

***Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945–1959.*** By Rósa Magnúsdóttir. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. xii, 240 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Photographs. \$74.00, hard bound.  
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In *Enemy Number One*, Rósa Magnúsdóttir contributes to the growing research that examines Soviet cultural relations with the United States during the early years of the Cold War. Drawing on extensive archival documents, Magnúsdóttir analyzes the often unsuccessful efforts of Soviet cultural officials to devise an effective propaganda campaign intended to counter American propaganda and to highlight Soviet achievements. The inclusion of Soviet citizens' responses greatly enriches the literature on the domestic consumption of propaganda and provides new information regarding the Soviet people's reactions to American cultural exchange initiatives.

Magnúsdóttir's book begins with an introduction that recalls the famous meeting of American and Soviet soldiers at the Elbe during World War II. She notes that this meeting inspired feelings of friendship and peace that would be overshadowed quickly as tensions grew during the first years of the Cold War. Her discussion then provides a concise account of Russian and Soviet conceptions of America from 1890–1941. Magnúsdóttir explains that these perceptions later served as the basis for postwar Soviet accounts that stressed the dual image of America as filled with “progressive Americans against the warmongers” (17) and as an example of economic progress undercut by its continued racial, social, and economic inequalities. In subsequent chapters, Magnúsdóttir successfully demonstrates that this image of America as well as the Soviet leadership's attitude toward the wartime alliance became reoccurring features of Soviet postwar propaganda.

Magnúsdóttir devotes the first three chapters to Soviet propaganda and ideology during late Stalinism. Though the wartime alliance had allowed Soviet soldiers and citizens exposure to American culture, the postwar environment stemmed such contact. Among the more successful propaganda efforts Magnúsdóttir analyzes are: the production of films that downplayed America's role in World War II, and the distribution of books by Americans, such as Lee Fryer, who stressed the sufferings of American farmers. Conversely, efforts with limited success include: efforts to jam Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts; visits by high-ranking Soviet delegations to the United States whose members would promote Soviet accomplishments; and visits to the Soviet Union by individuals deemed as sympathetic to socialism who would note its achievements.

Magnúsdóttir explains that Soviet cultural officials privately conceded that they lacked the knowledge to fully counter American propaganda. Amid these concerns, Magnúsdóttir states that Soviet officials expressed interest in the effectiveness of American propaganda. Magnúsdóttir's extensive review of reports known as *svodki* or “moods of the population” (47) indicates that Soviet officials sought to know citizens' thoughts on numerous subjects, including the United States' role in the postwar world. Her further review of individuals' *nadzornye proizvodstva* or “review files” (49) evidences that even some Soviet citizens, who did not reject Soviet teachings, began to frame their responses to events using VOA information.

In the next three chapters, Magnúsdóttir explains that Khrushchev returned to Lenin's notion of peaceful coexistence and sought interaction with the west. She notes that Khrushchev's focus on peaceful coexistence allowed for a reunion between Elbe veterans. At the same time, Magnúsdóttir recounts the Soviets' sustained emphasis on racial discrimination in the United States. Moreover, she describes Soviet officials'

continued lack of knowledge about American society, which resulted in failed propaganda efforts, such as the magazine *USSR*.

Amid the increased contact with the west, Magnúsdóttir analyzes the Soviet Union's struggle with its perceived need to monitor its citizens and with its desire to present itself as an open and a non-hostile society. She best describes this conflict during the 1957 World Youth Festival. During this event, Soviet citizens were monitored and contact between Soviet citizens and western visitors was discouraged. Even after the conclusion of the 1958 cultural exchange agreement, Magnúsdóttir contends that Soviet apprehensions about the west continued. For example, she notes that during the 1959 American Exhibition, Soviet officials forbade Americans from distributing consumer goods, including toy cars and cosmetics. Yet, Magnúsdóttir demonstrates that Soviet citizens appeared to have embraced Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence. Evidence appeared in the many letters citizens wrote to Khrushchev describing their past interactions with Americans and suggestions regarding Soviet-American relations.

Magnúsdóttir's conclusion returns to the theme of the wartime alliance. She notes that currently, memories of the alliance continue to act as the basis for mutual understanding between the United States and Russia, and that within Russia, it serves as the basis for increased patriotism. Rósa Magnúsdóttir's work provides a valuable contribution to early Cold War studies and appeals to scholars and students interested in Soviet and American history.

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***Russia's Turn to Persia: Orientalism in Diplomacy and Intelligence.*** By Denis V. Volkov. Cambridge University Press, 2018. xvi, 267 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Figures. \$105.00. hard bound.  
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This excellent book is a welcome addition to the growing body of works dedicated to the relationship between Russia and Iran in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Drawing upon the Foucauldian concept of power/knowledge, Denis Volkov analyzes the extent and nature of the impact of Orientologists, including "pure" academics and "scholarly trained experts" (10), on Russian state policy towards Iran. The author skillfully traces the dynamics of the relationship between academic knowledge of Iran and the execution of state power through three chronological periods based on political events in both Russia and Iran: late imperial (1863–1917) and early Soviet periods (divided into 1917–21 and 1921–41 sub-periods). Volkov examines the production of scholarly knowledge in four main domains: academic scholarship, the military, the diplomatic service, and the Russian Orthodox Church's missionary activities, with the latter only applying to the late imperial period. All these domains were interconnected at the institutional and individual levels. The author mentions the broader context of Russia's Persianate studies, including modern Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Central Asia, although the factual focus of the book is on Iranian studies.

The author came to the conclusion that in the late imperial period, academic scholars mainly exercised indirect influence on Russian policy towards Iran at an individual level, through training practical experts in the three other domains. It was Russia's western foreign policy that for the most part defined late imperial Russia's policy toward Iran. During the early Soviet period, Volkov argues, a "gradual demise of the classical school of Persian studies" took place (146), as information gathering