

# ***The demand for ‘critical research’ in a competitive authoritarian regime: think tanks in Mozambique\****

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## ABSTRACT

Think tanks in competitive authoritarian regimes are implicitly if not explicitly oppositional, producing and disseminating research critical of government policies and elite behaviour. Existing literature asks how and why such think tanks emerge and survive, and if they exercise real influence. This paper asks if anyone actually reads their critical research. Focusing on two cases in Mozambique – the *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE) and the *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP) – three original data sets are examined: (1) citations in the bibliographies of end-of-programme theses of undergraduates in the political science, public administration, economics, and/or sociology departments of two of Mozambique’s most important universities; (2) websites and Facebook activities – visits, downloads, etc.; and (3) citations in academic journals that publish on Africa. Findings show evolving demand for these think tanks’ research, suggesting their growing status within Mozambique and, by implication, within civil societies of similar competitive authoritarian regimes.

## INTRODUCTION

Think tanks and public policy research institutes, like a free press, are generally seen as both symbols and products of pluralist democracy.<sup>1</sup>

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In their North American roots, they reflect the structural pluralism that underlay the ‘polyarchy’ that Robert Dahl (1971) long argued was the best real-existing democracy we could expect to see.<sup>2</sup> Where government policies are the outcome of political debate and negotiated settlements among organised and competing interests (‘the art of compromise’), and where societal problems are increasingly complex, all negotiators must bring their best information to the table. Think tanks emerged to fulfil that need.

Outside of their ancestral Western soils, think tanks have been transplanted far and wide. They are a noteworthy phenomenon in new democracies and in recent democratic transitions.<sup>3</sup> A growing number have even sprouted in the challenging environments of ‘competitive authoritarian’ or ‘electoral authoritarian’ regimes – sometimes simply called ‘hybrid regimes’ – that exist in many of the former Soviet republics, including Russia, and throughout the continent of Africa.<sup>4</sup> Many if not most of these have been the fruit of collaboration between Western donors – governments, international non-government organisations and/or official multilateral aid agencies – and local academic networks.<sup>5</sup> Most think tanks operating in competitive authoritarian regimes are also implicitly if not explicitly oppositional in the sense that they typically produce information that is unavailable through official sources and that is critical of government policies and elite behaviour. They can be considered a highly specialised form of civil society advocating, directly or indirectly, for greater regime accountability and transparency, and a wider variety of political ideas and interpretations – again, in places where such advocacy is easily interpreted by regime elites as a form of disloyal opposition. In the words of McGann & Sabatini (2011: 6), therefore, think tanks in a given less-than-democratic regime are ‘[a]nalogous to a “canary in the coal mine” ... as a key indicator for the state of the civil society in that country. If analysts and critics associated with think tanks are allowed to operate freely, so too can the rest of civil society.’

Explaining the rise and survival of think tanks in such unpropitious soils is not difficult. On the Western donor side, think tanks fit well into the liberal-pluralist democratic governance and accountability agenda that has driven much funding following the post-Cold War wave of democratisation in the early 1990s:

The need for accountability is legitimised in the notion of representation, which in governance terms means that those selected to act in the name of the people are answerable to the people for their successes and failures. Accountability in turn rests on knowledge and information – transparency – and on institutional arrangements that create incentives for public officials

to act faithfully, efficiently, and honestly in carrying out the will of the people. The framework highlights contestability in the selection of public officials and the fostering of an ethic of public service as key ingredients in support of accountability. (Fölscher 2007: 245)<sup>6</sup>

Donors ultimately hope that investing in information transparency and diversity will translate into, or contribute to, effective checks and balances that will better ensure the long-term political stability of the beneficiary country, thereby enhancing economic prospects in a mutually reinforcing dynamic.<sup>7</sup> Authoritarianism, in this liberal-pluralist view, too easily slides into spiralling cycles of corruption, inequality, repression, violent 'civic conflict' – a legitimacy crisis with a vengeance, and the potential for infiltration by terrorist and/or organised crime networks.<sup>8</sup>

On the side of local academics, university budgets and salaries are rarely sufficient to sustain the research agendas and professional networks to which they might like to be dedicated, or the lifestyles to which many feel entitled. Donors and foreign NGOs have provided supplementary budgets and salaries for a generation or two of those best able to prosper from the competitive bidding processes of a wide range of development projects and studies. Think tanks are a logical component of these processes (McGann 2010).

Competitive authoritarian regime elites, in the meantime, have had to accept these think tanks – and civil society organisations, in general – at least in part due to their continued dependence on donor assistance. For example, the 'donor community' in Mozambique financed 54% of the country's budget in 2007; in 2012, that figure stood at 53% though it dropped to 36% in 2013.<sup>9</sup> Where such assistance is unnecessary, the regime's acceptance of critical civil society of any type tends to be limited; oil-rich Russia under Vladimir Putin is a particularly glaring example.<sup>10</sup>

The existing literature reflects the importance of understanding how think tanks in these less-than-democratic countries emerge and survive in the absence of pluralist foundations (i.e. intra-elite rule-bound competition and negotiated cooperation in a context of non-elite electoral participation based, at least in part, on perceptions of a given government's performance). Also discussed in much of the literature is the question of whether or not think tanks operating under such regimes exercise real influence over policy-making processes and/or policy agendas.<sup>11</sup> While these are important questions, this paper explores a less-asked, but equally important one: does anyone actually read the information such think tanks produce? This question is important

because, while the supply side of the equation has been well discussed in the literature (e.g. the ‘unpropitious soil’ of intra-elite politics, the donors’ agenda, and local academics’ interests), much less is known about the demand side.<sup>12</sup> If actual policymakers within the regime/state are more the target of such ‘critical research’ than the consumers or clients of that research,<sup>13</sup> it behoves us to know if anyone in these countries actually uses the information that these think tanks produce.

