

which rebels acquire arms are complex and challenging for them as they try to maintain insurgency. She argues that downturns in the resources and short-term capacity of rebels lead them to seek negotiations with the state.

This book includes a detailed exploration of the trajectory of rebel resource networks in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire, examining military, economic, and political resources. Citing the now-extensive literature showing a conflict-enhancing effect of natural resources, Hazen emphasizes the difficulty of translating natural resources into arms and highlights the degree to which rebels rely on black markets and the whims of foreign supporters. She concludes that the "most successful rebel groups will be those with the most diversified support networks" (p. 179).

A key contribution of Hazen's book will be to influence how scholars think about rebel capacity and the role it plays in determining when rebels pursue negotiations. Yet there is, as the author notes, a disconnect between negotiations and war end. Negotiations, she demonstrates, can be used as a time for rebels to regroup and resupply. The book is framed around the question of civil war duration (see Chapter 1); however, the underlying processes that it focuses on are not explicitly linked to the war end, except to say that war is more likely to end when the "taps [are] turned off" and rebels essentially cannot "maintain any viable alternatives" to fighting (p. 23). This conceptualization, which assumes that rebels will always fight if they can, prizes the role of resource networks above many other factors in determining conflict end (such as the role of third-party guarantors, the possibility of political power sharing, territorial decentralization, or military intergeneration). Rebels are not seen as having meaningful, and thus potentially satiable, political goals. Yet it is not clear that in all successful settlements of civil war (successful being, of course, a contested concept), rebels no longer could fight. The Shanti Bahini forces fighting in Bangladesh demobilized in response to concessions from the government after years of low-level fighting. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement in South Sudan almost certainly maintained the ability to wage insurgency at the time of settlement of the North-South Sudanese conflict in 2005. This does not in any way negate the central message of the book—that rebel supply networks are critical to their capacity and that they vary quite a bit over time and across rebel groups—but it does suggest that the role of supply networks on the outcome of conflict termination (as opposed to negotiations) is less clear and warrants further exploration.

Both books make a meaningful contribution to the study of civil war, and in the case of the Checkel volume, to the debate over what is good social science. Each also provides examples of excellent case-focused research that speaks to the quantitative study of civil war.

Alien Rule. By Michael Hechter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 218p. \$85.00 cloth, \$28.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592714002989

— Alexander Cooley, *Barnard College*

Over the course of his career, Michael Hechter has examined the subtle interplay between dynamics of collective action and national identity formation and mobilization. *Alien Rule* is perhaps the most ambitious in this line of works in its scope, as it explores no less than "the conditions that have made, and that might continue to make, alien rule legitimate in the eyes of the ruled" (p. 7). The simply posed puzzle, Hechter's disarmingly straight forward explanation, and a rabble-rousing selection of cases make the book a vital contribution to the analytical literature on empires, international hierarchy, and the sociology of organizations more broadly.

Antipathy to alien rule is rooted in nationalist sentiment and, in modern times, the powerful norm of sovereignty. Self-determination, according to Hechter, is so pervasive in modern times that no type of alien rule can be held normatively legitimate (p. 16). Instead, the author develops an instrumental notion of legitimacy that allows for a governed population to comply with the governance of ruling "out-group," even in the absence of coercion.

To secure legitimacy, rulers must first provide a stream of culturally relevant public goods to governed populations and, second, ensure that these are fairly allocated. This unabashedly rationalist logic is perhaps the most well-developed theoretical exposition of "efficacious authority" to date—and the argument's logic is applied to several different types of external governance including colonial regimes, contemporary military occupations, international post-conflict administration, and even NGO-administered governance. These insights also complement David Lake's relational contracting perspective on international hierarchy that observes that client states accept the authority of a patron in exchange for providing security and/or economic privileges.

The book's chapters are as fascinating as they are eclectic. Hechter confronts the near scholarly taboo surrounding the "alien rule/legitimacy" issue, but also selects controversial cases that themselves have spawned heated political and historiographical debates. Chapter 3 traces the history of foreign rule in Iraq, dating from the Ottomans to the British Empire and then native rule under Saddam Hussein, concluding that political stability will remain elusive in the post-U.S. intervention reconstruction phase as long as Iraq's oil wealth is unequally distributed.

Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the acceptance and legitimacy of Japanese colonial rule in two South Korea and Taiwan, demonstrating how Japanese colonial rule "yielded greater acceptance" in Taiwan (p. 95) than in

Korea where colonial policies fostered growing resistance. Hechter also develops three further propositions concerning the timing of occupation, incentives for collaboration offered to native elites, and the efficacy of rule in promoting economic modernization and development, thereby also weighing into the debate on the effects of Japanese colonialism on postwar East Asian development.

Chapter 5 focuses more narrowly on the dynamics of collaboration and legitimacy of military occupations, advancing a provocative analysis of the calculations made by Palestinians who decide to collaborate with Israeli authorities. Chapter 6, co-authored by Gail Dubrow and Debra Friedman, extends the logic of the argument to a quite different organizational domain—academic departments and the logic of receivership. Here, the authors show how externally appointed Chairs can return order to departments torn apart by disciplinary incoherence and resistance to institutional planning. A concluding chapter broadens the scope of the argument even further, speculating favorably on the potential for an international market for governance services and insightfully reminding us that the World Cup, one of the most nationalist sporting spectacles in the world, supports the argument's logic given that a significant portion of national teams hire foreign national managers for their expertise. Alien rule is seemingly disrupting national boundaries all around.

Hechter's analysis raises a number of analytical questions. The first and essential question, which would seem critical to a comprehensive rationalist account, is why rulers, even when adequately informed of the need to provide fairly allocated collective goods, still fail to do so. Even a potentially effective alien ruler is unlikely to become legitimate if the previous regime was effective and suddenly toppled or capriciously replaced. Inadequately performing native rule seems to be an implicit antecedent condition for the theory's logic to operate.

Second, the instrumentalist theory of legitimacy also assumes what is at times an unrealistically long time-horizon and enlightened strategic outlook. As Hechter himself observes, alien rulers may just prefer to use their privileged positions for predation to extract maximum rents for themselves and their narrow band of political allies, even if the center prefers more equitable allocations. Indeed, this is a dominant strategy given the considerable costs of governing directly and effectively. Or the center may actually be unconcerned with legitimacy altogether, preferring to just secure control. The cautionary tale of the extreme rent-seeking and oppression of the Belgian Congo, representative of many European colonial arrangements, is a classic example, as is the contemporary example of Russia appointing client

rulers in the North Caucasus or the breakaway Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Third and fourth, factionalism and its contours within the target society will have profound implications for the parameters of any alien governance, while their management by the ruler sends important signals to other peripheries. As Hechter argues, "[A]n occupier who is aware of the preexisting ideological, political, social or ethnic cleavages in native territory and takes advantage of them will be more likely to succeed" (p. 112). Hechter's Iraq and Japanese colonialism chapters further explore some of these analytical implications, but the issue could be tackled with more deduction and precision. Are decisions to empower or privilege one faction, which erode the fairness of public goods allocation and the legitimacy of rule, the result of resource constraints, the relative size of prominent factions as winning coalitions, or do they reflect a prior disposition to trust one identity-based group of intermediaries over others? If the latter, then identity resurfaces as an important orienting device even within strategic decisions about governance, while these decisions will have important ramifications across other peripheries.

To take the example of academic receivership further, the dysfunction of departments is just as likely to be rooted in intense personality conflicts that map onto and reinforce the disciplinary divides among its faculty. Consequently, external chairs may bring order not by effectively and equitably responding to all concerns, but by actually judging and handing a decisive victory to one of these competing factions. In turn, what the victorious faction and the university administration regard as effective and legitimate may simultaneously be viewed as ruthless and unjust by the vanquished and their allies in other universities whose departments are characterized by similar fault lines.

Finally, though the policy implications of Hechter's argument seem clear—especially within the context of discussing the efficacy of international peace building in post-conflict societies—the actual market mechanisms proposed for these tasks might be self-defeating according to the author's own logic. Much of the dysfunction of the U.S. led reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were rooted in relying on contractors whose organizational incentives were to obfuscate and mis-report problematic public goods projects, not improve their allocation. On the other hand, Hechter's analysis might give an additional reason to take the lending activities of China and other so-called "emerging donors" seriously as acts of international influence. It is exactly Beijing's emphasis on improving infrastructure and public goods in target countries—often secured by concessions in primary commodities—that might make its style of investment and aid more attractive than Western conditional project grants and loans.

