

builds up to the final section of the book, which covers the period from 1995 to 2000, as the pinnacle of the party's success and trajectory. Hume is portrayed as the architect of the cease-fires, the Good Friday Agreement, and the international body charged with decommissioning weapons. In the late 1990s, Hume and the SDLP were celebrated internationally, and their ideas became enshrined in the peace settlement. The parties committed to use only democratic means and to respect human rights; the principle of consent became established law.

One of the major strengths of the book is Farren's coverage of the SDLP's international connections to the Republic of Ireland, the United States, and Europe. From the beginning, the SDLP was dedicated to an all-Ireland approach to the conflict. The Republic of Ireland was crucial to sustaining the party financially and bolstering its political sway (70). Farren shows how Hume was able to recruit the American political establishment and strongly influence the US government's involvement in the conflict. In 1976, Hume convinced the "four horsemen" of Irish-American politics, Tip O'Neill, Edward Kennedy, Hugh Carney, and Daniel Moynihan, to renounce violence as a means to attain Irish unity. Hume also fervently championed European integration. Hume's dedication to the European ideals was shaped by his search for investment in Northern Ireland and his strong belief that the European institutions that had healed postwar divisions in Europe offered a model for Northern Ireland. The SDLP's support of Europe brought about the creation of a third seat in European Parliament, long held by John Hume. In addition, the party's involvement in Europe led to its strong influence over a substantial European peace fund.

Farren provides a comprehensive account of the important ways that the SDLP made peace possible in Northern Ireland. This is a critical contribution to a literature that all too often focuses on militants, not moderates. It is disappointing, though, that Farren ends the story in 2000. The chronology creates a convenient narrative for Farren: from the birth of the SDLP to the pinnacle of its success. Farren ends the story at the height of Hume's "political achievement and influence" when "the SDLP was basked in glory" (308). Yet the reader would be well served to have Farren's insights into the party's struggles of the past decade. The secondary literature on the SDLP is limited, which is one of the reasons this book is so important. Farren, nevertheless, does not refer to Gerard Murray's monograph, the only other history of the party. Despite minor problems, this is a welcome addition to the literature on the conflict. The significance of the SDLP is that it relied solely on the democratic process to advance social and political change in an era when violence was often used as a political tool and when Northern Ireland was under direct rule from the British government. This book ably describes the SDLP's important role in shaping Northern Ireland.

Megan Myers, George Mason University

DAVID FRENCH. *Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–1971*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 352. £65.00 (cloth).
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This book examines the British army from 1945 until 1971, when Britain completed the withdrawal of most military units from their role "east of Suez." As the author notes in his introduction, this is a subject that has been largely ignored in histories of postwar Britain and even in general histories of the British army. Studies of British defense policy have tended to focus on issues relating to the nuclear deterrent or to the examination of specific events or controversies. Popular accounts of army life tend to focus on high-profile regiments such as the Special Air Service and the Parachute Regiment or exotica such as the Gurkhas, or they relate to the social aspects of service in the National Service (i.e., conscript) army of the 1940s and 1950s. Remarkably, for example, there is no scholarly history of the British

Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The aim of this book is to provide a narrative history that bridges these gaps and that places the history of the British army within the wider context of British strategic activity by focusing on its ability to achieve the tasks that it was set by successive governments. David French is well placed to do this, having already established a reputation as a leading historian of the British army in the twentieth century. Rather sensibly, he notes that the main purpose of armies is to prepare for and to fight wars, and this is what he focuses on in this book. Thus, his primary focus is on the combat capability and performance of the army. He notes that revisionist historians have helped to reevaluate the performance of the British army in two world wars and his aim is to do the same for the postwar army. French borrows from current British military doctrine the notion that fighting power consists of three key elements: the physical (the means to fight), the moral (the will to fight), and the conceptual (how to fight), and he uses these as a guide to his analysis.

The book examines the twin tracks of British policy where the army was forced to maintain a major force (the BAOR) in Germany while also meeting the needs of expeditionary operations and insurgencies beyond Europe. French ably charts the associated challenges and compromises, asserting that, contrary to popular belief, at the conceptual level the army adapted reasonably well to the challenges posed by the possibility of conventional war in Europe but that this was undermined by material deficiencies resulting in an over-reliance on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons that ran contrary to NATO's declared strategy of flexible response. Traditional accounts usually give the army credit for developing an approach to counterinsurgency that was humane, insofar as it emphasized the minimum use of force, the avoidance of civilian casualties, and an emphasis on hearts and minds, and that was also uniquely successful. French challenges such assumptions, noting the frequent and deliberate use of coercion against civilian populations and a rather equivocal record of success. Similarly, army preparation for expeditionary operations is identified as haphazard at best, constrained by the ever present shortage of manpower and resources.

