Richardson's account of drives and valuation, and Maudemarie Clark's work on the self. In places, however, the central thread of the book is lost, and it's unclear how the arguments within and between chapters are to constitute a larger whole. Katsafanas does well to relate more technical discussions to broader themes in Nietzsche's thought, such as his mobilization of Nietzsche's account of bad conscience in Katsafanas' discussion of the falsifying effect of consciousness, but such productive exposition is rare. Cursory introductory and concluding chapters relate Nietzsche's theses to wider debates in moral psychology and the history of philosophy, but these concerns are noticeably absent from the heart of the book.

Schopenhauer looms very large, as he should in any discussion of Nietzsche, but the use to which he is put is sometimes unsatisfying. It is difficult for any reader of Nietzsche to impress upon his scattered remarks the imprint of a system; since Katsafanas means to do just that, he too often appeals to Schopenhauer, on, say, the nature of drives, to fill in the blanks of Nietzsche's thinking, without establishing that Nietzsche was in fact influenced by Schopenhauer on this specific point or to this specific extent.

In his discussions of willing and freedom, Katsafanas returns often to Nietzsche's figure of the sovereign individual who, unlike his weak-willed contemporaries, can rightfully claim the capacity to promise. Katsafanas mentions but does not seriously engage debates concerning Nietzsche's ultimate view of the sovereign individual, a figure argued by some to be parodic. Such a view, if true, would be problematic for Katsafanas' interpretation.

The heart of the book is a picture of Nietzschean moral psychology that avoids the false dichotomies of his predecessors. Inclinations are not burdensome to a rational creature, nor is reason a slave of the passions; instead, reason and sensibility are inextricably intertwined in a complex and shifting vortex of forces. We are not absolutely free, nor absolutely determined, but we are more and less autonomous, more and less able to shift the prevailing vortex of forces that constitutes us. We achieve freedom not by casting off the shackles of society in search of a pre-social self, nor by identifying our freedom with the progress of our culture and its institutions; instead, freedom is a negotiation between our rootedness and our individuality. The picture Katsafanas offers is compelling, well articulated, and well defended. The book adds to our understanding of several timely debates, and thus should be read by anyone interested in Nietzsche's moral psychology.

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Cosmopolitan Peace

CÉCILE FABRE

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; 339 pp. $70.00 (hardback)
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Cécil Fabre's latest book is a state of the art analysis of important and emerging issues in the discourse about just war. On Fabre's reading, cosmopolitanism demands that human beings wherever they reside have rights to whatever resources and freedoms are necessary to lead a flourishing life, and this implies "that they should be able to frame, revise, and pursue a conception of the good with which they identify" (3). It goes "hand in hand" with a certain attitude toward sovereign states and the legitimacy of national borders; "membership in this or that political community," she argues, "has limited ethical

relevance. It … does not generate obligations between fellow residents which outweigh obligations to distant strangers" (5). Sovereignty rights on this view are nothing other than "an instrumentally valuable way to discharge general, cosmopolitan obligations of justice."

Cosmopolitan Peace follows Fabre's much admired 2012 book *Cosmopolitan War* and it brings the cosmopolitan outlook to bear on "war endings and justice after war." She applies cosmopolitan justice to a range of normative issues that have not in the past been fully explored by just war theorists. An obvious virtue of the book is that it provides an ethical framework to underpin surrender pacts (Ch. 2), peacekeeping operations (Ch. 3), peace treaties (Ch. 4), restitution (Ch. 5), reparations (Ch. 6), punishment of war criminals (Ch. 7), and reconciliation programs (Ch. 9). Indeed, Fabre's innovative explorations of transitional foreign administrations (Ch. 8) and remembrance (Ch. 10) are virtually new inclusions to the just war discourse.

A foundation of this far-reaching theory of war endings and justice after war is the distinction Fabre attempts to draw between "justified peace" and "justified peace$_{atc.}$"[1] While justified peace carries cosmopolitanism's full commitment to universal rights protection, the latter concept allows for a condition of peace "all things considered," by which Fabre means a "state of affairs in which individuals do not enjoy all of their non-basic rights" (20) because of scarce resources, uncertainty, or non-compliance by powerful agents (19, 313).

