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Political Control, Administrative Simplicity, or Economies of Scale? Four Cases of the Reunification of Nationalized Theatres in Russia, Germany, Austria, and France (1918–45)

In 1917–18, the new republican governments of Russia, Germany, and Austria nationalized their former court property. A monarchic-turned-national heritage of prestigious opera and dramatic theatres weighed heavily on national and regional budgets, prompting first attempts to create centralized forms of theatre governance. In a second wave of theatre reorganization in the mid-1930s, the Soviet government created 'union theatres' under a Committee for Arts Affairs; the German and Austrian theatres underwent the Nazi *Gleichschaltung* (1933–35 and 1938); and France, a 'democratic outlier', opted for nationalizing the Opéra and Opéra-Comique under the Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux. These conglomerates have so far been little studied as historically specific forms of theatre management, particularly from a comparative, trans-regime perspective. What balance can be struck between economic, political, and 'artistic' costs and benefits? How does 'Baumol's law' of decreasing theatre profitability apply to these very different politico-economic systems, as well as to war economies? Dictatorships reveal an economic seduction power, while this essay argues for confirming a long-term 'great European convergence' of state-centred theatre management, internal structure, and accountability, both in peace and war. Here, the stated goals and short-term contingencies yielded to trends originating from the logic of theatre production itself, and the compromises that the state, theatre professionals, and the public accepted in exchange for the capital of prestige. Alexander Golovlev (PhD, European University Institute in Florence, 2017) is a senior research fellow at the HSE Institute for Advanced Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at the University of Moscow. His recent publications include, for *New Theatre Quarterly*, 'Theatre Policies of Soviet Stalinism and Italian Fascism Compared, 1920–1940s' (2019), and 'Balancing the Books and Staging Operas under Duress: Bolshoi Theatre Management, Wartime Economy, and State Sponsorship in 1941–1945', *Russian History* XLVII, No. 4 (2020).

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THE INTERWAR period in European theatre history was characterized by the creation and development of four experiments of theatre reunification. These were undertaken in two stages – in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, and in the 1930s. First came the nationalization of former court theatres in Germany, Austria, and Russia, and, second, the administrative amalgamation of the National and Comic Opera under the Popular Front in Paris. All of these theatres were not only nationalized as separate houses, but they were also being reorganized under varying degrees of united governance: the Preußische Staatstheater (PST, Berlin and Kassel), the Bayerische Staatstheater (BST, Munich), the Österreichische Bundestheaterverwaltung/Staatstheater (ÖBThV/Austrian Federal Theatres Directory, Vienna), the Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux (Paris), and the Soviet '[all-]union theatres' (*teatry soiuznogo podchineniia*, Moscow and Leningrad). The two latter were

created in 1936, more than eighteen years after the PST, the BST and the ÖBThV, and the first nationalization of court theatres in Russia in 1918.

This article attempts a comparative examination of this historical phenomenon from several perspectives (comparative study being a relatively novel approach to theatres of the period in question).[1] I will first investigate the economic, political, and legal genesis of the four consortia. Here I will be interested in the role of such factors as 'path stickiness', on one hand, and short-term shocks (war and revolution), on the other. Second, I will juxtapose their development in the 1920s and 1930s, the dividing line being represented by the Great Depression and the advent of the Nazi, Austrian Corporatist (Austro-Fascist), and Stalinist regimes, counterbalanced by the (progressive left-wing) Popular Front politics in France – a liberal democracy with a market economy. To what extent was the categorization of the four respective political frameworks as totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic counterbalanced by other socio-political and economic characteristics, which would be expected to have weighed heavily on theatre structures? The Second World War will represent a survival test for national theatres, with their management being affected by the war economy, mobilization, and the resulting scarcity of resources, coupled with policies aiming to curb inflation artificially.[2]

The purview of this study will be limited by the beginning of the French *Trente Glorieuses* (1945–75) and the Cold War, which effectively brought about numerous transformations in theatre governance; developments from more contemporary periods, relatively well known from secondary literature, will of course be taken into account.[3] I will consider the resources and the (mostly state) actors who were involved – and so the goals that they had set and their immediate and mid-term outcomes, as well as the specificity of theatres as objects and subjects of cultural policies and management.[4] Did uniting several theatres affect their productions, and also their relations with professionals and their public(s)? Was it more efficient (economies of scale), or was there another rationale for regrouping several theatres, which were essentially non-commercial enterprises, under one organizational umbrella? Given the decreasing profitability of theatres due to inflation and stagnant internal labour productivity, as opposed to the national economy in general (Baumol's law), would such conglomerates be more efficient than separate forms of governance (economies of scale)?[5] How would they co-exist with other factors such as mobilization, scarcities, and repressed inflation?

Due to the limits of space of a journal article, the vast source base of my subject will have to be used sparingly.[6] The wealth of empirically based historiography in the German-speaking countries and France – and early works appearing in Russia – pre-determines the marked historiographical dimension of this essay-cum-literary-review, which will seek to build bridges between different national and linguistic traditions. No comparison can pretend to be complete, and Italy, the UK, and the USA are excluded only because of the absence of comparable consortia. However, comparative theatre studies are, in my view, a promising area from which much can be learned beyond national, or disciplinary, boundaries.

From Monarchy to Republic: The End of the Great War and First-Wave Nationalizations

As the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian monarchies were overthrown, they left the new republican states with manifold political and legal problems, economic hardship, and (more or less effective) threats of disintegration. Theatres were not in the foreground, yet they were part of a larger problem of administering former court property, and they soon presented the unsuspecting new governments with unpleasantly heavy bills. Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd (St Petersburg), and Moscow hosted representative opera and drama theatres that had served as cultural showcases and had commanded significant prestige and cultural capital but were reliant on generous state subsidies and represented an expensive heritage from a regime whose compatibility with the new republican ideals (and dire

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economic realities) was highly problematic. At first, there was little or no specific legislation on theatre governance (one, fairly vague, decree issued by the Bolsheviks hardly counted).[7] Equally, there is little archival documentation from 1917–19 addressing the specific issues involved in theatre administration: directors were mostly left to their own devices in assuring the survival of their institutions.

Russia, where revolution occurred first, saw the Provisional Government creating a first theatre directory (*teatral'noe upravlenie*) under F. Batiushkov.[8] Charged with supervising the Mariinsky and the Bolshoi in Petrograd and Moscow, he saw only a few directives and even fewer resources put at his disposal. Even so, productions, while significantly reduced, were never entirely discontinued. Upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks promised to run full seasons and keep the personnel in place.[9] While the former Imperial Theatres showed outward and, at best, lukewarm allegiance to the new regime, Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first (and sympathetic) People's Commissar of Enlightenment, could do little to shield them from economic hardship.[10] Bold declarations of the newly created Theatre and Music Departments were all but meaningless, as avant-gardist experiments were mostly confined to smaller drama theatres (Mayakovsky and the futurists) which were easier to run and required less investment in human, financial, and material capital.[11]

War, communism and hyperinflation, combined with the changing situation on the front line, severely impacted the stability of supply lines and decimated the purchasing power of the Moscow and Petrograd population.[12] Lunacharsky and such of his subordinates as Ekaterina Malinovskaia, the last prominent (and still the only female) director of the Bolshoi before Nikolai Chulaki in the 1960s, did not design a policy for creating a distinctively socialist (or Bolshevik) opera theatre, despite later claims to the contrary.[13] Attempts to run the Bolshoi and other houses in a money-free barter (or other 'socialist exchange') were either not seriously undertaken, or quickly failed. After all, in what tangible 'kind' could opera theatres repay their suppliers?

