

points out that these opportunities were considerably less favorable for the Kurds when the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) launched its guerrilla war in the 1980s than in the 1920s because the Turkish state was much weaker in the 1920s. So how to explain the present-day PKK's greater success, compared to that of the short-lived Sheik Said rebellion in 1925?

Romano thus maintains that resource mobilization (RM) and rational choice (RC) approaches also give one a valuable additional understanding of how the Kurdish national movement built itself up in the 1980s, especially given its genesis with so few resources: "The PKK, with only a few hundred cadres, was able to increase the Kurdish population's sympathy and support by coordinating actions that mattered to the local people, most important of which was opposition to the landlords and exploitative tribal chiefs" (p. 74).

Finally, cultural framing or "shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (p. 21), and the cultural tool kit or "attitudes prevalent within a population" (ibid.), help explain why and how people pursue certain goals. When the PKK became aware that its Marxist ideology did not particularly appeal to its Kurdish target, it began "to stress its Kurdish nationalist and human rights grievance frames more than its socialist side" (p. 142). In addition, telecommunications and the Internet gave the PKK additional outlets: "By establishing MED-TV, a Kurdish satellite station based in London and Belgium, the Kurds became the world's first stateless 'television nation'" (p. 153).

Romano finishes his study with single chapters dealing with the Iraqi Kurds, the Iranian Kurds, and a thoughtful conclusion. Here, he argues that "had a lack of available traditional elite allies back in the 1950s forced the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement to develop a more progressive program that mobilized the peasantry and urban classes [as the PKK did in Turkey], the challenge to Baghdad might have been much stronger" (p. 195). He further notes, in regards to the U.S.-enforced no-fly zone over northern Iraq after 1991, that "the events that led to the creation of the Iraqi Kurdish safe haven are indicative of the increasing importance of international influences as a structural opportunity variable" (p. 211). As for the Kurdish situation in Iran, "what stands out the most . . . is the degree to which Iranian Kurds have relied on the appearance of auspicious opportunities, even more so than Turkish and Iraqi Kurds" (p. 244). Much more so than in Turkey or Iraq, "Iranian Kurdish challenges only emerged in significant form at times when the Iranian state was in dire straits" (ibid.).

In his conclusion, Romano usefully suggests two further themes: 1) "Kurdish women may have the ability to inject a necessary spirit of peaceful accommodation and cooperation amongst Kurdish nationalists and elites, if they are better integrated into the structures of political power in Kurdish society" (p. 252). 2) "The demands of Kurdish and

other minority groups for national and religious rights are actually a possible source of democratization for Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, since freedoms granted to one group presumably extend to every member of society" (pp. 254–55). This second suggestion leads into the possible benefits of future Turkish membership in the European Union.

Given Romano's emphasis on the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, his book's front cover illustration of the cemetery at and monument to the victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons attack on Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan is possibly misplaced. With the additional minor exception of a few historical quibbles, Romano clearly has succeeded in applying sophisticated social movement theories to the Kurdish nationalist movement. Indeed, his bibliography illustrates this by usefully integrating recent studies of the Kurds with general theoretical analyses of social movement theories. His study also includes a list of acronyms and abbreviations, a map, and an index. Although difficult reading at times, this analysis helps to advance Kurdish studies and will amply reward those who peruse it closely.

The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan. By Aseema Sinha. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. 384p. \$64.95 cloth, \$27.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070582

— Aruna Nayyar Michie, *Kansas State University*

This excellent study by Aseema Sinha is a pathbreaker in the fields of political economy and comparative politics generally, and an especially welcome addition to India studies. Conventional wisdom has it that low economic growth rates in India until liberalization in the 1990s were the result of centralized control, especially in the area of the issuance of licenses governing investments known as the *license raj*. On this view, licensing controls and cumbersome bureaucratic implementation procedures—supported by an ideology that sought to prevent concentration of economic power in the hands of a small group of private entrepreneurs at the expense of the wider social good—have been a drag on the Indian economy. Far better, the argument goes, would have been to let the market function to determine investment patterns. In essence, the debate about Indian growth has been framed around two alternatives—the classical free market and the dirigiste state.

