allows readers to trace the evolution of democracy indicators and indices across time and space. The rationale for this broad historical scope is premised on the assumption that the predictions of future political systems should be rooted in a sound understanding of past political institutions and trends. Second, the book introduces several indicators and indices (450+) for a systematic comparison and measurement of institutional and political developments (see chaps. 2 and 6). This material draws on more than 27 million observations collected from 202 countries between 1789 and 2018, which is important because it increases the levels of precision with regard to standards for measuring democracy. The book also introduces the V-Dem model of measurement, drawing from item response theory (IRT) modelling (see chap. 4). Third, the V-Dem dataset showcases impressive country coverage and cross-national data comparability. This dataset shows what collaborative efforts can yield over time. The project comprised 6 principal investigators, 19 project managers, 19 postdoctoral fellows, 37 regional managers, 160 + country coordinators, several graduate and undergraduate assistants and over 3,200 country experts who participated in coding the V-Dem dataset (2–4)—a level of participation that underscores how high the levels of data disaggregation are, making V-Dem an inclusive and useful dataset across the globe (see chap. 3). Lastly, the arguments presented in this book draw on a multidimensional approach to conceptualize democracy within well-defined political units. The book also integrates cross-sectional methodological procedures for collecting, coding and analyzing more than 27 million cross-country data entries.

While this is an excellent book, much credence is given to quantitative data and statistical inferences, making the arguments and discussions presented primarily accessible to scholars with a preference for numerical data. This is not to suggest that overreliance on statistical inferences represents a weakness; instead, it underscores the need for the reader to be familiar with advanced statistical tools such as Stan probabilistic programming language and Bayesian item response theory in order to fully appreciate the V-Dem model. Without this prior knowledge, the main chapters of the book (for example, chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7) will be difficult to read. Perhaps the book targets readers and scholars with statistical preferences. Finally, while chapter 4 discusses the viability of the V-Dem measurement model, it is not clear whether the model experiences estimation challenges with certain category of indicators. This information could be useful for readers who wish to know how well the model performs across the categories of indicators discussed.

Overall, this is an outstanding contribution to democratization research and certainly a very useful read in comparative politics. The book provides important and fine-grained metrics on democratization that are likely to change how we engage with political and institutional changes across time and space. Finally, the book is likely to provide compelling evidence-based insights to the ongoing discussions on whether there is an increase or decrease in autocracies across the world and how this increase/decrease knits together (or not) with pro- and anti-democracy claims.

James Harrington: An Intellectual Biography

Rachel Hammersley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 336.

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James Harrington was the most significant figure within the civic-republican tradition between Machiavelli in the sixteenth century and Rousseau in the eighteenth century. It was not by accident, after all, that Montesquieu singled out Harrington as a philosophical "legislator" uniquely driven by his passion for "the republic of England" (*The Spirit of the Laws*, bk. 29, chap. 19). Has he gotten

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his rightful due within the canon of Western political thought? Political theorists and intellectual historians should have a much better idea of how to answer this question on the basis of Rachel Hammersley's thoughtful and ambitious survey of Harrington's ideas and legacy.

Hammersley begins her book with a helpful sketch of all the very different Harringtons that have emerged between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. As the author lays out with terrific clarity and care, these divergent characterizations of Harrington have generated a series of important interpretive debates. Was Harrington the first historical materialist, as some commentators have claimed? Did he, along with John Milton, Henry Neville and Algernon Sydney, compose a tradition of English "classical republicanism"? Or owing to his debt to Machiavelli and Hobbes, was his republicanism (as Paul Rahe, for instance, has maintained) more modern in inspiration than ancient? Indeed, did he place sufficient emphasis on the idea of civic virtue to count as republican at all? The nineteenth century may have neglected Harrington, but there's been no neglect among theorists and historians of political thought over the course of the last 75 years. The image of Harrington that has assumed the most authority during this period has been the one instilled by J. G. A. Pocock; but Pocock's interpretation has drawn capable critics and challengers. By giving as much attention to Harrington's life as to his texts, Hammersley aspires to arrive at a fuller picture of the scope and originality of Harrington's contribution than would be available if one confined oneself solely to "the republican paradigm."