Unlike their counterparts abroad, the largest Soviet theatres in Moscow and Petrograd immediately faced the existential threat of dismantlement. In 1919, Lenin himself called off a commission charged with examining the theatres' closure (due to lack of fuel), appearing as a *deus ex machina* and thereby strengthening his position of power against both Lunacharsky and the ultra-leftist opposition.[14] A second round of manoeuvres took place in 1921–22 during the transition from war communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP).[15] Historians have debated whether this onslaught was conditioned by the stated goal of cutting state expenditure or by the need to curtail the independent remit of power held by Narkompros (run by Lunacharsky) while, simultaneously, reducing the former court theatres to mere beggars rather than allowing them to be confident and powerful lobbyists.[16] However, helped by Lenin's stroke, Lunacharsky and Stalin managed effectively to sabotage the Politburo decisions on a conditional closure, while again not offering any alternative to 'old-regime' theatre management practices.

The 1920s were marked by fierce debates between the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians (RAPM) and the Association for Contemporary Music (ASM), Russia's two leading musical institutions.[17] The Bolshevik regime's peaceful co-existence with the former court theatres was, nonetheless, far more problematic than in any contemporary 'bourgeois' European state in the 1920s. With the weakening of Lunacharsky's health and power, and the ascent of Stalinism, the theatre industry would face a watershed between the 1920s and the 1930s, and was propelled to the forefront of Stalin's 'conservative revolution' in the arts.[18]

Nationalization in Germany of the Prussian, Bavarian, and other court theatres, albeit far less radical, left the country with a fairly complicated administrative challenge. Unlike Russia, Austria, and (later) France, theatres in Germany were not directly subordinate to the Reich government but to separate federal states. In the best-studied case, the Prussian

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Free State administered the two Berlin opera houses: the Schillertheater (also known as the Preußisches Staatstheater) and the State Theatre in Kassel. The dire economic situation of the early Weimar Republic, compounded by the Ruhr crisis and ensuing hyperinflation in 1923, and political animosities in the Reich and Prussia, compromised the stability of state subventions.[19] Yet these were maintained, while the state left significant artistic freedom to the powerful directorate.

The *Intendant* (managing director) Heinz Tietjen embodied this tendency, and his personality would be a fixture in Berlin theatre life and historiography.[20] The federal state, the Länder, and the cities pursued an increasingly active cultural policy, aiming at culture's accessibility to growing and more diverse audiences, buttressed by tax-fuelled investments (particularly as the economy began to improve in the mid-1920s).[21] The Prussian Ministry for Science, Art, and Public Education, with the left-leaning Leo Kestenberg responsible for theatres, paid 11 million marks as late as 1929.[22] The 1929–31 economic crisis would effectively stifle an expansive (and expensive) cultural policy dominated by social democracy. Ominously, the Kroll Opera in Berlin was closed in 1930, as state subsidies were running dry.[23] The Nazis overtook a theatre industry overladen with deep structural problems in its economic model, and material stimuli – not unlike the case in the USSR – would facilitate the conscription of German theatres to the new regime's needs.

In Austria, the federal state directly overtook court property – after all, Austria's Bundesländer were much smaller than most German entities (and Austria itself was smaller than Prussia – roughly on par with Bavaria). The nationalization of former court property (*Hofärarvermögen*) on 3 April 1919 made the State Opera, the Burgtheater, and the Akademietheater, as well as the theatre at Schönbrunn, directly subordinate to the federal government (and treasury).[24] Franz Schalk led the Opera through the 1918–19 season, premiering Hans Pfitzner's *Palestrina* and Richard Strauss's *Die Frau ohne Schatten*.[25] Schalk and Strauss marked one of the Opera's most successful and well-studied directorships during the First Republic, both artistically and financially.[26] Yet foreign debt and relative poverty pushed Austria towards austerity, which was fully borne out after the Great Depression and the establishment of the corporatist ('Austro-Fascist') dictatorship.

France, victorious in the First World War (even if its economy was severely damaged by four years of warfare and the occupation of its north-eastern *départements*), saw the Third Republic unchallenged, and, with it, the old system of *directeurs-entrepreneurs* who managed separate theatres under a *cahier des charges* (which essentially stipulated the terms under which state subvention was conceded).[27] Such an extension of the operatic nineteenth century (future unification would not directly include dramatic theatre), together with a subvention that was voted for by parliament and was dependent on it, repeatedly brought up the issue of opera's compatibility with a democratic, republican, cultural-political outlook.[28]

No less importantly, personal continuities prevailed through the years of the Third Republic and Vichy. For instance, Jacques Rouché, director of the Paris Opera since 1914, reigned supreme until 1944 (and the *épuration* process: that is, the criminal prosecution of collaborators with the Nazi German regime).[29] As a fixture of French cultural life, he commanded an authority arguably superior to that of many prime ministers. The *Opéra* ballet, now headed by Serge Lifar, was only part of the artistic innovations visible in Paris, and until the Great Depression, opera lived through an economically and culturally vigorous era. The effective watershed between the 'golden age' of opera and the turbulent twentieth century was imminent as growing deficits would cause Rouché to resort to his private purse and, ultimately, to lobby for all-out nationalization. Unlike totalitarian states, the Third Republic showed typological parallels with the energetic cultural policies of German and Austrian social democracy, a dynamic distorted by war and Occupation.[30]

The 'pre-totalitarian' theatre in Russia, Germany, and Austria, and the concession governance in France, essentially constituted

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a transition period in theatre administration between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. From Bolshevik brinkmanship to the more conventional, social-democratic nationalizations in Berlin and Vienna, and through the last pre-unification years in Paris, theatre, both sung and spoken, regained organizational stability and continued to draw heavily on the state treasury. Returns to the 'old' normal were, in effect, more typical than radical ruptures, as no theatre revolutions materialized in the wake of the First World War. United governance was rather a means of administrative convenience, and a symptom of path dependence, rather than an attempt at a genuine transition.

Between Democracy and Dictatorship: The 1930s at the Theatres

The Great Depression and the downfall of democracies in Central Europe, combined with the crystallization of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, represented a radical shift in state theatres' political and, in part, economic position. Rising unemployment and inflation hit opera audiences, creating internal tensions both within individual houses and national cultural industries. In France, the financial situation of Parisian theatres became untenable, signifying the downfall of nineteenth-century theatre governance practices. This provided fertile ground for collaboration with non-democratic regimes.

The meting out of punishment and privilege, and ultimately the domestication of Soviet musicians as a professional body, marked the consolidation of Stalinism in the USSR.[31] Cross-totalitarian parallels are indeed ambiguous. The year 1932 marked the totalitarian control of Soviet artistic professions and the transition to socialist realism (in Katerina Clark's now universally accepted view).[32] Patriotic, pseudo-folk songs, effectively undermining the classic 'high-art' definition within a monotone production of the Union of Soviet Composers, and the creation of Soviet opera, 'a priority for the remainder of the Stalinist era' since 1936, were its key measures.[33] The qualities of socialist realism ('ideological correctness . . . realism, nationalism . . . popular appeal, technical mastery, and innovation', as listed by Dmitry Kabalevsky)[34] were both natural and problematic for the theatre, and opera in particular, as conservatism and the glorification of the Russian past, with increasingly explicitly nationalistic undertones, brought classical music to the fore.[35] Between enlightenment, nationalism, and imperialism, the Soviet state offered the artistic profession an impossible, and potentially deadly, conundrum: conformism to an unpredictable party line.[36] While contemporary (spoken) theatre languished, opera houses flourished – in exchange for loyalty.[37] Here, the union theatres would naturally play a prominent, although potentially perilous, role.[38]

Organizationally, the 1930s departed from the 1920s. The state effectively stepped up its financial commitment and, with the introduction of five-year plans in 1929, theatre accountability saw a greater degree of stability. The Soviet government assumed direct responsibility for running the country's main theatres after 1930, as the Bolshoi and the Moscow Academic Theatre (MKhAT) responded directly to a commission under Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Avel Enukidze, bypassing the Narkompros (run, after Lunacharsky, by Andrei Bubnov, who would be executed during the Great Terror).[39]

The fallout from Dmitry Shostakovich's *Lady Macbeth of Mtensk* at the Bolshoi (January 1936), and, tangentially, the disgrace of the previously powerful head of the All-Union Central Electoral Commission (VTsIK) Avel Enukidze, were a serious threat to the Soviet artistic world. There ensued the creation of a proto-ministry of culture in the USSR: the Committee for Arts Affairs (*Komitet po delam iskusstv*, or KDI), which comprised a directory for theatres (*Glavnoe upravlenie teatra*).[40] This department was directly charged with fourteen of the most important theatres in Moscow and Leningrad (now officially termed *teatry soiuznogo podchineniia*), channelling growing state subventions and exercising oversight, via republican and regional subordinates, over all Soviet theatres.

