

MARGINALIZED YET MOBILIZED

Race, Sexuality, and the Role of “Political Hypervigilance” in African American Political Participation in 2016

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Abstract

Both African American and LGBT voters can prove pivotal in electoral outcomes, but we know little about civic participation among Black LGBT people. Although decades of research on political participation has made it almost an article of faith that members of dominant groups (such as White people and individuals of higher socioeconomic status) vote at higher rates than their less privileged counterparts, recent work has suggested that there are circumstances under which members of marginalized groups might participate at higher rates. Some of this research suggests that political participation might also increase when groups perceive elections as particularly threatening. We argue that when such threats are faced by marginalized groups, the concern to protect hard-earned rights can activate a sense of what we call “political hypervigilance,” and that such effects may be particularly pronounced among members of intersectionally-marginalized groups such as LGBT African Americans. To test this theory, we use original data from the 2016 National Survey on HIV in the Black Community, a nationally-representative survey of Black Americans, to explore the relationship among same-sex sexual behavior, attitudes toward LGBT people, and respondent voting intentions in the 2016 presidential election. We find that respondents who reported having engaged in same-sex sexual behavior were strongly and significantly more likely to say they “definitely will vote” compared to respondents who reported no same-sex sexual behavior. More favorable views of LGBT individuals and issues (marriage equality) were also associated with greater intention to vote. We argue that these high rates provide preliminary evidence that political hypervigilance can, in fact, lead to increased political engagement among members of marginalized groups.

Keywords: African American, Black, LGBT, Voting, Intersectionality, Civic Engagement, 2016 Election, National Survey on HIV in the Black Community

Du Bois Review, 16:1 (2019) 131–156.

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doi:10.1017/S1742058X19000031

INTRODUCTION

Among the central and enduring issues in the study of race and American politics are questions about the relationship between marginalization and voting behavior, and recent elections have raised the salience of such concerns. The 2016 U.S. presidential race threatened several policy gains important to people of color and members of other marginalized groups, as debates about immigration, racial justice, reproductive rights, gendered violence, protections for transgender people, and marriage equality highlighted deep cleavages among Americans (Schuster et al., 2016; Stack 2016). For instance, the Affordable Care Act, against which Donald Trump campaigned heavily, brought the rate of Black uninsured down from 21% to approximately 13% (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016).¹ The modest but important police reforms achieved in response to the demands of racial justice movements were similarly threatened by a Trump victory, who campaigned on a “law and order” platform that took explicit aim at these changes (Roberts and Cleveland, 2016; Trump 2016). Trump’s selection of anti-gay stalwart Mike Pence as his running mate also signaled the possible reversal of recently won rights in areas such as marriage equality for the approximately 10 million voters who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) (Grinberg 2016; Stack 2018).

Indeed, much was at stake in November 2016 for African Americans and LGBT people, two of the most reliable Democratic voting blocs (Dawson 1994; Egan 2012; Frymer 1999; Strolovitch et al., 2017; Tate 1993). But although both Black and LGBT voters can prove pivotal in local and national elections (Egan 2012; Lewis et al., 2011; Schaffner and Senic, 2006), we know little about the determinants of voting among Black LGBT people, whose marginalized status is constituted by the intersection of race and sexuality and whose concerns have historically been given short-shrift by both mainstream civil rights and LGBT rights organizations (Battle and Harris 2013; Cohen 1999; Harris and Battle, 2013; Hunter 2010; Strolovitch 2007, 2012; Strolovitch et al., 2017; VanDaalen and Santos, 2017).² And although decades of research on the determinants of political participation has made it almost an article of faith that members of higher status groups vote at higher rates than their lower-socioeconomic-status (SES) counterparts, recent work has suggested that there are circumstances under which members of marginalized groups might, in fact, vote at higher rates. Some of this research suggests that this might happen when voters are particularly enthusiastic about a candidate (see Cohen 2012), but research on “threat as a motivator” suggests that turnout might also increase when groups perceive candidates or elections as particularly threatening (Hansen 1985; Miller and Krosnick 2004). We argue that when such threats are faced by marginalized groups, the concern to protect hard-earned rights can activate a sense of what we call “political hypervigilance,” and we examine whether the threatening political environment of 2016 heightened this vigilance among Black LGBT people, even as a lack of enthusiasm for the Democratic candidate led to a decline in turnout among African Americans more generally—from 66.6% in 2012 to 59.6% in 2016 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).

LITERATURE REVIEW

To begin to understand these issues, we consider the dominant explanations that scholars have offered for civic participation in the United States. We start by drawing on political science scholarship to first explain why members of some groups vote and participate at higher rates than others. Next, we discuss the smaller body of research on marginalization and civic engagement, exploring the circumstances under which non-dominant groups do, at times—and somewhat counter-intuitively—vote and

engage in other forms of political participation at higher rates than we might expect. We focus in particular on work showing that LGBT people are somewhat distinctive in this regard, professing higher levels of civic duty and engaging more frequently in protest activity than their straight counterparts. Finally, we explore recent scholarship that addresses civic participation among people whose marginalized status is structured by the intersection of race and sexuality, which is the substantive issue with which we are most concerned.

Explanations for Civic Participation in the United States

A large body of research has illuminated much about the broad drivers of political engagement in the United States (Brady et al., 1995; Campbell 2003; Majic 2014; Pierson 1993; Putnam 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen, 2002; Uslander and Brown, 2005; Verba et al., 1995). Emphasizing socioeconomic, resource-based, psychological/attitudinal, and policy-specific explanations for why individuals and groups participate at differential rates in American politics, this research has demonstrated some of the ways in which factors such as social location, financial resources, demographics and other markers of socio-economic status determine the extent of civic involvement (Brady et al., 1995).

Socioeconomic factors: Among the most consistent findings of this work is that social and economic privilege is associated with greater levels of civic engagement. Henry Brady and his co-authors (1995) argue, for example, that the uneven distribution of resources such as time, money, and political skills leads to higher rates of participation among people from higher socioeconomic groups. This finding about resources echoes evidence from other research demonstrating that socioeconomic factors such as family background and education are similarly associated with civic knowledge and propensity to participate (Brady et al., 1995; Uslander and Brown, 2005). Together, the findings of this body of work paint a picture in which wealthy, White, older, and college educated men are the most reliably enfranchised civic participants in the United States.