This question is especially relevant in a country like Mozambique where the adult literacy rate is only 56%,<sup>14</sup> where just 48.6% of registered voters turned out for the last presidential election in 2014 (reinforcing a longer-term trend of low voter turnout and political disengagement in general),<sup>15</sup> where less than 5% of the population uses the internet,<sup>16</sup> and where in the words of the founder of one of Mozambique’s popular newspapers, ‘For the price of a newspaper, you can buy eight loaves of bread and each loaf can feed four people for a day.’<sup>17</sup> The question is also relevant for those who believe that an essential component of a country’s independence is its ability to write its own history and its own social science<sup>18</sup> – and, I should add, its ability or willingness to read such writing.

In the work that follows, I ask this demand-side question of two ‘typical case studies’ of high-quality think tanks – the *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP: Center of Public Integrity) and the *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE: the Institute for Social and Economic Studies) – both carrying out ‘critical research’ in contemporary Mozambique, itself a ‘typical case’ of competitive authoritarianism.<sup>19</sup> To operationalise this demand side of critical research, in 2015 I analysed the bibliographies of end-of-programme theses of 786 undergraduate students in the political science, public administration, economics and/or sociology departments of two of Mozambique’s most important universities: the *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM: founded in 1962) and the *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais* (ISRI: founded in 1986). These are the types of university students who *should* be consuming/referencing IESE’s and CIP’s research; in other words, if *any* university students were reading such critical research, it would be *these* students. Similarly, I obtained information about IESE’s and CIP’s websites and Facebook activities – visits, downloaded articles/data, etc. – since this is another important means by which interested users access these organisations’ research documents. Finally, I analysed top social science and public policy journals that publish on Africa to see if professional academics working on Mozambique cite or otherwise reference IESE’s and CIP’s research.<sup>20</sup>

Before looking at the findings of this analysis, a brief description of each of these think tanks follows an equally brief background history of contemporary Mozambican politics.

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique's history as a Portuguese colony began in 1498 with the arrival of the first Portuguese explorers.<sup>21</sup> For centuries, the Portuguese occupation mostly remained confined to a handful of coastal trading enclaves (gold, ivory and, increasingly, human slaves) with periodic military incursions into the interior. The 20th century unfolded with growing levels of colonial occupation and control. The southernmost major city, Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo), became the colonial capital in 1902. Twentieth century colonial Mozambique increasingly modelled itself on the neighbouring white minority-ruled regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), but firmly within the vision of an overseas empire centred in Portugal.<sup>22</sup> Following the Second World War, Portuguese settlers flocked to the colony.

Mozambique began its post-colonial path in 1974 following 10 years of armed struggle led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) against Portuguese military and secret police forces. When the Portuguese military mutinied against its own government that year, the reins of independent Mozambique were handed over to the Marxist, Soviet-aligned and fiercely nationalistic Frelimo leadership. The new government proceeded to implement a plan of socialist nation building, based on centralised one-party rule, state ownership and management of the economy, and a 'high modernist' ideology (J.C. Scott 1999) that interpreted all traditional beliefs and practices to be retrograde and, therefore, unfit for the new nation. A severe lack of administrative capabilities (the Portuguese had seen fit to keep the vast majority of Mozambicans illiterate), Soviet-style economic policies (e.g. rural collectivisation and nationalisation of industries), and a growing discontent in some parts of the country with the government's negative attitudes toward religion and tradition fuelled the flames of an armed insurgency initiated in 1976 by the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), largely supplied and financed by Rhodesia and South Africa (Emerson 2014). The resulting 16-year civil war devastated Mozambique's economy, wiped out much of its transportation and communications infrastructure, and either displaced, impoverished or killed millions of Mozambicans.

With the end of white rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the winding down of the Cold War and the end of Soviet assistance, the Frelimo leadership ultimately abandoned socialism in favour of open markets and private investment (Pitcher 2002). ‘Simultaneous to the adoption of market-opening reforms, donors used the opportunity to promote political liberalisation’ and decentralisation (Reaud 2012: 24), ultimately establishing the legal framework for a transition to a multiparty electoral system (1990 Constitution). In 1992, an internationally brokered peace treaty was signed with Renamo. Since then, elections have been held for the presidency and the legislature (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014), for a growing number of ‘autonomous’ municipalities (1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013), and more recently for provincial assembly legislators (2009, 2014).

Frelimo has dominated in all these elections, consistently winning the presidency and the national legislative majority as well as an overwhelming majority of municipal executive posts and provincial and municipal legislative majorities.<sup>23</sup> But electoral fraud, Frelimo’s partisanisation of the state (i.e. its virtual monopoly over Mozambique’s state institutions, including the electoral machinery), electoral boycotts by Renamo in 1998 and in 2013, and periodic bouts of political violence – from both Renamo and Frelimo, have stained this otherwise promising story of Mozambique’s political and economic transformation.<sup>24</sup> Manning & Malbrough (2012: 2) sum up Mozambique’s slide into competitive authoritarianism:

Despite its early successes, Mozambique’s democratic credentials have been tarnished by a consistent lack of transparency in election administration, and more recently by the ruling party’s growing monopoly on power at all levels. ... Civil society organizations have been effectively excluded from participation in important public oversight bodies. Even where their participation is provided by law, representatives to these bodies have normally been handpicked by the Frelimo party.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Mozambique’s political development combined with discoveries of vast deposits of mineral wealth (primarily coal and natural gas) to provide fertile ground for an unprecedented influx of Western investments as well as development assistance, both public and private. Western interest was further bolstered following the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Eastern Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), the incidents of 9·11, and the growing lawlessness in and around Somalia and Yemen; all of which made the busy sea lanes along Mozambique’s coast and the stability of the regime in Maputo, all the more worthy of concern. By 2007, the donor community in

Mozambique financed 54% of the country's budget; in 2012, that figure stood at 40%.<sup>25</sup> But these and other development funds came with strings attached, one of which obliged the government to implement a series of 'good governance' reforms. And while the ambiguity of this term is undeniable, the premise was that Mozambique's Frelimo-dominated state needed to embrace greater degrees of decentralisation, transparency, accountability and pluralistic participation.<sup>26</sup> In response, reformist elements within the party-state joined growing ranks of college graduates in numerous donor-funded projects throughout the country, including a concerted effort to prepare localities for municipal-level autonomy and elected leadership by 1998.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, donor-funded civil society organisations (CSOs) sprang up throughout the country, some dedicated to supporting the good governance reforms (e.g. anti-corruption, electoral observation, decentralisation, etc.), others more focused on addressing specific social issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS, women's health, land rights, etc.). These included the *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE) and the *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP).