The stick of discipline and the carrot of growing subsidy simultaneously meant

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relative economic stability (the Bolshoi's subsidies more than doubled between 1929 and 1941, for example), together with the repression of artistic freedoms.[41] As in Germany, artists responded with declarations of loyalty; characteristically, every single major failure of 'Soviet opera' after Shostakovich befell a work intended to glorify (and to be representative of operatic) Stalinism – including Muradeli's *The Great Friendship* (1948) and Zhukovsky's *With All One's Heart* (1951).[42] Unlike in Germany and France, Soviet theatres were largely deprived of autonomy, and the 'union' theatres became a mere appendage of the ideological party-state apparatus. There was a darker and little-noted privilege, too. Repressions – such as the arrest and execution of Vsevolod Meyerhold – were not typical for opera theatres: the Bolshoi, staging *Lady Macbeth of Mtensk*, *The Great Friendship*, and *With All One's Heart*, was spared the shootings and the Gulag, and the union theatres remained privileged, and relatively safe, workplaces.

Conversely, German theatre conglomerates were hit by economic crisis and political instability, which, in their case, sounded the death knell for the Weimar Republic. In 1931–33, the Berlin theatre landscape underwent a seismic shift, when the Krolloper was closed, and the two remaining opera houses – the Lindenoper and Charlottenburg – pushed towards a closer unification, amidst greater instability at the highest management level.[43] The Nazi seizure of power (*Machtergreifung*) was followed by a wave of 'semi-legal' resignations and exile.[44] Yet it meant not only the mechanical Nazification and 'coordination' (*Gleichschaltung*) of all cultural institutions but also a new – problematic – field of opportunities for aspiring careerists. Germany's theatre studies (*Theaterwissenschaft*) was a telling example of a discipline's willingness to adapt to, and collaborate with, the new regime.[45] At the same time, the Nazis could not dismiss the results of the previous budgetary increases resulting from democratic cultural policies.[46] Inspired by Italian Fascism – although less so in practical governance, which starkly diverged from the decentralized Italian model – the Nazis sought to conscript Germany's theatres into projecting the prestige and supremacy of drama and ('most German of the arts') music, both within and beyond Germany.

Institutional history has provided important models for understanding German theatres, and the theatre groups in question. The Propaganda Ministry de facto directly supervised opera in Charlottenburg, or 'Goebbels-Oper', Goebbels equally being the political official (Gauleiter) governing Berlin.[47] Goebbels's propaganda empire carried additional weight, firstly via the Reichsdramaturg Dr Richard Schlösser; secondly via the chief responsible for music, Hans Drewes; and thirdly, via two professional departments – the Reichstheaterkammer and the Reichsmusikkammer.[48] Yet, as Adam Steinweis has noted, the *Gleichschaltung* did not bring about the financial security that many artists desired. Equally, the Nazi Parteistaat would not, despite voluminous bureaucratic correspondence, prove to be an all-encompassing instrument of controlling theatre life throughout the Reich.[49]

'Göring contra Goebbels' has been a focal point for much secondary literature,[50] since, after the demolition of parliamentary democracy, money and power were concentrated in the hands of competing Nazi functionaries (and not democratic bodies, or private donors *à l'américaine*). What did that specifically mean for theatre conglomerates? As the Prussian Theatre Committee (Preußischer Theaterausschuss) took shape, almost simultaneously with a Supreme Theatre Body for Bavaria (Oberste Theaterbehörde für Bayern) in 1935, Hermann Göring (Prussian Ministerpräsident) was appointed to the Staatstheater's artistic directory.[51]

Moreover, Adolf Hitler himself intervened in Berlin, Munich, and (later) Vienna.[52] Moving the increasingly powerful Clemens Krauss to Munich in 1937, Hitler personally supervised architectural renovation plans for the Bavarian State Opera, which he admired, making sure that a staggering 25 million RM were made available for his 'gigantomaniac' visions.[53] For their part, the consolidated Berlin opera houses would quickly seize the opportunity to reap a pecuniary harvest from the bosses' competition.[54] As elsewhere in

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Nazi polycracy, governance practices from above and lobbying from below brought initial turbulence but also new opportunities for the state theatres, opportunities from which these bastions of privilege effectively emerged both wealthier and into a stronger bargaining position. (As we will see below, this was a key difference from Stalinism.)

Stark internal hierarchies marked the social outlook of the German artistic world. Despite Nazi diatribes against the 'star system', the well known – and usually amenable – conductors and theatre directors enjoyed a lifestyle that had little in common with choir members or working-class professions.[55] The largely illusory *Volksgemeinschaft* ('people's community') gave way to maintaining the traditional social order, in the absence of trade unions, dissolved in favour of the Fachschaft Bühne ('Association of Stage Professionals') – a trait held in common with Italian corporatism).[56] 'Gentiles' often profited from the expulsion of their Jewish, or politically undesirable, colleagues.[57] Within these limits, the grand theatres of Berlin and Heinz Tietjen spectacularly built their power and standing, and developed relatively autonomous personnel and repertoire policies.[58] Intensive contacts between the state theatres in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and (later) Vienna, regulated by a 1937 agreement, played an important part in the internal negotiations within the musical profession (with no such parallels in the USSR).[59] The Bavarian State Opera, for example, kept meticulous records of price policies in Berlin and Vienna, whilst it was incessantly – and successfully – lobbying for gradual price increases in the late 1930s and well into the war.[60]

What of the repertoires of German theatres? As long as the plays and music on offer were not 'Jewish' or clearly opposed to the Nazi *völkisch* ideology (such as Ernst Křenek's *Jonny spielt auf*, attacked at the 1938 'Degenerate Music' exhibition), little direct guidance was given on what to stage: Nazi censorship was only slowly, and rather inconsistently, asserting its power over German theatre productions.[61] Boguslav Drewniak, Joseph Wulf, and (the Austrian perspective) Manfred Stoy convincingly show that German repertoires had remained fairly conventional.[62] Major theatre empires in Berlin and Munich were probably even more conservative than an average, less privileged, theatre. The absence of successful Nazi operas or drama, rivalries at the top, the persecution of Jews, the wealthy stars, and powerful directors all turned the state theatres in Prussia and Bavaria into uncomfortably natural bedfellows of fascism.

