

events were part of the Kremlin's narrative of Russia standing up from its knees" (98). Although at some points the authors address the counter-factual (would Crimea have happened had there been no Sochi?), they ultimately decide that the Crimean gambit was so important to Russia that it would have happened anyway. It is with this point that I think there is room for more interpretation or justification: had the games been more of a success, would the Russian state still have annexed Crimea? Similarly, what role do the considerably larger and more complicated FIFA World Cup sporting events play in the narrative of Russia rising from its knees? Is this Russia not just rising from its knees but also entering into the select club of World Cup host cities? What would a comparison of the World Cup and the Sochi Winter Olympics tell us about Russian government and politics generally? These are all questions that could be addressed in a hoped-for sequel or new edition.


Note

1. As, indeed, the authorities are currently doing in Moscow itself, trying to demolish Khrushchev-era apartments and relocate tenants to the rather distant "new Moscow." Local residents fear that the land on which their apartments stood will be used to build skyscrapers.

Reference

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Advanced introduction to nationalism, by Liah Greenfeld, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016, 137 pp., \$108 (hardback), \$19.96 (paperback), ISBN 9781785362545

Liah Greenfeld is a professor of sociology, political science, and anthropology at Boston University and the author of a number of books and papers on the subject of nationalism, which have made her an authority in this field. In particular, Greenfeld wrote a trilogy on modern culture composed of *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (1993); *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (2003); and *Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience* (2013) (all published by Harvard University Press). In this *Advanced Introduction to Nationalism*, she offers a compelling and succinct compendium of the research she has carried out over the last three decades.

Greenfeld's particular understanding of nationalism as "the cultural framework of modern reality" – clearly fleshed out in the introduction – sets her apart from most other authors in the field, who tend to focus on nationalism as a form of politics. Greenfeld instead looks at nationalism as a form of consciousness – one based on the principles of equality, secularism, and popular sovereignty – that permeates the modern world and has consequences for all areas of modern experience. Greenfeld puts culture, the human

mind, and symbolic processes, rather than structural and material variables, at the core of the social construction of reality, as well as of her analysis. As she explains in chapter 3,

The specifically human reality ... consists of a constant give-and-take between the inner workings of the mind and its symbolic environment, that is, between culture, as we can call the mental, symbolic, and historical process on the collective level, and the mind – the same process on the individual level.

In this book, after introducing her approach, Greenfeld deals with the origin and spread of nationalism in Western Europe, then moves to analyze the consequences of its rise in the areas of politics, the economy, and emotions (with a chapter on each). The volume concludes with some considerations on the “globalization of nationalism” in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Greenfeld locates the origin of nationalism in sixteenth-century England. The decimation of the English nobility in the wake of the War of the Roses forced the Tudor monarchy to co-opt members of the Commons into the aristocracy. According to her, this process of massive upward mobility in a society until then based on strictly divided and impermeable orders needed to be explained through some kind of socio-psychological rationalization, which was provided by the modern nationalist idea of the English nation as composed of equal and sovereign members. The success of this new national consciousness was due to the fact that it provided the masses with dignity – something that had until then been limited to a tiny minority of the population. As a consequence, national consciousness not only spread quickly and consolidated throughout England, but was later imported into other countries, among which Greenfeld analyzes France, Russia, the US, and Germany. In each case, the peculiar circumstances of its importation determined nationalism’s specific formulation.

Nationalism had consequences also for the economy. Reinterpreting Max Weber’s explanation of the rise of capitalism as the result of the new system of values introduced by Protestantism, she argues that it was not the Reformation but rather nationalism, and especially its distinctively egalitarian and secular orientation, that produced the “spirit of capitalism.” More importantly, Greenfeld asserts, nationalism’s inherent competitive nature meant that, when the economy was included into the areas of international competition between nations, this naturally led to “a commitment to constant growth.”

Chapter 5 shows how wide nationalism’s impact on human experience has been. She argues that the egalitarian and secular view of reality brought about by nationalism opened up to the human mind the possibility to experience a whole new spectrum of emotions – mostly passions linked to the processes of upward and downward social mobility that became “normal” in the modern world. At the same time, it also set the stage for the development of a whole series of mental diseases stemming from the existential insecurity and anomie endemic in free and egalitarian societies. As she points out,

In an open secular society, created by national consciousness, one was supposed to choose and then build one’s life. One’s own maker, one became the architect of one’s happiness. The personal responsibility that came with this empowerment gave rise to a very specific, modern, kind of unhappiness and suffering, which, in its acute form, would express itself as functional mental disease.

Greenfeld even goes beyond that and identifies “mental discomfort” as the main driver of “ideological activism” on the individual level, and “ideological politics” on the collective one.

The book closes with some considerations on the continuing relevance of nationalism in the last quarter of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. While

many commentators were predicting the disappearance of nationalism under the solvent of globalization, rather Greenfeld argues that we have seen the “globalization of nationalism,” especially its pervasive diffusion to India and China.

As one can glimpse from the above summary, Greenfeld’s *Advanced Introduction to Nationalism* is an extremely rich text offering a consistent and compelling argument about the nature, rise, and consequences of nationalism. The breadth of the argument constitutes both the strength and the weakness of the book. It is its strength because of the breath-taking disciplinary and historical ground that it covers in only 137 pages. It is its weakness because such a wide perspective would need to be supported by much more detailed empirical evidence than that presented. Yet, as said above, the book provides a summary of Greenfeld’s previous works, and one can simply refer to these to access and evaluate such evidence.

Greenfeld’s approach to nationalism represents a minority in the field. This book, which is especially useful for both undergraduate and graduate students familiarizing themselves with the subject, promises to help move her work into the mainstream.


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Pluralism by default: weak autocracy and the rise of competitive politics, by Lucan Way, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015, 274 pp., \$44.95 (paperback), ISBN 978-1-4214-1812-4

There currently exists a received view that “democracy largely failed” in the former USSR with the notable exception of the three Baltic republics which joined the European Union. This failure is then ascribed to the weakness of democratizing forces (including assistance by the West), an insufficient local “understanding” of what democracy is, or an absence of democratic traditions. This book by Lucan Way is a timely antidote against this type of democratic wishful arguing. The central thesis of the book is that the key explanatory factor of the “fate of democracy” in the post-Soviet world is *not* the strength or weakness of democratic forces or of civil society, but those of the forces that tried to install a new authoritarian regime.

The implicit assumption that the Soviet regime was authoritarian is correct, but fails to address the fact that some of the post-Soviet countries, particularly Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, represent a continuation of a totalitarian rather than a simply authoritarian regime, and in that sense continued *more* of the Soviet legacy than other countries did, which chose either the liberal-democratic or the neo-patrimonial path. While Way does point to the exceptional continuity in the Uzbek and Turkmen cases, his use of the single notion of authoritarianism places Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan too quickly in the same category as the manifestly more liberal, though not more democratic, Kazakhstan.

Largely limiting himself, with good reason, to the Post-Soviet countries (minus the Baltic states), the author reaches the general conclusion that “among the three main cases in this book [Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus’], differences in national identity most