terms had been forged in a political battle over race and space within the city limits. Newt Gingrich, who, as the author relates, could neatly address their racial fears without mentioning race at all, would embody the apotheosis of this new movement.

Atlanta's booming and inexorably spreading edge cities have prospered: They are full of elegant retail gallerias and ordinary malls, McMansions and starter homes, all of which are increasingly populated by a white, black, and increasingly Latino middle class. *White Flight* traces in one city several of the radical transformations of the American state in the twentieth century: the quest for full citizenship on the part of African Americans, the rise of suburban America as the political and economic engine for much of the nation, and the rise of the Republican Party from minority status in the 1940s to majority status by the end of the twentieth century. In these connections, Kruse illuminates a key phase in American political development.

The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents. By Colleen J. Shogan. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006. 230p. $45.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.
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— David B. Holian, *University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

This work offers a relevant, theoretically rich discussion of rhetorical strategies pursued by presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush. Colleen Shogan's accomplishment is striking not only because it is the rare presidential study that accounts for all the nation's chief executives but also because it exists at the intersection of two important, and in some respects competing, theories of presidential power, Stephen Skowronek's (1993) *The Politics Presidents Make* and Jeffrey Tulis's (1987) *The Rhetorical Presidency.* Like Skowronek, Shogan recovers the premodern presidencies, which are too often ignored, and links them to their successors by focusing on comparable political environments. This allows for fascinating and surprising conclusions across eras. Like Tulis, she focuses on rhetoric as a strategic tool that, on the one hand, can help presidents overcome constitutional limitations but, on the other hand, can raise public expectations beyond reasonable bounds. Also like Tulis, she finds Woodrow Wilson to be an important transitional figure, albeit in a more limited way. Far from introducing moralizing to presidential rhetoric, Shogan demonstrates that Wilson was the first to engage heavily in moralizing without reference to a specific policy goal, a tactic continued by Wilson's successors.

The author analyzes State of the Union messages and inaugural addresses through 2003 for moral and religious references. Here she casts her net fairly wide, drawing in not only allusions to God and specific biblical passages but also forward-looking visionary pleas for a more just nation or world, as well as backward-looking appeals to American exceptionalism. Her first cut at this very rich data set is to show the significant ebbs and flows in moral and religious rhetoric across administrations. The results are intriguing and an indicator of discoveries to come. The findings range from conventional to unexpected: George W. Bush relies on moral rhetoric a great deal; Abraham Lincoln, surprisingly, was more restrained.

The balance of this initial investigation rests on rather perfunctory regression analyses of rhetoric over time. The results are most interesting in terms of our assumptions that lack support. For example, moral rhetoric does not increase significantly when the country is at war. Moreover, Republican and Whig presidents have not relied on such rhetoric more than Democrats. Among other findings, an electoral mandate, operationalized as one's percentage of Electoral College votes, is inversely related to the rate of moral rhetoric. On the other hand, Skowronek's five reconstructive presidents (Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan)—those most successful at claiming and carrying out mandates—moralize at higher rates than do other presidents.

Because the author examines annual addresses across two centuries, more methodologically rigorous time-series techniques could have been applied to account for the possibility of time dependence in the data. However, in the context of this impressive work, this comment is a quibble. The strength of the book is its well-researched and provocative case studies of presidential moralizing, which generates questions, surprises, and new insights.

Here, the influence of Skowronek's work is most obvious. Comparisons among presidents that are not evident on their face emerge more clearly once Shogan fuses political environment with the strategic considerations that structure rhetorical choice. The author situates the case studies in the context of William Riker's concept of heresthetics, advanced most clearly in *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986). Riker defines heresthetics as the art of structuring the political world in ways that increase the probability of victory. Shogan's case studies describe presidents' attempts to enhance their political authority by their use—or the conscious restraint in their use—of moral rhetoric. The results of her research range across presidents who succeeded brilliantly in this endeavor (Lincoln), failed miserably (James Buchanan), landed somewhere in between (Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy), or purposely avoided moral rhetoric as inappropriate (Jefferson).