Ultimately, French concludes, the British created what John Lewis Gaddis characterized (in the case of the Soviet army) as a Potemkin army, one that had an outwardly impressive façade but that had very limited war-fighting capability. For a time, sufficient resources were scrapped together to meet European and overseas commitments and, on occasion, to meet the demand for operations overseas, but there were many failures to accompany the successes, and ultimately the entire system proved to be unsustainable. Ironically, Potemkinism did not undermine the political value of the BAOR, which contributed toward the stability of the NATO alliance and thus to the deterrence of any potential Soviet attack, but it is well that the fighting value of this force was never put to the test. Beyond Europe, the results were less satisfactory and the inability to meet commitments here while maintaining the façade in Germany reinforced the tendency to reduce and then eliminate most extra-European commitments from the mid-1960s.

The book is supported by an extensive bibliography indicating the very genuine depth and breadth of research. Inevitably, given the scope of the subject, there are some works relating to British policy in the period that have not been consulted. Reference to Spencer Mawby's *British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, 1955–67* (London, 2005), for example, could have supported French's claims about the coercive nature of British counterinsurgency at this time. Nevertheless, the engagement with secondary sources is impressive. Fundamentally, the book rests on very detailed primary source research in UK-based archives. Once again there are one or two minor omissions. The apparent failure to consult the Mountbatten papers is disappointing. Lack of reference to Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes and memoranda is puzzling given the range of relevant issues discussed in this joint forum, and rather limited reference is made to Air Ministry and Admiralty files. This may be inevitable in a book focusing on the army, but additional insight into the army may have been provided by some more research into their relationship with, and the views of, the other services.

Despite these caveats, it is important to note that this is a very well-researched book that succeeds in its aim to provide the first scholarly general history of the British army in the period from 1945 to 1971. In doing so, it provides a wealth of new information and challenges some widely held assumptions about the nature of that army and of British defense policy. It is to be hoped that this book prompts others to continue the investigation, to probe into issues and areas that French could only touch upon and thus to further our knowledge of the moral, physical, and conceptual components of the fighting power of the British army. In sum, this is a useful and an important work that will be essential reading for all those interested in the postwar British army and in wider British foreign and defense policy during this period. It is a good book, and I recommend it to you.

Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth

SUSAN R. GRAYZEL. *At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. 334. \$99.00 (cloth). doi: 10.1017/jbr.2013.33

This detailed, well-written book chronicles the cultural transformation wrought by the air raid, in reality and in the British imagination, between the early Zeppelin raids of the First World War and the end of the Blitz in the Second. Grayzel suggests that a gender-sensitive reading of how civilians understood the phenomenon of the bombing of cities reveals a deeper shift in perceptions of the nature of the state and war in the mid-twentieth century. The core argument is that the civilian reaction to bombing, especially in the First World War, eliminated the distinction between home and war fronts, and understanding the domestication of war helps explain both the rise in concern over the potential of bombing in the interwar years and the reaction to that bombing during the Blitz. Aerial bombardments meant that war could literally come home without warning, thereby turning civilians, particularly women and children, into targeted combatants. Dealing with this eventuality required a new form of civic identity, and Grayzel details how the creation of the civilian as stoic combatant came into being during the First World War.

This is one of the more original aspects of the book: Grayzel makes it clear that the people's heralded stoicism in the face of bombing was not the product of the Blitz itself. For other than the scale of the attacks, there was nothing really new about the bombing of the Second World War or the population's reaction to it. Grayzel shows that the expectation and reality of stoicism in the face of bombing during the Blitz was culturally forged over the previous twenty years. She details reactions to First World War bombing, the rise of interwar civil defense and Air Raid Precautions, and British discussions of the examples of bombing elsewhere, particularly during the Spanish Civil War. Indeed, as is well known, culturally expressed fears about the future prospect of bombing and aerially delivered gas in the interwar years far exceeded the actual experience of the Second World War.

Grayzel shows how the first civilian reactions to bombing in the First World War were confused and contested, ranging from outrage at their illegality and disbelief over their atrocity to calls for immediate retaliation in kind. And while discussions of the civilian reaction inevitably contained gender, social, and racial stereotypes (that Jews in the East End were more likely to panic, for instance), by the end of the war it was apparent that the population as a whole had adjusted to the situation with a grim determination to endure the new methods of warfare. The air raid had become domesticated. Pacifists and feminists used the air raid as a prime example of the dangers of modern war in their campaigns in the interwar years, only to be faced with arguments to the effect that not to prepare for air raids in the future would be damning the nation to certain attack and defeat. Eventually, the realization that all were at risk to