

those that did not qualify were either deemed illegal or denied access to the state. Thus, there were no independent, autonomous social groups (including religious groups) under authoritarian rule.

In the 1970s, Philippe Schmitter and others introduced the idea of neocorporatism to explain the persistence of corporatist-like institutions in postwar democracies. In neocorporatist systems, certain social groups were privileged over others and permitted to bargain directly with the state and other privileged groups. This privileged bargaining was called concertation. An example was the bargaining of the state, business interests, and organized labor over wages and the introduction of new technologies of production (among other things). The privileged groups in neocorporatism were independent and autonomous from the state. Neocorporatism was sometimes called societal corporatism to distinguish it from the state corporatism of authoritarian regimes. According to the scholars in this area, neocorporatism could coexist with democracy because elites and important parts of the general public recognized the legitimacy of both the state and the privileged groups and valued the social peace that concertation permitted.

Contrary to Ornston's argument in this book, neocorporatism was not seen always as conservative by scholars of previous decades. The neocorporatist systems described in a variety of works could make use of the social peace that arose from concertation to bring about important changes in policies and in social arrangements that could be transformative. Also, it was clear from attempts to use the concept of neocorporatism that there was considerable variation across countries and over time in concertative practices. Even in liberal regimes, there are instances of concertation. For example, the financial bailouts of the city of New York and Chrysler Corporation in the 1970s were examples of successful tripartite (government–business–labor) concertation in the United States.

Similarly, the idea of coordination or collaboration put forward by Ornston is not precisely defined and underspecified. He wants it to stand for a variety of practices, but seems particularly interested in government–industry and interfirm cooperative arrangements. Again, these forms of coordination exist in liberal regimes as well as in corporatist regimes, and so it is not always clear where to draw the line in identifying the type of regime.

Some scholars who attempted to apply the concept of neocorporatism in the 1980s later ended up modifying or abandoning the theoretical framework outlined here because it was not sufficiently precise to handle the phenomena they were observing. In *Between Power and Plenty* (1978), Peter Katzenstein used the idea of “policy networks” rather than corporatism to talk about the differences in advanced industrial states; T. J. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa argued that Japan was an example of corporatism without labor; and advocates of the “varieties of capitalism” ap-

proach, such as Peter Hall and David Soskice, returned to a simpler formulation by contrasting liberal market economies (LMEs) with coordinated market economies (CMEs). There is some discussion of this in Ornston's book, but it would have benefited from a more thorough coverage of the literature.

All three countries examined in detail are small and European. The final two chapters of the book expand the scope of discussion to compare the three countries with larger capitalist countries (like Germany), other Western European nations (like the Netherlands and Sweden), Southern and Eastern European countries (like Spain and Poland), and East Asian countries (like South Korea and Taiwan). These comparisons are fairly superficial and do not really help the author make his argument about the superiority of creative and competitive corporatism over conservative corporatism (which seems in retrospect to be a fairly empty prescription).

Despite these weaknesses, *When Small States Make Big Leaps* represents an important contribution to the comparative analysis of capitalist systems and a serious effort to explain how small capitalist countries are adapting to globalization of the world economy. The kernel of truth that emerges is that knowledge creation and the diffusion of new technologies are crucial for successful adaptation to this new global environment.

**Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism.** By Brian C. Rathbun. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. \$99.00 cloth, \$33.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592714001534

— Aaron M. Hoffman, *Purdue University*

This is an important book that, as its subtitle suggests, integrates the study of international security and domestic politics. For Brian Rathbun, trust is the belief that cooperation will be reciprocated and generalized trust is the belief that others are typically trustworthy. Generalized trusters, at least in the first instance, do not depend on specific information about the behavior, character, or motives of others. Instead, they trust others with the belief that people behave morally in their social interactions. “Strategic” trusters, by contrast, will not trust others without specific information that those individuals have interests that encapsulate their own. If the standard formula for strategic trust is A trusts B to do X, the formula for generalized trust is “A trusts or A is trusting” (p. 24).