Sinha's study successfully argues against this dichotomy and posits that both sides of the argument have missed the dynamic of what was actually happening. By focusing solely on macroeconomic policy and legal, institutional variables, the "market vs. state" debate cannot explain the enormous variation in growth rates and investment patterns across India's states. More fruitful is Sinha's approach, which examines the states' varying responses to central licensing regulations. Sinha argues that centrally directed regulations and procedures actually required coordination

with the states, which gave the states room and considerable flexibility in pursuing their own programs and in turn shaping the central agenda. Her model of polycentric hierarchy provides a framework that permits disaggregation of the interactions in a seemingly dirigiste system. Simply put, the model permits analysis of state-centered relations (the vertical strategies) along with interactions within states and their regions (horizontal strategies). Horizontal interactions—which include social, political factors and alliances and the wider regional environment—are largely responsible for the individual states' responses to central regulation. A carefully drawn series of hypotheses expand on the basic model. The basic indicators of development are growth rates, industrial change and investment patterns, and economic outputs and distribution patterns of investments by the central public sector, state public sectors, joint public-private ventures, and the private sector. Explaining these are a range of social, political variables that conditioned the states' responses.

Sinha's research employs what she calls "methodological eclecticism" (p. 25)—a rich mix of approaches and data, both qualitative and quantitative. Historical materials are used to look at the colonial heritage of various regions under the British, including levels and patterns of industrial development and the social, political groups involved. These provide a benchmark of sorts leading to the selection of Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu as the main cases. Quantitative data trace changes in development over time and patterns of investment. Sociopolitical analyses of classes, castes, and political alliances and parties provide insight into the horizontal strategies pursued by each state. Interviews with Ministry of Industry officials (Indian Administrative Service state cadres) indicate how each state perceived central policies and the alternatives they made possible and how each pursued its own strategy in light of these possibilities. Finally, interviews with private entrepreneurs offer the reader insight into their primary goals and their views about public policies. Together, these methods are used to develop a most interesting comparative account.

Gujarat pursued a kind of "bureaucratic liberalism," which meant that the state, in conjunction with private groups, used a strategy of active lobbying and pressures to attract investment. The Congress Party held a virtual monopoly of power until the mid-1970s, presiding over a broad coalition of larger farmers, traders, artisans, and lower castes. Farming castes, particularly the *patidars*, also went into businesses that provided a bridge between farming and industry. Investments in infrastructure and loans extended opportunities for small-scale ventures, reinforcing the coalition and making it difficult for labor in both industry and agriculture to have much political impact. The regional variable of having Mumbai close by spurred the Gujaratis to encourage investments. The result was good growth, lower unemployment, and poverty reduction.

Bengal's strategy, by contrast, was one of confrontation with the center. Industry was concentrated in the Calcutta area, major traditional investors were not Bengali, and indeed, the strong subnationalism of being Bengali tended to isolate them from the mainstream of politics and decision making. It also deterred other non-Bengali persons from investing. In fact, although many Marwari business people remained in Bengal, their investments tended to flow westward (p. 198). The Communist Party of India (Marxist), while having a nationalist ideology, is in fact a "regional party" using subnationalisms to win electoral support. It tended to view the center as exploitive and to promote policies based on this view. The result was industrial decline.

Tamil Nadu used a combination of both liberalism and confrontation. Faced with strong subnationalisms involving shifting caste and cultural identity, political parties mobilized electoral support along social rather than economic lines (p. 205). Outsiders were often blamed for the ills of the state. On the other hand, regional competitiveness from especially Karnataka and Kerala spurred periods of bureaucratic liberalism as well. Tamil Nadu then is a mixed picture.

Sinha argues these strategies laid the basis for industrial policy in the post-license raj period, with Gujarat sustaining a strong development path, Bengal a much weaker path, and Tamil Nadu experiencing a more mixed record.

Sinha includes a chapter that indicates how her model may be applied to other states, focusing on Brazil, China, the former Soviet Union, and post-Soviet Russia. Even though it is suggestive, this chapter clearly is an invitation for other scholars to expand the comparative scope of her findings and is not entirely essential to this study of India. It would be interesting to see how Sinha, and others employing her approach, might extend the analysis beyond industrialization and apply her approach to other aspects of development. Could one apply it to other areas of development such as education, health, or particularly agriculture? In all these policy areas, one would expect to find similar variations in the extent of central control (direction) versus market allocation. Certainly with the current preoccupation with globalization, less attention is being paid to these areas than to industrialization. I suspect that this approach would work well and that it would illuminate the more knotty policy problems associated with unemployment and poverty. However, I would like to see more on this.

