

Chapter Four centers around the issue of human trafficking identification. The author suggests that most cases of human trafficking in Russia are identified by a victim's complaint to the police. However, these complaints are few and far between because many victims are fearful and distrustful of police. The other two sources for identifying human trafficking in Russia – the information from victims' assistance organizations and direct law enforcement action – are not a promising avenue at the moment. The new laws on "foreign agents" made functioning of many NGOs in Russia difficult and further scarred the relations between police and victims' assistance organizations. The author also reports that law enforcement has problems identifying the cases of trafficking because they are often complex, new, and resource intensive. To avoid these difficulties, cases are often initiated under a different criminal charge.

In Chapter Five, McCarthy outlines the major obstacles for criminal investigation of human trafficking. The chapter analyzes the main types of evidence used in such cases (victim's testimony, video of trafficking transaction, physical, and forensic medical evidence). The author contends that the victim's testimony is often the main source of evidence in such cases with little or no corroborating evidence available in the form of witness testimonies and physical and forensic evidence. The chapter also goes into the broader issues within Russian police (inexperience, lack of training, time limits, and jurisdictional constraints) that interfere with effective investigation of trafficking cases.

In the last chapter, McCarthy examines the issues of indictment, trial, and sentencing practices for trafficking cases. Chapter Six suggests that many cases of trafficking in Russia are indicted under alternative "old" charges such as the organization and solicitation of prostitution, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or illegal migration. These charges are often perceived as easier to investigate, and prosecutors and judges prefer these "traditional" old charges to the new laws on trafficking. The author reports that most convicted defendants in trafficking cases in Russia receive meaningful sentences with an average prison sentence of 7.2 years for sex trafficking and 6.4 years for labor trafficking.

In sum, McCarthy's book *Trafficking Justice* is a must-read for scholars who study transnational crimes and for those interested in the Russian criminal justice system. The book is lively, easy-to-read, and can be used as supplementary reading for both graduate and undergraduate students in courses on comparative justice and transnational crimes. The book also may appeal to a broad range of researchers with backgrounds in political science, sociology, criminology, anthropology, and law.


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Russia in the German global imaginary: imperial visions and utopian desires, 1905–1941, by James E. Casteel, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016, 264 pp., \$28.95 (hc), ISBN 978-0822964117

James Casteel has written an often-fascinating exploration of German constructions of Russia, largely in the first half of the twentieth century. While German expansionism to

the East is hardly an untapped field of inquiry, historians have recently taken an interest moving outside of the state and applying the tools of both cultural history and global history to the story of German engagement with its East. Casteel fits comfortably into that trend. *Russia in the German Global Imaginary* is an effort to demonstrate that German visions of Russia were deeply influenced by the ways in which Germans sought to place themselves in the wider world. The idea of “Russia,” as opposed to the empirical land, functioned as a tool with which Germans engaged in a process of self-definition in a competitive global order.

Casteel’s analysis is based on a few foundational claims. It is, he argues, “impossible to imagine the nation without placing it in the wider world and understanding how it related to other nations and empires” (9). The fact that the nation was both an “imagined community” and also inescapably embedded in wider systems of political, economic, and imperial control suggests a powerful impulse toward defining the nation in terms of others. In the case of Germany and Russia, this emerges as a form of orientalism. Russian power, Russian resources, Russian Other-ness created the raw material for a complicated discursive field in which Germans negotiated their sense of self against the shifting reality of Russian power, Soviet social experimentation, and the lure of a “Wild East” frontier society.

Russia in the German Global Imaginary begins with a sort of prehistory, exploring German perceptions of Russia from the reentry of Russia into European politics to the beginning of the twentieth century. These first two chapters function effectively as a sort of source material for later representations: “older stereotypes were perpetuated and adapted to new situations” (11). The core of the book is an exploration of the impact of modernity, war, and colonialism on German perceptions of Russia.

The emergence of a powerful, modernizing Russia challenged German assumptions about the cultural backwardness of Russians. In the years before the First World War, this resulted in a proliferation of narratives about Russia. Theodor Schiemann, for example, led a conservative tradition of Russophobia that cast the Russian state as decrepit and dangerous. Others like Otto Hoetzsch and Gerhart Schulze-Grävernitz, meanwhile, emphasized the rapid modernization of the Russian state. The development of the Soviet state prompted fascinating debates about the nature of modernity and the prospects for a radically new social structure.

In exploring the modernization of Russia, Casteel introduces an easily overlooked element of German discourse: Siberia. Siberia functions in multiple ways in Casteel’s work. It sets up a contrast with European Russians. Russian backwardness could be rendered as a function of social organization by showing Russians prospering, laboring in Siberia. Russian backwardness could be rendered as a function of race by emphasizing the role of German colonists in settling Siberia. More significantly, Siberia permitted Germans to imagine a frontier society, one accessible to Germany. Siberia allowed Germans to imagine an analogue to the “Wild West,” a sparsely settled, resource-rich land that would generate fantastic profits through colonization and modernization. This reflected a particular vision of capitalist modernity, rooted in the expansion of the capitalist system into “virgin” territories, and relying on the wholesale transformation of societies and ecologies. It was a vision rooted not in the experience of growing cities or in tropical colonies but distinct to settlement colonies and societies like the United States, Canada, and Australia. In this fashion, Russia came to function within a particular German vision of modernity and colonization.