Unsurprisingly, generalized trust also differs from generalized distrust, the view that people are generally untrustworthy partners, both in its assumptions about the willingness of others to reciprocate cooperation faithfully and in the identity of its adherents. In *Trust in International Cooperation*, Rathbun's thesis is that efforts to establish the League of Nations, the United

Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were shaped by domestic political contests in the United States between generalized trusters in the Democratic Party and generalized distrusters in the Republican Party. Multilateral organizations require states to place their interests in one another's hands, meaning that joiners are exposed to the risks of opportunism. Trusting leaders, like Woodrow Wilson, who had a strong belief in the essential goodness of people, felt comfortable committing the United States to these arrangements despite the risks because he believed the country would not pay the consequences. On the other hand, distrustful leaders, like Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful Senate leader, could not tolerate the idea that the United States might cede some control over its fate to others. Similar controversies between generalized trusters and distrusters over these institutions played out in England.

Rathbun argues that rationalist theories of international relations, whether they take account of strategic trust or not, cannot explain domestic-level variation in support for multilateral institutions among politicians. Rationalist theories imply that actors embedded in the same structural conditions should evaluate and respond to those conditions in similar ways. Yet Rathbun's studies of the disagreements among U.S. policymakers about the wisdom of entrusting the country's interests to others in the context of multilateral institutions make a compelling case that leaders did not assess the trustworthiness of states the same way. Instead, what we find is that assumptions about the general trustworthiness of others ran deep in the political philosophies of liberal and conservative politicians.

In 2005, when I published *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*, I was aware of work in psychology and political science on generalized trust, but I was skeptical of its value for understanding international politics. Rathbun has persuaded me that thinking about generalized trust alerts us to significant variation in the domestic politics of multilateralism. By itself, this is an important contribution to the study of trust in international affairs and to the field of international relations more generally. I am less persuaded that Rathbun's work enables to him explain things about the demand for multilateral institutions that rationalism cannot. He argues that leaders defaulted to their basic assumptions about the trustworthiness of others in response to their fundamental uncertainty about the future. Rationalist theories, however, make the same general prediction. As James Morrow (1994) points out in *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (pp. 28–29), under conditions of *uncertainty* (situations in which possible outcomes and their probability of occurring are unknown), actors may assess the probability of the same outcomes differently based on their prior beliefs about how the world works. It is under conditions of *risk*

that actors are supposed to assess the world the same way. Seen in this light, Rathbun's work complements rationalism by fleshing out the worldviews that leaders rely on when they have nothing else to help them see what the future holds.

This work also raises several questions for future research. First, to what extent does the assumption that others are trustworthy operate when state survival is at issue? Rathbun argues that the cases he examines are important because real interests were at stake and misjudgments about the intentions of others would prove costly. He is right about this, but either no one or very few of those involved in the U.S. domestic debate over the League, UN, or NATO thought the immediate consequences of joining these organizations were dire. Indeed, situations of multilateral cooperation may mitigate the costs associated with trust violations by spreading the consequences across many members. James Lebovic's (2013) fine book, *Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama* suggests that generalized trust operates even in high-stakes bilateral rivalries, but research that assesses alternative explanations for the attitudes leaders held during these episodes is needed to confirm this observation.

Second, why do foreign policy elites rely on assumptions about the trustworthiness of leaders they ostensibly know? The strongest support for generalized trust derives from laboratory studies showing that a set of people who play prisoner's dilemma games with people they do not know use their first move to cooperate (e.g., Nahoko Hayashi et al., "Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study," *Rationality and Society* 11 [February 1999]: 27–46.). Yet the leaders Rathbun studied were not operating behind a veil of ignorance like the volunteers in laboratories. Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, were deeply involved in foreign policy issues—Wilson as president and Lodge as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—for years before coming to loggerheads over the League. These individuals knew a lot about the people the United States would be relying on, but both still relied on their assumptions about human nature rather than the information they possessed.

Complicating matters, it is clear that the very leaders who rely on assumptions about the trustworthiness of their potential partners sometimes abandon those assumptions in favor of an analysis of the historical record. During the effort to establish the UN, for example, U.S. support for giving Security Council members a veto hardened in response to Soviet actions that made American leaders question their intentions (p. 147). The research on generalized trust does not suggest that people only rely on assumptions about others, but the conditions under which people replace their assumptions with information about the behavior of others is unclear.

