military activities caused by NII ‘extremists’ in the months following the NII’s establishment,<sup>142</sup> with their numbers estimated by the Dutch at around 5,000 men in early 1948, much of Kartosuwiryo’s strategic work might well have been of little consequence or impact – apart from the damage these forces inflicted on local populations<sup>143</sup> – but for the decision of the Dutch to abandon any pretence at negotiation and attempt by military means to destroy the Republic. But the second police action, commencing on 19 December 1948, saw Dutch forces overrun the Central Java heartland of the Republic, seize the revolutionary capital of Yogyakarta, and capture the Republic’s leaders, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. Kartosuwiryo was quick to sense the importance of the moment and attempt to turn it to his advantage. The Republican government which had traded so much away to the Dutch was now no more. In response, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed a general holy war against the Dutch on 20 December ‘until the Islamic Revolution is ended and the Islamic State exists completely in the whole of Indonesia’,<sup>144</sup> and on the following day announced that, with the ‘fall of the Republic as a State’, his NII was now the sole political vehicle for those who supported the Republic of the proclamation — indeed, that the struggle of the NII was ‘the continuation of the struggle for Freedom, according to and mindful of the proclamation of 17 August 1945!’<sup>145</sup> The Dutch attack and the fall of the Sukarno–Hatta government, indeed, was a ‘Gift from God’ which ‘opens a new field, a field of holy war and the widest possible opportunity to receive again the greater Gift of God (*‘Azza wa Jalla*), that is, *The birth of the Free Islamic State of Indonesia*’.<sup>146</sup> On 23 December, Kartosuwiryo announced that the NII was in a state of war, fighting according to Islamic laws of war; there were only two combatants, the Dutch and their hangers-on and, now, with the fall of the Republic and its disappearance from

142 See ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maand maart 1948’, in *NIB*, vol. 13, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten (‘s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 370–2 (see also accompanying notes); ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng ... over de maand Mei 1948’, in the same volume, pp. 803–5 (and accompanying notes); ‘‘Situatierapport no 138 van 17 tot 18 Juni’’, Lt. gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen (Jonkman), 21 Juni 1948’, in *NIB*, vol. 14, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten (‘s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 174; ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta, Soekaboemi, Tjiandjoer en Buitenzorg, over de maand Juni 1948’, in the same volume, pp. 238–9.

143 One Dutch report remarked that in Singajaya subdistrict, ‘between 6 and 9 February [1949] 1115 houses, 15 mosques and langgars, one school and one baledesa were burned down, making 4000 people homeless’ (‘Politiek economisch verslag Priangan van resident/hoofd tijd. Bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) over Feb. 1949’, in *NIB*, vol. 17, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten (‘s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1992), p. 696.

144 ‘Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 5’, Imam SM Kartosuwiryo [20 Dec. 1948], *Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar*, folii, Archives of Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

145 ‘Negara Islam Indonesia: Maklumat no. 6’, in Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 63. See also ‘Proces-Verbaal [Rd. Didi bin Rd. Oehap al. Tatang Bahtiar]’, which indicates that this sentiment was broadly accepted amongst Darul Islam members.

146 ‘Negara Islam Indonesia: Maklumat no. 6’, in Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 64.

the struggle, just the 'Islamic Community of the Indonesian Nation and the Islamic State of Indonesia ... all alone in the world'.<sup>147</sup>

The Dutch attack, of course, removed from the Republic any obligation to respect the provisions of Renville.<sup>148</sup> Accordingly, almost immediately – a Dutch report spoke of 'very large TNI infiltrations'<sup>149</sup> – Siliwangi troops began to return to those parts of West Java which they had abandoned in February 1948. As they straggled back in late December 1948 and early January 1949, often with their wives and children in tow,<sup>150</sup> and knowing 'nothing of the existence of Daroel Islam until they reached West Java',<sup>151</sup> they encountered TII troops who now commanded large swathes of territory, especially in mountainous south-eastern Priangan.<sup>152</sup> Some early-returning TNI force dispositions found themselves disarmed by TII troops and their weapons confiscated.<sup>153</sup> Some in Tasikmalaya found themselves apparently enthusiastically welcomed by TII troops, oblivious to the fact that this attitude was simply a ruse to lull them into a false sense of security, an error which cost many of them their weapons and some their lives;<sup>154</sup> there were allegations in some cases that TII troops had drugged or poisoned TNI troops as means of relieving them of their weapons.<sup>155</sup> The local fighters, by whom the Siliwangi forces had expected to be welcomed, were hostile and uncooperative, notwithstanding occasional local compromise agreements between sections of the two forces,<sup>156</sup> and NII efforts to have the TNI acknowledge its authority and merge with it.<sup>157</sup> Siliwangi troops 'were completely unprepared for [the] attacks which ensued',<sup>158</sup> encountering 'no little hindrance' from Kartosuwiryo's men as well as from Dutch forces;<sup>159</sup> and Siliwangi troops felt that the Darul Islam troops 'concentrated their attention on opposing the Siliwangi' rather than the Dutch.<sup>160</sup> Kahin reported that 'one entire Siliwangi company was wiped out, while

147 'Maklumat no. 7', in Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, pp. 558–9.

