

therapeutic attention, essentially making it a nonissue for most people. In contrast, homosexuality in Poland was considered a moral failing, and in the context of the Catholic Church's "outsized role," activists were not able to consolidate a national coalition before Poland joined the EU. Chapter 3 compares the rise of the "hard-right backlash" in the early 2000s in Poland—in which political parties and their allies politicized the issue of homosexuality with strident homophobia and linked gay rights to Europeanization—to the mostly tepid backlash in the Czech Republic.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the resulting dynamics in the years leading up to (1998–2004) and then following EU accession (2004–12). In Poland, activists responded to the hard-right's bans on Pride marches and tacit approval of homophobic violence by embracing the EU's human rights framing, creating more formal organizations, and becoming explicitly political. By 2010, they were mobilized enough to host EuroPride in Warsaw, the first postcommunist city to host this European-wide event, and had found important allies, including a political party (Twój Ruch). In contrast, the Czech movement fragmented and lost important state funding. The remaining Czech groups focused on the single issue of registered partnerships, which they achieved in quite limited form in 2007, and then disbanded. In the process, they worked through informal, personalized contacts with parliamentarians, missing opportunities to create broader support or to push for other important reforms. Instead of facing backlash as in Poland, the problem was co-optation by a mostly indifferent state.

This in-depth qualitative analysis is reinforced by some quantitative analysis and some minicomparisons. The author uses quantitative data on attitudes toward homosexuality and LGBT rights to substantiate the notable differences between Western and postcommunist Europe, as well as multivariate regression to substantiate the hypothesis about the positive impact of the promise of EU membership on LGBT legal rights. Chapter 7 examines activism in Hungary, whose trajectory was quite similar to that in Poland, though the hard-right has had more electoral success; in Slovakia, whose trajectory is most like that in the Czech Republic, even though it is a more closed society; and in Romania, where backlash came before the EU pressure but together these forces boosted the movement. The book's argument is strengthened in the conclusion, which adds even more comparisons, showing how the Polish women's movement's trajectory is similar to that of LGBT rights, considering why Roma rights movements in postcommunist Europe have not had the same growth, and then comparing the trends in LGBT movements around the world.

Coming Out of Communism is a tour de force in comparative analysis, interrogating civil society—which is notoriously difficult to study—and covering issues often ignored by the field. Most in conversation with Philip

Ayoub's *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility* (2016), the book speaks to multiple central literatures in political science. Like Ayoub, O'Dwyer analyzes the impact of transnational influence on norm diffusion by examining the EU's recent pressure on LGBT rights, pointing to the visibility that such pressure can bring but also to the impact of opponents. However, the author is more concerned with social movement theorizing, making two important assertions that differ from Ayoub: first, that we should think about movement success beyond policy outcomes and, second, that threats to the "immediate protective surround" of individuals—often engendered by backlash—is one powerful way to overcome the collective action problem. While O'Dwyer might not agree—by bringing into focus the mobilization of marginalized "sexual minorities"—I think that his book challenges the common wisdom that postcommunist civil society can be characterized as weak, in the 1990s or today.

The book raises two concerns for me. First, while I agree that social movements are more than their legislative success, I hesitate to use the vibrancy of a movement as the only measure of its success, especially considering the high personal costs paid by LGBT activists and allies in Poland with the return of the hard-right in 2015. Feminist political science has many, and more nuanced, answers to this question of what counts as success for women's/feminist activism—as well as numerous studies of the EU's impact on violence against women—that could have been usefully considered here. Second, I think that the book glosses over the strategic political choices made by the hard-right, thereby failing to interrogate their claim that Europe is responsible for their homophobia. For example, the book asserts that "[t]he EU's promotion of LGBT-rights norms in applicant-states provoked varying degrees of hard-right backlash" (p. 18), even as the EU could do very little really to protect LGBT individuals. As others who have a global lens have asserted, I suspect that the postcommunist hard-right leaders chose to attack LGBT rights because that is what illiberal populists are doing these days; Europe is the scapegoat.

These concerns open up important and timely questions, which, together with the its strengths, make *Coming Out of Communism* a book that should be considered for use in introductory comparative politics seminars for doctoral students.