Psychological and attitudinal factors: Scholars have also shown that psychological and attitudinal factors play important roles in determining political participation in the United States. For example, higher levels of trust, optimism, and a sense of agency over one's future are associated with increased civic participation across sociodemographic groups (Avery 2006; Cohen 2012; Uslander and Brown, 2005). Likewise, the prototypical disaffected non-voter has low levels of trust in government to do the right thing, a lack of confidence that the government will be responsive to their needs, and a sense of alienation from the political system as a whole (Cohen 2012).

Policy feedback and threat as a motivator: Work addressing what scholars have come to call "policy feedback" (Campbell 2003; Pierson 1993) and "threat as a motivator" (Hansen 1986; Miller and Krosnick, 2004) suggests that groups with a stake in a particular policy will turn out to protect these policies. Scholars have shown, for example, that among the ways in which "policies create politics" (Schattschneider 1960) is that new government programs create new stakeholders which, in turn, create new patterns of civic participation among these beneficiaries. Building on behavioral economics ideas such as prospect theory, which contends that people are loss-averse and therefore more likely to take an action to avoid financial losses than to pursue gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), scholars have shown similarly that people are as motivated by a desire to "avert political threats" as they are by the possibility of desirable political opportunities (Hansen 1985; Miller and Krosnick, 2004). Research has shown that beneficiaries of programs such as Medicare and Social Security, for example, turn

out in large numbers to protect these policies when they are under threat (Campbell 2003), and that supporters of reproductive rights are more likely to contribute money to organizations whose solicitations emphasize threats to extant rights than to those whose requests are framed around opportunities to expand those rights (Hansen 1985; Miller and Krosnick, 2004).

Marginalization and Political Engagement

While we are interested in political participation among members of marginalized groups, voting research has typically taken the experiences and behavior of wealthy, White, and college educated men as its normative and empirical baseline (Junn 2007). A smaller but important and growing body of scholarship, however, has explored the civic engagement of members of marginalized groups (see, Cohen 1999, 2012; Egan et al., 2008; Majic 2011, 2014). Studies of voting behavior have shown, for example, that Black voter turnout has historically lagged behind White turnout, due, in no small part, to discriminatory laws and practices which have had as their goal the suppression of Black voters. Although the 15th Amendment to the Constitution and later the Voting Rights Act were enacted to protect voting rights for African Americans, factors including felony disenfranchisement, voter I.D. laws, and Supreme Court decisions about districting have eaten away at many of the most robust protections (Bentele and O'Brien, 2013; Nunnally 2012). Similarly, turnout among women lagged well behind that of men in every presidential election from the ratification of the 19th Amendment in 1920 until 1976 (Center for American Women and Politics 2017).

Recognizing that these patterns in voting behavior do not capture the full range of ways that groups might be politically engaged, scholars of race, gender, and sexuality have explored a broader range of forms of political engagement. Many of the findings of this research have challenged the assumptions of traditional models that take as given that members of marginalized groups—including people of color, LGBT people, women, hourly workers, and others—participate at lower rates than members of dominant groups. Samantha Majic (2014), for example, has shown that sex workers—a highly stigmatized and low-resource group—are more engaged in activities ranging from voting to non-profit agencies and community-based work than traditional models would predict. Some research has even found evidence that under some conditions, members of marginalized groups vote at *higher* rates than their counterparts in dominant groups. Voter turnout among eligible women, for example, which had lagged behind men's through 1976, surpassed it in 1980 and has remained higher in every presidential election since then (Center for American Women and Politics 2017). At 66.6%, voter turnout among African Americans in the 2012 election surpassed the rate for Whites for the first time since the U.S. Census began making this data available (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Similarly, using data from the 2012 National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement (NSLVE), scholars at Tufts University found that Black college students participated at higher rates in the 2012 presidential elections than students of other races and ethnicities (Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life 2012), perhaps because the Obama presidency heightened their sense of political efficacy (Cohen 2012).

The Political Distinctiveness of LGBT People

The traditional emphasis on voter turnout has been particularly unilluminating when it comes to understanding the political behavior of LGBT people, as surveys almost never included questions about LGBT identification until the 1990s (Egan 2012).

In the absence of this information, scholars have explored other avenues of LGBT political engagement, particularly the important role of social movements, political advocacy, and sustained mobilization in increasing access to HIV/AIDS-related treatment and resources (Cohen 1999; Gould 2009). For example, the AIDS Drug Assistance program was established in 1987 under Republican President Ronald Reagan's administration due to the persistent pressure of activists. This policy victory was particularly important to marginalized and stigmatized groups—low-income, LGBT, and HIV positive people who are disproportionately people of color—and exemplifies the importance of vigilance and commitment to political participation on the part of such groups and their allies.

More recent data has made it possible to explore more traditional measures of LGBT political attitudes and behavior (Egan 2012; Egan et al., 2008; Swank and Fahs 2016, 2013). Pat Egan and his colleagues (2008), for example, found that lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people are overwhelmingly likely to identify as and to vote for Democrats and also that they profess a greater sense of civic duty than their straight counterparts. LGB-identified voters also tend to show more liberal preferences on issues beyond those having to do specifically with LGBT rights, including foreign policy, environmental issues and the role of government (Egan et al., 2008; Egan and Sherrill, 2006). And echoing the finding about Black students in the NSLVE study cited above, Eric Swank and Breanne Fahs (2016) found that college students who identified as LGBT were twice as likely as their straight counterparts to engage in protest. These differences were particularly pronounced among LGB respondents who rejected other forms of social hierarchy and who were members of other marginalized groups as well (Swank and Fahs, 2016).

Civic Participation at the Intersection of Race and Sexuality

Although the studies described in the previous two sections explain a great deal about the political behavior of African Americans and of LGBT people, samples of Black LGBT people in standard surveys are typically too small to conduct meaningful analyses. Those studies that have examined civic participation among sexual minorities of color, however, provide suggestive evidence that their intersectionally-marginalized status is related to even more politically-distinctive behavior. Work by scholars such as Angelique Harris and Juan Battle (2013), Dara Strolovitch, Janelle Wong, and Andrew Proctor (2017), and Rachel VanDaalen and Carlos Santos (2017), for example, suggests that multiply marginalized individuals might be particularly socially and politically engaged, and also provides hints about the nature of that engagement. For example, Harris and Battle (2013) have shown that among “same-gender loving” Black women and men, feeling connected to LGBT communities was the most important predictor of sociopolitical involvement. While Harris and Battle find that a sense of community increases political engagement, scholars have found that some kinds of threats—such as the perception that heterosexism (Swank and Fahs, 2013) and racism (VanDaalen and Santos, 2017) are problems—is associated with increased political involvement, in the former case, among LGBT people of all races and in the latter case among LGBT people of color.