#### THE INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS SOCIAIS E ECONÓMICOS (IESE)

Following Mozambique's independence in 1975, Mozambique's main national university, the *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM) in Maputo, created the *Centro dos Estudos Africanos* (CEA: Centre of African Studies) as the university's research centre on historical and social issues.<sup>28</sup> In 1982, the CEA's director, Ruth First, was assassinated by a letter bomb of South African origin and the CEA fell victim to a combination of poor administration and civil war budget cutbacks. The Ford Foundation and the Swedish government, among others, helped to finance the UEM through the civil war years and into the post-conflict 1990s, including the creation of a social sciences division; but the CEA languished, and funding for faculty research in the social sciences was never sufficient, especially in light of relatively lucrative consultancy fees for any number of donor-funded projects requiring local participation. As a result, the number of UEM-based private consultants doing donor-specified and/or government-specified research multiplied while independent research never got off the ground.

In late 2005, a small group of professors from the Economics and Political Anthropology programmes at the UEM initiated talks with the Swiss Cooperation agency in Mozambique and with the Ministry of



Planning and Development (IESE 2010: 9). Two years later, some 30–40 academics, representatives of the state, and foreign donor representatives founded the *Associação para a Promoção de Estudos de Desenvolvimento* (PROED: Association for the Promotion of Development Studies) as an ‘advance committee’ for the purpose of founding and funding IESE. By the time of IESE’s inaugural conference in September 2007, the PROED had ‘raised close to US\$450,000 from the official cooperation agencies of the following countries: Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland’ (IESE 2008: 1).<sup>29</sup> By 2009, the list of IESE’s donors grew to include the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Finland (IESE 2010: 7).

Since 2010, IESE has published an annual volume, *Desafios para Moçambique* (Challenges for Mozambique) of research-based economic, political and social analysis of contemporary Mozambique; its hard-copy version is sold to researchers and interested parties, distributed for free to university libraries throughout the country, and ultimately posted online at IESE’s website, <<http://www.iese.ac.mz/>>. Other thematically focused books are similarly produced and distributed as funding allows. A working papers series, entitled ‘*Cadernos IESE*’, had produced 16 monographs by the end of 2015. A series of shorter ‘summaries and conclusions’ papers, entitled ‘*Boletim IDEIAS*’, numbered 81 by the end of that same year (90, as of July 2016). All of these can be downloaded for free at IESE’s website. At the same time that IESE reports are posted on their website, they are promoted on the organisation’s Facebook page and its email list containing dedicated links to the reports and the website itself. IESE sponsors a series of open Forums on specific topics throughout the year in and around Maputo, with attendance sometimes reaching into the hundreds. Visiting foreign graduate students and researchers – upon approval – participate in weekly seminars in which IESE researchers discuss their own and the visitors’ ongoing research.

Donors, at least, appear adamant about the quality of IESE’s work. ‘It is the only publisher and printer of significant policy-relevant research in Mozambique, and has had a high rate of output’, according to a 2011 Irish Aid assessment (Lister *et al.* 2011: 37). The UK’s DFID, in one of its annual assessments, wrote the following:

Between 2008 and 2012, IESE managed to gradually become a research institution of reference at the national and regional levels. They have also established contacts with internationally recognised research institutions in Africa and Europe. ... As a result of their reputation, they were invited



to present at different fora and their researchers also participated in the production of some international publications.<sup>30</sup>

According to *H-Luso-Africa*, an affiliate publication of the African Studies Association, 'IESE has a high reputation inside Mozambique and abroad for the quality of its research and its publications.'<sup>31</sup> In multiple conversations inside Mozambique over the course of three years, the near-universal assessment among Mozambican social scientists is that IESE is the country's most prestigious research institution in the policy sciences.

The regime, however, can push back. And it did so in 2014 when IESE was evicted from its state-owned offices after seven years of occupancy, and given only 15 days to move (Mulungo 2014). A more obvious push-back occurred in 2015 when former president Guebuza sued IESE founder/researcher, Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, for committing a 'crime against state security' when Castel-Branco published an open letter strongly critical of Guebuza on his Facebook page in late 2014 (he was subsequently absolved, but not without having to spend a lot of time and money for his defence).<sup>32</sup>

As of 2016, IESE supported 17 permanent researchers (as well as a varying number of associate researchers) and 10 additional full-time support staff. IESE's operating budget was 'around two million dollars' coming from a consortium of donors, foremost among them being the governments of Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, and the Danish NGO, IBIS-Mozambique.<sup>33</sup>

#### THE CENTRO DE INTEGRIDADE PÚBLICO (CIP)

The 2014 Corruption Perception Index from Germany-based Transparency International (TI) ranks Mozambique number 119 – in the bottom third – out of the 175 countries for which the organisation collected data that year.<sup>34</sup> According to TI's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 74% of Mozambicans surveyed felt that corruption in the public sector is either a 'problem' or a 'serious problem', and 79% felt that the government's actions in the fight against corruption were either 'very ineffective', 'ineffective' or 'neither effective nor ineffective'.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, the TI rates 'Budget Openness' in Mozambique as 'minimal'. In its 'Country Strategy' report for 2013–17, the Denmark-based international NGO, IBIS, wrote that 'Evidence of illicit forms of rent seeking and "grand corruption," trafficking of influence in the allocation of land concessions for mining, forestry and fisheries, has been produced, among others by IBIS' strategic partner in the Governance Pillar, the Centro de Integridade Público (CIP)' (IBIS 2012: 12).