148 See Nasution's instruction of 22 Dec. 1948, in his *Sekitar perang kemerdekaan*, vol. 10, pp. 17–18.

149 'Politiek economisch verslag van de resident/hoofd tijd. bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) betreffende de residentie Priangan over de maand Jan. 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 17, p. 324.

150 Simatupang, *Report from Banaran*, p. 31.

151 'Notes by George Kahin on Daroel Islam'.

152 See 'Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (CMI). Afdeling III. Order of battle bende-wezen West-Java. 1 November 1948', AAS, no. 2690, NA.

153 Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 64; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 85–6.

154 'Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 4 van Indonesië'.

155 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 85; Himawan Soetanto, *Long march Siliwangi* (Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka, 2007), pp. 184–5.

156 'Militaire bekendmaking no. 1 der N.I.I.' (O.W. Visser) [4 Feb. 1949], APG, no. 997, NA; 'Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 3 van Indonesië' [5 Feb. 1949], AMD, no. 1654, NA; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 86. A copy of such an agreement may be found in 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand Februari 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan', AAS, no. 3036, NA. See also 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand Maart 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan'. A more formal effort at parlay between Kamran and the TNI in February ended in violence (Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 89).

157 'Nota' (R.S. Nataradja) [31 July 1949], APG, no. 1001, NA; 'Politiek Economische Verslag betreffende de Residentie Priangan over de maand Februari 1949', Rapportage Indonesië, no. 329, NA; Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, *Siliwangi*, pp. 281–3.

158 'Notes by George Kahin on Daroel Islam'.

159 Roekomy *et al.*, *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat*, p. 189.

160 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, quoted in Daud Sinjal, *Laporan kepada bangsa: Militer Akademi Yogya* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 132. See also Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 88.

resting with stacked arms, by Daroel Islam troops, the members of the company having thought all Indonesian troops in the area would be friendly'.<sup>161</sup> A fierce, defining battle between a TII force and returning TNI troops – the latter seeking the return of seized weapons – took place in late January at Antralina, near Malangbong.<sup>162</sup> In early February, a TNI battalion reportedly lost 100 men and a great deal of equipment in a battle with a 1,000-strong TII force.<sup>163</sup> By March, the Dutch reported that 'in West Java increasingly and again and again [there are] murderous conflicts ("moord-partijen") between the Siliwangi TNI and the TNI'.<sup>164</sup>

The DI/TII attitude was in a substantial sense understandable. In the confusion following the evident and appalling collapse of the Republican government in Yogyakarta there was a vacuum of nationalist power and capacity, as well as the fear that the Dutch would force the captured Republican leadership to enter into an arrangement which would seriously compromise the struggle for freedom. Kartosuwiryo saw his Darul Islam as the single proper continuation – indeed development – of the independent Indonesia proclaimed in August 1945, the leaders of which had been defeated and left behind by history.<sup>165</sup> It was, the Darul Islam claimed, the only political entity which stood against the Dutch and the states they were busily establishing.<sup>166</sup> Apart from the view that the returning Siliwangi were an illegitimate force – it was they, after all, who had handed over the region to the Dutch almost a year before<sup>167</sup> – there was a real fear amongst NII leaders and their troops that the returning Siliwangi troops – whom they originally thought of as their 'guests' – were in fact runaways, a 'wild army' or, worse, communist remnants from the abortive 'coup' at Madiun some months earlier.<sup>168</sup> Kartosuwiryo, indeed, accused the TNI of arbitrary and rapacious treatment of the local people.<sup>169</sup> There was a strong sense that the TII had won the right to defend the autonomy they had carved out in large tracts of south-eastern West Java and, accordingly, 'to prevent actions contrary to religion', and to consider that – because of the Siliwangi's attacks on its forces – a state of war between the NII and these troops indeed existed.<sup>170</sup> It was, consequently, 'an obligation to use violence in relieving them of their weapons, equipment and possessions for the benefit of the N.I.I.'.<sup>171</sup> This military proclamation, the NII's first such document, made clear almost from the outset the NII's attitude towards the Republic and its returning troops,

161 'Notes by George Kahin on Daroel Islam'.