THEORY Political Hypervigilance

We argue that threat acts as a particular motivator for political participation among members of marginalized groups, for whom the concern to protect hard-earned rights is ongoing and can be particularly pronounced. Bringing the idea that civic engagement and political participation are often motivated by threats to rights and resources

into conversation with ideas developed by psychologists to describe the ways in which trauma can instill the kinds of long-term heightened awareness of threats in one's environment (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder) (Dalglish et al., 2001; Loo et al., 2001), we introduce the concept of *political hypervigilance*. *Political hypervigilance* is meant to crystallize the idea that the ongoing dangers faced by members of politically vulnerable groups lead them to remain on high alert for any sign that the hard-won and tenuous social and civil rights that protect them and their loved ones are under threat. On this view, the politics created by policies such as Medicare, Social Security, the Affordable Care Act and by rights such as same-sex marriage, are likely to be most salient to the beneficiaries who would be most vulnerable should they be lost, and that members of marginalized and intersectionally-marginalized groups will therefore be more—not less—likely to mobilize when they are under threat.

HYPOTHESES

Together, the studies that we have summarized suggest reasons to expect that LGBT people of color might be more politically engaged than their straight counterparts. Considered through the lens of our theory of political hypervigilance, these findings suggest further that this might be particularly true in threatening political contexts such as the 2016 presidential election—a context in which, as we discussed previously, the stakes for African Americans and LGBT people were particularly pronounced.

To explore whether Black LGBT people were more motivated to participate that year, we use original data from the 2016 National Survey on HIV in the Black Community (NSHBC), which allow us to examine the relationship among sexual orientation, policy views, and the intention to vote among African Americans in the 2016 election. Using these data, we test our theory of political hypervigilance, which holds that the particular threats faced by people whose marginalization is defined by the intersection of one or more forms of marginalization—operationalized in this case as being both African American and engaging in same-sex sexual behavior—*increases* their motivation to participate civically.

To these ends, we test two hypotheses. In particular, we expect that:

H1: African Americans who report same-sex behavior will also report greater intentions to participate civically.

H2: African Americans who demonstrate greater *support for* LGBT people and issues will also report greater intentions to participate civically.

Because our data include both straight Black respondents as well as African Americans who engage in same-sex sex, we are able to explore both the attitudes and behavior of Black LGBT people as well as some of the implications of African Americans' attitudes toward LGBT people.³

DATA AND METHODS

Black LGBT people are a relatively small and hard-to-reach population, and the difficulty of surveying them has meant that, with some important exceptions (such as Cohen 1999), they are rarely the focus of political science research (Harnois 2015). The NSHBC consequently offers a rare opportunity to study the political engagement of Black sexual minorities.

The 2016 National Survey on HIV in the Black Community

This study uses original data from the 2016 National Survey on HIV in the Black Community (NSHBC). The NSHBC is a probability-based web panel of African-Americans between the ages of 18 and 50. The panel is designed to be representative of adults living in households in the United States. To restrict our analyses to eligible voters, we only included respondents who were born in the United States. Panel members were recruited through random-digit dialing and address-based sampling. Address-based sampling enables the inclusion of households that are served only by cell phones or have no telephone service. Households without access to the internet are provided with access and hardware if needed. Similar probability-based web panels have been used in previous publications (Kelly et al., 2015; Lantz et al., 2016; Meng et al., 2016; Pynnonen et al., 2016). Panel members received an e-mail request to participate in the survey on February 12, 2016. Email reminders were sent to non-responders on day three of the field period. Additional email reminders to non-responders were sent on day 6, 10, 16, 25, and 35 of the field period. Data collection was completed on April 17, 2016. The study was approved by the Boston Children's Hospital Institutional Review Board.

The survey included sixty-nine close-ended items including measures of voter registration, voting intentions, views toward LGBT populations, experiences with racism, HIV testing behavior, and demographic information. Data were weighted to adjust for nonresponse so that people responding to the initial screening questions matched the age, sex, and other characteristics of the total population 18 to 50, as estimated from the most recent Current Population Survey conducted by the US Census Bureau.

Key Variables

We operationalize our outcome of interest—"civic participation"—using a survey question that asked, "How likely are you to vote in the November 2016 elections for the U.S. President or Congress?" (hereafter referenced using the variable name *Voting Intention*). Of the possible responses, "Definitely will vote" was coded as 1 and all other categories ("Probably will vote," "Possibly will vote," and "Will not vote") were set equal to 0. Please see footnote for additional details about our decision, and Appendix A for related regression results.^{4,5}

Our analysis includes three key explanatory variables: respondent same-sex sexual behavior, anti-transgender attitudes, and attitudes about LGBT rights. To operationalize *Any Same-sex sexual behavior*, we used the survey item that asked, "Have your past or current partners been (Choose all that apply): Male, Female, Transgender (Male to Female), Transgender (Female to Male)." Men who reported having had a male partner and women who reported having had a female partner were coded 1, while respondents reporting having only partners of a different sex were coded 0. Table 1 reports the results of this variable disaggregated by sex to show Male-to-Male and Female-to-Female same-sex sexual behavior. Because only a tiny portion of respondents (N=6) reported having had sex with a transgender partner, these individuals were not included in the *Any Same-sex Sexual Behavior* variable.

We used three items to measure attitudes toward trans people and about LGBT rights. The first item gauged support for same-sex marriage, asking respondents to choose their level of agreement with the statement: "The idea of same-sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me" (Stoeber and Morera, 2007). In the logistic regression analysis, this measure was coded as a binary variable with "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree" coded as 1, and "Neither Agree nor Disagree," "Agree," and "Strongly Agree" coded as 0. Anti-transgender attitudes were measured using two

Table 1. Characteristics of survey sample eligible to vote by November 2016 presidential election voting intention (definitely will vote vs. all other intentions).