The CIP was founded in 2005 by a group of journalists and academics as a non-partisan and non-governmental think tank dedicated to conducting ‘research and advocacy on fiscal transparency and decentralisation and monitor[ing] public-sector procurement, anti-poverty programs, and extractive industries operating in the sub-Saharan African nation’.<sup>36</sup> According to its website, the CIP initiated its activities in late 2007 following completion of a three-year Strategic Plan supported by a combined contribution of two million dollars from the UK’s DFID, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the embassies of Denmark, Holland and Sweden.<sup>37</sup>

‘CIP’s mission is to promote integrity in the public sector in Mozambique, through exposure of corruption and irregularities in general and advocacy for public awareness and support of good practices in the management of the common good.’<sup>38</sup> The CIP divides its research focus into five main categories: anti-corruption, the extractive industry, public-private partnerships, conflicts of interest and public finances. The CIP’s researchers produce reports in the style of investigative reporting, ranging in size from book-length monographs to one-page research reports; some are published as hard copy, while all are posted with free access on their website: <<http://cipmoz.org/index.php/pt/>>. At the same time that CIP reports are posted on their website, they are promoted on the organisation’s Facebook page and its email list, with dedicated links to the reports and the website itself. High-impact reports are periodically launched with public presentations of the data in and around Maputo.<sup>39</sup>

The CIP is described by the highly respected independent Mozambican newspaper, *Canal de Moçambique*, as ‘the most active national civil society organisation in the areas of government oversight, promotion of transparency and the combatting of corruption’ (Nhamirre 2012: 2). In a recent report published by the European Commission (Lawson *et al.* 2014: 132), the CIP was called ‘perhaps the most regular and systematic of the CSOs performing analysis related to public expenditures, including budget monitoring at the district and municipal levels’. Another recent report issued by ‘a group of international NGOs working on governance and aid effectiveness in Mozambique’ described some of the CIP’s main research products as follows: ‘Newsletters, distributed free of charge, from the Centre for Public Integrity containing objective, brief and thorough research and analyses on issues like good governance, transparency and integrity, and with a special focus on cases of corruption. The quality of the Newsletters is unique for this type in Mozambique’ (Informal Governance Group and Alliance 2012:

34). Transparency International describes the CIP as 'Our Chapter' in Mozambique, an affiliation dating back to 2008 and one that includes a rigorous vetting process.<sup>40</sup>

As of 2015, the CIP maintained a staff of 16, including nine researchers, and operated on an annual budget of 'about a million dollars' coming from a consortium of donors consisting of the UK's DFID, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the embassies of Norway and Denmark, and Oxfam Novib (a Dutch affiliate of Oxfam International).<sup>41</sup>

FIELD DATA: THE DEMAND FOR CIP'S AND IESE'S CRITICAL RESEARCH

Think tanks such as the CIP and IESE produce policy-relevant research. Perhaps it goes without saying that such research is meant to be read and to contribute to public policy debates and political discourse in general. The research for this article provides evidence – suggestive but by no means definitive or complete – about the demand-side of CIP's and IESE's critical research output within Mozambique and abroad.<sup>42</sup>

*University Students in the Policy Sciences: Thesis Citations  
(two case studies)*<sup>43</sup>

We would expect college students in public policy-relevant fields to take advantage of these think tanks' free and easily accessible information. The graphs showing the percentages of IESE citations relative to all citations (Figure 1) and relative to all citations of Mozambican sources – 'Mozambican Citations' (Figure 2) – are drawn from a large sample of senior theses in the departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Economics, and Sociology, and Masters theses in Public Administration, at the national flagship public university in Maputo, the *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM) from 2009 to 2015.<sup>44</sup>

Similarly, percentages of UEM seniors' CIP citations relative to all citations, and those relative to all 'Mozambican Citations' can be found, respectively, in Figures 3 and 4.

The data show, at the very least, that this sample of college students is accessing both IESE and CIP research, much more the former than the latter, however. With the exception of economics students, trends show their use of IESE research grew over time; that IESE research constituted




Figure 1 UEM: IESE citations as percentage of total citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).

over 25% of Mozambican citations for the UEM’s Political Science and Public Administration seniors by 2014 is especially noteworthy, as is the steady growth among that particular population from only 5% of Mozambican citations just five years earlier. Trends in the CIP data are less obvious, with some trending upwards and others trending downwards.

Turning to our second case, Maputo’s *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais* (ISRI), Figures 5 and 6 present the data for senior theses in public administration from 2009 to 2015.<sup>45</sup> As was the case for




Figure 2 UEM: IESE citations as percentage of Mozambican citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).




Figure 3 UEM: CIP citations as percentage of total citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).

UEM students, the data for ISRI public administration seniors show that they are citing both IESE and CIP research, and they are doing so more for the former than for the latter. There is also a perceptible upward trend in both IESE and CIP citations over time.




Figure 4 UEM: CIP citations as percentage of Mozambican citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).




Figure 5 ISRI – Public administration: IESE citations as percentage of all citations and of Mozambican citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).

### *Websites and Facebook Pages*

A second means of determining the demand for these two think tanks' critical research is to access information about their websites and Facebook activities – visits, downloaded articles/data, etc. – especially noting, if possible, domestic demand and distinguishing it from demand outside of Mozambique.

Figure 7 shows the evolution of IESE website 'visits' ('sessions') from January 2011, when data first started being collected, to January 2015.<sup>46</sup> Out of a total number of almost 109,000 visits (and 274,540 'page views'), IESE's website received an average of 1,730 visits per month (roughly 58 visits/day), with clear dips during summer months and periodic and apparently random peaks over 2,000.<sup>47</sup> Figure 8 shows the top five national origins of IESE's website visitors: 63% were from Mozambique itself, representing 10 times the number of Brazilian visitors (the second national origin location) and almost 10 times the




Figure 6 ISRI – Public administration: CIP citations as percentage of all citations and of Mozambican citations, year-to-year (2009–2015).




Figure 7 IESE website audience overview ('Sessions').

number of Portuguese visitors (the third national origin location). 53.95% of Mozambican visitors were first-time 'new users', suggesting a broadening base of users and people learning about IESE.

What the data from Figures 7 and 8 cannot show is the degree of 'engagement' of website visitors, as measured by the amount of time they spend on the site. According to additional IESE data, fully 64.5% of website visits during this period lasted less than 10 seconds, which means that they were likely wrong turns on the internet highway. Needless to say, that's a lot of not-very-engaged visits. The same data show, however, that the average duration for Mozambican sessions (3:43) was over twice as long as for Brazilian sessions (1:47), which were just a little less than that for Portuguese sessions (2:09), suggesting that Mozambican visitors tended to be more engaged in their visits.

