

role in prodding people to violence against others. A scholar's task, Velychenko reminds us, consists in giving nuances of localism, individual motives, and contingent perceptions their due weight. The book ends with a conclusion on the long-term demographic and psychological ramifications of the Civil War and a helpful appendix (a signature mark of all Velychenko's publications) with apposite primary documents translated into English.

Astounding as it is, the wealth of facts amassed by the author serves as a double-edged sword. This is particularly true for the first part about everyday life. The logical connections between examples are often vague, producing an impression of repetitiveness. The problem stems from the filter employed by the author, whereby experiences are categorized by the governments—Bolshevik or Ukrainian—where they were “registered.” This approach does not appear warranted given, as Velychenko concedes, how unstable, transitory, and tenacious control over the swaths of Ukraine's territory between 1918 and 1921 was. One begins to wonder what was specifically Bolshevik or UNR about typhus in the Kyiv province or Podilia. It would have been appropriate to let the metaphor of the horsemen of the apocalypse (employed by the author) unfold into a thematic discussion of mortality, epidemics, and mores. That, in turn, could have underpinned an elaboration of different views held and policies promoted by the contenders to address or, at times, instigate the disasters of war and revolution.

This brings us to the issue of responsibility, at the heart of the book's second part. Velychenko seems content to blame the Bolsheviks for the violence because their leaders' utterings jibed with the activities of the agents on the ground (who thus acted “in the spirit of Bolshevism”). The absence of such statements from the UNR leaders, without necessarily exculpating them, substantiates the author's intention to produce a much more complex explanation of violence. It is questionable how the administrative collapse resulting in the emergence of autonomous, violence-prone agents on all sides justifies this unequal treatment of the principal belligerents. In the context of labile, shifting loyalties reference to reified identities and clear-cut dichotomies, such as “observant Jews” and “apostates,” “Russians” and “Russified elements,” and even “Ukrainians” also seems unjustified.

An epistemological gap runs between the two parts of the book. Whereas the first part ties the degradation of living conditions to state collapse, the second seeks explicitly to reintroduce the state—or governments—in promoting patterns of violence. This is not to insist that one needs to side either with a faceless “statelessness” or with state-connected violent entrepreneurs in framing experiences of the civilians. Rather, this suggests that a bridge between political actors and their fortunes on the one hand and the overarching humanitarian collapse on the other has not yet been established. The book does not accomplish this task, but it makes important steps in this direction.

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***The Austro-Hungarian Army and the First World War.*** By Graydon A. Tunstall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. x, 466 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. \$34.99, paper.  
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During the First World War, Austria-Hungary faced enemies on more fronts than any of the other great powers of Europe. Graydon Tunstall argues that “Habsburg armed forces were, quite simply, incapable of conducting modern warfare” at a level needed

to withstand such threats, and yet somehow “the army muddled through multiple battlefield defeats,” avoiding collapse until the end of October 1918, barely two weeks before Germany sued for peace. His task, as he defines it, is to explain how “the army remained battle-worthy until almost the end of the conflict” (25).

Tunstall spends nearly half of the volume covering the pre-1914 background, the July Crisis and declarations of war, and the initial campaigns of the summer and autumn of 1914 in Galicia and the Balkans. He surveys the unique political structure of the multinational Habsburg empire after the compromise of 1867 and the challenges it posed for the armed forces, which featured a common Austro-Hungarian army but separate Austrian and Hungarian reserve formations. The Dual Monarchy spent less per capita on the military than any other European power and maintained a relatively small army for a country of its size, weaker than its potential adversaries in artillery and machine guns. When it came to infrastructure, the inadequacies of the rail network, especially in the eastern and southern lands of the empire, caused problems for the initial deployment of troops to the front lines and for their supply and reinforcement throughout the war.

The nationality problem, of course, made everything worse. Even though regiments were recruited from territorial districts, few were monolingual and some had as many as four official languages. Tunstall highlights the “prewar prejudice against Slavic troops” and the corresponding “Czech resentment toward the Habsburg regime” as further centrifugal factors (7). After the army deployed to the front lines, Czech soldiers numbered among the army’s first, and most eager, deserters. As Tunstall notes, cohesion suffered all the more from the “severe losses . . . during the opening battles of the war” (33). Reserve officers lacked the language skills of the professionals they replaced, skills essential to maintaining the functionality of the multinational army.