	<i>All Respondents</i> (N=838)		<i>Definitely Will vote</i> (N=513)		<i>All other Intentions^a</i> (N=324)		<i>p value^c</i>
	<i>n^b</i>	%	<i>n^b</i>	%	<i>n^b</i>	%	
Gender							
Male	337	46%	200	41%	136	52%	0.0020
Female	501	54%	313	59%	188	48%	
Age (in years)							
18-24	127	19%	68	18%	59	20%	0.0390
25-34	312	36%	183	33%	129	41%	
35-44	224	26%	145	28%	78	25%	
45-50	175	18%	117	21%	58	15%	
Household income							
<\$25,000	309	25%	144	17%	164	36%	<0.0001
\$25,000 - <\$50,000	205	27%	136	29%	69	26%	
≥\$50,000	324	48%	233	54%	91	39%	
Education							
Less than high school	58	11%	20	6%	38	18%	<0.0001
High school diploma or GED	175	33%	81	28%	94	41%	
Some college, college degree or more	605	55%	412	66%	192	41%	
Employment status							
Employed	600	72%	391	77%	208	64%	<0.0001
Unemployed	238	28%	122	23%	116	36%	
Marital status							
Single	522	62%	312	60%	209	64%	NS
Married or cohabiting w/partner	316	38%	201	40%	115	36%	
Frequency of religious services attendance							
Daily/weekly	336	39%	206	37%	130	43%	NS
Monthly/a few times per year/never	499	61%	305	63%	194	57%	
Registered to vote							
Yes	715	88%	495	98%	219	73%	<0.0001
No	95	12%	9	2%	86	27%	
Same Sex Behavior & LGBT Views							
Same sex behavior							
None	728	90%	441	86%	287	95%	<0.0001
Any	98	10%	67	14%	31	5%	
Same sex behavior type (among those with any)							
Male-male	40	39%	27	39%	13	41%	NS
Female-female	58	61%	40	61%	18	59%	

Continued

Table 1. (continued)

	<i>All Respondents</i> (<i>N</i> =838)		<i>Definitely Will vote</i> (<i>N</i> =513)		<i>All other Intentions^a</i> (<i>N</i> =324)		<i>p value^c</i>
	<i>n^b</i>	%	<i>n^b</i>	%	<i>n^b</i>	%	
“Society should view transgender people as normal.”							
Agree/strongly agree	253	30%	175	35%	78	22%	0.0001
Neither agree nor disagree	305	37%	179	36%	126	39%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	265	33%	153	29%	112	39%	
“I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender.”							
Agree/strongly agree	313	36%	218	45%	95	23%	<0.0001
Neither agree nor disagree	277	35%	151	29%	126	42%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	235	29%	139	26%	96	34%	
“The idea of same sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me.”							
Agree/strongly agree	306	39%	175	33%	131	26%	0.0002
Neither agree nor disagree	227	28%	137	28%	90	28%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	291	34%	195	39%	96	26%	

^aWill not vote, possibly will vote, probably will vote.

^bCounts are unweighted. Percentages are weighted.

^cDifferences between definitely will vote and all other intentions significant at $p < 0.05$. NS = not significant.

separate items that asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following two statements: “I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender” and “Society should view transgender people as normal” (Walch et al., 2012). As in the case of the same-sex marriage variable, these variables were coded 1 for responses that denoted greater acceptance of transgender individuals. That is, the responses “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” were coded as 1, and all other selections were coded as 0.

Control Variables

In addition to these variables of interest, we also included controls for three well-established predictors of civic participation in U.S. elections: *Age* (1= Age 45 to 50), *Gender* (1= Female), *Unemployment* (1 = Employed), *Income* (1= Income \geq \$50,000), *Education* (1= Graduated high school), and religiosity (1=Attends services at least weekly) (Verba et al., 1995). These variables were all coded 1 for the value that we hypothesized to have greater associations with voting behavior.

Caveats and Data Limitations

While the NSHBC offers the opportunity to study the political engagement of Black LGBT people, we recognize that the data also present some limitations for our analyses. Most significant is that self-reported voting intention represents a somewhat limited measure of political participation, particularly if what we really care about is whether or not people do, in fact, vote. Unfortunately, however, the NSHBC did not include measures of actual voting behavior, nor did the survey ask about other activities we would have liked to explore, such as participation in rallies and protests, donating time

to political campaigns, and the like. Although we are limited by the constraints of the NSHBC, and although self-reported intention to vote does not perfectly predict actual voter turnout, scholars have shown that the response that one will “definitely vote” is the best self-reported predictor of actual voting behavior (Harvard Kennedy School 2013; Rogers and Aida 2014). That is, voters are quite good at predicting that they *will* vote, even if they are less accurate in their assessments that they will *not* vote. Todd Rogers and Masahiko Aida (2014) found, for example, that only 87% of those who predicted that they would vote actually did so in the 2008 general election. As such, while the available measure does not perfectly predict actual voter turnout (and while it cannot rule out the possibility of biases between those who do and not vote among those who say they will), *voting intention* serves as a reasonable proxy through which to gauge political motivation among segments of the electorate.⁶

Similarly, we recognize that same-sex sexual behavior is not the same as self-identified LGBT status. Egan (2012), for example, found that only approximately 68% of respondents in the 2008 and 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) who reported having had a same sex partner in the previous five years actually identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Scholars have also documented significant differences between those who choose to identify as LGBT and those who engage in same-sex sexual behavior but do not identify as LGBT (Egan et al., 2008). For example, Egan and colleagues (2008) find that identification as LGBT is the key driver of political distinctiveness among sexual minorities. But while the lack of a more direct measure could confound our analysis, we show below (Appendix C) that the attitudinal and demographic characteristics of respondents who report same sex behavior are in line with the distinctly liberal and younger age distribution of LGBT-identified individuals in the general population of the United States (Egan et al., 2008; Gallup 2017; Lewis et al., 2011).

We also acknowledge that the observational nature of the data available to us do not allow us to assess directly whether or not political hypervigilance drives the observed differences in voting intentions. Our ability to assess such claims is further compromised by the lack of a measure of political knowledge, which is likely a component of knowing that one’s rights are under threat and acting accordingly. As a partial remedy for this absence, we include a control for education, which many scholars have identified as a key predictor of political knowledge (Verba et al., 1995). In addition, the analysis did not include information about the date on which respondents completed the survey, and we thus lack information about the proximity of the survey date to each state’s primary election. Given that the data were collected during the 2016 primary season, proximity to local races may affect survey results. Finally, social desirability bias may play a role in the extent to which respondents are willing to report their comfort or discomfort with transgendered people and gay marriage, for example. However, the NSHBC data were collected using a confidential web panel, a mode that has been shown to reduce the role of social desirability bias in survey responses (Kreuter et al., 2008).

