the agency of local actors and elites matters in overall outcomes. She is particularly interested in why regimes decide to decentralize or not, and then how they use these measures to strengthen their own ruling coalitions and their own regime's security and survival. Although authoritarian regimes in general can be expected to resist international pressures to decentralize or devolve power, Clark shows that these measures may actually help preserve their rule. "This study," she argues, "demonstrates how decentralization provides a greater stabilizing function for authoritarian regimes then does centralization" (p. 11).

The book provides in-depth analyses of the historical development of the regime and the state in both Jordan and Morocco, and it then turns to the different strategies of centralization and decentralization in both cases. At face value, Morocco has decentralized, certainly far more than Jordan has. But Clark's book shows how the state in Morocco has achieved an "unofficial recentralization of power" (p. 7): economic and political reform processes have "disaggregated the state," but they have not lessened the power of the regime (p. 283). To the contrary, they have strengthened it by allowing it to broaden its ruling coalition and bases of support both locally and nationally. Clark notes that similar outcomes have emerged in Jordan via more limited and inconsistent disaggregation of state responsibilities, specifically with the huge role that royal NGOs (RONGOs) play in the delivery of public services. The state, in short, still plays the largest role in politics, society, and the economy, even after decades of privatization and its more recent discourse on decentralization.

Clark's comparison of Jordan and Morocco also highlights the vitally important roles of political parties. With far more developed and institutionalized party structures nationally and locally than in Jordan, Morocco's parties were able to engage decentralization efforts via their own patron-client structures, while the regime was able to steadily broaden its ruling coalition by co-opting everything from opposition parties to civil society organizations, all in the name of decentralization and reform. In contrast, Clark argues, Jordan has a weak and underdeveloped party system, with electoral systems (a new one for every election) generally designed to weaken parties but reinforce representation for the tribal Transjordanians who dominate rural areas and municipalities, while curbing the power of the largely Palestinian Jordanian cities.

These implications matter not only for local politics and the delivery of basic services but also for stability at the core of the state itself. Clark argues that "while decentralization in Morocco offers pro-regime elites increased access to resources, centralization in Jordan has consistently reduced access by the very elites considered the bedrock of regime support" (p. 196). She continues, "Yet in a context of shrinking resources and a crisis in municipal service provision, particularly in rural Transjordanian-dominated municipalities, the regime's strategy of centralization has exacerbated the competition between tribes and fragmented them along clan and family lines" (p. 284). Clark notes that these previously bedrock communities of regime support are increasingly in crisis, and hence so is the regime. This carries rather stark implications for governance and stability in the kingdom. Jordan's ruling bargain—a monarchical regime that has based its power on support from tribal Transjordanians—works less and less well as time goes on. Clark argues that the combination of centralization, persistent economic and fiscal crises, and the prevalence of *wasta* (personal influence) networks in Jordan serves to continually destabilize the state and society, increasing divisions even within and between the Transjordanian tribal communities who make up most of Jordan's municipalities. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon and seems to have been part of the protests of 1989, 2001, and beyond; yet it may be getting steadily worse, as seen in the many protests during and after the 2011 "Arab Spring" period.

These findings underscore the differences in strategies and outcomes of the two cases. Clark notes, "Decentralization is far more stabilizing vis-à-vis the regime in Morocco than centralization is vis-à-vis the monarchy in Jordan. While in Jordan, elites have few to no new avenues for patronage and compete against each other for shrinking resources, decentralization in Morocco offers local elites new opportunities to access resources and maintain patron-client ties." (p. 238)

Having compared in exhaustive detail politics and policy in Jordan and Morocco, Clark provides arguments that transcend these cases and indeed can be applied across the Middle East and beyond. The findings, in short, are in no way limited to these two countries or their regime types. This book is an excellent contribution to the literatures on local and municipal politics, authoritarian survival, and comparative political and economic development. It is rich both theoretically and empirically and will be of great interest to any student or scholar of comparative politics.

Youth in Regime Crisis: Comparative Perspectives from Russia to Weimar Germany. By Félix Krawatzek. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 336p. $95.00 cloth.
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As I was writing this review, millions of residents of Hong Kong—including, evidently, the bulk of the city's university students—were involved in a months-long pitched battle with authorities over the future of democracy and self-rule in the territory. The 16-year-old Greta Thunberg, meanwhile, was making her way back to Sweden from New York, where she had taken her battle over the future of the planet to the United Nations, backed by what may

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well be the most important global youth movement since 1968.