In Austria, the abolition of parliamentary democracy in 1933 subjected Austrian society to a clerical dictatorship that bore many elements of fascism, looking rather to the Italian model than to Hitler's racially defined *Volksgemeinschaft*. 'The better German state' explicitly opposed Nazi radicalism and outlawed the National-Socialist Party after a failed putsch in 1934 (Herbert von Karajan was a party member). Loyalty to the new regime was at the core of the activities of the Theaterreferat of Neues Leben, a satellite organization of Austria's single party, the Vaterländische Front.[63] Yet conservative, nationalist, and anti-Semitic elements, both from above and below, created a favourable terrain for the future Nazi takeover, and Nazi infiltration of Austria's musical profession worked towards luring the Bundestheater into Hitler's camp. On the other hand, the Austrian state had pursued a conservative, deflationist budgetary policy, which meant that subsidies towards the Federal Theatre Directory were hardly generous.[64] This fiscal austerity, in an economy that was structurally weaker than Germany's, resulted in, on the one hand, a greater attraction towards Nazism, and, on the other, a quiet slide towards authoritarian practices within the theatres, all of which effectively made the transition to Nazi totalitarianism relatively unproblematic.[65]

And the Nazis acted quickly. The post-Anschluss laws on the mandatory investigation into the cultural departments came into force in June 1938.[66] The newly pronounced 'judenrein' ('free from Jews') Austrian Staatstheater under Alfred von Eckmann (active since 1933) were promoted to the ranks of 'Reich' theatres.[67] This entailed significant pay rises for large parts of the personnel.[68] Reich subventions (*Reichszuschuss*) were

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swiftly doubled before the war, passing from 2 to 4 million RM for the State Opera, and from 1.2 to 2.6 million RM for the Burgtheater.[69] Moving the *Reichstheaterwoche* to Vienna, and later renovation works, equally meant that the Viennese theatres asked for – and obtained – more money.[70]

Furthermore, Austria's full integration into the Reich meant the introduction of Nazi polycracy. While Clemens Krauss in Munich obtained power and money directly from Hitler, Goebbels installed his protégé Heinrich K. Strohm at the (Viennese) Staatsoper, replacing director Erwin Kerber.[71] Local *Gauleiter* were no less keen to develop their own agency: after Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Joseph Bürckel (from the Saarland), Baldur von Schirach energetically took to promoting 'his' court theatres. He adopted Göring's title of Oberster Chef der Staatstheater, appointed a native Austrian, Karl Böhm, as Director of the Opera, and played with the notions of Vienna's cultural grandeur and its specific mission in the 'German South-East' and Central Europe.[72] Yet theatres were not the sole beneficiaries of polycracy in German Austria, as well as in the 'Altreich'. Hitler, like Mussolini, kept for himself the power of choice, presiding over interdepartmental animosities, while the Nazi regime bought the Bundes/Staatstheater allegiance with massive financial injections and new career opportunities.

In France, the only democratic outlier among major continental European opera markets, 1936 marks the start of parliamentary negotiations for joint nationalization of the most prestigious Parisian theatres,[73] culminating in the January 1939 law on the RTLN.[74] The last years of the concessionary regime had seen a rapid decline in theatres' economic performance and growing deficits.[75] Coupled with Rouché's now desperate lobbying, this paved the way for a state takeover. What came next was hardly surprising. Immediately, the subventions took off, arriving at 17 million francs for 1939 (several times as much as the mid-1920s level).[76] However, as the RTLN did not start taking shape before the transition to the war economy, it is difficult to estimate its short-term outcomes; and, indeed, the erstwhile democratic practices of full state governance do not elicit the same spectacular dynamics as in (totalitarian) Germany and the USSR. The copious correspondence between Rouché and state authorities suggests that the government foresaw an important increase in expenditure, yet would push for achieving better end-of-year balances due to centralized governance and economies of scale. None of these was to materialize before the war and the installation of the Vichy regime.

Reunited Theatres and War: Bare Survival or Pursuit of Benefits?

How could war have an impact on the theatre complex? First, mobilization measures undertaken by national governments would obviously impede a theatre's normal functioning. Conversely, theatres could be conscripted as part of the war effort and thus preserve their functional integrity. Second, the war economy introduced shortages of personnel, money, and materials. Third, warfare and occupation displaced theatres or forced them to adapt to an occupying power. How did theatre unions withstand the war's stress-test in Greater Germany, the USSR, and France? No government contemplated abandoning its prestigious theatres (whereas hesitations had been voiced during the First World War). France and Germany in 1939 and the USSR in 1941 issued nearly identical instructions to the effect that staging theatre productions should be continued to prop up morale. Artists were expected to contribute to cultural programmes for the troops as well as perform at home, which counted as a form of mobilization within the war effort. No immediate budgetary cuts were considered, and in the Second World War the theatre benefited from far greater stability than in 1914–18.

Soviet Stalinism arguably made the best attempt at effectively using its union theatres for the war effort and propaganda, and at achieving good cost-benefit results – a process that has received relatively little scholarly attention.[77] A highly mobilized, militarized Soviet war economy, where the command and redistribution machine of the dictatorial state would not face any opposition, defined

the theatre industry.[78] Yet subventions and administrative support came in. The Bolshoi (which did not even have an appointed director in 1941) was partly evacuated to Kuibyshev, together with the government.[79] Other theatres were equally partitioned between their traditional stages and evacuation sites in Siberia and Central Asia.[80] In addition, the GUT union theatres directory was charged with supervising evacuated Ukrainian theatres – de facto creating an ephemeral 'conglomerate'.

Within the union theatres, as well as elsewhere, opera still weighed most. Even here, because of mobilizations, the number of Bolshoi personnel was reduced from over 2,000 to 1,744 in 1942–43, including adolescents recruited locally in the place of mobilized workers, and the Kirov (Mariinsky Theatre) employed just over one thousand. Premieres were simply abolished, stage decorations reduced to a minimum, artists performed in front line brigades (and more famous artists sought opportunities to give additional concerts elsewhere for extra pay). Under these circumstances, the country's largest theatre, the Bolshoi, managed to cover more than half of its expenses through ticket-sales-generated income. (Other theatres show varying statistics.) However, part of the Bolshoi remained in Moscow (as well as Stalin and the head of the Committee for Arts Affairs, Mikhail Khrapchenko), and the building was damaged by a bomb in late 1941. The state rushed to restore the Bolshoi's historic facade, and theatre personnel were ordered back to the capital as soon as the Wehrmacht was decisively pushed back in the spring of 1942.

From then on, state subsidies went up (in all likelihood concomitantly with inflation). By 1945, Moscow union theatres were in much better shape compared to 1941–42. A full restoration of theatre life in Leningrad was contingent on Soviet victories in 1943–44, when the blockade was lifted. Authorities, however, found it difficult to manage theatres on a centralized basis just when these were being moved across the USSR, often in chaotic circumstances, yet the KDI documentation shows a degree of simplification and centralization in financial decision-making, for example, with regular comparative statistical tables serving as KDI's (and theatre departments') instruments of power and oversight.

The union theatres, however conscripted and forcibly 'optimized', fared much better than the Soviet population.[81] Simultaneously, a war-conditioned liberalization of cultural policies brought temporary respite for the musical profession.[82] State support was, nevertheless, mitigated by inflation, labour, and material shortages, which significantly distorted the classic 'Baumol equation', even within a 'state-socialist' Soviet economy.[83]

German theatres, for their part, successfully obtained funds for productions and even for a number of premieres.[84] Hitler personally wished that the German arts would flourish under all circumstances. Vienna and Berlin topped the list of subventions in absolute terms, while Munich 'achieved' the lowest profitability (own income-to-subsidy) ratio. Within and without the Reich theatres, expenditure was growing, yet slower than income, which resulted in a reasonably favourable economic statistic.[85] Powerful directors in Berlin, Munich, and Vienna vied for stars and staged expensive premieres, and all theatre consortia were heavily invested in the regime's propaganda measures, such as guest tours or festivities. The Reichstheaterkammer and the Propaganda Ministry tried to de-escalate rising tensions between the wealthy imperial theatres and the provincial 'rest'. However, the proposed '*Gagenstop*', which was meant to curtail artistic mobility and 'voice-drain' towards the wealthy Reich Theatres which offered better salaries, was quickly scuttled by the big houses' resistance.[86]

At first, state support held firm in the face of war adversities. The destruction of the State Opera in Berlin in April 1941 by a bomb, with Germany still at the apex of its military might, prompted an immediate visit by Goebbels (who forbade all photographing).[87] Next came a subvention for reconstruction and modernization (upon Hitler's personal order), ensuring that the Opera would continuously play after autumn 1941.[88] In May, the Berlin Staatsoper went to Paris to perform Wagner, staging a unique form of direct collaboration

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between the PST and the RTLN under the aegis of German artistic propaganda.[89] However, after the Bavarian State Opera fell victim to Allied bombs in October 1943, its reconstruction was protracted well into the Federal Republic's years.