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND STUDY RESULTS

Means and standard deviations for continuous variables and counts with percentages for categorical variables are presented in Tables 1 and 2. We conducted bivariate analyses (cross tabular and unadjusted logistic regression analyses) to explore statistically significant relationships among attitudinal and demographic variables and intention to vote. We then conducted a series of logistic regression analyses, controlling for *Age*, *Gender*, *Unemployment*, *Income*, *Education*, and *Religiosity* to examine factors driving

Table 2. Results from bivariate and multivariate regression analyses for November 2016 presidential election voting intentions, among those eligible to vote.

Factor	N	Bivariate		Any Same Sex Multivariate (n=826)		Gay Marriage Multivariate (n=823)		Transgender Views: Friend Multivariate (n=824)		Transgender Views: Society Multivariate (n=822)	
		OR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value
Female (ref: male)	837	1.5 (1.2, 2.0)	0.0020	1.9 (1.4, 2.5)	<0.0001	1.9 (1.4, 2.6)	<0.0001	1.8 (1.3, 2.4)	0.0003	1.9 (1.4, 2.5)	<0.0001
Age 45 to 50 (ref: all other ages)	837	1.5 (1.1, 2.2)	0.0260	1.5 (1.0, 2.3)	0.0311	1.5 (1.0, 2.3)	0.0319	1.5 (1.0, 2.2)	0.0436	1.5 (1.0, 2.3)	0.0309
Income >=50K (ref: income <50)	837	1.9 (1.4, 2.5)	<0.0001	1.4 (1.0, 1.9)	NS	1.3 (0.9, 1.8)	NS	1.4 (1.0, 1.9)	0.0386	1.4 (1.0, 1.9)	NS
Graduated high school (ref: did not graduate high school)	837	2.7 (2.1, 3.6)	<0.0001	2.6 (1.9, 3.6)	<0.0001	2.7 (1.9, 3.7)	<0.0001	2.7 (1.9, 3.8)	<0.0001	2.7 (1.9, 3.7)	<0.0001
Unemployed (ref: employed)	837	0.5 (0.4, 0.7)	<0.0001	0.8 (0.6, 1.2)	NS	0.8 (0.5, 1.1)	NS	0.8 (0.6, 1.2)	NS	0.8 (0.6, 1.1)	NS
Attended religious service daily/weekly (ref: monthly/a few times per year/never)	835	0.8 (0.6, 1.0)	NS	0.7 (0.5, 0.9)	0.0070	0.7 (0.5, 1.0)	0.0435	0.8 (0.5, 1.0)	NS	0.7 (0.5, 1.0)	0.0228
Any same sex behavior (ref: none)	826	3.0 (1.7, 5.1)	<0.0001	2.9 (1.6, 5.2)	0.0002	–	–	–	–	–	–

Continued

Table 2. (continued)

Factor	N	<i>Bivariate</i>		<i>Any Same Sex Multivariate (n=826)</i>		<i>Gay Marriage Multivariate (n=823)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Friend Multivariate (n=824)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Society Multivariate (n=822)</i>	
		OR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value
“The idea of same sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me.” Disagree/strongly disagree (ref: neither/ agree/strongly agree)	824	1.8 (1.3, 2.4)	0.0002	–	–	1.7 (1.2, 2.4)	0.0013	–	–	–	–
“I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender.” Agree/strongly agree (ref: neither/disagree/ strongly disagree)	825	2.7 (2.0, 3.6)	<0.0001	–	–	–	–	2.6 (1.9, 3.6)	<0.0001	–	–
“Society should view transgender people as normal.” Agree/strongly agree (ref: neither/ disagree/ strongly disagree)	823	1.9 (1.4, 2.6)	<0.0001	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.9 (1.4, 2.7)	0.0002

NS = not significant.

voting intentions among all respondents eligible to vote. All covariates were coded as binary (0,1) variables, with the category hypothesized to be positively associated with definite voting intentions set equal to 1.

We regressed respondents' stated intention to vote on the independent variables using logistic regression. The discrimination ability of the logistic models was measured by c- statistics with calibration assessed using Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square statistics and their associated p-values. We employed an alpha of 0.05 in all statistical tests to determine statistical significance.

Descriptive Statistics

As the data in Table 1 make clear, slightly more than half of respondents in the sample are female (54%) and almost two-thirds of respondents were between 25 and 44 years of age (62%). Almost half of respondents had a household income of \$50,000 or more (48%) and over half had completed some college (55%). Almost one-third of respondents were unemployed (28%), most were single (62%), and fewer than 40% of respondents were married or living with a partner. More than one third of respondents attended religious services at least weekly (39%), while the majority (61%) attended services monthly or less frequently. Ten percent (n=40) of the men and 12% of the women (n=58) in our sample reported having engaged in same-sex sex. These proportions are similar to the percentage of those reporting same-sex sex in the broader public but are also, as we expected, higher than the proportion of LGBT-identified individuals in the general population (Egan 2012; Gallup 2017; Semlyen 2017). A recent study by Gallup (2017), for example, found that 4.6% of non-Hispanic Blacks identified as LGBT. Similarly, the younger age distribution of NSHBC respondents reporting same sex behavior is similar to that of LGBT-identified people in broader studies (Egan et al., 2008; Gallup 2017). Although not statistically significant, the NSHBC subsample of those reporting same-sex sexual behavior reports lower average income levels and higher levels of education than those who do not report such behavior, in keeping with the pattern of socioeconomic status among the overall LGBT population (Egan et al., 2008; Gallup 2017).

We present respondents' views about LGBT people in Table 1. These data make clear that relatively similar proportions of respondents agreed (30%) and disagreed (33%) with the statement that society should view transgender people as normal. A similar distribution is evident with respect to same-sex marriage, with 34% of respondents expressing an accepting view toward same-sex marriage—by either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement that “The idea of same sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me”—and 39% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with this negative view. Similarly, just over a third of respondents (36%) agreed that they would feel comfortable if they learned their best friend was transgender, while just under a third (29%) said that they would feel *uncomfortable*.

Table 1 also presents the breakdown of professed voting intentions as they vary by demographic categories and by respondents' attitudes towards LGBT people and issues. More than half of all NSHBC respondents (57%) reported that they “definitely will vote” in the 2016 elections. Sixty-three percent of women and 53% of men said they would definitely vote. A disproportionately high percentage (80%) of those reporting any same- sex sexual behavior responded that they definitely will vote. Similarly, although individuals reporting same-sex sex made up 10% of the overall sample, they comprised 14% of those who answered that they “definitely will vote.” Older respondents (35 to 44 and 45 to 50) were also over-represented among those reporting

that they definitely intended to vote. For example, while 18% of respondents were between the ages of 45- 50, they comprised 21% of those who said that they would definitely vote.