IESE launched its Facebook page on 28 July 2013. From then until 27 July 2015, IESE's page recorded a 'total reach' (the number of people who have seen any content associated with the page) of 61,396 (on average, 2,558/month or roughly 84/day). Of these, 7,333 – or

Country	Acquisition		
	Sessions	% New Sessions	New Users
	<b>108,985</b>	<b>52.18%</b>	<b>56,869</b>
	% of total: 100%	Avg for View: 52.07%	% of Total: 100.22% (56,745)
	(108,985)	(0.22%)	
1. Mozambique	<b>69,003</b> (63.31%)	44.47%	30,683 (53.95%)
2. Brazil	<b>6,943</b> (6.37%)	71.14%	4,939 (8.68%)
3. Portugal	<b>6,601</b> (6.06%)	71.20%	4,700 (8.26%)
4. United Kingdom	<b>3,617</b> (3.32%)	45.98%	1,663 (2.92%)
5. United States	<b>3,568</b> (3.27%)	74.55%	2,660 (4.68%)

Figure 8 'Location' (or national origin) of IESE website users.



11.9% – were ‘engaged users’ (defined as any ‘click’ on a specific post or any ‘story’ created on or from that post).<sup>48</sup> Figure 9 shows the evolution of several demand-side indicators over the two years following the page’s launching. While the data show the ebb and flow of ‘reach’ and ‘engagement’ based on the periodic release of IESE reports and publications, the overall trend lines – only one of which is reproduced in the figure – are positive, albeit only slightly so.

Figure 10 shows the evolution of visits to the CIP website each week from August 2013, when data started being collected, to mid-July 2015.<sup>49</sup> Out of a total number of 158,135 visits during this period of almost two years,<sup>50</sup> CIP’s website received an average of 1,535 visits per week (6,140/month or roughly 219/day). The trend shows a 31% increase over that time: from 1,300 to about 1,700 visits per week. CIP’s website data reports do not include the ‘engagement’ measure, so it’s impossible to know how many of these visits may have been wrong turns. Additional CIP data do show that 65% of these visits were ‘unique visits’, defined as visitors accessing a single research report only, usually a new report linked to a Facebook post and/or to one of CIP’s emails (or, in some cases, mentioned in a newspaper article); 41% of the total were ‘first-time visits’ – as in IESE’s similar data, suggesting a broadening base of users and people learning about CIP. Unfortunately, CIP data reports do not track the national origins of visitors. The fact that the content sections of the website – the actual research reports – are exclusively in Portuguese would tend to




Figure 9 IESE Facebook audience overview.




Figure 10 CIP website audience overview ('Pageloads').

limit most visits to those from Lusophone countries and a relative handful of specialists.

CIP's website data contain an additional feature that allows the separate tracking of 'businesses belonging to the Mozambican political elite and holders of public office (such as ministers, legislators, CEO's of public enterprises, etc.)'.<sup>51</sup> These data give us an important indicator, imperfect though it may be, of the demand side of CIP's output from *within* the upper echelons of the regime itself. Each week, on average, 183 so-called 'regime elites' – or more precisely, people working within these 'elite' work sites – accessed the CIP's website between 29 July 2013 and 19 July 2015, for a total of 18,843 visits during this entire two-year period (26 visits each day, on average). 31% of these were 'unique visits' and 25% were 'first-time visits'. Figure 11 shows the evolution of such visits during this period, with the peaks representing report launchings and/or publicity surrounding their findings. The trend line shows a clear increase over time (74%): from 128 to 223 per week.

CIP launched its Facebook page on 2 September 2014. From that day until 21 July 2015, the page was accessed 132,746 times (1,125/day, on average). In spite of the familiar peaks and valleys and the relatively short time frame (slightly less than 11 months), the 'daily reach' trend line (Figure 12) shows an increase from just below 1,000 to about 1,750 per day. During that same period, CIP publications and reports were either accessed and/or downloaded 23,700 times (201/day, on average), and otherwise 'engaged' visitors – liking, commenting on and/or sharing content from the page – totalled 4,609 (39/day, on average).




Figure 11 CIP website ‘regime elite’ audience overview (‘PageLoads’).

*Academic Literature: Citations*

A third way to test the demand for the critical information produced by IESE and CIP in Mozambique is to look at the academic literature on Mozambique since these think tanks began their operations (2008 and 2007, respectively).<sup>52</sup> Figure 13 shows the number of articles in a sample of English-language academic journals that include policy-relevant research on Africa from January 2007 until the end of 2015. The results appear less-than-impressive, with only the *Review of African Political Economy* (UK) standing out as a noteworthy exception. Figure 14 shows the results of a similar inquiry into Portuguese-language




Figure 12 CIP Facebook audience overview.

Journal Name	SCimago Journal Report (2015)[1]	# of Mozambique Articles		
		(Jan 2007-Dec 2015)*	# IESE cites	# CIP cites
Review of African Political Economy (UK)**	0.772	29	21	5
Journal of Southern African Studies (UK)	0.485	21	0	1
World Development (UK)	2.1	21	0	0
Journal of Modern African Studies (UK)	0.828	8	0	0
Journal of African Economies (UK)	0.647	6	0	0
Afrika Spectrum (Germany): 2009-2015	0.296	4	0	0
African Affairs (UK)	1.512	3	1	0
Journal of Contemporary African Studies (UK)	0.493	4	1	0
Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute (UK)	1.02	2	0	0
Journal of African Business (US)	0.318	3	0	0
American Journal of Political Science (UK)	5.101	1	0	0
Third World Quarterly (UK)	1.088	1	0	0

\* Post-independence social science articles with 'significant' empirical content on Mozambique ("Mozambique" as one of subject terms and/or keywords' or appearing in the article more than five times); excludes book reviews and editorials.

\*\* One article written by IESE founder, Castej-Blanco, contains nine of IESE's twenty-one cites and four out of five CIP cites in ROAPE.

1. 'The SJR is a size-independent prestige indicator that ranks journals by their 'average prestige per article'. It is based on the idea that 'all citations are not created equal'. SJR is a measure of scientific influence of journals that accounts for both the number of citations received by a journal and the importance or prestige of the journals where such citations come from. It measures the scientific influence of the average article in a journal, it expresses how central to the global scientific discussion an average article of the journal is.'