Vienna, initially spared by Allied bombers, became an ever more attractive place for German artists. Yet with the war tide turning against Germany, even the Viennese state theatres were forced to improve their income-to-expenditure ratio, and subventions were under threat of reduction starting with 1942–43.[90] War shortages, evident already in early 1940 with the introduction of stringent rules on distribution of iron, leather, soap, coal, and fuel, started to disrupt theatre activities from 1942, when the first closures were ordered for cold winter days.[91] In addition, von Schirach's credit in Berlin was continually weakening from 1942,[92] which did not bode well for the Staatstheater and their bargaining position.

Next to material resources, theatres in Germany and elsewhere also battled for their (male and able-bodied) stage workers and, to an increasing degree, artists, whom the Wehrmacht would try to conscript as the war wore on. Nonetheless, the Deutsche Bühnenjahrbüche show an actual increase of listed personnel between January 1939 and 1944: 1,113 and 1,005 for Vienna and Berlin in 1939, and, respectively, 1,247 and 1,448 for 1944.[93] This did not happen in France or the USSR, where theatres reported contractions by up to a quarter. The *uk-Stellungen*[94] occupied by now a large part of administrative archives, and the Gottbegnadeten-Liste of most talented artists became a key instrument of Adolf Hitler's personal power.[95] Total mobilization started in the autumn of 1944, when theatres were closed, although some houses, with Goebbels's support, found ways to keep a minimal level of artistic activity – symphony concerts, for instance.[96]

For France, the war brought about two very significant shifts: first, between the *drôle de guerre* during the last months of the Third Republic and the Armistice; second – after the total occupation in 1942 – the Libération of 1944, which introduced the *épuration* measures. All political regimes were, however, committed to the RTLN. In 1939–40, its budgets were not slashed, as the theatres were expected to resume normal activities with the 1939–40 season (unlike the previous closure in 1914).[97] Salary cuts (of up to 25 per cent) were introduced as the houses' only form of financial sacrifice for the war effort.[98] The German offensive of the summer of 1940 would dramatically reverse the situation: part of the Opéra ballet had gone on a tour to Spain, its director (Rouché) escaped Paris for Cahors, and the documentation of financial services, as well as theatre property, was scattered on the railways.[99]

Despite the general chaos, the Vichy government immediately reinstated the RTLN. This followed the contradictory dynamic of the 'National Revolution', where a convergence of mostly right-wing and anti-democratic elites resulted in a 'revolutionary' yet ultimately anti-republican and collaborationist project which would conscript the 'undefeated' French culture.[100] After Serge Lifar's short interregnum – he had established personal connections with the German Occupation administration – Rouché returned to Paris.[101] Subventions were guaranteed, paid mostly by Vichy and co-sponsored by the Germans for propaganda events.[102] Theatres manifestly needed state support. The immediate price for that was at least twofold. Rouché diligently applied the anti-Semitic legislation introduced by Pétain, and Vichy functionaries continually eroded the director's position of power (although not to the extent of the Soviet theatres). On the other hand, the forced financial controls and rationalization measures of Vichy, combined with Germany's siphoning off of French resources, created an objectively unfavourable conjuncture, offset only by the government's preferential treatment of the RTLN.[103]

Theatres in Paris, like Germany and (as far as premieres were concerned) unlike the Soviet Union, pursued an active performing policy, buoyed by a very high demand for culture and entertainment during the *années noires*. Material shortages, nevertheless, became a serious issue from 1941–42. State subventions were still coming in, and

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discounted tickets for German officers were being quietly compensated by Vichy, based on RTLN's own (one has to suspect, liberal) estimates. Artistic collaboration en masse became a major political problem after the Liberation.[104] It prompted legal processes and social condemnation (Alfred Cortot or Serge Lifar), as resistance was confined to parts of the orchestra and working departments (the famous *électriciens* who supervised the then-cutting-edge electrical appliances of the Opéra's stage, an earlier Rouché innovation).[105]

1944–45 brought about three significantly diverging trajectories for theatres in Germany, France, and the USSR. Von Schirach and Göring were losing their power to Goebbels.[106] Material conditions worsened dramatically during the 'total' war, the forceful closing of theatres (*Theatersperre*), and the imminent economic and military collapse. During the final battles of 1945, the Bavarians only occasionally performed at the Prinzregententheater, and the opera houses of Berlin and Vienna were in flames. In liberated Paris, economic scarcities were matched by a highly controversial *épuration*, which brought forward the ambivalent role of the nation's representative theatres under German and Vichy rule (Serge Lifar was sacked, and Rouché forced into an honourable retirement). In the USSR, to the contrary, the politically anaemic union theatres prospered as economic and cultural institutions, propped up by generous state funding and wartime political liberalism.

These short-term divergences do not reveal important structural differences in managing the four theatre conglomerates. In a war economy, privileged theatres could fend off difficulties with reasonable ease and seek privilege through proximity to power, given the guaranteed public presence (normally full houses) and, thus, income. Their exact forms of organization were secondary, subject to the balance of political interests of the state, and to the situation on the front and in the hinterland.

Coda: Diverging Paths After the War?

After the war, large conglomerates tended to die a quiet (and often protracted) death. The division of Berlin and the abolition of the Prussian state did away with the Prussian state theatres as an organizational entity. The Berlin State Opera, finding itself in the eastern sector, was run under a special commission of the People's Education Ministry of the later GDR (Ministerium für Volksbildung, Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten, Division Darstellende Kunst), which preferred individual, ministry-level governance to theatre conglomerates.[107] Competition with the western sectors of 'Greater Berlin' became a major economic problem following the Erhard reform of 1948 (until the Berlin Wall terminated the free flow of artistic and technical personnel).[108] In Munich and Vienna, large-scale reconstruction work on the destroyed opera houses took years before they would become operational again.

The Soviet Union continued running its federal theatres, albeit with separate accountability and loosening centralization under direct supervision from Moscow, both until and after 1952, when the Culture Ministry replaced the Committee for Arts Affairs.[109] In France, the RTLN survived the first postwar decade and its inflation, yet the absence of any quantitative improvement of performances in its two opera houses under the state's *tutelle embarrassée* led to its gradual abandonment between 1971 and 1978, and the final independence of the Opéra-Comique in 1990. Austria displays more continuity, with the Bundestheaterverwaltung reinstated in 1945, then reformed in 1971 and, in a major shift, in 1998, when it was replaced by the Bundestheater-Holding.[110]

However, the period following Austria's adhesion to the EU, and the centre-right push towards management practices imported from the private sector, has not led to a qualitative change in the theatres' governance. Likewise, the Parisian Opera's relatively favourable performance figures are mostly explained by the opening of the new Opéra Bastille (with its larger capacity and superior technical characteristics) and, as the literature suggests, by the successful managerial policies of Hugues Galles.[111] Contemporary Russia has not envisaged comprehensive theatre reforms (apart from a few Yeltsin

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decrees). Ultimately, the theatre unions in question proved to be only moderately effective, if at all, and remained a historically specific creation of the interwar period when theatres tried to combat a worsening economic conjuncture, and states were prepared to play a more active part in both the economy and culture. Liberal ('capitalist') democracy, communism, and fascism were less stable than the 'deep theatre' underlying various reorganizations, and the often-cited technical constraints of the theatre industry that have impeded attempts at reform.

