explicitly and New Jersey focussing on family relationships and the dynamics of dating. Despite these differences, professional educators praised each program for the ways in which they "invited frank discussion of dating, marriage, and sexuality in public school classrooms" (47). Educational materials like textbooks, films, and teacher class plans addressed important topics such as sexual anatomy, masturbation, sexual arousal, menstruation and reproduction, in single and co-ed settings.

The context and content of sex education classes warrant closer attention, Freeman argues, because knowledge about biological and psychological sexual development and the opportunity to discuss important questions with peers while in school empowered high-school students. Sex education classrooms gave students exposure to "democratic and gender-egalitarian principles" that Freeman suggests led them to form more equitable heterosexual arrangements. Girls in particular benefitted. Experiences in progressive, discussion-based and student-directed classrooms, Freeman writes, "induced girls to be self-reflective, pursue self-improvement, develop sexual subjectivity, and expect fairness in relationships" (xiii). She goes as far to say that such lessons translated into an overall "critique of male-dominated households" by sex and family life educators (150). Such apparent radicalism flew under the radar. The 1940s and 1950s sex education classroom was strikingly different from the classrooms of the 1970s and beyond when Christian conservatives targeted schools for teaching a view of sex at odds with their religious views. Implied in this trajectory is that progressive sex education in the 1940s and 1950s became a resource for the generational upheavals of the 1960s. Freeman concludes that the "gender consciousness instilled in girls by sex education and family living curricula in some ways enabled them to recognize their collective identity and gain awareness of gender inequality" (149).

Intriguing as these assertions are, there is little evidence to support them. There are few voices from students or parents in this history and little methodological sense of either group existing in dynamic and complex relationships with the broader culture outside schools. *The Feminine Mystique*, Betty Friedan's didactic exposé of stifling Cold War heterosexuality, is surprisingly absent. Drawn heavily as it is from educational materials and programs, *Sex Goes to School* does not wade into the far more complex world of actual dating and mating, or engage enough with the cataclysmic transformations in sexuality that took place around sex education classrooms between 1930 and 1970.

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Jason Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean 1937–1962* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, $99.00 cloth, $24.95 paper). Pp. 248. ISBN 0 1953 3202 4, 978 0 1953 3202 5.

If there is one theme which dominates the small literature on postwar American policy towards the anglophone Caribbean it is uncertainty or ambivalence: Cary Fraser's book on the subject was actually called *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism* and, while the title of Jason Parker's book is suggestive rather than explicit in indicating his

central concerns, at an early point he explains that the relationship "is best conceived of as a uniquely 'protean partnership' in the hemisphere" (8). At the beginning and towards the end of the text Parker invokes the myths of both Proteus and Cain. Despite the absence of a mortal crime, Cain's situation is said to parallel "the hegemon's dilemma" of how a large power, like the United States, can regulate what ought to be a fraternal relationship with its smaller hemispheric partners. At another point the United States is portrayed as Menelaus, trying to tame the shape-shifting Proteus, incarnated in the form of the unstable political systems of the anglophone Caribbean territories at the end of empire. These are thought-provoking metaphors, interesting as much for the dissimilarities between the mythical prototypes and mid-twentieth-century international politics as they are for the persuasive suggestion that the American government was preoccupied with the rational regulation of an intrinsically difficult and unpredictable relationship.

Aside from these allegorical features, what is most striking about Parker's book is the exceptional quality of the research and analysis. *Brother's Keeper* covers twenty-five years of an eventful history and encompasses domestic, regional and international aspects of the Caribbean policy of the United States. Initially, prominence is given to the role of diasporan solidarity as a factor in American policy during the 1930s. Parker offers a convincing argument that the presence of Jamaican and other Caribbean migrants in New York became a factor in the Roosevelt administration's promotion of social and economic reform in Britain's Caribbean colonies. In the second half of the book he emphasizes the foreboding which American policy-makers felt when contemplating the emergence of democratic, nationalist politics in the region; this was epitomized by Eric Williams's campaign against the American military base at Chaguaramas in Trinidad during the late 1950s. International factors added a further layer of complexity as it became evident that American obligations to their European ally in London could potentially conflict with the imperative to demonstrate an understanding of the congenial kind of nationalist anti-imperialism espoused by local politicians such as Norman Manley of Jamaica.