Given the author’s previous scholarly work in Austro-Hungarian war planning against Russia and Serbia, the Carpathian “Winter War” of 1915, and the siege of the southern Polish fortress of Przemyśl in 1914–15, it is not surprising that his sections on the army’s flawed mobilization and subsequent disastrous opening campaigns on the Eastern and Balkan fronts are especially thorough. In contrast, the Italian front receives scant coverage, at least for 1915, after Italy’s entry into the war, and for 1916. Tunstall focuses his attention on Austria-Hungary’s war in the Alps and along the Isonzo River only for 1917 and 1918, when there is relatively little action elsewhere to discuss. He overstates Austro-Hungarian weakness in the Adriatic Sea, which an American observer called “an Austrian lake” as late as January 1918. If it were true that “Habsburg naval forces were overwhelmed once Italy declared war” (397) then the Allies would not have conceded the Adriatic to Austria-Hungary, a costly strategic decision that allowed Germany to run submarine operations out of bases there, which sank millions of tons of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean.

This volume is the seventh in the Cambridge series *Armies of the Great War*, which began to appear in 2014, on the centennial of the outbreak of the First World War. Previous volumes have covered the armed forces of each of the other European great powers plus the United States. Tunstall’s work conforms to the high standards of the series in being based on extensive archival research as well as an exhaustive reading of published primary sources and secondary works. The number and quality of maps is not adequate for the level of detail in which operations are discussed, and the index is not particularly useful. Figures include photographs of the leading personalities mentioned in the text. In the end, there is nothing here that would surprise a reader already familiar with the Austro-Hungarian war effort of 1914–18. Tunstall’s impressive body of research only confirms what we already know, that

the army of the Dual Monarchy was ill-prepared to fight against other great powers on multiple fronts, and the empire as a whole was too weak to survive a war of such length and magnitude.

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***Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes: An Intellectual Biography of Dmytro Dontsov.*** By Trevor Erlacher. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2021. xvi, 642 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. Maps. \$84.00, hard bound.  
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Trevor Erlacher's biography of Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) places the ideologue of the Ukrainian extreme right in his proper, “broader European, Eurasian, and global” setting, thereby “contextualizing Dontsov and Dontsovism diachronically, placing his words, actions, and associations in their . . . contexts” (43). In this pursuit, Erlacher aptly and intelligently navigates Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, German, and French literature and Ukrainian, Polish, and Canadian archives. In six, chronologically organized chapters, Erlacher takes us through Dontsov's life from his early years in the sleepy Russian provincial city of Melitopol. Here, the young Russian started his political development as an orthodox Marxist, before around 1909, influenced by (mis)reading of Friedrich Nietzsche, taking up voluntarist positions, glorifying “amorality,” and calling for Ukrainian belligerence (69–70). Radicalized further during World War I, Dontsov breaks with the Ukrainian People's Republic and his former mentor Symon Petliura (107), supporting the German-staged coup that brought Pavlo Skoropads'kyi to power, serving as head of the Hetmanate Telegraph Agency (146), before being antagonized by the hetman's last-minute attempts for federation with Russia.

Erlacher skilfully guides his readers along Dontsov's intellectual journey, from his Novorossia childhood, as young Dontsov, a speaker of a muddled “Muscovite-Ukrainian jargon” who was unable to distinguish Ukrainian from Polish, to the main ideologue and icon of the Galician extreme right (273). Despite radical transformations from orthodox Russian Bolshevik to pro-Nazi propagandist, racial scientist at the Reinhard Heydrich Institute to Christian mystic and Cold warrior, Dontsov traded one totalitarian *Weltanschauung* for another. His greatest influence was that of transmitter of transnational fascism and as translator and popularizer of Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Francisco Franco, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, and Leon Degrelle (312). Dontsov perceived himself as a Ukrainian Joseph Goebbels (318) or Mussolini (339). Though the idiosyncratic totalitarian himself never joined its ranks, Dontsov inspired the fanaticism of the Stepan Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN(b), its violent hatred that aimed at forming a “new Ukrainian: youthful, brutal, ‘with stone heart and burning faith.’” (233) In the 1930s he conceptualized antisemitism as “a Ukrainian tradition,” condemning the leadership of the UNR for having failed to take advantage of the Judeophobic sentiments of the Ukrainian masses (318), and commending Hitler and the Third Reich for their determination to exterminate those “bacilli” (319). These would form the underpinnings for the wave of ethnic violence the OUN(b) launched against Jews, Poles, and, not least, Ukrainian political opponents during the war, claiming the lives of 90,000 Poles and many thousands of Jews.

Erlacher intelligently and elegantly situates Dontsov in the larger European fascist, or multi-totalitarian context. He aptly guides the reader through *European* intellectual