Conclusion

The four cases of theatre reunification in Russia, Austria, Germany, and France, while not identical in size, composition, or spatial distribution, arguably have one common denominator. Their presumed objectives (cutting costs) were not fulfilled, and the state, more or less reluctantly, assumed an ever more onerous financial burden in the face of almost cosmetic organizational change and the continued domination of opera.[112] Conversely, national – and, in Germany, regional – governments conscripted these prestigious houses for political representation (and propaganda) purposes, and they exercised power over top management as well as, albeit to a lesser extent, repertoire choices. Yet theatres were not only the victims but also the beneficiaries of dictatorship, as they actively sought political patronage and lobbied for their interests in exchange for loyalty. The differences between democratic and dictatorial regimes were conditioned by the absence of parliamentary mechanisms, the growing role of the head of state and high-ranking functionaries, and their rivalries. The common economic imperative of decreasing profitability met the states' preparedness to run extensive cultural policies. And uniting theatres was not the only answer: in Italy, Mussolini successfully pursued a *divide et impera* policy to instil obedience.[113]

Stalinism demonstrates the largest degree of unity and (short-term) efficiency in subordinating theatres and achieving good economic performance statistics, as neither the Committee for Arts Affairs nor the union of theatres in Moscow and Leningrad displayed independent political leadership and agency, and the theatres' balance sheets looked better than in Germany, Austria, and France. In contrast, Germany was the stage of competition between Goebbels and Göring, and the dexterous manoeuvres of aspiring Gauleiters outside Berlin, drawing a very different picture from the Soviet one. Thus, the Bavarian theatres drew advantages from Munich's status as the 'capital of the movement' (often at the City of Munich's expense), and Baldur von Schirach played the role of a local prince-patron promoting 'his' court theatres. However, being located outside a 'capital' city, whether it was Berlin, Munich, or Vienna, would render a theatre politically insignificant and struggling to compete for resources, as the Staatstheater in Kassel had to learn. This structure of patronage networks distinguished Germany from the Soviet Union and fascist Italy and, to an extent, from Paris-centric France.

What, then, distinguishes democracy, socialism, and fascism? While zeitgeist ideas from Cold War studies might suggest that democracy is beneficial for the development of the arts,[114] theatre directors and artists were willingly accommodating their interests to dictators, not least because autocratic and totalitarian regimes usually arrived with huge additional subventions. However, the dictatorial state had little interest or competence in day-to-day repertoire policies and economic management. As 'socialist realism' or any form of 'socialist' governance remained an unresolved enigma for the Bolshoi, starting with the October Revolution – with both of its attempts to stage an exemplary Soviet opera dramatically failing in 1936 and 1948 (with no real consequences for the house itself) – German theatre directors in Berlin, Vienna, and elsewhere had only to ensure the Germano-centricity and the absence of Jews in their programmes (as no 'Nazi' repertoire was likely to emerge). For the rest, they ran the balance sheet according to conventional methods and absorbed growing local and Reich subventions.

Economically, dictatorship was beneficial for theatres, turning them into bastions of loyalism. On the personnel level, and in the obvious presence of the star system, the Bolshoi artists were unlikely to face repressions, and only a few non-Jews (for example, communists) fled Nazi Germany, with the absolute majority of 'gentile' German musicians refusing to follow Toscanini's example of going into exile. Likewise, the transition from the Third Republic to Vichy was a smooth one for the RTLN's non-Jewish personnel: the RTLN became a prominent locus of Franco-German collaboration.

The war economy, which profoundly twisted the standard Baumol model, had in itself contradictory consequences for the theatres. Repressed inflation, material shortages, and personnel mobilizations hit all houses. Nonetheless, no significant economies of scale or rationalization measures at the conglomerates' level could be achieved (undermining their very goal). Both public affluence and state subventions remained very high; those in power and/or in possession of tickets remained faithful to their theatres. The Soviet state could boast the (numerically) best economic performance statistics, at the price of cutting premieres and new productions, and reusing old stage materials.

The RTLN led a relatively lavish existence in wartime Paris, although it had to accommodate to the usual plagues of wartime cities: difficulties, for instance, in procuring anything, starting with fuel, through (artificially) stifled markets or via the sprawling state rationing machinery. The German theatres, too, were subject to rationalization measures, which degenerated into lengthy bureaucratic processes and the continuous struggle for *uk-Stellungen* (that is, being classified as 'irreplaceable'). In the continuation of peacetime governance patterns, Berlin, Munich, and Vienna commanded significant financial resources and used these in unequal competition with poorer and less powerful regional theatres, prompting the Reichstheaterkammer to issue repeated, and ultimately toothless, admonitions. The Reich/union theatres' top position on the priority list was further evidenced by the two bombings of the Staatsoper unter den Linden in April and the Bolshoi in November 1941. Despite the front-line situation being opposite for Germany and the USSR, the immediate reaction was identical: allocation of all resources needed a speedy reconstruction. (The tide of war had changed, making this impossible in Munich two years later.) It is not implausible to suggest that Vichy would have proceeded in the same way, probably with some help from the Occupation authorities.

The years 1943–44 were the beginning of the end for Nazi support lines, culminating in the *Theatersperre* which had similar consequences in Berlin and Vienna, concurrently with Baldur von Schirach's, and later Göring's, loss of power in favour of the RMVP. Soviet theatres underwent an opposing dynamic, and the RTLN, while subject to *épuration*, survived the Provisional Government period with no damage to its economic interests, as far as they could be assured in France during 1944–47. In all cases, the state demonstrated resolute commitment both to theatres themselves and the conglomerates under examination, and all of them survived 1945, while typically, and quietly, withering away later (with the Austrian exception), as economies of scale would hardly materialize, which was not the case within separate houses. The *non-lieu* of substantial change and the long-term traction of the 'European convergence' remain a salient feature of all theatres, beyond the dictatorship/democracy and fascism/communism/liberal capitalism divides, and even the shocks of war did not invert the tendency.

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36. See Pauline Fairclough, 'From Enlightened to Sublime: Musical Life under Stalin, 1930–1948', in *Russian Music Since 1917*, ed. Patrick Zuk and Marina Frolova-Walker, p. 148–63.

37. See Marina Frolova-Walker, *Russian Music and Nationalism from Glinka to Stalin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

38. Ekaterina [Yekaterina] Vlasova, 'Stalinskoe rukovodstvo Bol'shim teatrom', *Otkrytyi tekst* 2013, <http://www.opentextnn.ru/music/epoch%20/XX/index.html@id=4768>.

39. Vlasova, 'Stalinist Opera', p. 165–67.

40. See 'Postanovlenie Politburo TsK VKP(b). Ob organizatsii vsesoiuznogo Komiteta po delam iskusstv', in *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia*, p. 281; 'Polozhenie o Komitete po delam iskusstv pri Sovnarkome Soiuza SSR, 25 September 1936', in *Spravochnik rukovodiashchikh materialov Komiteta po delam iskusstv pri SNK Soiuza SSR* (Moscow; Leningrad: Iskusstvo, 1941), p. 5–12; and Nataliia L. Golovkina, 'Sozdanie i deiatel'nost' Komiteta po delam iskusstv SSSR (vtoraia polovina 30-kh gg. XX v.)', in *Istoriki razmyshliaiut*, VI (2003), p. 28–38.

41. There is no clear evidence that Stalin had detailed knowledge of contemporary German and Italian theatres, or referred to any foreign examples at all.

42. See Vlasova, 'Stalinist Opera', p. 167–87.

43. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 123.