Piety and Public Opinion: Understanding Indonesian

Islam. By Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 208p. \$65.00 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719000380

— Michael Buehler, *School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London*

In their new book, Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani want to provide a "corrective"

to “sensationalist, sometimes even hysterical characterizations of Muslim beliefs that in the West so often drive public discourse” (p. 2). In order to do so, they examine whether there is a relationship between levels of piety among Indonesian Muslims and support for Islamist political parties; whether piety affects opinions about, and the use of, Islamic financial products; and finally, if, and if so how, piety shapes the way Indonesian Muslims interact with the broader world.

The authors’ public opinion survey, administered in the year 2008, found no systematic relationship between the religious orientation of Indonesian Muslims and their support for Islamist parties or *Shari’a* law. Levels of piety also do not determine support for democracy, Islamic finance, or views on foreign relations. In short, “evidence that more religious Indonesian Muslims think or behave differently than their less religious counterparts simply does not exist” (p. 4).

Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani provide evidence for their argument across four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of “piety” and puts forward a research method to measure levels of piety through public opinion surveys. In Chapter 3, they examine whether pious Muslims are more likely to support Islamist parties that want to adopt *Shari’a* law than are less religious Indonesians. They find that “even among those respondents who are most sympathetic to political Islam, Islamist party ideologies only give parties an advantage over non-Islamist parties when voters are uncertain about parties’ economy policy platforms” (p. 62). Chapter 4 asks whether more pious Muslims are more likely to think favorably about Islamic finance products and make more frequent use of such services compared to their less religious counterparts. The authors find that levels of religiosity do not determine the ways in which Muslims in Indonesia engage with the modern market economy. Finally, they ask whether the revitalization of Islam across the archipelago has led to a reorientation among the Indonesian population toward the Middle East and away from the West. Here, the authors find that more pious Muslims indeed like to see closer relations with the Arab world. However, such views do not compete with pious Muslims’ preferences for engagement with other cultural realms, including “the West,” Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the main findings and a discussion of how the Indonesian case can inform research in other Muslim-majority countries.

Piety and Public Opinion makes several important theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. Its main theoretical contribution is the finding that factors such as globalization and modernization, rather than levels of religiosity, shape attitudes toward politics, the economy, and the wider world in the largest Muslim-majority country and third-largest democracy in the world. Methodologically, the book’s thorough discussion on how to

operationalize “piety,” a much-studied but hitherto poorly defined concept, and how to make it suitable for public opinion surveys will be of much use to academics working on the relationship between religion and politics in other Muslim-majority countries. Empirically, the book is a powerful opening salvo for future comparative research on whether the revitalization of Islam in Muslim-majority societies will shape politics and public life in distinct ways.

In addition to a host of new questions raised, and which are introduced by the authors in the final chapter, there are several additional issues that future research may want to take into account. The book goes to great length to conceptualize the main independent variable (piety) in a comprehensive fashion. The dependent variables, however, could have been discussed more critically. For instance, Chapter 3 examines whether levels of piety determine support for Islamist parties and the adoption of *Shari’a* law. The authors find that more pious voters are more likely to support Islamist parties *if* these parties put forward a policy platform that is clearer to voters than the policy platform of nationalist-secular parties. However, I found the definition and conceptualization of “Islamist party” and how that concept was then translated into Indonesian rather problematic. Concretely, according to the authors, “Islamist party” is to be understood as a party that wants *Shari’a* law as the basis of the political system. In contrast, an “Islamic party” may make frequent reference to Islam during campaigns and in party platforms but does not explicitly demand *Shari’a* law to be the basis of a political system. Since the Indonesian language does not differentiate between “Islamist” and “Islamic” party, the authors asked respondents whether they would support a political party based on Islam (*partai politik yang berasas Islam*) “wishing to implement Islamic law.” However, there is no consensus, not even among Islamist activists in Indonesia, as to what actually constitutes “Islamic law.” Rather, *Shari’a* law has been described as a “total discourse” that includes religious, legal, moral, and economic rules and regulations.

Since there is no agreement on what constitutes Islamic law, it has come to mean anything to anyone. The authors could have said more about how a concept as vague as *Shari’a law* potentially affects the book’s finding that there is no relationship between levels of piety and support for Islamist parties (i.e., parties that wish to implement *Shari’a* law). Furthermore, the battery of survey questions that Indonesians were exposed to in order to test the relationship between levels of piety and support for Islamist parties advocating the adoption of *Shari’a* law asks about a purely hypothetical situation. Not a single Indonesian party has called for the adoption of Islamic law in a national election campaign for the past 17 years. In the words of a leading scholar on party politics in Indonesia: “The issue of establishing an Islamic state or introducing Islamic law in Indonesia was buried in 2002 during the last round of constitutional amendments, and

no Muslim party has seriously raised it again ever since” (Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (2009), p. 334). The authors’ claim — that “[p]olitical parties in Indonesia range from avowedly pluralist social democratic parties to openly Islamist parties” (p. 72) — is therefore incorrect.