Socioeconomic indicators such as household income, education level, and employment status were also positively and significantly associated with intentions to vote. But although previous work on Black civic engagement finds that religiosity increases civic participation among African Americans, frequency of religious services attendance was not significantly associated with the intention to vote among the respondents in our sample (Dawson et al., 1990).

Multivariate Results: Greater LGBT Tolerance, Greater Intended Electoral Engagement

The results of our logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 2, and reveal pronounced differences in professed voting intentions between people who reported sex with a partner of the same sex and those who did not (even after controlling for gender, age, income, education, religiosity, and unemployment status). More specifically, with an odds ratio of 3.2 (95% C.I.: 1.7, 5.1), the odds that a respondent who reported same-sex sexual behavior also reported that they would definitely vote was more than three times the odds for their heterosexual counterparts.

It was not only people who engaged in same-sex sex who were more likely to say they would vote; people who held more supportive attitudes toward same-sex marriage and about transgender people were also more likely to say that they planned to vote in the 2016 election.⁷ For instance, those who disagreed with the statement that “The idea of same sex marriage seems ridiculous” had 1.8 times the odds of saying that they would definitely vote than those who were neutral about or agreed with the statement (O.R. = 1.8, 95% C.I.: 1.3, 2.4). Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that they would feel comfortable if they learned their best friend was transgender had almost three times the odds of saying that they would definitely vote in 2016 than those who were neutral or reported less comfort (O.R. = 2.7, 95% C.I.: 2.0, 3.6). Finally, broader support for transgender people was also positively associated with increased intentions to vote, as people who responded that society should view transgender people as normal were twice as likely as those who did not agree or were neutral on the issue to say that they definitely would vote in 2016.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings of our analyses provide strong support for both of our hypotheses and, more broadly, for our theory of political hypervigilance. More specifically, the finding that African Americans who report having engaged in same-sex sex were more likely to say that they intended to vote in the 2016 presidential election lends credence to the argument that under some circumstances, multiple marginalization increases rather than decreases political participation. And because previous research has shown that those who claim an LGBT identity are more politically engaged than those who have same-sex sex but do not identify as LGBT (Egan 2012), it is possible that our analyses understate both the extent and implications of this vigilance for voting.

Our findings also provide evidence of hypervigilance among those who express greater support for LGBT people and rights, who were also more likely to say that they would vote. Additional evidence that hypervigilance plays a role in increasing political activity among members of intersectionally marginalized groups is apparent

among Black women (the group by and about whom the theory of intersectionality was developed), who were far more likely than their male counterparts to say they planned to vote (O.R. = 1.9; we also replicated this finding in a separate analysis of a sub-sample of more than 4,400 Black respondents to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study; O.R. = 1.2) (Crenshaw 1991).⁸ Though not the only way to interpret our results, we argue that together they do suggest that politically vulnerable groups perceived the 2016 election as a threat to themselves and their loved ones and acted accordingly.

These findings also echo—and suggest an interesting wrinkle to—Egan’s (2012) arguments about the “political distinctiveness” of LGBT voters. In particular, they suggest that the political distinctiveness and civic duty evident among LGBT people and those who care about them may be driven by the relatedly “distinctive” sense of vulnerability and threat that members of marginalized groups feel in the face of potential losses to hard-won policy gains on which they often depend for their survival. In other words, greater political participation on the part of sexual minorities and of those who hold supportive views of LGBT people is a function not only of identity and ideology but also of material interests common to these communities. One particularly salient example of such a threat is the one posed by the 2016 election to programs for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment—policies that affect people of color who have same-sex sex (even those who do not identify as LGBT) as the HIV risk for men who have sex with men remains high regardless of whether individuals identify as LGBT. The Affordable Care Act and state Medicaid expansions that have been targeted by the Trump administration have helped to expand and facilitate access to health care for low income people and people of color in general, and have also expanded access to lifesaving AIDS medications for people for whom HIV positive status was a pre-existing condition.

CONCLUSION

What is the relationship between marginalization and voting behavior? Whereas traditional research on political participation has typically taken as given that voting is positively associated with socioeconomic status and privilege, there also are circumstances under which members of marginalized groups turn out at higher rates than their higher-status counterparts. We argue that these high rates of participation are the result, in part, of a phenomenon that we call political hypervigilance—a particular way in which threat acts as a motivator for members of marginalized groups.

We recognize that our reliance on cross-sectional data and the absence of several theoretically-relevant independent and dependent variables limits our ability to make causal claims. Future research will try to address these concerns through survey experiments that allow us to test our claims about political hypervigilance more directly. This research will also include measures of actual voting behavior as well as other kinds of political engagement. Qualitative interviews and focus groups could also be used to explore the meaning of political hypervigilance for Black LGBT people themselves and to examine in greater depth why they participate at higher rates than their straight counterparts.

Although our results are situated in the context of one particular presidential election season, they are suggestive about the role of political hypervigilance in the political behavior of members of marginalized and intersectionally-marginalized groups. In particular, they suggest that in a context in which threats to LGBT communities and communities of color are likely to continue and to intensify, Black LGBT people

will continue to remain vigilant about threats to policies in areas such as funding for HIV prevention and treatment programs. More generally, the concept of political hyper-vigilance also promises to help us understand the central role played by members of marginalized groups in so many contemporary social movements, from the foundational role of queer women of color in the Black Lives Matter movement—arguably the most consequential racial justice movement of the last several decades—to the Women’s March, #MeToo, and #SayHerName movements for which intersectional frameworks have been key organizing principles.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank the Women and Society Seminar at Columbia University, as well as Drs. Patrick Egan, Bob Blendon, Logan Casey, Keren Ladin, Andrea Acevedo, Madina Agénor, and Peter Levine for their helpful feedback and suggestions. We would also like to acknowledge Dr. Tony Earls and the NSHBC National Advisory Committee for their contributions and support. The research for this paper was made possible with help from the Harvard University Center for AIDS Research (CFAR), an NIH funded program (P30 AI060354), which is supported by the following NIH Co-Funding and Participating Institutes and Centers: NIAID, NCI, NICHD, NIDCR, NHLBI, NIDA, NIMH, NIA, NIDDK, NIGMS, NIMHD, FIC, and OAR. Funding was also provided by the UCLA Center for HIV Identification, Prevention and Treatment Services (CHIPTS) which is supported by NIH grant no P30MH058107. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

