Reformation and Counter-Reformation produced numerous pockets of religious minorities. Braun's research design enables him to study the same religious denomination in a majority and minority context within the same state, as well as to compare minority response in states that differ in their occupation regimes, political cleavages, religious diversity, and characteristics of their Jewish populations. Braun uses a diverse set of data, which include information on the fate of Dutch and Belgian individuals of Jewish origin, painstakingly geocoded and matched across German registration lists, commemoration books, and return lists; hand-collected archival material on all clandestine rescue operations in select regions; a survey of Protestant and Catholic clerics in Belgium; testimonies from 20 countries affected by the Holocaust; records of postwar trials; and articles from the mainstream and underground press.

The book first establishes that minority status predicts more positive attitudes toward Jews and greater empathy with the Jewish plight in the Netherlands. Braun shows this through content analysis of more than 1,700 prewar claims by opinion leaders in the Catholic media in the 1930s in regions where Catholics comprised the majority or minority, as well as analysis of 905 resistance newspapers published during the war. He then runs regressions to demonstrate that proximity to Catholic churches increased evasion from deportation in Protestant-dominated areas, whereas proximity to Protestant churches increased evasion in Catholic-dominated areas. Next, he examines rescue activities across the religious divide in the Twente region of the Netherlands using mixed methods to explicate the mechanisms through which the structure of minority networks affects the success of clandestine collective action.

The final three chapters study cases off the regression line and derive the scope conditions of the argument. Braun finds that other minorities, such as radical socialists and communists, as well as members of ethnic enclaves, also contributed to the rescue of Jews. This finding reinforces his argument on the importance of both motivation and capacity in clandestine rescue operations. Braun explores the generalizability of his argument by analyzing the prevalence of religious minorities among rescuers identified in 6,407 Yad Vashem testimonies from across Europe. Strikingly, minorities were overrepresented in all but five countries: Denmark, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. The first three states enjoyed considerable autonomy from Germany, which meant that majority churches and national elites could help their Jewish countrymen more openly, as detailed in Hollander's book. In Poland and Lithuania, religious minorities often identified with the Nazi occupiers or were attracted to economic or political rewards that came from participating in genocide.

This thoroughly researched and persuasively argued book shows that it is not members of the society's mainstream but rather of its marginalized groups who risk their lives to rescue others in a crisis. Furthermore, both empathy toward the victims of mass violence and the ability to help them are the product of underlying social structures. The book, as one of its many contributions, thus proposes important structural conditions for the defense of pluralism. It is a must read for scholars of intergroup relations, ethnic violence, civil society, collective action, and altruism.

Together, Braun and Hollander's contributions refine our understanding of how genocide can be prevented and why victimization rates vary across states and localities. They establish that empathy toward the Jewish victims played some role in their survival, but only within the constraints of the occupation regime (Hollander) and may itself have been endogenous to the structural positions of their would-be rescuers (Braun).

The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria. By Salwa Ismail. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 225p. $105.00 cloth, $27.99 paper.
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Today, many in the West associate Syria with shocking violence. The country has been the scene of the most brutal war of the twenty-first century, and its name conjures associations of crimes against humanity, chemical weapons, systematic torture, forced disappearances, and refugee displacement of epic proportions.

Although this might be the first time that violence in Syria is regularly splashing across international headlines and television screens, violence is nothing new to Syria. Indeed, as Salwa Ismail skillfully demonstrates, it has been integral to its rule since Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970. In *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria*, Ismail argues that violence, in both its routine and spectacular forms, is a modality of government that structures relations between regime and citizens, as well as citizens' own political subjectivities. It has thereby shaped Syrians' understandings of self and others, fixed their "interpretive horizons," and produced degradation, dread, and abjection as principal affective experiences of politics.