162 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 91; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 86; Satari, *Album*, pp. 303–4; Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, pp. 114–17; Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, *Siliwangi*, pp. 523–6; 'Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen. Afgesloten 30 Januari 1949 te 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1252, NA.

163 'Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen: Afgesloten dd 18 Februari 1949, 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1253, NA.

164 'Wekelijksmilitair inlichting- en operatief rapport v/m 23 t/m 29 Maart 1949', AMD, no. 1125, NA.

165 See *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat*, p. 233; I.S. Awwas, *Menelusuri perjalanan jihad S.M. Kartosuwiryo: Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1999), p. 57.

166 'Nota' (R. S. Nata[radja]) [31 July 1949], APG, no. 1001, NA.

167 Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 181; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 88.

168 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand April 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasundan', AAS, no. 3036, NA; Pinardi, *Kartosuwiryo*, p. 66; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, pp. 90–1; Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 181.

169 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 86.

170 'Militaire bekendmaking no. 1' [25 Jan. 1949], APG, no. 997, NA.

171 *Ibid.*

even if it also stated that the Republican troops – differently from the Dutch – could only be deprived of their weapons and dispersed, but should not be killed.<sup>172</sup>

### **The Dutch, the Republic and the Islamic State: Diplomacy and violence**

#### *Dutch–Indonesian diplomacy*

It soon became clear that the Republic had survived, both in the form of an emergency government established in Sumatra under the leadership of Syafruddin Prawiranegara and especially in the invigorated guerrilla activity of the TNI, especially around Yogyakarta. But in the view of the Darul Islam, the Dutch wished to reduce the Republic to the status of just another of the many puppet states it had created; the Republic's refusal to desist from its compromises with the Dutch strengthened that notion, as well as the Darul Islam's sense that it now represented the single vehicle of true opposition to the Dutch.<sup>173</sup> On 7 May 1949, discussions between the Dutch and the Republic produced the Rum–Van Royen agreement, which provided for a cease-fire and for the eventual transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to a Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat; RIS) in which the Republic itself would be no more than a component part. That agreement provided new ammunition for Kartosuwiryo's view that the Republic had failed and had sold out its sovereignty to the Dutch, that the proposed Republic of the United States of Indonesia, including the Republic, was a plaything of the Dutch, and that the Round Table Conference was nothing more than a colonial conference. Moreover, he feared that, in the event of a third world war, something he had long awaited, the Dutch would be unable to make good their undertakings.<sup>174</sup> That view, spread amongst his followers, in turn led to a further rapid growth in his influence and following.

In those parts of West Java where Darul Islam was most active, some sections of the Siliwangi troops – wearied from the Madiun campaign and the strain of 'fighting by day against the Dutch and by night against the Darul Islam'<sup>175</sup> – soon arrived at a

172 'Militaire bekendmaking no. 1 der N.I.I.'. Deliar Noer ('Penegakan syari'ah Islam dalam pentas politik nasional', in Irfan S. Awwas, *Risalah kongres Mujahidin I dan penegakan syari'ah Islam* [Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001], pp. 36–7) suggests that, had the TNI not required TII forces to subordinate themselves to it but rather invited them into a partnership to fight Dutch forces, Kartosuwiryo might have accepted such an arrangement and the final break might not have eventuated. But that view seems to ignore both the ferocity of the TII response to the returning TNI troops and its grave suspicions about the character and purpose of these troops.

173 See the Darul Islam propaganda material enclosed with Regent of Garut to Resident of Priangan, 25 Mar. 1949, APG, no. 1108, NA.

174 Pinaridi, *Kartosuwiryo*, pp. 66, 70, 72; Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 92; Noer, *Partai Islam*, pp. 181–2; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 91–3, 121; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 666 [20 Aug. 1949]. For a vigorous rendition of the view that 'the Republic of today is no longer the Republic for which [the people] struggled from of old', see also the pamphlet of the Ciamis branch of NII, dated 21 July 1949, included in 'Politiek-politioneel-verslag dalam bulan Juli 1949 dari kabupaten2 seluruh Negara Pasundan', AAS, no. 3036, NA. The day after the proclamation of the NII, the head of information for the NII in Tasikmalaya spoke of 'the fall of the Republic of Indonesia. From being a free state, the Republic has become a colony under the name of a participant state of the R.I.S. [United States of Indonesia]' ('Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand Augustus 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan', AAS, no. 3036, NA).