The danger inherent in any qualitative study is conclusions that accord too nicely with the extant record. Lincoln must have chosen his rhetoric wisely given his transcendent presidency, whereas Jimmy Carter's moralizing led to an ineffectual term. The reader's willingness to reflect seriously on such conclusions depends on the quality of the author's research and argumentation. Here, Shogan does not disappoint. She musters impressive evidence from primary documents and secondary historical

literature to provide a deeper understanding of presidents' decisions to engage in or refrain from moralizing. The careful inductive process she employs leads her to articulate seven political conditions that structure rhetorical choice. Four promote moralizing; three discourage it. For example, presidents can enhance their political authority by moralizing when they need to rally an uncertain public or simplify a complex issue. On the other hand, moralizing is more likely to weaken an administration's political standing when the president's party is internally divided or scandal undermines the high ground on which a president tries to stand.

Upon elucidating these principles, Shogan discusses how presidents measure up to them, and she uncovers some revealing comparisons across eras. For example, Lincoln and Kennedy, for most of their presidencies, avoided constructing good-versus-evil arguments in attempting to hold together their divided parties. James Madison and Lyndon Johnson shrewdly moralize to unite the country behind war with Britain and civil rights legislation, respectively. Three of these examples, in particular, represent cases in which rhetorical decisions play against type. Neither Madison nor Johnson came to office known for his rhetorical flourishes, while Lincoln represents the nation's moral touchstone.

Of course, there are points in the analysis of the case studies that do not ring quite true. At times, the discussion of Buchanan's and Carter's failures to improve their deteriorating political situations via the proper application of rhetoric evokes the image of the captain of the *Titanic* requesting a different bucket. But such is the very nature of pondering decades-old, even centuries-old, decisions. Shogan offers an insightful, thought-provoking analysis that significantly advances our understanding of the rhetorical choices of presidents past, present, and future.

The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law. By John Fabian Witt. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 322p. $55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.
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— David Stasavage, *New York University*

The development of workmen's compensation legislation is a subject of considerable historical interest. As the first major social insurance program adopted in the United States, it is also a story that may shed light on the broader question of why welfare state development in the United States differs so markedly from that observed in many other industrialized countries. In this engaging book, John Fabian Witt traces the development of legal ideas and public responses to the problem of industrial accidents during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is first and foremost a legal history, but it should nonetheless be of considerable interest to political scientists and, in particular, those interested in the subject of welfare state development. Witt argues that the problem of industrial accidents led to a series of legal and institutional responses that involved a fundamental reconceptualization of the problem of risk and that helped influence the subsequent development of the American welfare state through the New Deal years. More provocatively, he suggests that these legal and institutional responses were a contingent or accidental outcome. Alternative responses to the problem of industrial accidents might have led to an alternative path of welfare state development.

During the late nineteenth century, an epidemic of industrial accidents in the United States came to be perceived as a major social problem that would need to be addressed by public action. Mechanization associated with industrial growth had led to a perceived drastic increase in the number of accidental deaths and injuries for American workers. There was also the perception that accident rates were much higher in the United States than in other industrial countries, yet public responses to the problem had lagged. Witt organizes his study by exploring four levels at which there was a legal or institutional response to this emerging problem. These also refer to four alternative solutions.

A first level involved the question of whether existing legal doctrine could be adapted to deal with the reality of the industrial workplace. The emergence of industrial accidents presented a particularly acute problem for classical tort law, which made no provision for the compensation of those who suffered accidents neither through any fault of their own nor due to identifiable negligence on the part of their employer. By the end of the nineteenth century, it became increasingly apparent to those in the legal profession that this characterized a very significant fraction of workplace accidents. Ignoring these cases would be unjust, yet classical tort law provided no alternative doctrine for effectively dealing with them. As a result, a purely legal solution to the problem seemed precluded. Both here and elsewhere in the book, Witt's observations regarding the evolution of the law and the social context in which it occurred are particularly insightful, in addition to being readily accessible to a broad readership.

Rather than solving the problem by legal means, an alternative response to the problem of industrial accidents was for workers to form cooperative insurance associations. Witt next describes how during the late nineteenth century, given weak options for obtaining accident compensation via the legal system, there was a dramatic growth in cooperative insurance societies that would provide death and disability benefits. Unlike the pattern observed in a country like the United Kingdom, however, where cooperative societies became the foundation of a system of social insurance provided by the state, this was not to be the case in the United States. While the description of this differential evolution is fascinating, Witt ultimately provides relatively little explanation of why exactly cooperative insurance societies in the United States failed to develop