[<http://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php>]

Figure 13 IESE & CIP citations in English-language academic journals (Jan. 2007–Dec. 2015).

academic journals that contain social scientific research – at least one article – about Mozambique. Again, the results are less-than-impressive. In both cases, however, the citations of IESE and CIP publications are predominantly found in more recent publications, suggesting a growing familiarity among academic specialists with these organisations' work.

#### SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In Mozambique, among those with whom foreign researchers typically become well-acquainted (university professors, foreign and local graduate students, mid-level government officials, and foreigners working in the aid industry), the research produced and disseminated by both

Journal Name[1]	# of Mozambique Articles	# IESE cites	# CIP cites
	(Jan 2007-Dec 2015)		
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos (Portugal)	28	4	2
Africana Studia (Portugal)*	4	2	0
Sur: Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos (Brazil)	3	0	0
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations (Brazil)	1	0	0
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (Brazil)	1	0	0
Dados (Brazil)	1	0	0

\* AS excludes 2015

1. I have been unable to discover the functional equivalent of the SCimago Journal Report for Portuguese-language publications.

Figure 14 IESE & CIP citations in Portuguese-language academic journals (Jan. 2007–Dec. 2015).

the *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE) and the *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP) is widely understood to be first-rate. Being autonomous from the ruling party/state regime, it is also understood that these think tanks produce research that is either explicitly critical of the government or, at the very least, at odds with the regime's official stories. Both of these think tanks exist to speak fact-based truth to concentrated power. Mozambique's government has been implicated in multiple corruption scandals and incidences of electoral fraud and repression over the years, but also in any number of seemingly 'public' policies that turn out upon investigation to be highly partisan and/or clientelist in terms of their actual beneficiaries. Exposing these for what they are – providing critical information – is the bread and butter of both of these think tanks.

As most democratic theory recognises, a pluralist democracy without multiple sources of information is nothing but a hollow shell; by the same token, a competitive authoritarian regime, like Mozambique, *with* multiple sources of information contains potentially powerful seeds, or foundations, for a pluralist democracy to eventually take root.<sup>53</sup> In the shorter term, critical information can also shame a government into approximating the 'good governance' for which donors and many government opponents advocate. But these outcomes might occur *in fact* only if people are *actually* reading and making use of the critical information produced by such think tanks as IESE and CIP in Mozambique.

Are they?

Prior to this article, there has been no answer to that question. Partly, that's because no one seems to have been asking the question. And partly, it's because those in house – at least in the cases of IESE and CIP – have had little time or incentive to answer the question for

themselves. This would appear to be the case for other think tanks in comparable countries as well, for I have found no empirical assessments of the demand side of their sometimes considerable output. Without comparative or baseline data, therefore, the results of the research in this article can only be suggestive in terms of their implications.

The data on college students' use of IESE and CIP critical research suggest, overall, that social science undergraduates in Mozambique are increasingly aware of IESE's output (less so, however, for Sociology majors and almost not at all for Economics majors). Citations of IESE research reached over 25% of Mozambican citations for Political Science and Public Administration seniors at the public flagship *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM) by 2014, and 13% of Mozambican citations for Public Administration seniors at the private *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais* (ISRI) by 2015. Students' demand for CIP's research seems similarly positive and growing, albeit at a much lower level, but only for Public Administration seniors (and much more so at UEM than at ISRI); other majors show little and/or declining familiarity with CIP's research. Undoubtedly, the fact that several of IESE's and CIP's founders and researchers also teach at the UEM, and that many others are graduates of the UEM, helps to explain the greater familiarity of UEM students with these organisations' research as compared with those at the ISRI. That many of these students eventually find work in government service allows for the likelihood of a growing number of well-educated consumers of critical research within the regime itself; in other words, at the very least, one can infer a growing awareness among younger state and party functionaries that the official stories and party lines are not the only policy-relevant information out there. The same can also be said for the graduates who eventually find work in civil society organisations, opposition parties and the handful of opposition-led local administrations that periodically slip through the constraints of the regime.

The data on website and Facebook sites for IESE and CIP show considerable usage for both organisations: fluctuating, but with upward trends. IESE's data for its website allow us to see that 63% of users were from Mozambique. Of those, more than half were first-time 'new users', suggesting a broadening base of users and people learning about IESE. A sobering point of fact is that slightly more than three-fifths of those accessing IESE's website stay for less than 10 seconds, most likely indicating a mistaken hit on a search for something else. Two years of data regarding IESE's Facebook page reveal daily ebbs and flows of 'reach' and 'engagement' based on the periodic release of IESE reports and

publications; the overall trends, however, are positive. The CIP's website receives, on average, over two and a half times more visits per day than IESE's, and the trend shows a 31% increase over time. Two out of five users of the site are first-time visitors (there are no data on 'engagement'). CIP data on 'regime elite' usage of their site provide a rough indicator of usage or demand from *within* the upper echelons of the regime itself. Averaging 26 visits per day, the trend of those data shows a 74% increase between 2013 and 2015. This indicates that CIP research *is*, at the very least, finding its way into Mozambique's opaque party/state. CIP's Facebook data show a similar increase in both 'reach' and 'engagement', but at a scale of activity more than 13 times that of IESE: daily 'reach' averages of 1,125/day compared with IESE's 84/day. CIP's more topical and journalistic reporting, as opposed to IESE's academic social science, likely accounts for the higher numbers visiting CIP's website and Facebook page. That the critical information provided by IESE and CIP are accessed via a social media site should not automatically disqualify its significance. In the USA, at least, 'Facebook users are much more politically engaged than most people' (Pew Research Center 2013). There is no reason to believe that the same does not apply to the roughly 5% of the Mozambican population – primarily, the urban elite and upper-middle class – that enjoys regular access to the internet.