NOTES

1. Throughout this text, we use the terms Black and African Americans to refer to members of the African Diaspora living in the United States. Our sample includes first-generation individuals from the Diaspora who may not identify as African American, therefore we use the term Black to encompass these groups. We capitalize “Black” when the term is used as a racial category, and similarly capitalize the term “White” when we use it to refer to race.
2. Throughout this article, we use the term “LGBT” to refer to individuals who self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender. Recognizing that individuals who participate in same-sex sexual behavior may not identify as LGBT, we use the term “sexual minorities” to encompass the broader category of people who have sex with members of their same sex.
3. Although overall views toward same-sex marriage have become more favorable among both the general public and African Americans over the last fifteen years, support for gay marriage has been lower among African Americans (42%) than among the overall population (55%; Fingerhut 2016).
4. We had originally intended to use as an additional measure of civic participation, an NSHBC question asking respondents whether they are “currently registered to vote in the U.S.” However, we found that few variables of interest were significantly associated with voter registration at the bivariate level, and, with 72% of respondents reporting that they were registered, there was also too little variation in responses to this question for it to serve as a dependent variable, as few variables of interest were significant in the logistic regression (Appendix A).
5. In unadjusted, bivariate analyses, for example, only four variables were significantly associated with voter registration: gender (female), education, any same-sex, and agreement with the statement “I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender.” In addition, in logistic regression analyses using voter registration as an outcome (adjusting for covariates), few variables of interest were significant at the 0.05 level. P-values for a few variables of interest, for example, were as follows: same sex behavior ($p=0.0789$);

positive views on gay marriage ($p=0.0537$); positive views on finding out that a friend was transgender ($p=0.0169$); agreement that society should view transgender people as normal ($p=0.1358$). While few variables were significant, the results are nonetheless in keeping with those for intention to vote. For example, respondents who reported having engaged in same-sex sex were more likely to be registered to vote compared to those who did not report engaging in same-sex (A.O.R. = 2.4, 95% C.I.: 0.9, 6.5). Similarly, the odds of being registered to vote among respondents expressing positive views toward same-sex marriage and transgender people were higher than they were among those who expressed negative views (“The idea of same-sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me” disagree/strongly disagree vs. all other categories: A.O.R. = 1.6, 95% C.I.: 1.0, 2.7; “I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender” agreed/strongly agreed vs. all other categories: A.O.R. = 1.8, 95% C.I.: 1.1, 3.0; “Society should view transgender people as normal” agreed/strongly agreed vs. all other categories: A.O.R. = 1.5, 95% C.I.: 0.9, 2.5).

6. Our faith in the measure was reinforced by comparing our results to those from an analysis of voting intentions using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which confirm relationships of similar magnitude and direction among the sociodemographic covariates in the NSHBC data (Appendix B)
7. That the results hold not only among African Americans who report same-sex sex but also among those who hold more positive attitudes about LGBT people raises questions about whether it is more progressive views that lead to a greater likelihood of intending to vote. This explanation appears reasonable given that individuals with higher educational attainment, on average, hold more liberal social views, and education is a well-known predictor of civic participation (Feldman and Johnston, 2014). However, national polls reveal that conservative ideology is strongly associated with voting and other methods of civic engagement (DeSilver 2015; Pew 2014). For example, a 2014 Pew survey of 10,013 respondents found that consistently conservative individuals were far more likely than their liberal counterparts to report that they “always vote” (78% versus 58% of consistently liberal respondents) in general elections. Thus, consistent progressive views are not always associated with greater civic engagement—in fact, the opposite appears to be true. However, because approximately 80% of African Americans identify with or lean toward the Democratic party, we assume that our sample is already more liberal on many economic and social issues than the general public (Gallup 2013; Pew 2015). At the same time, we knew at the outset that African Americans hold less progressive views on LGBT issues such as marriage equality. Ultimately, we found that Black Americans who were more socially progressive on controversial questions related to LGBT rights were among the respondents who expressed the greatest likelihood of voting in 2016.
8. Controlling for Age, Unemployment, Education, Income, and Attendance at Religious Services.

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APPENDIX A. RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR SELF-REPORTED VOTER REGISTRATION, AMONG THOSE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE.

Factor	N	<i>Bivariate</i>		<i>Any Same Sex Multivariate (n=799)</i>		<i>Gay Marriage Multivariate (n=797)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Friend Multivariate (n=797)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Society Multivariate (n=795)</i>	
		OR	p-value	AOR	p-value	AOR	p-value	AOR	p-value	AOR	p-value
		(95% CI)		(95% CI)		(95% CI)		(95% CI)		(95% CI)	
Female (ref: male)	810	1.7 (1.1, 2.6)	0.0129	1.8 (1.2, 2.8)	0.0066	1.9 (1.2, 3.0)	0.0042	1.7 (1.1, 2.7)	0.0157	2.0 (1.3, 3.1)	0.0026
Age 45 to 50 (ref: all other ages)	810	1.1 (0.6, 1.9)	NS	1.1 (0.6, 1.9)	NS	1.2 (0.7, 2.1)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.8)	NS	1.2 (0.6, 2.1)	NS
Income <50K (ref: income 50+)	810	1.0 (0.7, 1.5)	NS	1.4 (0.8, 2.2)	NS	1.3 (0.8, 2.2)	NS	1.3 (0.8, 2.2)	NS	1.3 (0.8, 2.1)	NS
Graduated high school (ref: did not graduate high school)	810	2.4 (1.6, 3.7)	<0.0001	2.8 (1.7, 4.6)	<0.0001	3.0 (1.9, 4.9)	<0.0001	2.8 (1.8, 4.6)	<0.0001	3.0 (1.8, 4.8)	<0.0001
Unemployed (ref: employed)	810	0.7 (0.5, 1.2)	NS	0.9 (0.6, 1.5)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.7)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.6)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.7)	NS
Attended religious service daily/weekly (ref: monthly/a few times per year/never)	807	1.0 (0.7, 1.6)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.5)	NS	1.0 (0.7, 1.7)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.6)	NS	1.0 (0.6, 1.5)	NS
Any same sex behavior (ref: none)	799	2.7 (1.0, 7.0)	0.0487	2.4 (0.9, 6.5)	NS	–	–	–	–	–	–