175 *Keng Po*, 21 Mar. 1949.

more-or-less peaceful *modus vivendi* with Dutch troops.<sup>176</sup> According to one Dutch report, 'up to now in this regency [Tasikmalaya] there has been no single case of combat contact between our military and the TNI'.<sup>177</sup> Indeed, in March TNI units under the leadership of Achmad Wiranatakusumah, son of the Wali Nagara of Pasundan, agreed to co-operate with the Dutch forces connected with the state of Pasundan,<sup>178</sup> and Major Nasuhi's TNI battalion made a similar, if only temporary, arrangement, partly, the Dutch report went, because 'the TNI felt itself threatened by the DI'.<sup>179</sup> Sudarman's battalion also followed suit, for the same reason.<sup>180</sup>

Such willingness to co-operate with Dutch forces prompted Kartosuwiryo to wonder why these TNI units preferred to hand themselves over to the Dutch rather than to the TII.<sup>181</sup> While the TNI continued to seek some co-operation with the Darul Islam, its efforts proved fruitless.<sup>182</sup> Indeed, according to the Dutch, 'the very bad experiences which the TNI has had with the DI in cases that a kind of co-operation has been arrived at have however opened everyone's eyes concerning the impossibility of a compromise'.<sup>183</sup> As the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations moved apparently ineluctably towards a resolution, a cease-fire came into effect between Dutch and TNI troops and the Dutch even began to pass over territory to the TNI.<sup>184</sup>

*The Islamic and Republican states: Diplomacy and conflict*

All the while, Kartosuwiryo's influence and reach had spread beyond his core areas of support to take in a significant part of West Java, and ever further afield.<sup>185</sup>

176 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 92; 'Kort verslag van het bezoek door ondergetekende [Van Maarseveen] gebracht aan Indonesië van 20-29 Juni 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 19, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten ('s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1994), p. 191; 's'Jacob (voorzitter van de Nederlandse delegatie te Batavia) aan s'Jacob (hoogleraar te Utrecht), 17 Aug. 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 19, p. 544.

177 'Politiek-economisch verslag Priangan van resident/hoofd tijdelijke bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) over Maart 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 18, ed. P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten ('s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1993), p. 305.

178 'Commissaris van de kroon voor Pasundan (Van Duffelen) aan hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon (Beel), 22 Feb. 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 17, p. 622; *NIB*, vol. 18, p. 8, note 1. 'Legercommandant (Spoor) aan minister van binnenlandse zaken van Pasundan (Mahmoen Soemadipradja), 1 Maart 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 18, p. 8; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 89-90. See also 'ZG Rapport no. 55 dd. 1 Apr 49', AAS, no. 2799, NA; *Sin Po*, 23 Mar. 1949; and *Keng Po*, 24 Mar. 1949.

179 'Politiek-economisch verslag Priangan van residentie hoofd tijdelijke bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) over de maand April 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 18, p. 513. See also 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand April 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasundan'; *Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, Siliwangi*, pp. 306-7; *Sin Po*, 20 Apr. 1949.

180 Groen, 'Marsroutes', p. 204.

181 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 130.

182 'Politiek-economisch verslag van Pasundan van gedelegeerde van de hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon voor Pasundan (Van Duffelen) over de maand Okt. 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 20, p. 512.

183 'Politiek-economisch verslag Priangan van resident/hoofd tijdelijke bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) over Maart 1949', in *NIB*, vol. 18, p. 305. There were, it seems, some such cases of co-operation, although they were often ruined by bad faith (See 'Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen: Afgesloten 29 Januari 1949 te 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1252, NA; 'Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen afgesloten dd 15 Augustus 1949, 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1259, NA).

184 Alers, *Om een rode of groene merdeka*, pp. 244-5.

185 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 100; 'De Dar-ul-Islam beweging'. According to a Dutch report on TII troops in Garut, 'their clothing is predominantly black with a red armband or red headwear (*hoofddoek*) with a



By October 1949 the Dutch estimated the size of the TII at 12,000–15,000 men.<sup>186</sup> The TII had begun to expand quickly in the absence of TNI troops which had withdrawn to Central Java.<sup>187</sup> According to Kahin, ‘in late 1948 and early 1949 almost as much of their [the Dutch] West Java puppet state of Pasundan was controlled by Darul Islam as by their own troops’.<sup>188</sup> Indeed, ‘prior to the ... arrival of TNI troops, nearly all of the south Preanger except the Dutch occupied cities and towns was under control of Daroel Islam’.<sup>189</sup> That fact of local NII supremacy in early 1949, indeed, served to sharpen the sense of contestation between the TII and the TNI. Indeed, while the TII engaged vigorously, continually, and often successfully, with Republican forces – ‘in Majalengka regency the Darul Islam movement is winning important territory at the expense of the TNI’<sup>190</sup> – TII actions with Dutch forces became ‘few and far between’.<sup>191</sup> And as opposition mounted between TNI and TII – according to one Dutch report ‘the battles ... often take place with large numbers involved and last for hours’<sup>192</sup> – so did Republican vengefulness and bitterness grow; ‘various Siliwangi battalions ... would like nothing better than to join in the struggle against the D.I., as revenge for what they experienced from the D.I. during their return after the second police action to West Java’.<sup>193</sup> TNI success remained limited; around mid-1949 it was reported that ‘70 per cent of the southeastern part of the Priangan Residency belongs to the domain where the D.I. is lord and master’, and the numerical strength of the movement was estimated at 15,000 men.<sup>194</sup> ‘Where the DI clashes with the TNI’, remarked one Dutch report, ‘the DI mostly appears to be the strongest [sic]’.<sup>195</sup> By August 1949, the Dutch calculated that ‘bandits’ outnumbered the TNI by a factor of 7 to 1.<sup>196</sup> It should be noted, however, that although Darul Islam troops (i.e. Hizbullah and Sabilillah) made up most of the irregular guerrillas in the area, they were not the only ones. As pointed out by Cribb, the *lasykar* troops were unhappy with the Renville and Rum–Van Royen agreements, to the extent that collaboration