One of the strange aspects of the Harrington story is that while he established himself in the history of political thought as one of the seventeenth century's leading theoretical champions of republican institutions, Harrington was personally friendly with Charles I, the monarch whose defeat and execution turned England into a republic during the decade (the 1650s) when Harrington wrote all his political works. Parliament appointed Harrington as gentleman of the bedchamber in service to Charles I when Parliament assumed responsibility for the captive king in 1647. The two of them hit it off. Hammersley captures the nature of the relationship by quoting biographical accounts by John Toland ("[Harrington] had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the King, who much convers'd with him about Books and Foren Countreys"), Anthony Wood ("His Majesty lov'd his company, and, finding him to be an ingenious Man, chose rather to converse with him than with others of his Chamber: They had often discourses concerning Government") and John Aubrey ("Mr. Harington passionately loved his majesty") (57). However, both Wood and Aubrey report that the king balked "when they happen'd to talk of a Commonwealth," refusing "to indure it." The regicide in 1649 hit Harrington hard; yet his affection for Charles didn't deter him from publishing, seven years later, a statement of republican principles of lasting significance. Indeed, Hammersley quotes a royalist's angry accusation that Harrington had betrayed his friendship with "the blessed martyr Charles" by composing a book like *Oceana* (61–62, 152–53).

No less intriguing is the issue of Harrington's veiled and rather tense relation with Oliver Cromwell. A legend disseminated by Toland has it that Harrington had to get Cromwell's daughter to intercede with her father in order to secure permission for *Oceana* to be published (68, 122). The extent to which the book was part of a movement of republican resistance to Cromwell's Protectorate is still debated by scholars. The restored monarchy arrested Harrington in 1661 on suspicion of being an anti-royalist subversive, and in his responses to interrogators, he claimed that he had written *Oceana* in order to educate Cromwell about the nature of a commonwealth (identified by Harrington with popular sovereignty), referred to Cromwell as "a Usurper" and asserted that the book proved the Cromwellian regime not to be the commonwealth it took itself to be (68, 82).

Hammersley's own position in regard to debates concerning Harrington's republicanism is that while he was unquestionably committed to the theoretical superiority of popular government, his republicanism was capacious enough to encompass varieties of commonwealth that

incorporate aspects of monarchy. Moreover, Hammersley suggests that this was in no small measure owing to Harrington's biographical connections with the Stuarts (both Charles I and Charles's nephew, Charles Louis). She calls him "a pluralist rather than an exclusivist republican" (66, 92, 175n38, 266), and she advocates in a persuasive and balanced way for this view. Another crucial aspect of the argument is that it was redundant for Harrington to decide the role of monarchy on a normative basis, since Harrington's proto-Marxism (his theory that the character of the political "superstructure" follows ineluctably from its economic foundation) dictated that this question has to be decided ultimately by the historical rise of new constellations of dominant property relations (12–15, 84–85, 97–99).

Rachel Hammersley has given us a well-crafted, meticulously researched and beautifully readable study of an important thinker. Her intellectual biography will be an essential resource for all students of republican political thought.

Provincial Battles, National Prize? Elections in a Federal State

Laura B. Stephenson, Andrea Lawlor, William P. Cross, André Blais and Elisabeth Gidengil, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019, pp. 234.

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In Canada, federal elections are regional affairs. It is a maxim so well established that few scholars bother to interrogate it. For more than a generation, the Liberal party's base has remained fixed in Ontario and Atlantic Canada, while conservative parties of various labels have tended to dominate Western Canada. Of the two major parties, the one that wins the most seats in British Columbia and Quebec—or the one that benefits most from the strength of a minor party like the New Democratic party or Bloc Québécois—tends to form government. Seen most recently in 2015 and 2019, these aggregate-level results are so durable as to be taken for granted by most students of Canadian politics. The political science community is fortunate that the authors of *Provincial Battles, National Prize* are not among the majority, as they are the first to ask *how* and *why* Canadian elections are so regionalized.

In their book, Stephenson, Lawlor, Cross, Blais and Gidengil treat the 2015 federal election as a case study in regionalized party politics in Canada and beyond. They advance three hypotheses to explain the regionalization: that the parties were responsible (by campaigning on a regional basis), that the media were responsible (by framing the election through regional lenses) and that the voters were responsible (by virtue of holding different values, priorities and policy preferences).

The book begins with a comprehensive review of the concept of regional voting in Canada. This includes a critique of the region-as-artifact view. As the authors put it, "Regional variation in political preferences should only be considered true regional differences if they cannot be explained by variations in the social composition of the regions" (25). This is a point to which the authors return throughout the book, as their analyses demonstrate that "people sharing the same social background characteristics often vote differently from one region of the country to another" (26).

In search of explanations, the authors draw on theoretical frameworks concerning party campaign strategies (for example, positioning, selective emphasis, resource allocation) and media framing (for example, agenda-setting, framing). The authors test these theories with a

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