Youth are not always at the forefront of political change, and when they are, it is not always for the better. But whenever the politics of a society shift, we are likely to find youth somewhere near the fulcrum. And yet, as Félix Krawatzek argues in his new book *Youth in Regime Crisis*, we have very little in the way of a systematic theory of youth in political change.

Krawatzek's book aims to remedy this problem by turning our attention to discourse. This is not simply a methodological or evidentiary predilection, although the empirics of the book draw predominantly on a novel approach to discourse analysis (about which more later). Rather than seeing discourse as a reflection of the crisis he seeks to study, Krawatzek sees discourse as part and parcel of the crisis itself. Put more directly, a crisis of politics *is* a crisis of discourse. Following Arjen Boin and colleagues ("Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests," *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 [1], 2009), the author writes, "A crisis is a particularly forceful *interpretation* of events" (p. 9)—one that involves not just competing allocations of blame and hope but also a dramatic change in the way that people talk about time. Borrowing from Reinhart Koselleck (*Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, [1979] 2004), Krawatzek reframes crisis in terms of *Erfahrungsraum* (roughly, the use of the past in the present) and *Erwartungshorizont* (roughly, the future as it is presently imaginable). In doing so, his conceptual point is not simply that crisis foreshortens these things, drawing them more closely into the present and speeding them up; more broadly, that foreshortening and speeding up are *themselves* the crux of political crisis.

In addition to explaining why we need to take discourse analysis seriously, this conceptualization makes it abundantly clear why youth is at the center both of the study and of the phenomenon of regime crisis: young people are simultaneously less beholden to the past and more beholden to the future, a fact that is discursively—and thus politically—powerful both to regime incumbents and challengers. This conceptualization also clarifies why we should use the verb form "youth is," rather than "youth are," because youth in this context is primarily a symbol, rather than an agglomeration of people of a particular age. Its biological and biographical boundaries are malleable and permeable, demanding interpretation and contestation by analysts and protagonists alike.

Having established this perspective, most of the rest of the book is given over to a structured case comparison that examines the place of youth—and not its role, because agency is a question for Krawatzek rather than an assumption—in four historical episodes: Weimar Germany, 1968 France, *Perestroika*-era Russia, and post-Soviet Russia after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. For each of these four cases—which represent two democracies and two autocracies facing crisis, as well as two cases of regime change and two of consolidation—the author collects, codes, and analyzes hundreds of contemporaneous newspaper articles from across the political spectrum, which reflect both how "youth" speaks and is spoken about.

This analysis is presented in two ways, one traditional, the other less so. Happily, many of these texts are also presented, immersing the reader in the mood of the moment. It is in these passages where the book comes most alive and where the purpose of the author's conceptual framework is most clear.

But because endeavors of this ambition cannot easily be built on a readable sample of texts, Krawatzek develops a method of discourse network analysis. Put simply, this approach uses words as nodes and then looks to see how they are connected with one another in a corpus of texts at given periods of time. We can thus see how words and concepts cluster together—which are more "central" and which more peripheral—and the findings are indeed illustrative of the dramatic differences in the way youth was discussed in the revolutionary days of Russia from 1986 to 1991 versus the more counterrevolutionary days of Russia from 2004 to 2011.

Like all methods, it is not without its limitations. Discourse network analysis provides less granularity and makes comparison harder than do more established approaches, whether human coding based on a more nuanced framework or computer-assisted topic modeling. The choice of network analysis is evidently motivated by a desire to focus not simply on the content of discourse but also on its structure—on the position of words and concepts in relation to others. Whether gaining that focus is worth the price of lost resolution on the details of the discourse is a question that will have to be addressed by anyone who wants to take this method forward.

Unfortunately, the book's methodological novelty somewhat overshadows its potential for theoretical innovation. That potential is, to a degree, limited by the project's research design. In seeking to elucidate the place of youth in regime crisis, Krawatzek defines the latter as episodes in which the status quo (as embodied in an older generation) is delegitimized and in which an alternative political arrangement is present (as embodied in an external example). By this definition, all four cases do indeed rise to the level of a crisis, and we can see important divergence. In those regimes that survive the crisis and consolidate, the position of the state in the youth discourse remains hegemonic, youth is at least partially co-opted, and mobilization fragments. Where regimes fall, it is the elite that fragment, because their attempts to co-opt the youth discourse founder and the demands of "youth" become more generalized.