red-white star’ (‘Overzicht en ontwikkeling van de toestand 5 Aug. 1800 uur tot 12 Aug. 1800 uur’ [13 Aug. 1948], AMD, no. 1121, NA; “Beoordeling van de toestand in de periode 11 tot 17 Mei 1949 (no. 17)” van legercommandant (Spoor), in *NIB*, vol. 18, p. 660; ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand April 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasundan’.

186 ‘Minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen (Van Maarseveen) aan hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon (Lovink), 6 Okt. 1949’, in *NIB*, vol. 20, p. 183.

187 ‘Islamitisch stroomingen in de Residenties Priangan en Cheribon’, 9 June 1948, AAS, no. 2572, NA.

188 Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution*, p. 331.

189 ‘Notes by George Kahin on Daroel Islam’.

190 ‘Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 5 van Indonesië’ [16 Feb. 1949], AMD, no. 1654, NA; see also ‘Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 11 van Indonesië’ [31 Mar. 1949], AMD, no. 1654, NA.

191 Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, p. 92.

192 ‘Politiek economisch verslag Priangan van resident/hoofd tijd. Bestuursdienst Priangan (Van der Harst) over Feb. 1949’, in *NIB*, vol. 17, pp. 696–7.

193 ‘Verkort Politiek Weekrapport nr. 12 van Indonesië’ [7 Apr. 1949], AMD, no. 1654, NA.

194 ‘Links-politieke en extreem-Islamitische stromingen in West-Java’ [7 Sept. 1949], AAS, no. 3038, NA. See also ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand Mei 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasundan’, AAS, no. 3036, NA; ‘Beknopt politiek-politioneel-verslag over de maand Maart 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan’; and ‘Politiek economisch verslag Residentie Priangan Juli 1949’, Bijlage IIIId of ‘Het Communisme in Indonesië’, AAS, no. 2740, NA.

195 ‘Politiek-economisch verslag van Pasoendan over de maand October 1949’, Rapportage Indonesië, no. 310, NA.

196 ‘Beoordeling van de toestand in de periode van 19–26 Juli 1947 (no. 27)’ [1 Aug. 1949], APG, no. 1266, NA.

with the Republic and TNI was not envisaged, and a similar attitude was assumed by the *Bambu Runcing*.<sup>197</sup> One Dutch report in mid-1949 remarked that the Darul Islam's 'conviction that the Islamic State of Indonesia is the single organisation which has held out and which will continue to hold out against the Dutch and against the puppet-regimes created by the Dutch has had disastrous consequences'.<sup>198</sup>

But there was still no final and definitive break with the Republic. That did not come until August 1949, when it became clear to Kartosuwiryo that the Republic, its captured leaders now freed and politically rehabilitated, and its legitimacy and primacy ever more broadly acknowledged across the archipelago, would take part in the Round Table Conference in The Hague to finalise the details of a transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch. Before that time, there appeared to be some space for a negotiated appropriation of the NII into the fabric of the Republic, but Kartosuwiryo's incrementalist, and essentially reactive/adaptive style of politics, was not fitted to an atmosphere where a creative initiative was desperately needed. Horikoshi notes that 'it is unlikely that even Kartosuwiryo himself, at least initially, intended to lead the movement as far as it eventually went. He adjusted and altered his plans until finally he was left with no alternative but to pursue his initial goal by means of a civil war against the Republic'.<sup>199</sup>