Another cornerstone of *Cosmopolitan Peace* is the "dependence of *jus in bello* upon *jus ad bellum*" (21). Soldiers fighting in an unjust war give up their traditional "war rights" including the right to kill enemy soldiers. To defend her position, she articulates a "causal contribution" argument, according to which choices of individuals, rather than citizenship and nationality, determine rights and responsibilities after (as during) war (6).

In many of these contexts, the claims and distinctions that emerge from cosmopolitan justice yield intuitive conclusions. Peace agreements are normally administered by the United Nations (UN) and a primary legal commitment of the UN is to universal human rights protection. Military occupation is typically a task undertaken by powerful countries inside weak or failed states; it is hard to envision a framework other than cosmopolitanism suitable to constrain military occupiers.

Fabre's framework of cosmopolitan principles represents a categorically individualistic view of just war. It departs considerably from Michael Walzer's theory in *Just and Unjust Wars* (which is unsurprising; Fabre's contributions to just war literature frequently consolidate or expand views carved out or endorsed by Walzer's cosmopolitan critics). So, even if *Cosmopolitan Peace* reflects the most progressive understanding of the just war tradition in recent memory, and one unambiguously committed to protection of basic human rights, just war theorists from any but the current generation would likely contest the architecture that makes Fabre's framework function so well.

Its breadth of reach and unsurpassed clarity of argumentation nevertheless make this book a must read for contemporary theorists. Fabre's analysis of two quite different issues—punishment and remembrance—demonstrates why. Punishment is deeply problematic not only within just war discourse but in geopolitical conflicts around the world,

[1] The subscript '$_{atc}$' (all things considered) stipulates that under a condition of justified peace$_{atc}$ less than the full range of universal human rights are protected.

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where whole societies can be subjected to uncritical punishment for the crimes of a few irresponsible leaders, or where amnesty for war criminals can become the easy path out of civil strife. Fabre argues compellingly that choices of individuals—certainly the choices of high officials, but sometimes also those of rank-and-file soldiers—justify criminal punishment; punitive action that imposes burdens on entire populations cannot be justified (179). And even when it *is* possible to bring war criminals in front of international tribunals, doing so is justified only if those measures produce a justified peace$_{atc}$ (213).

Fabre's pioneering chapter on remembrance argues from the same premises. Commemoration of past wars "is best justified by appeal to the moral imperative of bringing about universal peace" (303). Remembrance is justified when it "transcends national and political borders and yet is appropriately sensitive to the specific historical and personal importance which the remembered war has for those who commemorate it" (283).

Both are important developments in just war cosmopolitism and Fabre's reasoning fastens together these and every other philosophical position defended in the book. On the other hand, traditional just war theorists might order things differently. They might dispute the value of the "cosmopolitan archipelago" (198) that Fabre is moved to defend as a model of universal jurisdiction. Regarding remembrance, they might contend that common patterns of commemorating sacrifices by *our* soldiers to preserve *our* way of life should play a significant role in justifying war remembrance. They might hold in short that political communities should retain a degree of primacy in certain judgements about war but they ought nevertheless to cultivate fellowship whenever possible among their people and the rest of humankind.

The precedence of new just war theory over old may be this book's greatest attribute, and Fabre builds a persuasive case that it is. A few will maintain against Fabre that just war doctrines contained much of value in phases that preceded radical individualism. On the other hand, few would disagree that *Cosmopolitan Peace* represents the most influential and the most meticulously argued normative account of war's aftermath produced to date.

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The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability

ELIZABETH BARNES

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In *The Minority Body*, Elizabeth Barnes provides a compelling argument that being disabled "is not something that by itself or intrinsically makes you worse off" (6). More pointedly, Barnes suggests that, while disability may very well be a difference that results in different experiences from the majority, the difference associated with disability is not by itself, bad—people with disabilities have minority bodies, which are neither broken nor defective. Barnes proceeds to this end by breaking the argument down into six chapters.