To illustrate these claims, Ismail analyzes an impressive range of primary sources, including memoirs, diaries, newspapers, novels, speeches, human rights investigations, and more than 150 interviews that she conducted in Syria between 2002 and 2011 or with Syrians exiles thereafter. The book's first empirical chapter offers a chilling examination of how the political prison serves as a "template of rule." It disciplines by humiliating, if not breaking, prisoners' personhood, generating a relationship of power that then becomes continuous with the wider

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society. The chapter turns next to the notion of "the massacre" as another mechanism of rule, tracing the roots of Islamist insurgency in the late 1970s and its climax in the Assad regime's killing of up to tens of thousands during its 1982 assault on the town of Hama. The next chapter adapts William Reno's concept of "shadow state" (*Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, 2008 [1995]) to consider the political economy of control as practiced through the Baath Party, security establishment, clientelism, and co-optation, as well as their crisscrossing of sectarian and sociospatial lines. The third chapter probes memories of everyday life to show how schools and families have been key sites producing and reproducing citizens' fear, debasement, and disengagement. The fourth chapter returns to Hama and considers how memories of the violence of the 1980s have, despite enforced public silence, been formative of Syrians' understandings of the regime and its modes of operation. The fifth chapter turns to the performativity of violence through consideration of some cases of murder and slaughter since 2011, arguing that such horrors are staged, emplotted, and narrativized to create a sense of the uncanny that elides victim and perpetrator.

The sum of this multidimensional analysis is an examination of the politics of violence in Syria of unprecedented depth, breadth, and theoretical sophistication. The power of the book lays in its convincing demonstration of the continuity and coherence of violence as an apparatus of rule across levels of analysis (from the regime through various tiers of state and party agents to citizens themselves), locations (from detention camps to schoolyards to individuals' inner worlds), and kinds of experience (from physical destruction of the body to the felt negation of dignity), as legible at different registers in diaries, literary works, spoken memories, and beyond.

This is a very significant achievement. Students of Syria will benefit from a far-reaching and comprehensive grappling with this facet of Assad rule. Students of violence will benefit from a masterful example of how to employ diverse sources to trace how distinct forms of violence aggregate into a system that saturates public and private life alike. Anyone bewildered by the brutality consuming Syria since 2011 will find clues in Ismail's exposure of the ways that a politics of extermination and annihilation have long been "just beneath the surface" of Syrian political life. The current war has thus brought to horrific culmination a potentiality engrained in the very logic of regime–citizen relations. Today's violence might shock, Ismail teaches us, but it ought not surprise.

Like any important work, *Rule of Violence* can leave readers with questions. The book paints a mosaic of the multifaceted manifestations of violence, and some pieces of that mosaic fit better than others. The book is most compelling where its empirical detail is most vivid, such as in descriptions of wrenching degradation in prison or suffocating school environments epitomized in the khaki of militarized uniforms. I found less compelling those sections where theory and academic jargon were more heavy-handed and, at least for this reader, obscured Ismail's interpretive insights more than they illuminated them. Some of the book's attention to political economy seemed tangential to the overall project. Issues such as the demographics of security and military recruitment and housing, illicit markets, the social and land conflicts generated by rural–urban migration, and 1980s and 1990s economic shortages were fascinating, but could have been more strongly connected to the book's central argument. Ismail has much of interest to say about how class, corruption, sect, and space are constitutive of Syrian society and how precarity is constitutive of Syrian selves. However, interpretation of these material elements under the rubric of violence can seem like a conceptual stretch.

Mainstream empirical political scientists might note the book's lack of some of the basic components of conventional disciplinary frameworks. In this regard, the book would have been better served by an overarching puzzle and an explication of how the posed argument answers that question. The preface alludes to puzzles: Ismail notes how Syrians' "silence about Hama . . . was . . . puzzling" (p. viii) and her subsequent interest in "the question of the role of violence and memories of violence in shaping the Syrian polity" (p. ix). However, the book does not have a driving question that begs for explanation, and accordingly, its chapters do not clearly add up to such an explanation. A framing of this sort might have better connected the book's various points and threads into a sharper theoretical takeaway that not only describes and interprets violence, but also clarifies how precisely that interpretation explains something about Syria that existing scholarship fails to explain.

To accomplish the latter, the book might have also included a review of literature on Syrian politics and a sharp statement of the unique contribution of this work. Ismail's introduction expertly discusses Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Sigmund Freud, and other theorists, skillfully relating their work to Syria. Largely missing is a critical discussion of arguments put forth in existing scholarship on Syria and how *Rule of Violence* contests or extends them. Ismail briefly compares her approach to that of Lisa Wedeen (*Ambiguities of Domination*, 1999) (p. 100), but a fuller discussion of this sort at the outset would have better showcased the book's novelty. This would have been valuable, because Syria watchers will likely find Ismail's arguments to be consistent with what they already understand. Indeed, few who know Syria and Syrians would dispute the extent to which political violence shapes both.