Its attention fully committed elsewhere and apparently unaware how far things had come, the Republic made only desultory efforts to save the situation, maintaining the climate of ambiguity noted above. But things had gone too far. Hatta wrote to Kartosuwiryo in mid-1949, seeking the end of all hostilities against the TNI, but without eliciting any recognition by Kartosuwiryo of the Republic's authority.<sup>200</sup> At another time in 1949, Hatta had contacted Kartosuwiryo in writing, in a further attempt at reconciliation. Hatta suggested that if Kartosuwiryo were ready to create a united front against the Dutch, the Republic would offer him a medal, although the letter simply asked Kartosuwiryo whether he would reconsider his position *vis-à-vis* the Republic after the proclamation of the RIS.<sup>201</sup> Early in August 1949, Mohammad Natsir was directed by Hatta to seek an end to TII attacks on the Republic's forces; Natsir sought to make contact through the veteran Persis leader, Ahmad Hassan, with Kartosuwiryo and invite him to negotiations. Natsir's letter to Kartosuwiryo, written on hotel notepaper, lacked official weight; and it took three days to reach Kartosuwiryo. Meanwhile, on 6 August, Hatta left for The Hague to take part in the Round Table Conference. In his later response to Natsir's missive, Kartosuwiryo remarked that he had already proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia; he could not turn back.<sup>202</sup> 'I do not want to swallow my spittle again', he allegedly remarked.<sup>203</sup>

197 Cribb, *Gangsters and revolutionaries*, ch. 12–13.

198 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel-verslag over de maand Juni 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasundan', AAS, no. 3036, NA.

199 Horikoshi, 'The Dar ul-Islam movement', p. 60.

200 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 93. This may be the representation mentioned in 'Dagrapport van de Sectie Inlichtingen afgesloten dd 11 Juli 1949, 10.00 uur', APG, no. 1258, NA.

201 *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 13 Feb. 1950, in 'Ichtisar gerakan DI/Kartosuwiryo' [27 July 1950], Arsip Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI (1949–1950) [hereafter KabPerd], no. 150, ANRI.

202 Abdullah *et al.*, *Sejarah ummat Islam*, p. 377; Puar, *Mohammad Natsir 70 tahun*, p. 185; Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 182; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 93.

203 Quoted in Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 93–4.

*Proclamation of the Negara Islam Indonesia and the Republic's reaction*

On 7 August 1949 in Cisayong, Kartosuwiryo formally proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia,<sup>204</sup> an action, like so many of Kartosuwiryo's actions, determined by others' actions and agendas. The proclamation asserted that 'The Islamic State of Indonesia grew in a period of war, in the middle of the national Revolution, which then at the end, after the Renville Document and the Islamic Community awoke and arose against the viciousness of colonialism and the slavery perpetrated by the Dutch, changed its nature and became an Islamic Revolution or *Holy War*'.<sup>205</sup> A political manifesto published soon after the proclamation branded the Republic as a 'puppet state', invited those Republicans 'who still have the spirit of struggle' to join with the NII's efforts, condemned the Round Table Conference and the creation of a Republic of the United States of Indonesia and vowed to continue the Islamic struggle.<sup>206</sup>

Even though the break was now definitive – notwithstanding the odd rumour that Kartosuwiryo was on the point of submitting to Yogyakarta<sup>207</sup> – the Republic was reluctant to engage in a violent attempt to destroy the NII. In December 1949, the Minister for Religious Affairs in the new RIS Cabinet, K.H. Masykur, was directed to initiate talks with Kartosuwiryo, but his half-hearted effort failed to bear any fruit and Masykur himself failed to meet with Kartosuwiryo.<sup>208</sup> Another effort at negotiation six months later was just as unsuccessful.<sup>209</sup> The Masyumi congress of 1949 promulgated an official request for the Darul Islam to be peacefully dissolved.<sup>210</sup> In early 1950, a Masyumi-proposed and government-appointed commission failed to develop a credible strategy to end the 'Darul Islam problem',<sup>211</sup> leading the PSII to complain that the military – defying the politicians' request – was taking matters into its own hands.<sup>212</sup>

Only in mid-December 1949 was a formal military operation (Gerakan Operasi Militer V) initiated against the Darul Islam.<sup>213</sup> That reluctance was partly a consequence of the fact that the Republic had larger and more serious problems to deal with, including the need to assert its primacy, peacefully and otherwise, within the new-born RIS, and partly to avoid arousing broader social sensitivities about the

204 Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 74.

205 Kartosuwiryo's proclamation, in Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 75.

206 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 119; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran*, p. 668. A little earlier, a Dutch report claimed that Kartosuwiryo had contacted the Masyumi leader Kasman Singodimejo expressing his opposition to the Round Table negotiations and requesting him to organise a coup against the Republican leaders ('"Beoordeling van de toestand in de periode t/m 8 November 1949 (nr. 42)" van legercommandant (Buurman van Vreeden)', in *NIB*, vol. 20, pp. 567–8).