The discussion of Siberia (and Max Sering’s discussions of German settlement in the Baltics) also put questions of agricultural capitalism into the center of Casteel’s analysis.

German analysis of Russian society came to be informed by a normative vision of patterns of land ownership. Small-scale freehold ownership became emblematic of a progressive society, effectively aligning the interests of the individual with the interests of society. In this discussion, Casteel lightly touches on a wider discursive tradition in what the Germans called “internal colonization.” A fuller treatment would have deepened the intersection between particular visions of modernity, colonization, and international economics. This would be valuable in its own right and also as a means of demonstrating the particularity of this very specific vision of modernity, one deeply connected to capitalist norms and rather distant from the modernity of Georg Simmel, Arthur Gwinner, and John Rockefeller.

Casteel’s work is at its strongest when it explores how Germans used Russia to think through the meaning of modernity for Germany. In the process, the United States is frequently used as a second point of reference. Casteel’s analysis would be strengthened by a little more attention to how Germans thought about the United States. Similarly, the discussion of German ideas about Russian agriculture would be stronger with a little more information on German agricultural thought. There are a variety of other questions left tantalizing unexplored. How were Germans to profit from a new frontier? Railroad construction and mining concessions? Would the surplus products of this frontier be reserved for Germany? Or would they flow into global markets? Casteel complicates the German vision of Russia wonderfully and demonstrates that this vision was globally situated. The process of contextualizing *Rußland* is welcome, but could have been more fully realized with more attention to the narratives being mobilized to define Russia.

Casteel also very appropriately emphasizes the porous boundaries of discourse construction. Germans did not read only Germans, after all. The most effective example of this in *Russia in the German Global Imaginary* is in the use of discourses of frontier society. What is striking is the absence of Russian thinkers and writers in the discussion of German perceptions of Russia and the Russian relationship to the West. After all, that was a central theme to Dostoyevsky’s literature, Chaadayev’s philosophy, and Karamzin’s history. Russian Marxism grappled incessantly with this question. Apropos of Sering’s vision of Russian agriculture, Tolstoy has an extended discussion of Russian versus western agriculture and Russian land-holding in *Anna Karenina*. Yet that Russian debate about the West and itself seems strangely absent from Casteel’s discussion of German visions of Russia. By comparison, very similar Romanian discussions about Romanian identity were deeply informed by French and German discussions of capitalism, modernity, and national identity. German depictions of Romanians were, in turn, influenced by those narratives that Romanians elaborated for themselves. Casteel’s work could have profitably explored the ways in which discussions of “modernity” and “European-ness” moved back and forth across the German–Russian frontier.

Taken as a whole, Casteel’s work is an important contribution that does much to complicate and deepen our understanding of German views of Russia. The subtext to the piece, Operation Barbarossa and the war for *Lebensraum*, appears simultaneously to have long antecedents and to be a significant break. The colonial undertones to much preceding German discussion of Russia clearly played a role in guiding Hitler and the Nazis toward a colonial empire to their East, and legitimizing their vision within the German population. At the same time, however, the essential elements of settler colonialism in Nazi visions of *Lebensraum* were geographically shifted from

Siberia to European Russia, and the narrative construction of Russian modernity disappeared entirely.


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The rise and fall of Belarusian nationalism, 1906–1931, by Per Anders Rudling, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, 436 pp., \$29.95 (paperback), ISBN 978-0822963080

Per Rudling introduces his book as a study of the invention of Belarus. This invention was unfolding in that East European corner which could be easily seen as an illustration to Ernest Gellner's metaphor of "Megalomania," an imaginary region of multiple, loosely connected, and somewhat overlapping ethnic groups, who spoke several mutually understandable dialects – except for those "petty merchants" who resided in small towns and attended a church of their own, of fluid visions of regional belonging, and of nationally indifferent premodern identities. There, somewhat belatedly if one is to judge by more general European standards, several hundred literati and intellectuals who adhered to the language-centered tradition that had been established by Herder and Humboldt, began to articulate their people's specificity and "difference," dreaming of turning mostly illiterate peasants into subjects with a national history (which, according to both Hegel and Marx, people to the East of Prussia lacked), culture, rights, and, eventually, statehood. As the turmoil of the twentieth century, with the World War, revolutions, occupations, and retreats unraveled, those ethnically diverse borderlands turned into a playground of national rivalries, declarations of independent statehood followed by inclusions into larger, also unstable political units, and of negotiations of state borders and political regimes. Contemporary post-Soviet nation-states all resulted from the historic process to which the period that Rudling made the subject matter of his book gave a start.

The study is organized chronologically and "geographically." Each chapter, starting with the blurry and stumbled imperial beginnings of Belarusian nationalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, covers a portion of the quarter century between 1906 and 1931, at which point the Stalinist modernization project firmly took over and the romantic nationalizing agenda succumbed to the industrializing one: the latter demanded a reorganization of Soviet society, strong centralized power, and Russian-speaking intelligentsia in the non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union. The author breaks this period into several time spans: the 10 years between the Revolution of 1905 and World War I and the subsequent October Revolution, the nationalizing 1920s and, eventually, the suppression of Belarusian nationalism and the beginning of purges in the early 1930s. At the same time, after the end of World War I, Belarusian ethnic and linguistic territories were divided between the Soviet Union and the Second Polish Republic (they were reunited in 1939 with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact), and Rudling explores national – and antinational – policies and the visions of nationhood on both sides of the Soviet–Polish border. Some of these