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The structure of the comparison, however, does not allow the author to see how the place of youth in the process of crisis affects the outcome. Across all four cases, the same variable—elite cohesion—more or less determines both the degree to which the incumbent regime is able to dominate the discourse on and with youth, and the propensity of the regime to survive the crisis. Indeed, in two of the cases, France in 1968 and Russia in 2004 onward, it is difficult to argue that the regime was ever seriously threatened, specifically because elites never split.

As a result, the book does not make a full-throated causal argument about youth in regime crisis: it remains a story of place, rather than role. To be sure, there is value in this. The book amply demonstrates how much more we can learn about the process of political crisis by using youth as a lens. It adds weight to an important but underrepresented literature on the place (and role) of ideas in processes of political change, including several of the cases in this book (see, for example, Stephen E. Hanson, *Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia,* 2010). But ultimately it does not do as much as it might to undermine elite-centric theories of politics.

Whose Agency: The Politics and Practice of Kenya's HIV-Prevention NGOs. By Megan Hershey. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019. 224p. $69.95 cloth.
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Between 1990 and 2017, 36.9 million people died of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and 70.8 million people became newly infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus that causes AIDS. Like other states in East and Southern Africa, Kenya has faced a serious AIDS epidemic; analysts estimate nearly 2 million Kenyans have died of AIDS since it was first diagnosed in Kenya in 1984. The Kenyan government largely ignored the AIDS epidemic until the late 1990s, when the prevalence of HIV reached its peak in the country (affecting roughly 1 in every 10 Kenyans) and bilateral and multilateral funders began to make AIDS a priority. Even after this shift, however, the key actors responding to AIDS in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa were nongovernmental and included people living with HIV and their families, friends, communities, and religious congregations, as well as NGOs. Any researcher who has spent much time in East and Southern Africa can attest to the ubiquitous white SUVs emblazoned with NGO logos and red anti-AIDS ribbons zipping around capital cities and along major highways. Before the publication of Megan Hershey's *Whose Agency*, however, we knew very little about the many NGOs responding to AIDS in Africa, and especially about how they interact with the state and with citizens and what, if any, real impact they have in stemming the tide of the epidemic.

Whose Agency sets out to teach us not just about the role of NGOs in the fight against AIDS in Africa but also about the challenges faced by NGOs. They are agents navigating the messy middle between two principals: the citizens who are their intended beneficiaries, and the funders and state officials who provide the resources or permission for NGOs to do their work. HIV/AIDS response in Kenya is the substantive focus of *Whose Agency*, but the book's ideas about participatory development, state–NGO relations, and faith-based organizations (FBOs) could be applied to other substantive issues in developing countries beyond HIV/AIDS and the health sector, including disaster relief and education (both development sectors in which NGOs, FBOs, funders, and the state play various roles in delivering services to citizens).

The key takeaway of *Whose Agency* is that NGOs are flexible and adapt to navigate challenges, whether they are posed by the state, funders, or intended beneficiaries. Hershey's book encourages even skeptics of the AIDS industrial complex to look at the work being done by local NGOs and find success stories in responding to AIDS in Africa. She empirically substantiates this "success" in the fight against AIDS using meaningful measures, including reports on uptake of HIV testing, a critical behavior for stemming the spread of HIV.

Hershey's analysis is based on a mixed-methods approach. A great strength in *Whose Agency* is its triangulation of multiple forms of data to support its claims. Hershey draws on data collected through in-depth interviews, participant observation, focus group discussions, and face-to-face survey interviews. She estimates that she conducted 150 interviews with NGO staff, participants in the HIV training programs put on by the NGOs, and government officials. *Whose Agency*'s most compelling analysis is its close comparison of four NGOs in Nairobi, Kenya, each occupying a cell in a 2 x 2 matrix of location (university setting or high-density informal settlement) and religion (Christian based or not). Hershey conducted more than six weeks of participant observation with each NGO when she collected most of her fieldwork for the book (from November 2007 to October 2008). The original survey data analyzed in *Whose Agency* (N = 420) included university students and youth in informal settlements and aimed to be representative of the youth populations in the catchment areas of the four NGOs Hershey studied. Through these methods, Hershey aimed to measure and capture a number of phenomena: the NGOs' success in transmitting HIV-prevention messages that would spur behavior change, the participation of beneficiaries in designing programming and the representation of beneficiaries' interests in NGO decision making, the challenges NGOs had and how they responded to them, and to what extent religion featured in the NGOs' culture and programming.

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