207 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand September 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan', AAS, no. 3036, NA.

208 I.N. Soebagijo, K.H. Masykur: *Sebuah biografi* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1982), pp. 83–4; Dengel, *Darul Islam*, pp. 122–3.

209 Boland, *The struggle of Islam*, p. 60.

210 'Penyelesaian soal Darul Islam', *Berita Indonesia*, 23 Dec. 1949; 'Statement Masjumi tentang Peristiwa "Darul Islam"' [23 Apr. 1950], KabPerd, no. 150, ANRI.

211 Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. 173.

212 'Sikap PSII Terhadap Penyelesaian Soal Darul Islam' [4 May 1950], Arsip Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia Serikat, 1949–1950, no. 107, ANRI.

213 Mokaginta *et al.*, *Sedjarah*, p. 98.

place of Islam in the state.<sup>214</sup> The attitude of the Masyumi party was also deeply influential in impeding any move to apply unrelenting violence as the single means of destroying the movement. Speakers at the December 1949 Masyumi conference in Yogyakarta were concerned to defend and praise Kartosuwiryo for his role in defending West Java, weakening the Dutch in the process and thus strengthening the Republic's negotiating position. Some delegates wondered why the Republic had been prepared to collaborate with 'treasonous' Dutch-sponsored puppet states but not to find some method of compromise with the Darul Islam.<sup>215</sup> Following on its previous requests, at its December 1950 conference in Yogyakarta, Masyumi called for a 'Resolution Commission' 'to look for the best possible way to settle the problems of Darul Islam and everything related to it'.<sup>216</sup> In the previous month, prime minister Natsir, describing the Darul Islam situation as 'a part of the general guerrilla problem', had called on those who had been disappointed and disillusioned with the results of the independence struggle to integrate themselves anew with the young Republic and seek their aims by peaceful means.<sup>217</sup> The Republic made little or no effort in the early 1950s to respond to two initiatives from Kartosuwiryo which seemed to offer some form of accommodation with the Republic.<sup>218</sup> The army, bloodied by its own experiences with Darul Islam and eager to pursue a military solution to the Darul Islam problem, saw this governmental reluctance as dangerously dissembling.<sup>219</sup>

But why did the dispute eventually have to come to this? As one scholar noted, the Islamist 'aims of the Dar ul-Islam movement are widely shared beyond its formal limits, among the Indonesian Muslim community'.<sup>220</sup> Indeed, the idea that the Republic of Indonesia was a Muslim country and should eventually come to have Islam as its basis had long been common currency amongst Muslim leaders, teachers and intellectuals; indeed, many saw the attainment of independence as the indispensable means towards that end.<sup>221</sup> The freedom of Indonesia was seen as a necessary condition for the proper practice of Islam, and resistance to the Dutch an integral component of the struggle.<sup>222</sup> As early as October 1945, the Yogyakarta branch of Masyumi had declared that 'the Islamic community of Indonesia must fight on the road of Allah, reject the slander of colonialism and tyranny and uphold the religion

214 Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. 174.

215 Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 123.

216 Quoted in Aboebakar, *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim*, pp. 174–5.

217 *Pedoman*, 12 May 1951, in M. Natsir, *Capita selecta 2* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1957), pp. 270–1.

218 On 22 Oct. 1950, Kartosuwiryo sent a 'secret note' to Sukarno requesting, among other things, that the Republic dispense with nationalism and instead adopt Islam as its guiding principle; on 27 Feb. 1951, Kartosuwiryo sent another missive seeking, amongst other things, recognition from the Republic (Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, pp. 163–74). See also Boland, *The struggle of Islam*, pp. 60–1; and Dengel, *Darul Islam*, p. 220.

219 Herbert Feith, *The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 211.

220 Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. 162.

221 *Ibid.*, pp. 162–4; Harun Nasution, 'The Islamic state in Indonesia: The rise of the ideology, the movement for its creation and the theory of the Masjumi' (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1965), pp. 78–9.

