Similarly, although Read makes occasional reference to the different views of political economy between Hamilton and Jefferson, he does not take the opportunity to examine the fact that these differences entail radically different views of the good society. Hamilton seems to believe that a political economy built around what we would today call a national economic policy can provide increasing levels of economic growth. Hence, he seems to pin the idea of the good society on the idea of material well-being. Jefferson's ideal, by contrast, is that of political and community self-determination through active, independent citizenship. By situating the views of Wilson and Jefferson on power and liberty within their larger political vision and by paying more attention to the nuances of public liberty, Read might have avoided portraying them as having overly simple solutions to one of the most important questions of political life.

Read's detailed reconstruction and analysis of the competing accounts of the relationship between power and liberty in these four thinkers is a valuable contribution to the literature on the founding period. He reminds us of the quality of thought on profound questions by those at the very center of political life of the time. Moreover, he brings to our attention the fact that for Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson everyday political life was defined in large part by the answers we provide to the fundamental questions of politics.

Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism. By David Schlosberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 223p. $45.00.

Wade Sikorski, *Willard, MT*

According to David Schlosberg, the first thing to do is forget that there is any such thing as environmentalism, a single philosophy shared by everyone who might be described as an environmentalist. Instead of a single theory, which might inform the environmental movement the way that Marxist theory informed the socialist movement, there is an almost unlimited variety of ways environmental advocates identify themselves. Schlosberg lists but a few of them: "Not only romantic preservationists, efficient conservationists, public-health advocates, and environmental illness victims, but also deep ecologists, greens, bioregionalists, animal liberationists, advocates of permaculture and organic agriculture, ecofeminists, religious evangelists, social ecologists, steady-state economists, neo-Malthusians, neo-Ludidites, neo-Hobbesians, ecological technology promoters, nature consumers, indigenous rights activists, spiritualists, planners, conservation biologists, environmental health professionals, environmental justice advocates, environmental lawyers, gains, ecosocialists, nature writers, worker-health advocates, eco-anarchist youth, and more" (p. 3).

As anyone who has ever tried to organize a coalition of environmentalists knows, getting anything done is a lot like herding cats. The more you try to point everyone in the same direction, the more everyone heads off in different directions. According to Schlosberg, this diversity of environmental philosophies is not a cause for despair; it may suggest a failure of leadership and lack of theoretical development, but it is an inescapable necessity based on different experiences of an industrialized environment. Following the thinking of Donna Haraway (*Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, 1991) Schlosberg argues that knowledge about the environment is necessarily situated, limited by place and time. As a result, no coalition of environmentalists can come to a single interpretation of the environment and the harm being done to it because their experience is necessarily dispersed over a wide array of occupations, toxic exposures, disease experiences, personal histories, philosophical and religious orientations, identity structures, and power relationships. However much some may aspire to an objective knowledge about the environment, appeals that transcend any single ideology or perspective are doomed to failure as a purely practical political matter because they simply will not reflect the different things people know about their lives.

The task that Schlosberg sets for himself is to find a way for different kinds of people with different experiences and different knowledges to work together without giving up the energy that comes from being different—to make difference an advantage rather than a weakness. Classical pluralism, as put forward by Edward Banfield, Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, Nelson Polsby, and David Truman, although it ostensibly deals with difference, is miserably inadequate for this task. This model of pluralism is what the large environmental groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, National Audubon Society, and the Environmental Defense Fund, have followed. These groups built huge organizations, centralized control in the staff, went to Washington, lobbied Congress, and negotiated with their opponents, the major polluting corporations, in an attempt to countervail their influence. For all their efforts and all the attention they have received, the Big Ten environmental groups have accomplished little.

Schlosberg contends that a new kind of critical pluralism is more likely to be effective in protecting the environment and seeking environmental justice. Something like William Connolly's (*The Ethos of Pluralization*, 1995) ethic of agonistic respect for difference will create the respect needed for environmentalists of all stripes to work together in rhizomatic pluralities, networks of mutual aid. Instead of approaching difference in others as an obstacle to be overcome, an agonistic respect for difference cultivates an appreciation for it, recognizing that identities are necessarily formed by the way we distinguish ourselves from others. Because those "others" are necessarily lacking in something we appreciate or endorse, we should encounter difference within an understanding that there can be no identity without others who differ from it, and difference becomes an opportunity to learn about the inevitable cruelities and injustices lodged in one's own identity and presumptions. As people reflect on how their differences from others constitute their identities, even the most worthy ones, they gain an opportunity to understand themselves better, perhaps becoming more just and compassionate. Instead of feeling threatened by differences with their allies, environmentalists would be more likely to work effectively with them toward common ends. That is the hope that Schlosberg pursues.

Although environmental justice organizations such as the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice (CHEJ) may not have read Connolly, or writers in a similar vein, such as Michel Foucault, Giles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, that is what they have been doing, Schlosberg contends. They have been organizing what these writers might call rhizomatic pluralities, heterogeneous networks sustained by difference and connection, by multiplication and dispersion, not by hierarchy and singularity. Instead of focusing on policy at a national level, going from the top down (as the Big Ten environmental groups have done), environmental justice groups such as CHEJ have focused on what is happening at the local level, on a particular incinerator, hazardous waste dump, nuclear power plant, confined feedlot operation, or

whatever. Instead of trying to make itself larger, CHEJ helps local organizations get better organized, advises them on what has worked for others, provides technical information on environmental toxins, and then gets out of the way. By weaving together rhizome-like networks of local organizations like this, each dealing with the problems in their own community, instead of building unitary tree-like organizations as the Big Ten have done, organizations such as CHEJ are more likely to cause the changes needed to protect the environment, according to Schlosberg.