The data on academic journal citations of IESE and CIP research show a slow evolution of demand from around the world from specialists on Mozambican contemporary history, society, economics and politics. As one would expect from its nature as a self-consciously *academic* think tank, IESE fares better in this realm of demand for its research compared with the more explicitly policy-oriented and journalistic CIP. That IESE's website and some of its publications are in both Portuguese and English, and CIP's are only in Portuguese, might also help explain some of these differences.

The final word of any exploratory research is always tentative. Independent think tanks can play an important role in both democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes in allowing alternative and critical information to circulate among the citizenry and affect the political discourse ... but only if citizens and influential outsiders actually read it. This case study has shown that two of the most prominent independent think tanks in Mozambique *are* getting their research to the reading and researching public, and they are doing so at a growing rate. Time and further research will help to determine just how significant these findings are in the medium-to-long term.



## NOTES

1. According to the website of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania (n.d.): 'Think tanks are public policy research, analysis and engagement organisations. They are organisations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues. Think tanks may be affiliated with political parties, governments, interest groups or private corporations or constituted as independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These institutions often act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities, serving the public interest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic research into a language and form that is understandable, reliable and accessible for policymakers and the public.'

2. For the history of think tanks ('an American invention'), see McGann & Sabatini (2011), especially Chapter 2. For a brief history of think tanks in Africa, see Mbadlanyana *et al.* (2011: especially 68–71).

3. See, for example, Ohemeng (2005) on Ghana; Weaver & McGann (2000); J.M. Scott (1999); also McGann (2010).

4. 'Hybrid regimes are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to state offices combines both democratic and authoritarian practices. More specifically, such regimes display the following features:

- Government negotiations with opposition forces are rare.
- Die-hard loyalists of the government are placed at top-level positions in state offices, such as courts, thereby undermining the system of checks and balances.
- The state actively seeks to undermine the autonomy of civic institutions.
- The law is invoked mostly to penalise opponents but seldom to sanction the government.
- The incumbent changes and circumvents the constitution.
- The electoral field is uneven, with the ruling party making use of sinecures that are systematically denied to the opposition.
- Corruption and clientelism. (Corrales 2011: 1; also Brown 2011).

For a list of such regimes and their developmental trajectories – democratisation, unstable authoritarianism and stable authoritarianism – between 1990 and 2005, see Levitsky & Way (2006: 86–table 1.2). For the similar concept of 'electoral authoritarianism', see Schedler (2006). For Mozambique as a competitive authoritarian regime, see Levitsky & Way (2012); also Pérez Niño & Le Billon (2016).

5. See, for example, Ibrahim (2004); Hearn (2007); also Johnson (2000).

6. In the words of McGann & Sabatini (2011: 61–2), 'The real point of having think tanks to help government think is not to have them be mere technical adjuncts to the bureaucracy, but to have them be a probing, critical, independent spirit in society that is part of the process of holding government accountable to a democratic polity.' For an argument with illustrative case studies about the positive contribution of think tanks to democratisation, see McGann (2010).

The academic literature on the 'liberal-pluralist view' is large. See, for example, Huntington (1984); also Plattner (2009). For a useful review of the literature and history of the concept of democracy promotion 'from outside' (i.e. by external donors), see Reinhard (2010); also Harrison (2001); Youngs (2001); Crawford (2003a, 2003b).

7. A much more critical perspective sees donor governments and their NGOs promoting a more economic neoliberal agenda wherein a functioning state is necessary for private sector interests – donor states' business interests – to invest and profit. See, for example, Bartlett (2001). For an even stronger critical perspective, identifying African NGOs and think tanks as agents of Northern neo-imperialism/re-colonisation, see Hearn (2007); see Hanlon (1991) for a specific application to Mozambique.

8. 'in relative terms at least, there is a global trend towards ... civic conflict. Fundamentally urban in character this form of conflict, when allowed to become violent and destructive, arguably represents an enormous contemporary threat to human security worldwide.' (Beall *et al.* 2011: 3; also Brown 2005).

9. Scholz & Plegemann (n.d.: 1). According to Sumich (2008: 116), 'foreign aid supplied around 60 per cent of the government budget between 2002 and 2004'.

10. For Putin's Russia, see Carothers (2006); also Livshin & Weitz (2006). For a discussion of these and other 'leverage' and 'linkage' structures and their impact on authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, see Hartmann (2016).

11. See, for example, Ohemeng (2005); Bennett *et al.* (2011); Braun *et al.* (2004).

12. One partial exception is Peake & Marenin (2008) – 'partial' because while recognising that 'well-researched and constructed reports [do] not get read or make much of a difference' (60) in the issue-area of policing system reform, they do not actually demonstrate this 'fact' other than to argue in a footnote how their 'experience' in the field and with the literature has generated their 'considered judgments' (67, n. 3).

13. We do not know the extent to which policymakers and decision makers consume think tank information in competitive authoritarian regimes – in other words, the question of think tanks' influence on policy makers. If partisan and intra-state bureaucratic politics generate demands for think tank allies in the West (see McGann & Sabatini 2011: 32–5, also 45), we can imagine a similar process in competitive authoritarian regimes, though it would be more difficult to ascertain through the opaqueness of such regimes' inner workings and the unwillingness of civil society actors to explicitly associate themselves with 'the opposition' for fear of reprisals from the government and the ruling party.

14. <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview>>.

15. Mozambique News Agency (2014). For the 'longer-term trend,' see de Brito (2010).

16. 'Porque é ...' (2014).

17. Erik Charas of @Verdade, quoted in Kavuma (2011).

18. See, for example, Cutajar (2008); also Mbadlanyana *et al.* (2011: especially 78–80).

19. For 'typical cases', see Gerring (2008). A point of clarification may be in order: CIP and IESE are typical cases of high-quality think tanks doing 'critical research' in competitive authoritarian regimes. They are *not* typical cases of civil society organisations in Mozambique; the latter are almost universally recognised as weak and rarely independent of the party/state. See, for example, IBIS (20.11.2012: 12 and 20–1). The Civicus (2013) Enabling Environment Index – measuring 'the conditions within which civil society work' – places Mozambique in the same low-midrange scores as such similar competitive authoritarian regimes as Kenya, Russia and Venezuela.

20. For a brief discussion of problems of measuring think tank 'influence' (related to what I call 'demand' for their research), see McGann (2010: 5–6); for a more extended discussion, see McGann (2007); also McNutt & Marchildon (2009).

