

left to wonder what first-class globalization would entail, and how exceptional this “second-class” type of outward investment is. Is it unique to Chinese enterprises?

Drawing on rich material from interviews with SOE managers, local staff and other members of Chinese communities in Ghana and Benin, observations made through shadowing interviewees in their daily activities, and discourse analysis of policy statements and media reports, Lam reveals the multidimensional nature of the globalization of Chinese SOEs. She distinguishes three types of embeddedness that mark this process (pp. 3–7; 148–151). First, societal or Chinese embeddedness reflects the company’s “genetic code” and its social and political ties to the home country. The second type, territorial embeddedness, captures the extent to which the company is anchored in the African host country. Managerial embeddedness, lastly, highlights the actors’ interaction with other actors in local networks and processes of trust-building. The extent of a company’s triple-embeddedness determines its trajectory and success in Africa.

An unexpected contribution of the book lies in its documentation of the role of SOE managers, who prove to be key actors in developing globalization strategies. Lam provocatively uses the concept of “expat” rather than “migrant” to describe SOE managers in Ghana and Benin. She finds that these expats – many of whom have lived in Africa for over a decade – embody the tensions of the process of localization. Getting together at the golf course on Sundays and residing in fancy suburban villas, these managers live comfortable lives. However, their wealth is localized. The social and cultural capital they have accumulated in West Africa over the years is not transferable to China. They lack the social etiquette and connections to integrate with the business elite at home. While these managers are upwardly mobile in Africa, they prove spatially immobile. Many opt to extend their stay in Africa, which has led to a paradox: the Chinese managers who are the strongest advocates of workforce localization also constitute the main barrier to it.

The breadth of material and the depth of analysis of *Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in West Africa* are rare in the young field of Africa–China studies. Given the major achievement of the author, it is regrettable that the publisher does not live up to this standard. This should, however, not deter the reader. Providing unique insights into the changing face of Chinese SOEs in Africa, the book is a must-read for students and scholars working on Chinese involvement in the developing world.

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*Hypocrisy: The Tales and Realities of Drug Detainees in China*

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Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019

vii + 164 pp. \$45.00

ISBN 978-988-8455-68-3 doi:10.1017/S0305741019001012

*Hypocrisy* ethnographically analyses contemporary first-hand accounts of arrest, internment, release and recovery, as told by mainland Chinese people with drug addiction. Vincent Cheng’s analysis uncovers a discursive mismatch between what the mainland Chinese state espouses in its propaganda on the topic of drug addiction and rehabilitation, and the reality of the experience for his informants. While the state

asserts that it wishes to humanely treat and educate detained drug addicts in ways that facilitate their return to everyday society in a productive capacity, the informants' stories point to punitive abuse in detention and ongoing control on their release. Cheng argues that this bears out a fundamental structural "hypocrisy" in the drug rehabilitative system in mainland China, hence the title of the book. Cheng claims that this hypocrisy is the cause of persisting unhappiness and dissatisfaction for his informants, as recounted in their stories. Moreover, he boldly asserts that their unhappiness and dissatisfaction present a threat to the legitimacy of the mainland Chinese state, and, by corollary, the ruling Communist Party. This is because they clearly contest and refute key claims made by the state in its propaganda.

*Hypocrisy* is an essential read for Sinologists who are well versed in the historical and contemporary experience of drug addiction across greater China. Many books have documented the historical experience, but only one humanities' work to date has examined the contemporary experience, namely, my own book, *Chinese Stories of Drug Addiction: Beyond the Opium Dens* (Routledge, 2016). Cheng's book is a welcome and unique addition, as it analyses first-hand stories that were shared with him during extended ethnographic encounters. This, indeed, is a commendable achievement, as it would have been ethically and logistically very difficult to plan and carry out. Drug addiction remains a politically sensitive topic in mainland China. Yet, Cheng has overcome what would have been formidable barriers to obtain his corpus of stories. Although these stories are necessarily limited to a specific group of individuals in a specific geographical location, they are unfiltered by editorial or creative processes. This usefully stands them in contrast to my own work.

