

(subject of her second book) was powered mostly by those who did not find Islam incompatible with modernity (principal thesis of the earlier one).

Taking a close look at the politics of the provinces, Martin makes a compelling case that not all who campaigned for reform, nor all those who opposed it, were necessarily committed to either cause from any ideological conviction. Frequently, local factional preoccupations at the level of elite politics propelled individuals or groups to move toward or away from the direction of reform (particularly if their rival was not in that camp to start with), as it seems to have been the case in Shiraz or Esfahan; there were even occasions, as in Bushehr, where serious engagements with the reform agenda began only after the drift of developments in Tehran became clear in the provinces. There were still others, such as the more radical elements in Tabriz, who joined the fray in order to capitalize on opportunities that had suddenly become available in pressing the demands of the city's underclass.

The question that is left tantalizingly open by the author is no less important than the ones she chooses to address: What made the “Islamic” agenda of reform (or politics) “Islamic”? Is it simply the involvement and the agency of the ‘ulama’ that made some concerns of 1906 “Islamic”? Clearly not, for, as Martin herself shows, there were as many ‘ulama’ who made their peace with the *mashruta* option as those who clamored for *mashru’a*. Should that not qualify even the secularist *mashruta* agenda as an Islamic option? Similarly there were many outside the ranks of the ‘ulama’ who solicited for *mashru’a*—how does one categorize them? Or is it merely the use of Islamic terms of references (i.e., the notion of instrumental use of religion) for mobilization of popular support—even when protagonists of such Islamic agenda might be involved in local elite power struggles that are patently unrelated with the cause of the faith, such as Haji Mirza Hasan in Tabriz, Haj Aqa Nurullah in Esfahan, and Mu‘tamid-i Divan in and around 1906? Is it both of these considerations together—the agency and the language—or maybe something altogether different? Towards the beginning of her book, Martin is quite emphatic that contrary to what Ahmed Kasravi and others like him used to believe, the secular agenda was neither clearly formulated nor clearly understood at the time of the *Mashruta* revolution. Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that neither was the “Islamic” agenda clearly formulated or understood, except in an instrumental way.

MATEO MOHAMMAD FARZANEH, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2015). Pp. 329. \$45.94 cloth. ISBN: 9780815633884

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Since the early 20th century, historians of social movements and revolutions have found themselves in a dilemma. How can we understand revolutions as structural transformations if they occur as a result of contingent and heterogeneous factors, many of which are marked by distinct characteristics with significant historical consequences? In a theoretical sense, one can arrive at an understanding that writing about revolutions is at best a mode of historical thinking, or a way of making sense of a particular historical configuration whose presence can no longer be felt but whose specter continues to haunt the present moment. The task of a historian is to reveal these ambiguities and yet seek to understand the role of the agencies through which revolutions become possible in the first place.

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–11) continues to fascinate historians for how it opened up a new democratic ethos, which led to the creation of a parliament with long-term impact

on Iranian and Middle East history. Explanations of the Constitutional Revolution, however, have long played upon a basic theme: the rise and emergence of a constitutional democratic critique of royal authority with the aim of curtailing its arbitrary power. What most studies have neglected is the role of diverse actors with competing notions of revolutionary change, actors whose contribution defined the Constitutional Revolution as one of the significant political upheavals of the 20th century.

Mateo M. Farzaneh's book, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani*, presents one of the best studies of a group of underestimated political actors, namely, Shi'i 'ulama' whose participation in politics during 1905–11 played an integral role in the establishment of the first constitutional monarchy in Asia. Farzaneh argues that Mullah Muhammad Kazim Khurasani, a leading and influential high-ranking Shi'i cleric living in Najaf, Iraq, provided significant support for the triumph of the revolution. In terms of political and spiritual leadership, Khurasani was successful in promoting the newly formed Iranian parliament and provided justification for a constitutional government through his reinterpretation of Shi'i jurisprudence.

Of particular importance in Farzaneh's textual analysis of Khurasani's writings is his framing of constitutionalism through millenarian discourse, which saw the parliament protected by the Hidden Imam whose eventual return will return justice on earth. Farzaneh is at his best showing how Khurasani competed and challenged anticonstitutional clerics from Iraq through a vast Shi'i transnational network. Far from a monolithic entity, the Shi'i clerical establishment underwent increasing fragmentation with its increasing engagement with constitutional politics. What Farzaneh ultimately provides is a depiction of a distinct Shi'i political modernity, of which Khurasani became the best spokesman.