21. This historical background section builds upon Nylén (2014: 5–7).

22. See Allina (2012).

23. Elections results here: <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Mozambique](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Mozambique)>; also <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Mozambique](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Mozambique)>.

24. See Lalá & Osteheimer (2003). For the '*partidarização*' (partisanisation) of the Mozambican state, see Cahen (2016: 15). For Mozambique as a competitive authoritarian regime, see Pérez Niño & Le Billon (2016).

25. See Note #6; also Reaud (2012: 33–4).

26. See Canhanga (2009: 96); also Manning & Malbrough (2012). For a more recent illustration, see the comments of Joanna Kuenssberg, the UK's High Commissioner to Mozambique since mid-2014, in Nhantumbo (2016).

27. See the collected essays in Weimer (2012); also Canhanga (2009).

28. Much of what follows in this paragraph is based on a 9.9.2013 personal interview with then-Director of IESE, Luís de Brito, in Maputo. For a history of the CEA, see Fernandes (2015); also the edition of the *Review of African Political Economy* dedicated to the memory of Ruth First: Vol. 41, Issue 139, January 2014.

29. Author's translation. IESE was officially and legally established on 27 November 2008 (IESE 2011: 3).

30. Department for International Development (DFID) (n.d.); footnotes in the original were omitted here. The external reviewers (van Buren & Matos 2014) who researched and wrote IESE's most recent 'Midterm Evaluation', argue that 'IESE produces good value for money because of its considerable output of evidence based research results that is among others influencing policy making, has contributed to the adaptation of legislation and regulation ..., is a source of important and relevant information to national and international organizations and is giving an important contribution to stimulating and raising the level of public debate. ... Quality of IESE's work is judged as good in general, although not uniform, and at the level of the research carried

out in research centres in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. IESE is unique and [a] pioneer in Mozambique in the ethics, rigor, and way it conducts research and publishes results.'

31. O'Laughlin (2014); See also <<https://networks.h-net.org/h-luso-africa>>.
32. *Jornalista e académico ...*' (2015).
33. Oksana Mandlate, IESE researcher and head librarian (personal communication, 18.7.2016); confirmed in Van Buren & Matos (2014: 4).
34. <<https://www.transparency.org/country/#MOZ>>. Mozambique first showed up on TI's CPI in 1999 when it ranked number 56 out of 99 countries (<[http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi\\_1999/o/](http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1999/o/)>). For full descriptions and analyses of corruption in Mozambique, see Harrison (1999); Mosse (2004); Hanlon & Mosse (2009); Martini (2012).
35. <<http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=mozambique>>.
36. International Budget Partnership (n.d.).
37. <<http://cipmoz.org/index.php/en/about-us>>; also Adriano Nuvunga, CIP's Director since 2012 (interview, 28.8.2013).
38. <<http://cipmoz.org/index.php/en/about-us>>.
39. For example, see: <[http://www.cip.org.mz/images/Documentos/Sem\\_categoria/convite\\_publico.pdf](http://www.cip.org.mz/images/Documentos/Sem_categoria/convite_publico.pdf)>.
40. TI's national chapters are vetted 'through a review process every three years, aimed at ensuring continuous compliance with our standards and strengthening the work of the chapters. In instances where a chapter's performance continually falls short of the standards, the chapter may voluntarily withdraw or face disaccreditation or suspension from the movement.' (<[https://www.transparency.org/whowere/accountability/national\\_chapter\\_accrreditation\\_and\\_individual\\_member\\_appointment\\_policy/1>](https://www.transparency.org/whowere/accountability/national_chapter_accrreditation_and_individual_member_appointment_policy/1>))
41. Edson Cortez, CIP researcher (personal correspondence, 11.1.2016).
42. Certainly, the non-government media in Mozambique frequently references these think tanks' output, especially the print media (e.g. *Savana*, *Canal de Moçambique*). Another study using discourse analysis in such media, in political talk shows, on the legislative floor, etc. would be able to uncover and quantify such use.
43. Two other case studies in Maputo were considered then abandoned: *Universidade São Tomás* (founded, 2004) and the *Instituto Superior Politécnico e Universitário* (founded, 1996). Courses in governance and public administration at the UST are housed in the Philosophy department; 171 senior theses from 2009 to 2014 were mostly philosophical studies and not empirical social science (e.g. only four IESE citations and two CIP citations were found among all 171 theses). The ISPU has no records of political science, public administration, sociology or economics instruction.
44. Senior theses were accessed online (<<http://www.saber.ac.mz/>>), in the UEM's main library, or in departmental archives between June and August 2015. The sample constitutes 100% of available theses through these means. The UEM was founded in 1962.
45. ISRI was founded in 1986 as a private institution. The Public Administration major began in 2001.
46. These data on the IESE website and Facebook page, including the charts, and all other cited information, were compiled and presented to the author by Bruno Darsam, Coordinator of Communications and Information Technology at IESE, in July 2015.
47. 'A visit is anytime a visitor reaches your site from somewhere outside of your website domain. ... A page view is when a page on your site is loaded by a browser.' (Hubspot 2016).
48. 'Stories' are defined in the Facebook data as including 'liking your Page, posting to your Page's timeline, liking, commenting on or sharing one of your Page posts, answering a question you posted, responding to one of your events, mentioning your Page, tagging your Page in a photo or checking in at your location'.
49. CIP's website had existed for several years prior to August 2013, but 'audience' data were never collected.
50. Excluding the 11 weeks of missing data, the total number of page loads ('visits') is 141,250. To get the number of 158,135, I take the average number of visits for all 92 weeks for which data exist (1,535) and apply that number to each of the 11 weeks for which data are missing. I perform these same operations for all reported data, in the text and in the corresponding figures.
51. Edson Cortez, CIP Researcher (interview, 20.7.2015).
52. Using EBSCOhost, I determined which social science academic journals published research-based articles on Africa and listed in Figs 13 and 14 all relevant articles with Mozambique in the title or in the keywords.
53. Recall the 'liberal-pluralist view' that informs 'good governance' donors, discussed in the introduction.

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