also with emotions and self-identity. For example, loyalty, which he claims is an underexplored emotion, is a key theme in the book, and he shows how the politics of skill, such as respect for marksmanship, shaped clientship relationships. He also discusses hunting as the "violent expression of masculinity" (38) and the relationship between hunting and religion in the case of the San and Khoi. He makes the important point that mimeomorphic firearm actions that appeared universal on the surface were in reality locally adapted by those who still relied on spears to fight new enemies armed with guns—as at eTaleni in 1838, where the Zulu defeated well-armed Boer commandos. Moreover, just as guns were materially "naturalized," beliefs about guns were adapted rather than simply adopted. The Sotho, for example, called firearms *tladi-ya-matsoho*, "lightning of the hands," referring to the Sotho belief that death comes not from a distant deity but from the hands of witches. So, as Storey says, "in the gun, there could reside more than one understanding of the material world" (95).

Storey is a rigorous and serious historian with an unpretentious methodology. The structure of the book is logical and clear, and chapters are broadly chronological but thematically distinct. The first five chapters are derived largely from secondary sources, and the subsequent five chapters are largely from primary sources. There are some flaws in the editing (e.g., a whole paragraph is repeated on pages 81 and 83), and occasionally, Storey's secondary sources seem inadequate for the point he is making. But such imperfections are minor and to be expected in a work spanning several centuries and based on several different sets of archives and an immense historiography. Such a historical project demands intellectual boldness, agility of mind, and dexterity in juggling secondary and primary sources. These qualities are clearly manifest in William Storey's *Guns, Race, and Power.*

Sandra Swart
Stellenbosch University
Stellenbosch, South Africa
sss@sun.ac.za

Timothy Scarnecchia. *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964.* Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008. Studies in African History and the Diaspora Series, no. 35. xvi + 224 pp. List of Abbreviations. Maps. Figures. Photographs. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. $80.00. Cloth.

Tim Scarnecchia's book is about the death of a democratic tradition. It argues that, with the ebbing of colonialism in southern Africa, struggles to control the state became struggles between African nationalist movements even more than struggles against intransigent white settlers. Factionalism destroyed a tradition of reciprocal democracy (largely undervalued in pre-

https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.2011.0036 Published online by Cambridge University Press

vious histories) that had emerged in the townships of what was then Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, in the 1950s. This new politics was a departure from that of existing, elite-led African organizations, which were attempting to secure civil and political rights on the grounds that the elite's education and wealth made them equivalent to whites. The new bottom-up democratic tradition was based, rather, on civic leaders listening to the needs of township dwellers who were also, in a classic patronage model, furthering the interests of the poor in exchange for their political support. It was precisely this political support that gave men like Charles Mzingeli, unofficial mayor of Harare township, leverage within the white settlers' state.

By the 1960s, however, with the "winds of change" and the Cold War, the stakes became higher. Rather than offering local patronage within the townships, new African leaders were seeking control of the state: a much bigger pie with much bigger slices of influence and power on offer. In this dispensation, the demands of the poor at the grassroots could only be satisfied at a national level. Rather than offering redress for immediate grievances in exchange for local support, the new "nationalists" required the poor to provide unconditional, unquestioning, disciplined support, in exchange for the promise of an entirely new form of rule at the top of the state.

Scarnecchia goes on to trace the development of "sell-out" politics in the early 1960s: an approach to political dissent that has scarred public life in Zimbabwe ever since. He argues that once the goal of nationalist struggle was the ability to dispense patronage at the national level, there was no room for dissent or policy debate. Nationalist leaders such as James Chikerema and Robert Mugabe saw competition from within the African opposition as a threat to the movement's chances of reaching the ultimate goal of the "political kingdom" (in Kwame Nkrumah's phrase) from which "all other things shall follow." Above all, then, it was important to inscribe competitors as traitors who had to be excluded from legitimacy at all costs: "imperialist stooges" or "sell-outs." Scarnecchia's book shows how a basic compass error—the shift from fighting *for* township residents in order to get their support, to fighting *over* township residents' loyalty—established violent factionalism as the standard mode of politics in Zimbabwe.

Scarnecchia raises some important new perspectives in telling this story. By focusing on urban townships, he challenges work such as Alexander et al.'s 2000 account of nationalism in Zimbabwe (*Violence and Memory*, James Currey) as fundamentally a rural movement—and, indeed, traces the moment at which a shift toward rural campaigns was deflected by the emergence of urban faction-fighting. He also highlights the influence of women in setting the agenda for civic leaders, and, again, identifies the moment at which rape became a "legitimate" tactic in nationalist politics. Along with his detailed analysis of the nationalists' assault on the independent trade union movement—with its implicit critique of the "political kingdom" as

the primary route to a better life—Scarnecchia inscribes gender and class at the heart of the question of what/who constitute "the nation."

Another significant contribution lies in the use of correspondence from the U.S. Embassy and the AFL-CIO. The dependence of all the political movements on U.S. funding, at government or trade union level, highlights the purely polemical nature of the "imperialist stooge" rhetoric. But Scarnecchia also highlights the distorting influence of international actors playing Cold War politics: "What the United States likely saw as relatively 'small' investments in individuals and movements had disproportional consequences for those who received American support and backing" (160), either in saving them from oblivion or compromising them irredeemably.

I would have liked to see a little more attention to the changing meanings of "rights" and "sell-out" in this book. I also wonder how far the inescapable parallels with the political violence and "imperialist stooge" rhetoric in Zimbabwe today have influenced the analysis. But more important, perhaps, than its academic significance, is the book's impact as a profoundly humane work. Scarnecchia reminds us that nationalist heroes are human, subject to making mistakes when goaded by everyday casual racism: "Nationalist leaders channeled their personal and localized frustrations with the humiliations of white racism . . . into political action. It would be a mistake to assume that such channeling of discontent should automatically lead to a coherent nationalist politics" (158). So, rather than blaming individuals for the destruction of a bottom-up democratic tradition and the emergence of "sell out" politics, Scarnecchia notes compassionately that history is messy and mourns a tragically lost opportunity.

Diana Jeater
University of the West of England
Bristol, England
Diana.Jeater@uwe.ac.uk

https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.2011.0036 Published online by Cambridge University Press