Likewise, the public opinion survey asked respondents whether they are more likely to support a political party that puts forward a clear agenda on how to improve the Indonesian economy and citizens’ welfare, rather than a party that lacks such a clear agenda. While the authors went to great length to conceptualize and operationalize “party platform,” this is again a rather artificial setup. In reality, Indonesian politics are deeply transactional. Instead of having the choice between different party platforms, or even clearly formulated and vague party platforms, Indonesian voters are confronted with party platforms that range from the fantastical to the outright nonsensical. Since the country became a democracy in 1998, no Indonesian party has put forward a comprehensive policy platform with concrete suggestions on how to address the archipelago’s many problems.

In short, there is a need for a more critical discussion of the fact that several of the dependent variables are either understood in Indonesian society in a multitude of ways (Shari’a law) or do not really correspond to the actual political environment in Indonesia (Islamist party; economic party platform) and how this may affect the validity of the survey results.

Finally, the main finding that levels of piety are inconsequential for democracy, partisan politics, support for Shari’a law, and Islamic finance, as well as foreign relations, leads the authors to conclude that “[p]ublic opinion . . . may have no causal impact on policy outcomes at all” (p. 22). Instead, they argue that elites play an important role in shaping policymaking. While this confirms previous research on the role of Islam in Indonesian politics, more could have been said about the rather complex interaction between elite-driven politics and public opinion.

Since 1998, at least 700 Shari’a regulations have been adopted across Indonesian provinces and districts. Most of these laws directly violate the constitutional rights of Indonesians. While this development may indeed be the result of a top-down process initiated and maintained by political elites, as this book and works by other scholars suggest, the question concerning why Indonesian society is not more vocal when it comes to resisting such developments needs to be discussed. Public opinion and even levels of piety may shape Indonesian policymaking not so much by *actively calling for* certain policies but by *not resisting* their adoption and subsequent implementation.

Overall, the proposed conceptualization of “piety” and the instructions on how it can be harnessed in public

opinion surveys in other contexts will be useful for scholars working on other countries, while the empirical findings of *Piety and Public Opinion* are guaranteed to stimulate debate among area specialists.

Democratizing Urban Development: Community Organizations for Housing Across the United States and Brazil.

By Maureen M. Donaghy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2018. 234p. \$99.50 cloth, \$34.95 paper.

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— Gianpaolo Baiocchi, *New York University*

In increasingly unequal cities, what role can civil society organizations play in promoting affordable housing? Today, nearly a billion people worldwide live in inadequate housing, and the United Nations projects that by 2030, the urban housing shortage will be of about 2 billion people (p. 5). At the same time, cities are increasingly becoming sites of urban investment, and their leaders are choosing market-driven strategies that exacerbate urban inequalities. It is clear that urban mobilization for affordable housing exists, but can organizations play a role in actually defining what more affordable urban development will look like?

In this useful and extremely well researched book, Maureen M. Donaghy draws our attention to a set of questions that are generally ignored in urban sociology: How do community-based organizations actually engage institutions to shape development? And what are the consequences of these choices? The answers to these questions are based on richly developed case studies that are then put in conversation. The author develops an unusual—and quite productive—comparison of four cities (Atlanta and Rio, for their Olympic development, and São Paulo and Washington, DC, for their central-city development strategies). Donaghy argues, generally speaking, that organizations are more successful in protest in “outside” strategies to prevent displacement than in “inside” strategies of proposing policies that would shape urban development and secure the gains achieved otherwise. This points us in important directions as we think about how to construct a more democratic city.

In addition to a series of chapters dedicated to each of the case studies, the book also includes a theory chapter that offers a number of important correctives to the literature, particularly the social movements scholarship. By moving the discussion away from movement *tactics* and the dichotomy of contention and cooperation that mostly defines that literature, the book moves us to consider the longer arc of strategies that movements adopt. It also makes the very correct point that much of the literature on governance assumes that movements are inherently normatively oriented to participation, when in fact there are a range of strategic orientations that are responsive to opportunities and context.