Cheng's data is very impressive. Unfortunately, his key findings are less so. He is correct in characterizing the contemporary political discourse on drug addiction and rehabilitation in mainland China as one that casts people with drug addiction as victims or patients in need of care and education. By doing so, the unerring state paternalistically casts itself as a positive, enlightened force that can help affected individuals return to their families and society in a productive capacity. This is to their greater benefit, as well as that of the wider society and the nation, in particular. The state needs an ongoing, high level of control over its citizens in order to accomplish this task. Such controls, however, maintain social stability, a key political tenet of the contemporary state. By casting its rehabilitative principles and practices in this way, the state not only discursively justifies itself domestically, it also meets its obligation as a modern global citizen whose actions align with world's best practice.

State propaganda, however, cannot singularly shape the day-to-day actions of everyday citizens, including local police and prison guards. Many other discursive forces are in play. Cheng points to a long-standing cultural stigma when he observes that his informants fear that local police will expose their illicit-drug-using history to their neighbours and work colleagues. Their fear stems from the fact that such a stigma casts those who are addicted to illicit drugs as despised non-persons, who are best removed or eliminated from everyday society. This has included execution in the past. Cheng, nevertheless, appears to ignore its impact on the day-to-day actions of local police and prison guards, even though it can readily explain why they do what they are claimed to do. Thus, what his informants tell him does not singularly bear out the hypocrisy of the state. It more reasonably bears out, amongst other phenomena, the longstanding cultural stigma that casts them as non-persons. Accordingly, local police and prison guards can readily dismiss and abuse them, and use them as chattels to improve the financial status of their local facility. Thus, the observed discursive contradiction, which Cheng calls "hypocrisy," between how the state and how everyday people, such as local police and prison guards, cast

and respond to drug addiction, is not so remarkable. Many social phenomena, such as severe mental illness, manifest such contradictions. Moreover, these contradictions do not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of the state, as Cheng claims. They can be readily accommodated, amidst the reality of one's day-to-day existence. Everyday citizens hear what state propaganda says, yet cultural norms, values and scripts discursively prevail in their day-to-day lives. Perhaps, Cheng could have reflected more on why his informants call greater attention to state discourse than cultural discourse in their stories. Why do they solely blame the state for their ongoing misery rather than wider society, who drove them to abuse illicit drugs; or themselves, who chose to take illicit drugs in the first place?

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*GMO China: How Global Debates Transformed China's Agricultural Biotechnology Politics*  
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New York: Columbia University Press, 2018

xx + 288 pp. \$35.00; £27.00

ISBN 978-0-231-17167-0 doi:10.1017/S0305741019000882

Genetic modification of plants for human use began as an inadvertent by-product of seed selection by hunter-gatherers and launched the first agricultural revolution. Systematic gene modification through selective self- and cross-breeding launched a second agricultural revolution in the first half of the 20th century. In the last decades of the 20th century, yet another agricultural revolution began with the ability to manipulate genes not just within but across species. Transgenic Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and another agricultural revolution were born.

Cotton was one of the first crops to which GMO technology was applied. A gene from *Bacillus thuringiensis*, a bacterium toxic to bollworm, was inserted into the cotton genome creating a plant that in essence produced its own insecticide. Chinese farmers quickly recognized the potential for increased yields and lower pesticide costs, and were amongst the first to grow what is now known as Bt cotton. China was not only an early adopter of GMOs but also an early innovator and was in fact the first country in the world to develop a pest-resistant GMO rice variety.

As Cong Cao describes in *China GMO*, it is not surprising that China was at the forefront of the global GMO revolution, given its food security and environmental challenges and its broader strategic focus on technology development and commercialization. What is surprising is that China's GMO revolution stalled with the breakthrough rice not allowed to enter the Chinese market and Bt cotton remaining the only significant GMO crop grown domestically.

*China GMO* helps us understand why China's GMO revolution stalled by taking us chronologically and thematically through GMO technology in general (chapter one), international GMO regulation and policy debates (chapter two), research on and regulation of GMOs in China (chapters three and four), Chinese public concern about GMO safety and the role of Chinese media in fuelling that concern (chapters five and six), and the specific case of GMO rice (chapter seven). Cao's particular emphasis, and the subtitle for the book, is on external influences in China's GMO story. Cao explains how scientists studying in the US acquired the initial skills to develop and commercialize GMO crops, but he also describes how perceived risks