44. Eicher *et al*., *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 14. Oliver Rathkolb estimates the percentage of (spoken) theatre artists who had to leave Germany at less than those in other arts (*Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 22). The expulsion of Bruno Walter and Erich Kleiber, among others, was nevertheless a significant qualitative loss to German musical theatre.

45. Laurence Senelick, 'The Nazi Occupation of *Theaterwissenschaft*', *New Theatre Quarterly*, XXXVII, No. 4 (November 2021), p. 365–75.

46. See Thomas Höpel, 'Geschichte der Kulturpolitik in Europa: vom nationalen zum europäischen Modell', in Matthias Middell, ed., *Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Festschrift für Hannes Siegrist zum 60. Geburtstag* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), p. 189–91.

47. Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 13–16; Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 190–1.

48. Boguslav Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat: Szenarium deutscher Zeitgeschichte 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1983), p. 16–17; Eicher *et al*., *Theater im 'Dritten*

Reich', p. 23–4; Johanna Mertinz, 'Die Kulturpolitik des Nationalsozialismus und ihre Auswirkungen auf die österreichische Theaterkunst' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Universität für Musik und Darstellende Kunst Vienna, 2017), p. 148–9. Richard Strauss's lifelong struggle for authors' rights, combined with his undoubted, if naive, opportunism, ensured that composers would for the first time receive fixed royalties for performances of their work (an important factor for the theatres' balance sheets).

49. Alan E. Steinweis, *Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theatre, and the Visual Arts* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). See also Michael Meyer, *The Politics of Music in the Third Reich* (New York: Berghahn, 1993), Michael Kater, *Twisted Muse: Musicians and their Music in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Brigitte Darlinger and Veronika Zangl, eds., *Theater unter NS-Herrschaft: Theater under Pressure* (Göttingen: V&R & Vienna University Press, 2018).

50. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 187.

51. Olive Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 16; Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 144–5; Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 19, 21; Jürgen Schläder, ed., *Wie man wird, was man ist: Die Bayerische Staatsoper vor und nach 1945* (Leipzig: Henschel, 2017), p. 180.

52. Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat*, p. 14; Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 22. See also Michael Walter, ed., *Hitler in der Oper: Deutsches Musikleben 1919–1945* (Stuttgart: Metzger, 1995).

53. Schläder, ed., *Wie man wird, was man ist*, p. 123–6.

54. See the *Deutsche Bühnenjahrbücher* and the first published overview by Georg Droescher, *Preußische Staatstheater: Statistischer Überblick auf die künstlerische Tätigkeit und die Personalverhältnisse* (Berlin: Otto Elsner, 1936). See also Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 206–7.

55. Ingeborg Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik auf die Wiener Staatsoper 1938–1945' (Diplomarbeit, Vienna University, 2000), p. 55–6.

56. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 24–8.

57. Schläder, ed., *Wie man wird, was man ist*, p. 176–7.

58. Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat*, p. 46–51.

59. Manfred Stoy, *Die Wiener Staatsoper 1938–1945: Bd. I* (Vienna: Der Apfel, 2017), p. 345.

60. BHStA, MK 50146, Staatstheater: Preise, Abonnement.

61. Erik Levi, 'Opera Theatre', in John London, ed., *Theatre under the Nazis* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 136–47.

62. Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat*, p. 328–32; Joseph Wulf, *Musik im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1998), p. 302–10; Stoy, *Die Wiener Staatsoper*, p. 76–87, 315–31; Spielplan der Wiener Oper (Projekt *Eine politische Geschichte der Oper in Wien*), <https://www.mdw.ac.at/imi/operapolitics/spielplan-wiener-oper/web/>.

63. Mertinz, 'Die Kulturpolitik des Nationalsozialismus', p. 177.

64. Stoy, *Die Wiener Staatsoper*, p. 91–3.

65. See Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, and Rathkolb, 'Vom Operntheater zur Staatsoper Wien', in *Geschichte der Oper in Wien* (II), 222–41, as well as the groundbreaking dissertation by Evelyn Schreiner, 'Nationalsozialistische Kulturpolitik in Wien 1938–1945 unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der Wiener Theaterszene' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Vienna University, 1980). On Austria's economy, see Gerhard Senft, 'Neues vom "Ständestaat": Anmerkungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik im Austrofaschismus', in *Das Dollfuß/Schuschnigg-Regime 1933–1938: Vermessung eines Forschungsfeldes*, ed. Florian Wenninger and Lucile Dreidemy (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013), p. 243–56.

66. Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat*, p. 23.

67. Wolfgang Fritz, 'Fortschritt und Barbarei: Österreichs Finanzverwaltung im Dritten Reich' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Linz University, 2010), p. 247. While erstwhile projects of a full reunification with Berlin were aborted, Hitler refused to give Clemens Krauss the power to lead both the Viennese and Berlin Staatsoper, and turned down Josef von Manowarda's project of a Berlin-Vienna union, while dispatching Wilhelm Furtwängler to oversee Vienna's musical life. See Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik', p. 14–15, and Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 108–12, 119–20.

68. The Nazi regime meant a notable improvement of material living conditions for some: in the choir, male singers saw their salaries rising from 100 to 400 RM and their female colleagues from 100 to 380 RM. Even in 1944, the Opera in Vienna spent more on its personnel than Berlin (5.044 million RM against 4.454 million RM), or any other theatre. See Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 113; Otto Fritz, 'Die Oper in Zahlen', p. 315.

69. Drewniak, *Theater im NS-Staat*, p. 72. Mertinz's numbers are slightly different (cf. Mertinz, 'Die Kulturpolitik des Nationalsozialismus', p. 179–80), yet they point in the same direction.

70. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 259. See also Stoy, *Die Wiener Staatsoper*, p. 326, 336–7; Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik', p. 58–60.

71. Schläder, ed., *Wie man wird, was man ist*, p. 160–72; Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 121; Stoy, *Die Wiener Staatsoper*, p. 18–28.

72. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 260; Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 123; Mertinz, 'Die Kulturpolitik des Nationalsozialismus', p. 187–9.

73. Crise et réorganisation des théâtres lyriques nationaux: 1938–1939, *Gallica – Bibliothèque nationale de France*, <https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb42630879w>; Pascal Ory, *La belle illusion: Culture et politique sous le signe du Front Populaire 1935–1938* (Paris: Plon, 1994), p. 315.

74. Loi du 14 janvier 1939 relative à la Réunion des Théâtres Lyriques Nationaux (Journal Officiel du 21 janvier 1939). Décret du 11 mai 1939 portant règlement d'administration publique de la loi du 14 janvier 1939 relative à la Réunion des Théâtres Lyriques Nationaux (JO du 31 mai 1939).

75. See the data collected in Jean Gourret, *Ces hommes qui ont fait l'Opéra* (1984), cited in Agid and Tarondeau, 'Gouvernance et performance'.

76. Ory, *La belle illusion*, p. 315.

77. For an extended treatment of this period see Alexander Golovlev, 'Balancing the Books Under Duress: Bolshoi Theatre's Budgets and Opera Production, 1941–1945', *Russian History*, XLVII, No. 4 (2020), p. 333–61.

78. R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison, S. G. Wheatcroft, eds., *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jacques Sapir, 'The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II', in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Levin, eds., *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (1997; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 233; D. D. Butakov, 'Raskhody gosudarstvennogo biudzheta v 1941–45 gg.', in Iurii A. Beliaev, ed., *Finansovaia sistema gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (Moscow: Finansy, 1996), p. 37; Ol'ga V. Glushakova,

'Biudzhet SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny', *Sibirskaia finansovaia shkola* VI, No. 113 (2015), p. 12.