Finally, are policies that are rooted in the generalized trust of leaders successful at promoting the interests of states over the long run? Blind trust of any kind is not normally considered wise strategy, but there is certainly a case to be made that generalized trust made the efficacious NATO alliance possible. On the other hand, the Wilson administration's conviction that other states could be trusted was so strong that it failed to appreciate the challenges associated with getting the League Charter passed by the Senate. It is easy to imagine that Wilson also could have misjudged the rectitude of other leaders. Hasty judgments, after all, are often erroneous.

In summary, *Trust in International Cooperation* is a noteworthy contribution to the field of international relations. Rathbun's thesis about generalized trust enables him to explain things about the formation of multilateral institutions that other theories overlook. It appears that the book's biggest weakness is an inability to explain the conditions under which generalized trusters and distrusters become attentive to information about the actions and intentions of their counterparts. Nevertheless, the framework offered is rich enough and sophisticated enough to support future investigations into these and other subjects.

**Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible.** By Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and George Tsebelis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 248p. \$80.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

**The Crisis of the European Union: A Response.** By Jürgen Habermas. New York: Polity, 2012. 120p. \$64.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592714001546

— Richard Bellamy, *University College London*

In May 2000, the European Parliament proposed the adoption of the phrase “Unity in Diversity” as the official motto of the European Union. Although the motto was part of the failed Constitutional Treaty, it was omitted from the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, EU officials and a surprising number of academics regularly employ it to characterize the EU. Like much political rhetoric, this slogan offers the prospect of reconciling competing claims, while assiduously steering clear of any concrete proposal as to how this might be done. Yet the tensions within this rhetorical formula remain. At some level, each must place limits on the other—if one prioritizes unity, that will set limits to the level and type of diversity, and vice versa. Once one moves from rhetoric to the realities of policy and treaty making, these tensions and the choices they entail cannot be put to one side. As the English saying goes, “one cannot have one's cake and eat it too”—or, in deference to the predominantly German authorship of these two books, as the Germans put it, “one cannot dance at two weddings at the same time.”

As Daniel Finke and the coauthors of *Reforming the European Union* note, the very diverse features and preferences of the 27 (now 28) member states had seemed to make the EU not only increasingly unworkable as a united political organization (and ever more so as yet new member states joined), but also apparently impossible to reform in a more coherent direction. This book traces the eight years of repeated failures and ultimate success between the drafting of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty in 2001 and the successful ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. At the heart of the book is the puzzle of why it proved possible to reform the EU with 27 members when reform efforts had repeatedly failed with 15—after all, it may be hard to dance simultaneously at 15 weddings, but 27 ought to be almost twice as difficult. The standard account of institutional change has drawn on evolutionary biology and conjectured that it takes the form of “punctuated equilibrium,” whereby a period of stasis is followed by rapid change. However, the authors note that in the EU, stasis was followed by painstakingly slow change.

The stasis is easily explained, even if the explanation flies in the face of the received wisdom of both neo-functionalism and intergovernmental theories of integration, with the one assuming that change follows naturally from functional imperatives and the other that the bigger states will call the shots. If either of these accounts held, one would have expected reform to have occurred sooner. However, because in a consensual system even quite small players who favor the status quo, or whose populations do, will be able to block major reform, it did not. The puzzle is why change—especially quite radical change—should have come about, given that over this period the number of potential veto players grew as enlargement swelled the ranks of those inclined to a more skeptical position, while a number of political leaders felt obliged to ratify agreements via the far riskier process of referenda rather than through parliamentary votes, where one would expect a government to be able to have a built-in majority.

In investigating this puzzle, the authors explored the full range of actors involved, both domestic and European, built up a database of their shifting preferences regarding reform, and covered the whole lengthy process, rather than looking discreetly at a single stage as earlier studies had done. As such, this is by far the most comprehensive account of the reform process. Their most generalizable conclusion is that if a majority of political leaders are convinced that reform is necessary, then ultimately they will get their way. That said, as their analysis shows, there are plenty of contingent obstacles able to block the path to reform, so that politicians need not just *virtu* but a fair dose of *fortuna* to get their way.

This book looks at the pre-Eurocrisis period, and although it was published in 2012, the crisis is not mentioned even in the conclusion. The normative assumptions of the authors are also largely unspoken. However,