A tripartite chronological division emerges in the book which emphasizes discontinuity in American policy. During the Roosevelt presidency the role of expatriate West Indians in Harlem is a key theme. Roosevelt's sponsorship of Charles Taussig's Caribbean reformism is placed firmly in the context of domestic American politics and Parker argues that it was the existence of "transnational diasporan energies" (66) which differentiated the case of Britain's Caribbean colonies from other examples of decolonization. The Truman era is dealt with in a single chapter and is characterized as transitional; the best that can be said for it, in Parker's view, is that it did not "precipitate the disaster that so often followed US policy into the decolonizing Third World." It was only in the Eisenhower and Kennedy period that the full force of the Cold War began to be felt in American policy towards the anglophone Caribbean. Although in principle the United States supported local nationalists, American pursuit of national security objectives could undermine this stance. These ambiguities in American policy were still unresolved when Trinidad and Jamaica became independent in 1962.

Parker has presented a convincing argument supported by excellent research and some persuasive writing but there are two caveats: one formal and forgivable, the other methodological and inexplicable. As the foregoing indicates, the book tends to

divide American policy rather neatly between presidencies; this presents an exaggerated picture of discontinuity and impedes Parker's efforts to restore agency to local actors. On the positive side of the ledger this does add coherence to a potentially confusing narrative and assists in the process of developing some clean lines of argument. By contrast, the decision to pay no attention whatsoever to the autobiographical works by Trinidad's first Prime Minister, Eric Williams, or other Caribbean leaders is baffling. Williams's *Inward Hunger*, which was first published in 1969, is a classic of anti-imperialist writing. Other significant works by Albert Gomes and C. L. R James are also excluded from the otherwise comprehensive bibliography. Readers will, however reluctantly, have to forgive these omissions because, in all other respects, this is an immensely impressive work of scholarship.

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Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, $24.95). Pp. xvi + 237. ISBN 978 019 517383 3.

More than forty-five years after his death, President John F. Kennedy remains a subject of fascination for both scholars and citizens. In public opinion polls, US citizens consistently rate Kennedy as a great President. When asked to explain their choice, respondents cite Kennedy's quality of leadership. Scholars similarly rate President Kennedy in favorable terms. On President's Day, 16 February 2009, C-Span, the public-affairs cable channel, released a survey conducted among sixty-four presidential scholars. The survey placed Kennedy in sixth place among the forty-three Presidents, from George Washington to George W. Bush. This was a remarkable result for a man who served only two years and ten months, about a thousand days, in office. The scholars cited Kennedy's wise management of the economy, his commitment to civil rights, and his successful conduct of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises as justification for his high standing.

The Bay of Pigs invasion was not one of President Kennedy's bright and shining moments. On 17–19 April 1961, 1,500 Cuban exiles backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stormed ashore at the Bay of Pigs, hoping to incite a widespread rebellion that would lead to the overthrow of Fidel Castro. Castro's forces quickly routed the invaders, killing 114 and capturing 1,179. Castro had a disciplined army of 25,000 and an extensive militia of over 200,000. Former secretary of state Dean Acheson had warned Kennedy prior to the invasion that it did not take an accounting firm "to figure out that fifteen hundred Cubans aren't as good as twenty-five thousand" (65). In this new history of the invasion, Howard Jones asks the familiar scholarly question, "why did such an intellectually talented president approve an invasion plan so obviously and egregiously flawed" (91)? Like earlier chroniclers of the invasion, such as Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer (1962) and Peter Wyden (1979), Jones agrees that Kennedy's decision to cancel planned air strikes doomed the invaders. But Jones has also combed the records of congressional committees that investigated both President Kennedy's assassination and US plots to assassinate foreign leaders. Jones persuasively argues that invasion plans were