79. Solomon Volkov, *Bol'shoi Teatr: novaia istoriia* (Moscow, AST, 2018), p. 367, 377–8; V. I. Zarubin, *Bol'shoi Teatr. Pervye postanovki oper na russkoi stsene, 1825–1993* (Moscow: Ellis Lak, 1994), p. 30.

80. Postanovlenie GKO no. 7885, 'Ob evakuatsii Bol'shogo Gosudarstvennogo Akademicheskogo ordena Lenina Teatra, Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Akademicheskogo ordena Lenina Teatra im. Gor'kogo, Gosudarstvennogo Malogo Teatra i teatra im. Vakhtangova', 13 October 1941, in Leonid V. Maksimenkov, ed., *Muzyka vmesto sumbura. Kompozitory i muzykanty v Strane Sovetov, 1917–1991* (Moscow: MFD, 2013), p. 218.

81. Letter No SP-28. 6 July 1941. RGALI, f. 648, op. 5, d. 54, listy 199–200.

82. Ekaterina S. Vlasova, 1948 *god v sovetskoi muzyke* (Moscow: Klassika-XXI, 2010), p. 411; Vlasova, 'Vliianie zapadnogo muzykal'nogo soobshchestva na ofitsialnyi status sovetskikh kompozitorov vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny i v poslevoiennyie gody', in Ekaterina S. Vlasova *et al.*, eds., *XX vek. Muzyka voiny i mira* (*materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii*) (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2010), p. 46–62.

83. Franklyn D. Holzman, 'Soviet Inflationary Pressures, 1928–1957: Causes and Cures', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXIV, No. 2 (1960), p. 181–2; Jacques Sapir, *Les fluctuations économiques en URSS 1941–1985* (Paris: Éditions EHESS, 1989); Eugène Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina University Press, 1998); Elena Iu. Zubkova, ed., *Sovetskaia zhizn'. 1945–1953 gg.* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003); Iuri I. Kashin, ed., *Denezhnoe obrashchenie v SSSR perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v dokumentakh* (*1941–1945*) (*Po stranitsam arkhivnykh fondov Tsentral'nogo Banka Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 5*) (Moscow: TsB RF, 2008).

84. See Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik', p. 42.

85. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 53.

86. Ibid., p. 57.

87. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 215.

88. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 69; Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 215–21.

89. Fred Prieberg, *Musik im NS-Staat* (Frankfurt am Main: Taschenbuch, 1983), p. 398; Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 98.

90. Eicher *et al.*, *Theater im 'Dritten Reich'*, p. 261. More specifically for Vienna, see Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik', p. 53, and Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*, p. 76.

91. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 222–8. Vast parts of opera correspondence dealt with requests for materials, channelled via Reichstheaterkammer and involving significant bureaucratic effort; the simultaneous struggle for keeping male personnel '*uk*' (see note 94 below) would haunt every theatre. See Rotter, 'Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik', p. 77–8.

92. Schreiner, 'Nationalsozialistische Kulturpolitik', p. 76.

93. Deutsches Bühnenjahrbuch: 50. Jg. (1939)-55. Jg. (1944).

94. *Uk – unabkömmlich* ('indispensable') – was an official designation that prevented specialists in strategically important industries from being conscripted into the Wehrmacht.

95. Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet.*

96. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 235, 238. Those are well documented for Vienna as well (Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet*; Trümpi, *Politisierte Orchester*).

97. *Journal officiel*, 1, 1 janvier 1939, p. 4, 32; 1, 1.01.1940, p. 2, 20. AN, F21/3981, Projet du budget des Beaux-Arts pour 1940.

98. AN, AJ /13/1695, Lettre de la RTLN au Ministre des Finances, 14.09.1939.

99. AN, AJ/13/1695, Lettre de J. Salière au Ministère de l'Education Nationale, 29.07.1940.

100. See Marc-Olivier Baruch, *Le régime de Vichy 1940–1944* (Paris: Texto, 2017); Robert A. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Jean-Pierre Rioux, 'Ambivalences culturelles (1940–1941)', in Jean-Pierre Azéma and François Bédarida, eds., *La France des années noires. 1. De la défaite à Vichy* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), p. 558.

101. Sandrine Grandgambe, 'La Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux', in *La Vie musicale sous Vichy*, p. 112; Claire Paolacci, 'L'ère Jacques Rouché à l'Opéra de Paris (1915–1945): Modernité théâtrale, consécration du ballet et de Serge Lifar' (vol. 1) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2006), p. 479; Mark Franko, 'Serge Lifar and the Question of Collaboration with the German Authorities under the Occupation of Paris (1940–1949)', *Dance Research*, XXXV, No. 2 (November 2017), p. 218–57.

102. See Laurence Bertrand Dorléac, *L'Art de la Défaite 1940–1944* (Paris: Seuil, 2010); Stéphanie Corcy, *La vie culturelle sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Perrin, 2005); Yannick Simon, *Composer sous Vichy* (Paris: Symétrie, 2009).

103. On the French economy and economic policies, see Alfred Sauvy, *La vie économique des Français de 1939 à 1945* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978); Michel Margairaz, 'L'État, les finances et l'économie? Histoire d'une conversion 1932–1952, I-II (Histoire économique et financière de la France)' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Paris, 1991); Dominique Veillon and Jean-Marie Flonneau, eds., *Le temps des restrictions en France* (*1939–1949*) (Cahiers de l'Institut d'histoire du temps présent, 32–3) (Paris: IHTP, 1996); Dominique Veillon, *Vivre et survivre en France 1939–1947* (Paris: Éditions Payot, 1997); Michel Chélini, *Inflation, État et opinion en France de 1944 à 1952* (Paris: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique/Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1998); and Fabrice Grenard, Florent Le Bot, and Cédric Perrin, *Histoire économique de Vichy: L'État, les hommes, les entreprises* (Paris: Perrin, 2017).

104. See Karin Le Bail, *La musique au pas: être musicien sous l'Occupation* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016); Jane Fulcher, *Renegotiating French Identity: Musical Culture and Creativity in France during Vichy and the German Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Simon, *Composer sous Vichy*.

105. Myriam Chimènes, 'Alfred Cortot et la politique musicale du gouvernement de Vichy', in Myriam Chimènes, ed., *La Vie musicale sous Vichy* (Paris, Éditions Complexe, 2001), p. 35–52. Guy Hervy *et al.*, *Quand l'Opéra entre en Résistance: les personnels de la Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux sous Vichy et l'Occupation* (Paris: L'Oeil d'Or, 2007).

106. Aster, *Staatsoper*, p. 241.

107. Ibid., p. 463.

108. See Sabine Vogt-Schneider, *'Staatsoper Unter den Linden' oder 'Deutsche Staatsoper'? Auseinandersetzungen*

um Kulturpolitik und Spielbetrieb in den Jahren zwischen 1945 und 1955 (Berlin: Verlag Ernst Kuhn, 1998).

109. Ruslan Khestanov, 'Chem sobiralas' upravliat' partiia, sozdav Ministerstvo kultury SSSR', in Irina V. Glushchenko and Vitalii A. Kurennoi, eds., *Vremia, vpered! Kul'turnaia politika v SSSR* (Moscow: HSE UP, 2013), p. 35.

110. Vera F. Vieten, 'Die Ausgliederung der österreichischen Bundestheater und die Reorganisation der Berliner Opern im Vergleich' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Vienna University, 2016).

111. Agid and Tarondeau, 'Gouvernance et Performance'.

112. Marina Frolova-Walker and Jonathan Walker, 'Introduction', in *Music and Soviet Power*, p. 10.

113. Golovlev, 'Theatre Policies of Soviet Communism and Italian Fascism Compared'.

114. These have been challenged and undergone several revisions since the late 1960s, particularly in the 1980s, as Frances Stonor Saunders's seminal study on the Congress for Cultural Freedom demonstrates: Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid The Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); US edition: *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000).