Unlike many books in political science, *Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism* will be as helpful to political activists as it will be to academics. It delineates the differences among different generations of pluralist thought and relates those differences to efforts to organize the environmental movement, suggesting ways that would be both more effective and more just. This book is important because it is one of the first by a political theorist to examine the theoretical implications of the environmental justice movement carefully. Let us hope it opens doors that other political scientists will explore.

Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition. By R. Claire Snyder. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 183p. $60.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Florida International University*

This is a clearly written and interesting exploration of the citizen-soldier tradition from a postmodern feminist perspective. The author asks: "What happens in a tradition that links citizenship with soldiering when women become citizens" (p. 2)? In the republican tradition, Snyder argues, citizens are expected to participate in both civic and martial practices. When women engage in martial practices, however, they subvert a long and close association among men, the masculine, and the military. One might suppose that desexing and/or degendering the military would be Snyder's goal, but her argument is more radical.

Snyder believes the ideal of "civic masculinity" should be retained but reconfigured as a set of practices in which both men and women engage. Similarly, she proposes that both men and women engage in a set of practices she calls "robust feminity" (a concept that emerges only in the last pages of the book and is not developed). To me, it seems easier to dissolve the association between men and the military and the association of masculinity and the military than the link between men and masculinity. Even if one does not accept Snyder's final argument, there is much of value in this book.

Snyder is clear about her many assumptions. First, she argues that the military is a key political institution, and only the citizen-soldier tradition places it at the center of political thinking. (I agree it should be; thus, the study of U.S. governmental institutions would encompass the Congress, the presidency, the judiciary, and the military.) Second, for Snyder a citizen is one who engages in civic practices. She contrasts this with citizenship conferred by blood or by place of birth. Although she discusses Rousseau's concept of the citizen-soldier at length, she does not use his better known definition of the citizen as one who is simultaneously sovereign and subject; this would make governing and liability the core elements of citizenship. Also, Snyder does not address the long-standing link between citizenship and property.

In the civic republican tradition "soldiering is central to the process of becoming a citizen, because martial practices instill in citizens the virtues required for participation in self-government aimed at the common good" (p. 100). It is true that those who have soldiered have often used their service to claim citizenship (African Americans after the Civil War and again after World War II, women after World War I, 18-year-olds after Vietnam). Some would argue, however, that the citizen-soldier tradition does not require all citizens to soldier so much as it argues that militaries should be composed of citizens as opposed to mercenaries, and citizens with civilian lives as opposed to military professionals. Snyder rejects both positions.

Snyder also assumes that the republican tradition "necessarily entails" (p. 1) a commitment to the principles of liberty, equality, camaraderie, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship. She suggests that universal, democratic principles are part of the republican tradition. (Some would almost certainly feel it important to distinguish the democratic from the republican.) Snyder does acknowledge, however, that the citizen-soldier tradition she admires has a potential for creating a monster: a military that is exclusive, conforming, and chauvinistic, a military that moves from patriotic defense to imperial conquest, a military composed not of autonomous citizens but of a totalized mass.

Indeed, when Snyder examines particular instances of organizations that invoke the citizen-soldier tradition, she finds little virtue. One example is the militias that emerged in this country in the 1960s (and faded from the landscape after the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City). These, Snyder suggests, were rooted in an antidemocratic exclusion of others, even though they sprang from the belief of members (largely white males) that it was they who were being excluded from civic/political participation, whether because government was responding to a too heterogeneous citizenry or because it had become too large, too remote, too controlled by the wealthy.

A second example Snyder considers is the culture of two state military colleges, Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel. She states these claim to celebrate the citizen-soldier ideal, but instead they use exclusionary, misogynist, and homophobic training practices that are incompatible with the tradition. Again, Snyder asserts that the tradition is democratic, but she acknowledges that the thought of both Machiavelli and Rousseau (which she explores in some depth) can lead to deformed and vicious military institutions. Snyder does not provide any sustained, "virtuous," democratic, inclusive examples of a republican state based on the citizen-soldier tradition. Is it possible that getting people (men or women) to kill and/or to sacrifice their life requires either coercion or the conviction that one is special, different, extraordinary? Is it possible that exclusion is necessary to the functioning of the martial although antithetical to a commitment to the common good? (Current Swiss practices that require male citizens to participate in the military might have provided Snyder with a virtuous example; Swiss women not only do not participate in that military but also only recently have obtained full voting rights.)

Snyder provides a useful review of the U.S. civic republican tradition, beginning with the Second Amendment to the Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792, which required enrollment of all free, white, able-bodied men between the ages of 15 and 45. Not long after that legislation, "voluntary" (exclusionary) militias were formed (pp. 87, 93), which were believed to be "better" than the inclusive militia dictated by law. A little more than a century later the Dick Act of 1903 gave the federal government some control over these "voluntary" groups, which had become known as National Guard units. By 1908 the federal government had obtained the right