222 Wahid Hasyim even issued a *fatwa* to the effect that in the period of revolution it was forbidden to use Dutch ships to make the *haji* (Aboebakar, *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim*, p. 113).

of Allah and the freedom of the State of the Republic of Indonesia'.<sup>223</sup> The 1946 Masyumi conference in Solo had determined 'to strengthen and perfect the bases of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia so as to bring into being an Islamic society and an Islamic State'.<sup>224</sup> The 1946 urgency programme of Masyumi had called for 'a State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Islam'.<sup>225</sup> In March 1948 at the third Masyumi congress in Madiun, chairman Sukiman clearly enunciated the notion that the Republic was the vehicle for the realisation of the Islamic State, a view with which Natsir was in accord.<sup>226</sup> The progressive Masyumi leader Mohammed Rum, like Natsir himself, saw no necessary contradiction between the 1945 Constitution and an Islamic state; 'the Pantja Sila are all principles of Islam'.<sup>227</sup> The noted West Java-based Persis leader, Isa Anshary, while he strove for 'the freedom and sovereignty of the people of the Indonesian State', also sought 'the realisation of the Islam-ideology in state affairs'.<sup>228</sup> Where these people parted company with Kartosuwiryo (although their criticism of him remained muted) was in the matter of the means chosen for the desired end, and particularly over his employment of apparently indiscriminate violence in pursuit of his political ends.<sup>229</sup> They could not, therefore, approve of what the Darul Islam had become.<sup>230</sup> Like his Muslim fellows, Kartosuwiryo had long opposed the abiding tendency of the government of the Republic to engage in diplomatic manoeuvres with the Dutch rather than to seize independence boldly and, if necessary, violently. But his voice was but one of numerous and politically much more weighty voices, both within the Masyumi party and outside it, which frequently made the same cry, which contributed much to the instability of the Republic's government, but which did not go into violent revolts against it.<sup>231</sup>

### Concluding remarks

Why, then, did Kartosuwiryo start shooting? The evidence discussed above suggests that his resort to violence was not the inevitable product of a long-gestating ambition to establish an Islamic state, or a frustrated desire to obtain personal power. Rather, it was the consequence of a confluence of highly unusual circumstances and timings which pushed Kartosuwiryo, step by step, to violent revolt in order to create, maintain, then defend, the controlling autonomy he had secured in West Java – with an underlying desire to further expand his influence to the outer islands. He was certainly a man of shuttered vision and unusual energy and intensity, but he shared those

223 *Djiwa Repoeblik*, 20 Oct. 1945.

224 Quoted in Aboebakar, *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim*, p. 357. See also pp. 360–1.

225 *Ibid.*, p. 360.

226 'De Negara Islam Indonesia'.

227 Mohammed Rum, paraphrased interview with George Kahin, Yogyakarta, 23 Nov. 1948, Kahin (private).

228 Paraphrased in 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag over de maand Maart 1949 van de regentschappen in de Negara Pasoendan'.

229 See, for example, the case of Kiyai Yusuf Tazuri, in Van Dijk, *Rebellion*, pp. 13–14. See also the Jan. 1951 clarification of the Masyumi position in relation to Darul Islam in Puar, *Mohammad Natsir 70 tahun*, pp. 180–1. An important element in their calculations was probably the political cost of engaging in open conflict with the established powers.

230 See *Sin Po*, 20 Apr. 1949.

231 Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 179.



qualities with many other leading figures of the revolution who did not resort to violent means to achieve their political ends. In his case, the crucial factors were, first, his capacity, in late 1947 and 1948, to capitalise on the Republican insistence on diplomacy and Dutch readiness to resort to aggression to consolidate his following in rural West Java. Second, the TNI *hijrah*, both in its timing and its effects, gave him the unparalleled opportunity to build both his military and administrative capacity with a vacuum of local power; similarly, the TNI return to West Java in 1949 exacerbated the tensions between the 'foreign', 'weak' Republican army and the local, dedicated, Islamic militias. Third, the lamentable collapse of the Republic in December 1948 gave him persuasive grounds to argue that his movement offered the single, last opportunity to oppose Dutch colonial power. Finally, one must look to the extreme state weakness of the Republic at this time. That weakness was certainly of the military kind; indeed, 'the Republican government was hardly in a position to make a major problem of the Dar ul-Islam movement, the less so since the activities of the latter were directed mainly against the Dutch and were in no way inhibited by Dutch-Indonesian agreements or by the issuance of cease-fire orders'.<sup>232</sup> But that weakness went also to its capacity to appreciate the real threat that Darul Islam represented, and to make a concerted and purposeful attempt either to domesticate or destroy Kartosuwiryo's movement.

Kartosuwiryo's resort to violence, then, was a function of the repeated interplay of contingency and locally motivated reaction, which Kartosuwiryo – and the Republic – allowed, by default, to direct the action. If at the beginning of the century, during the so-called *zaman bergerak* – 'age in motion' – ideology and reactions to the established authority called the shots, amidst the deep transformations of the 1940s, at the institutional as well as social levels, Islamism escaped the constraining bonds of mainstream nationalism and nationalist discourse, one of the few occasions when such has occurred in the modern history of Indonesia. That it could do so says more about the detailed play of historical contingency than about the putative power of any particular ideological fixation.

232 Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects*, p. 174.