The book consists of three parts, eleven chapters, a conclusion, a useful chronology section at the beginning, and an appendix at the end, plus photos of key clerical figures during the Constitutional Revolution. The first three chapters provide a historical account of modern Iranian history with a focus on state-led economic, legal, and political reforms under the Qajars. They also discuss the impact of reforms on clerics, merchants, and the newly formed intellectual circles, mostly active under the reign of Nasr al-Din Shah (1831–96) and Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896–1907).

Chapter 4 looks at Shi'i clerical history, tracing its foundation to the pre-Islamic period. Chapter 5 continues the discussion of Shi'i Iran by looking at the relationship between clerical authority and state power from the Safavid to the Qajar era. This chapter is one of the best, in my opinion, as it provides a comprehensive analysis of Shi'i clerical establishment in the context of Akhbari–Usuli conflict and the consolidation of Shi'i Usuli orthodoxy. The intraclerical relations are made in connection with state power in the 18th century. Part 2, comprising Chapters 6–9, looks at Khurasani, his thoughts, theology, and political thoughts, as a leading Usuli cleric. In Part 3, Chapters 10 and 11 describe Khurasani's tension with anticonstitutional clerics, especially Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri. These two chapters are highly informative and well written. They describe an intense political and religious conflict between two major Shi'i clerics with implications on contemporary history. The chapters also represent among the few in-depth studies on Shi'i clerical conflicts in the Constitutional Revolution period, and certainly merit the full attention of scholars who seek to better understand an era when Iranian political modernity underwent a radical transformation.

Some of the most interesting features of this book are the chronology section at the beginning, the appendix with primary sources, and especially the photos from the Constitutional era, which include depictions of Khurasani, Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarnai, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i, Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, and many other clerical figures. These sections reveal the patient workings of a scholar with a keen eye for primary sources found at major archival institutions.

For all its accomplishments, Farzaneh's book could have benefited from some in-depth comparative analysis. It could have also benefited from comparative studies such as Nader Sohrabi's *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), a significant work of comparative historical analysis and theoretical insight about the different ways the Iranian and Ottoman Constitutional movements originated from the 19th-century reform period and later, in the 20th century, negotiated, challenged, and transformed patrimonial states.

Other related key questions remain. On the transnational level, how did religious currents in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and other revolutionary experiences in Asia in the 20th century differ, if at all, from the proconstitutional clerical currents in Qajar Iran? What might a spiritual modernity of the 20th century look like with Khurasani as a model revolutionary cleric?

But the above objections are not meant to diminish the significance of this book. Through an analytical overview of the ideological transformations and religious and political changes, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani* is a work of provocative and historical depth. It offers an accessible and coherent analysis of Iranian politics and religious discourse by Khurasani and other politically involved clerics during the Constitutional Revolution. Farzaneh's analytical precision in bringing to light Khurasani's historic attempt to pursue democratic-minded reform in Shi'i Islam and Iran is commendable. This important book encourages readers of various backgrounds to rethink one of the greatest revolutions in modern history.

GUY BURAK, *The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Pp. 273. \$99.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781107090279

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In *The Second Formation of Islamic Law*, Guy Burak peers into the history of the rise of Hanafism as the official legal school of the Ottoman Empire. By drawing on biographical dictionaries (*tabaqāt*), chronicles, and selected fatwa compilations, Burak narrates the emergence of Ottoman Hanafism as a "distinct identity." Rather than taking the Ottoman Hanafi tradition as an isolated entity, the author associates it with former Asian Islamic legal traditions. By doing so, he calls attention to the possible intellectual connections that existed between Ottoman and the Transoxanian ("Mongol," in the author's words) jurisprudential realms.

The first part of the book focuses on the office of the mufti in the Mamluk and Ottoman jurisprudential traditions. The objective of the discussion is to argue that the Ottoman Empire, unlike the Mamluks, established a clearly defined judiciary hierarchy. Burak undertakes in his discussion a detailed quantitative analysis of the certificates (*ijāza*) issued by the Mamluk jurists that enabled their students to teach law and issue fatwas. This analysis indicates that after the 16th century, the issuance of the *ijāzas* in former Mamluk domains drastically declined. This coincided with the official appointment of provincial muftis in Damascus directly by the Ottoman imperial center, supervised by the imperial mufti (*ṣeyhülislām*). Burak selectively employs specific fatwas and draws on secondary sources to argue that this shift attributed a binding force to the imperial mufti's legal opinions, as well as to those of the provincial muftis, since they were following the fatwas produced by the former. As such he considers fatwas found in compilations as binding opinions applicable to any case throughout the empire, a prevailing but yet-to-be proven tendency