In an important essay, Amartya Sen (1997: 27) noted that the pro and anti market positions seem to have an "odd 'hold' on all sides, so that we concentrate only on some issues and ignore many—often more important—ones." He was so right. Aseema Sinha's book breaks out of that straitjacket. In so doing, it greatly enhances our understanding of the political and social dynamics of public policy, shedding light on India and at the same

time developing a theoretical framework of broader relevance.

Public Opinion and Political Change in China.

By Wenfang Tang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 237p.

\$55.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070594

— John James Kennedy, *University of Kansas*

In this comprehensive book, Wenfang Tang explores the nature and origins of mass opinion in urban China through survey research conducted between 1987 and 2000. The general theme is how some local democratic practices can develop within the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, rather than presenting a single theory or model, Tang examines a series of case studies on public opinion. He draws on a rich data set that consists of 11 large-scale urban surveys conducted by Chinese government and academic institutions, including his own 1999 six-city survey. With this data he examines a wide range of theories and explanations, such as regime legitimacy (Chapter 3), the influence of the media on opinion (Chapter 4), social capital theory (Chapter 5), political participation (Chapters 6 and 7), and the role of intellectuals (Chapter 8). Thus, this book has a broad appeal to those interested in political development as well as contemporary China.

Public opinion research is still a new and developing field in China. Tang provides an honest portrayal of the challenges and pitfalls of conducting survey research in the PRC. He lays out the political difficulties and possible solutions before presenting the statistical analysis. He addresses a number of issues regarding data quality, including questionnaire design, the truthfulness of respondents, and sampling problems. Questionnaire construction and choosing the right wording is a difficult task under the best survey conditions in industrialized democracies, but it is even more complicated in an authoritarian regime. The issue is political sensitivity. Certain topics cannot be addressed in Chinese opinion surveys, such as evaluations of specific national leaders or the efficiency of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, questions about local government, political behavior, and economic policies tend to be more acceptable. Tang correctly points out that political sensitivity is not a significant problem because of the numerous nonsensitive topics that can be explored (p. 52). He also deals with the issue of fear and assessing the truthfulness of respondents. This is done by identifying indicators of fear, which include specific survey questions that address trepidation in publicly criticizing the government, the nonresponse rate, and the number of "do not know" answers. These indicators allow the researcher to assess possible bias. Finally, drawing a representative urban sample is becoming more difficult due to the increase in rural-to-urban (and urban-to-urban) migration. Tang mentions several methods to resolve the prob-

lem, including the use of Geographic Positioning Systems (p. 45). More importantly, he reminds us that given the difficulties in obtaining a nationally representative sample, it is often safer to study the relationships between variables than the descriptive statistics about a single variable. Thus, he presents a convincing argument that despite the potential problems, "public opinion surveys can be effectively used as a research tool for studying China" (p. 50).

The book is divided into three parts and nine chapters. The first two chapters provide background for the reader, with a brief history of the important political and economic events in contemporary China (Chapter 1) and a detailed description of the surveys (Chapter 2). The next three chapters discuss how public opinion is formed in China. The results in Chapter 3 might be puzzling for American scholars who believe that regime support is associated with political legitimacy. Throughout the 1990s, no matter how the questions are worded, most of the surveys that address trust in the national leadership or trustworthiness in central government institutions report a strong level of support. Moreover, in his own 1999 six-city survey, Tang finds that the state-controlled media had an increasingly significant influence on regime support over time (p. 98). For scholars interested in social capital theory, another intriguing result is the high level of interpersonal trust among friends and neighbors and, at the same time, a low tolerance for other groups and alternative opinions. In Chapter 5, he concludes that in urban China, interpersonal trust is positively related with some democratic practices, such as voting in local elections and contacting officials, but it is negatively associated with democratic values such as social tolerance (p. 115). The last three chapters examine political participation and the responsiveness of local government agents. One of the key findings is that popular opinion can be expressed in urban China and that local government agencies are becoming more responsive. However, the author warns against too much optimism and states that "there was no evidence that the highest levels of the Chinese political system were responsive to broader political issues and challenges" (p. 139).

In general, this book challenges the pretransition or predemocratization literature that stresses the role of a growing urban middle class to make greater political demands on the authoritarian regime. Tang finds that the urban demands are focused on material or modern values, such as housing and job security, rather than postmodern values, such as human rights and individual political autonomy. Although there are increasing reports of urban protests and demonstrations against local government agencies, these disturbances represent only a small proportion of the urban population, and they currently pose no threat to the regime. In fact, the central leadership continues to enjoy a high level of popular support. This suggests that