In this sense, Ismail's analysis might reaffirm and deepen existing ideas more than present path-breaking

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new knowledge or build counterintuitive theory. Its innovation lays in the thoroughness with which it probes and makes sense of violence in Syria as a system. In bringing together the multiple strands and manifestations of violence in one rich and erudite text, it is poised to stand as the most important reference on the topic. Anyone wanting to understand Syria and Syrians should grapple with this book.

Megaphone Bureaucracy: Speaking Truth to Power in the Age of the New Normal. By Dennis C. Grube. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 232p. $29.95 cloth.
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In a context of polarization, political distrust, and the 24-hour news cycle, Dennis Grube explores the changing relationship between elected leaders and appointed bureaucrats in Western democracies. Focusing on the United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, Grube's comparative analysis shows how today's civil servants have increasingly found themselves governing in public. In this new era, historic norms and conventions are being eroded as bureaucrats have greater opportunity to make public interventions that challenge the authority of elected representatives. *Megaphone Bureaucracy* makes an original and convincing case that these new opportunities should not only be welcomed but also embraced by civil servants so they can provide an authoritative voice in public debates that are increasingly being framed by "fake news" and misinformation.

By making this argument, Grube challenges the conventional wisdom that civil servants have been politicized and constrained by powerful governments. Instead, he suggests that new forms of social media afford civil servants a higher degree of agency than they possessed in the past. The roles that senior public officials previously performed behind closed doors are now more likely to be undertaken on the public stage. How should public officials adapt to these new conventions? Grube answers this question by developing a new approach to public leadership he describes as the "Washminster" model. As a hybrid between Westminster traditions and Washington practices, Grube proposes that officials should accept greater responsibility for the role they play in decision making while also assuming an independent identity and proactive public profile. They should have and embrace the opportunity to defend themselves from politicians' and media criticism as well.

Grube's key point is that such a model would enable civil servants to actively seek and deliver "public value" by providing evidence and data to enrich policy debates. He draws on Jeffery Tulis's concept of the "rhetorical presidency," which highlights the importance of communication as a means for presidents to assert their agenda in the face of restrictive institutions. Grube suggests that his Washminster model would allow civil servants to fulfill a similar role of "rhetorical bureaucrats." His key point here is that bureaucrats are already operating on the public stage, yet outdated conventions restrict them from assuming the tools of the trade that would allow them to exercise their growing agency effectively. Bureaucrats need to be allowed the space to communicate their knowledge and expertise to a wider public audience and thereby maximize their contribution to the democratic process.

Megaphone Democracy makes this interesting and compelling argument on the basis of wide-ranging new empirical evidence. Grube analyzes what he describes as the "visible manifestations of bureaucracy" (p. 52) in the form of written communications—letters, briefing notes, interviews and speeches—that provide evidence of bureaucrats' behavior. These are then compared to bureaucrats' interpretations of their own actions, which are found in 45 semi-structured interviews with retired mandarins from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The actions and beliefs of bureaucrats are then triangulated with public records and media coverage. Grube uses this new empirical evidence not only to develop his Washminster approach to public leadership but also to document the different ways bureaucrats must increasingly engage with the public. These ways include communicating in writing, assuming roles in public leadership, appearing in front of oversight committees, publishing memoirs, and negotiating both established and new forms of social media. These examples are used to show how Grube's Washminster system is already in operation in many western democracies today and to make the case that we should rethink the relationship between elected representatives and appointed officials to ensure that bureaucrats engage in the policy-making process more effectively.

Megaphone Democracy raises several interesting questions about transparency, accountability, expertise, and political trust. Grube makes a clear and convincing argument that the relationship between civil servants and politicians has changed, which provokes obvious questions about how such a transformation can be explained. Grube repeatedly refers to the rise of the 24-hour news cycle and social media throughout the book and how they have led to increased scrutiny of bureaucratic leaders. But given how much of the book is focused on asserting the agency of public officials themselves, I wondered about civil servants' own role in contributing to these changes. Have civil servants actively sought to adopt a more public role, or have they passively and reluctantly been thrust into the public spotlight due to changes in the media and political communication? This raises further questions about popular understandings and expectations of democracy; in particular, precisely

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