Continued

Appendix A. (continued)

Factor	N	<i>Bivariate</i>		<i>Any Same Sex Multivariate (n=799)</i>		<i>Gay Marriage Multivariate (n=797)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Friend Multivariate (n=797)</i>		<i>Transgender Views: Society Multivariate (n=795)</i>	
		OR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value
“The idea of same sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me.” Disagree/strongly disagree (ref: neither/agree/strongly agree)	798	1.5 (0.9, 2.4)	NS			1.6 (1.0, 2.7)	0.0537				
“I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender.” Agree/strongly agree (ref: neither/disagree/strongly disagree)	798	1.9 (1.2, 3.1)	0.0086	–	–	–	–	1.8 (1.1, 3.0)	0.0169	–	–
“Society should view transgender people as normal.” Agree/strongly agree (ref: neither/disagree/strongly disagree)	796	1.4 (0.9, 2.4)	NS	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.5 (0.9, 2.5)	NS

NS = not significant.

APPENDIX B: RESULTS FROM BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VOTER INTENTIONS AND VOTER REGISTRATION AMONG BLACK RESPONDENTS AGE 18 TO 50, COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2016.

Voter Intention

Factor	N	<i>Bivariate</i>		<i>Multivariate (n=4345)</i>	
		OR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value
Female (ref: male)	4422	1.1 (1.0, 1.3)	0.0243	1.2 (1.1, 1.4)	0.0012
Age 45 to 50 (ref: all other ages)	4422	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	<0.0001	1.6 (1.3, 2.0)	<0.0001
Income <50K (ref: income 50+)	4422	0.6 (0.5, 0.7)	<0.0001	0.8 (0.7, 0.9)	0.0013
Graduated high school (ref: did not graduate high school)	4422	3.3 (2.7, 3.9)	<0.0001	2.2 (1.8, 2.8)	<0.0001
Unemployed (ref: employed)	4422	0.4 (0.4, 0.5)	<0.0001	0.5 (0.4, 0.6)	<0.0001
Attended religious service daily/weekly (ref: monthly/a few times per year/seldom/never)	4345	1.4 (1.3, 1.7)	<0.0001	1.3 (1.2, 1.5)	<0.0001

Voter Registration

Factor	N	<i>Bivariate</i>		<i>Multivariate (n=4284)</i>	
		OR (95% CI)	p-value	AOR (95% CI)	p-value
Female (ref: male)	4356	1.2 (1.0, 1.3)	0.0120	1.3 (1.1, 1.5)	0.0004
Age 45 to 50 (ref: all other ages)	4356	1.4 (1.2, 1.7)	0.0004	1.6 (1.3, 1.9)	<0.0001
Income <50K (ref: income 50+)	4356	0.5 (0.4, 0.6)	<0.0001	0.6 (0.5, 0.7)	<0.0001
Graduated high school (ref: did not graduate high school)	4356	3.3 (2.7, 4.0)	<0.0001	2.0 (1.6, 2.5)	<0.0001
Unemployed (ref: employed)	4356	0.4 (0.3, 0.4)	<0.0001	0.4 (0.4, 0.5)	<0.0001
Attended religious service daily/weekly (ref: monthly/a few times per year/seldom/never)	4284	1.2 (1.1, 1.4)	0.0040	1.1 (0.9, 1.3)	NS

NS = not significant.

APPENDIX C. CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY SAMPLE BY SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

	<i>All Respondents behavior (N=838)</i>		<i>Any same sex behavior (n=98)</i>		<i>No same sex behavior (n=657)</i>		<i>p value^b</i>
	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	
Gender (female)	522	55%	58	61%	396	55%	NS
Age (in years)							
18-24	134	19%	11	10%	80	15%	0.0034
25-34	323	36%	46	53%	236	36%	
35-44	233	27%	24	29%	189	28%	
45-50	178	18%	17	8%	152	21%	
Household income							
<\$25,000	322	25%	47	32%	213	22%	NS
\$25,000 - <\$50,000	211	27%	21	23%	166	28%	
≥\$50,000	335	48%	30	45%	278	51%	
Education							
Less than high school	62	11%	9	14%	38	10%	NS
High school diploma or GED	179	33%	15	24%	132	32%	
Some college, college degree or more	627	56%	74	62%	487	59%	
Unemployed	250	29%	32	28%	166	25%	NS

Continued

Appendix C. (continued)

	<i>All Respondents behavior (N=838)</i>		<i>Any same sex behavior (n=98)</i>		<i>No same sex behavior (n=657)</i>		<i>p value^b</i>
	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	
Marital status							
Single	541	62%	70	72%	368	55%	0.0039
Married or cohabiting w/partner	327	38%	28	28%	289	45%	
Ever tested for HIV	627	73%	83	84%	511	78%	NS
Region of origin							
Northeast	152	18%	21	13%	106	18%	<0.0001
Midwest	175	17%	27	36%	124	15%	
South	439	54%	38	44%	347	56%	
West	102	11%	12	8%	80	11%	
MSA status							
Metro	806	91%	95	96%	612	92%	NS
Non-metro	62	9%	**	4%	45	8%	
LGBT Views							
“Society should view transgender people as normal.”							
Agree/strongly agree	261	30%	50	50%	184	28%	0.0001
Neither agree nor disagree	317	38%	27	26%	251	38%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	273	33%	21	24%	215	34%	

Continued

Appendix C. (continued)

	<i>All Respondents behavior (N=838)</i>		<i>Any same sex behavior (n=98)</i>		<i>No same sex behavior (n=657)</i>		<i>p value^b</i>
	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>%</i>	
“I would feel comfortable if I learned that my best friend was transgender.”							
Agree/strongly agree	322	36%	60	61%	234	35%	<0.0001
Neither agree nor disagree	290	35%	19	18%	226	35%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	241	29%	19	21%	191	30%	
“The idea of same sex marriages (two men or two women) seems ridiculous to me.”							
Agree/strongly agree	313	38%	19	18%	258	42%	<0.0001
Neither agree nor disagree	241	28%	18	20%	193	28%	
Disagree/strongly disagree	298	34%	60	62%	200	30%	

^aCounts are unweighted. Percentages are weighted.

^bDifferences between any same sex behavior and no same sex behavior significant at $p < 0.05$. NS = not significant. **Data suppressed due to low cell counts ($n < 5$).