Like any classic “big-issue” social analysis, *Alien Rule* prompts us to revisit a whole range of political and social phenomena in an unexpected and thought-provoking new analytical light. Hechter’s argument and provocative case applications will both inspire and infuriate, most likely along predictable theoretical and methodological divides, but its basic insights cannot be ignored by the growing number of scholars engaged with the politics of international hierarchy.

Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order. By Eric Helleiner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. 304p. \$39.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592714002990

— W. Kindred Winecoff, *Indiana University Bloomington*

The 1944 Bretton Woods conference that established the regulatory institutions still governing the global economy was founded on still-remembered battles between the United States and United Kingdom over the principles and control of the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (forerunner to the World Bank). The victory of the United States on most key points of dispute both signaled and formalized the beginning of the American hegemonic project. Control of the world’s monetary system was the prize, and by 1956 the utility of monetary power was proven as the United States coerced reserve-poor Britain into abandoning its intervention in the Suez crisis by vetoing IMF disbursements of dollar liquidity. Monetary power’s importance remains clear today, as world leaders criticize American monetary policies and manipulation of the Bretton Woods institutions while simultaneously stockpiling dollar reserves in an attempt to self-insure against monetary instability. According to the view of these critics of the United States, the economic development of the world’s poorer countries was never a major consideration for U.S. policy.

Eric Helleiner’s chief ambition in this compelling volume is to question this narrative by demonstrating that development was a central issue before and during the Bretton Woods discussions. The “forgotten foundations” of the postwar economic system were a series of efforts, primarily involving the U.S. and Latin American governments, to institutionalize international economic relations following the 1930s depression. The financial arrangements agreed upon at the 1944 conference, at which a number of Southern governments participated, were intended to stabilize the world’s monetary system so that postwar development could occur. Moreover, as Helleiner shows, this development was never intended to be solely for the benefit of the advanced economies wounded by World War II, but also for independent states in Latin America and Asia (and imagined future states that would

emerge from decolonization). These states were supportive of the development goals articulated in the Bretton Woods agreement, seeing them as a follow-on to U.S.-led efforts to construct regional analogues to the IMF and IBRD in the Western Hemisphere from the 1930s. Helleiner supports his claims with a sea of archival documents, many of which were unavailable to previous scholars conducting research in this area. Additionally, Helleiner’s grasp of the secondary literature is extensive; it is highly unlikely that he has neglected a source that would call his account into question.

Much of Helleiner’s account focuses on the relationship between the United States and Latin America during the 1930s and early 1940s. Roosevelt’s New Deal government saw economic well-being as a prerequisite for humans thriving alongside personal liberty and human security. They sought to internationalize these goals as a matter of national security and international cooperation. FDR’s “Good Neighbor” policy orientation was an early precursor to the multilateralism that would later characterize Bretton Woods. The proposed Inter-American Bank was one such effort, and provided a clear model for the IBRD. Other efforts focused on the creation of capable central banks in developing countries that could work with the U.S. Federal Reserve on monetary coordination, balance of payments management, and commodity price stabilization. Not all of these efforts were immediately successful, but they created a stable of technocrats in the United States and Latin America that had been working on these issues for years prior to the Bretton Woods meetings.

Of these, perhaps the most interesting—and least discussed until now—were Raúl Prebisch and Robert Triffin. Triffin, a Belgian-American economist and representative of the U.S. government, consulted with Latin Americans on the creation of new monetary regimes in their countries. Prebisch, best known for his later work on dependency theory, admired these efforts, as well as Triffin personally. The feeling was mutual. The two agreed that developing economies needed to adopt economic policies according to their local needs, particularly in the case of capital account and exchange rate management. Triffin took this conviction with him to the IMF, which he joined as Director of Exchange Control Division in 1946. Thus, deviation from classical economic orthodoxy became embedded both in official U.S. policy and the Bretton Woods institutions from the beginning. Over time, the World Bank and IMF would develop a somewhat different reputation.

Other parts of the world were also interested in the internationalization and institutionalization of development. It has long been known that Friedrich List, drawing inspiration from Alexander Hamilton, was an inspiration for East Asian developmentalism. (List’s 1841 decline of the editorship of *Rheinische Zeitung* paved the way for Karl Marx to gain intellectual prominence as well as an interest in political economy.) Helleiner provides an