

In Chapter 13, Christopher Marx details the logic of Hendrik Verwoerd's technocratic racism, which he used to build and justify the system of apartheid in South Africa after the Second World War. Gregory Smithers compares the construction of whiteness in the United States and Australia in Chapter 14, arguing that, whereas American anxiety about the fragility of whiteness manifested in restrictive immigration policies and legalized segregation, Australia's unwavering belief in racial superiority enabled some to advocate a strategy of eradicating the Aborigine problem through managed education and intermarriage. Finally, in the only chapter that is more contemporary than historical, A. Dirk Moses explores the transformation of white Australia into a multiracial, multicultural society, bringing the heterogeneity of anti-racist discourses, particularly conceptualizations of indigeneity, to the foreground.

Together, the essays demonstrate that there is no singular, uniform mechanism through which global racial ideologies are translated or adapted into different social, historical, or national contexts. It is clear, however, that Western ideas about the nature of race or the function of racism were never adopted wholesale, nor transported without themselves changing through the course of their travels. Similarly, the authors take great pains to demonstrate that racial ideologies are fundamentally transnational, existing beyond the control of any one nation-state, and are also complex, contradictory, malleable, and incoherent. This volume is a wonderful contribution to a growing body of scholarly work and will appeal to audiences interested in transnational history, international relations, and cultural studies.

Between indigenous and settler governance

Edited by Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. Pp. 228. Hardback £75.00, ISBN 978-0-415-69970-9.

Reviewed by Gabriel Piterberg
UCLA, USA
E-mail: gabip@history.ucla.edu

doi:10.1017/S1740022813000570

The most significant contribution of this welcome volume is that it addresses the question of how to study indigenous peoples within the framework of the global phenomenon of settler colonialism. Moreover, the book does not stop at raising the

question, in the manner of Gayatri Spivak's 'Can the subaltern speak?'. Rather it goes on to investigate the colonized indigenous communities' interaction with the invading colonizers. Some of the contributions offer structural analyses of this interaction, while others bring to the fore indigenous subjectivity; not a few of them do both. Crucially, the volume as a whole is a healthy combination of epistemological and ontological contemplation of the colonized on the one hand, and documented, empirical study of their actual history, economy, and anthropology on the other.

Comparative settler colonialism as a scholarly field is relatively recent. The foundational works evinced critical interest in the white settlers and only indirectly in the indigenes, even if the critique was radical. They insisted that the dispossession and elimination of the native societies were not extrinsic 'things' that the settler nations once did but what those settler nations intrinsically are. George Fredrickson's assertion that there is no history of the US and South Africa that is not the history of white supremacy is a notable example.¹ Explicitly or implicitly, the assumption has been that studying the settler societies aloofly from their interaction with the native societies is tantamount to accepting the former's hegemonic narratives (for example, studying the formation of such pivotal Zionist institutions as the kibbutz and the *Histadrut* as if they were unrelated to what the Zionists called the 'Arab problem'). This direct concentration on the settlers stemmed from the fact that these scholars originated in the settler nations that they radically criticized, as well as from the fact that the settlers, for obvious reasons, had left a heftier and more accessible record.

Even a scholar of native origin such as Edward Said, whose work is not normally associated with settler colonialism, addressed the settlers directly, and the colonizers more generally, rather than the natives. His seminal essay 'Zionism from the standpoint of its victims, is a case in point. In it Said did not directly engage with the standpoint of the victims.² Rather, he read Moses Hess, George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*, and Herzl, and submitted a corrective: one ought to ask not just what these writings meant for Jews but what their consequences

1 George Fredrickson, *White supremacy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

2 Edward Said, 'Zionism from the standpoint of its victims', in *The question of Palestine*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 56–114.

would be for Palestinians. It might be objected, however, that the victim's standpoint is in the authorial voice.

Between indigenous and settler governance is a substantial contribution to the growing search for the study of indigenous societies in the context of comparative settler colonialism, in ways that go beyond the critical investigation of the settlers from the standpoint of what their actions meant for the natives, even if this consideration continues to loom large. The temporal focus of the volume's essays is the nineteenth century to the early decades of the twentieth; spatially they deal with North America and Australasia. In the Introduction, Lisa Ford explains that what makes this possible, in essence, is the discrepancy between settler intention and structure on the one hand, and contingency and incompleteness on the other. The eliminatory nature of settler projects as well as their uncompromising drive to absolute sovereignty, vis-à-vis both the native communities and the metropole, has never been coherent and complete, and has left gaps, however narrow, for the indigenes to resist and try to reassert themselves in very difficult environments and in a perforce limited manner. Moreover, the legal and economic structure of the settler states – though prejudiced and discriminatory in theory and practice – could be creatively used by indigenes to further their interests with varying degrees of limited success.

The tension between structure and 'messy' reality as a facilitator for examining the indigenous communities in concrete circumstances is embedded in a comment that Ford makes on one of the most prominent scholars of settler colonialism, Patrick Wolfe. On several occasions she has disapproved of an excessive structural determinism that she detects in his approach, and she raises it again in this volume: 'To this end, the work gathered here collectively rejects notions that settler colonialism is a structure bent inexorably on dispossession, subordination, erasure or extinction Instead, this volume demonstrates the contingency and incompleteness of settler states and their collective, indigenous interlocutors, and it insists on the constitutive nature of their interactions, however unequal (p. 11).'

Ford's critique is helpful in that it poignantly encapsulates the approach that provides a coherent framework for the volume's chapters; but it is also problematic. The book shows neither that settler projects are *not* eliminatory by both intention and material structure (in a land-labour formation in

which, fundamentally, native labour is eschewed but the entire land is coveted it could not have been otherwise), nor that their eliminatory nature ended in the frontier phase. What it does demonstrate in a variety of ways is that this structure is incomplete, not perfectly coherent, and ridden with contradictions, which presents possibilities for indigenous action in an environment that has no 'post' of either settlerism or capitalism. Wolfe is the author of the most oft-quoted dictum in settler colonial studies: 'Invasion is a structure, not an event'. The volume's content reaffirms this observation in both approach and documentary evidence. Otherwise, why use the designation 'settler states', in which 'settler' is not just a pronouncement on these states' origination but one that signifies their ideology, praxis, and institutions?

Of the numerous excellent chapters in this collection I would like to highlight three. Ian Hunter's original argument in 'Vattel in revolutionary America' is in the register (described above) of studying the history of the settler nations as the history of their engagement with the indigenes, without directly examining the indigenes themselves. Prevalent narratives of settler legal history, while not uniform, share the assumption that the use of European justice to conquer and dispossess the indigenous people was a corruption of that justice. Focusing on the American revolutionary statesmen-intellectuals, Hunter argues that they 'did not operate within milieux governed by overarching norms: norms they betrayed and that we might restore. On the contrary, during the 1780s and 1790s these statesmen worked within a tradition of political thought whose central premise was that the actions of states – engaged in warfare, conquest, annexation and colonization – are not subject to an overarching principle of justice' (pp. 12–13).

What they did resort to was the European principle of *jus gentium*, the right of nations, which the American founding fathers acquired through its most important articulation, namely Vattel's *Law of nations*. This principle recognized that domestic law within European states was beholden to justice, but that that justice was inapplicable to the relations between European states, and that these relations were governed by a casuistic logic, whereby the case-by-case arrangements between given states tautologically justified – or at least legitimized – them. Hunter proceeds,

Far from betraying a higher law that might have included Europeans and indigenous peoples within

an overarching (possibly pluralistic) jurisdiction in using the Vattelian law of nations to justify their conquest and dispossession of American Indians, the revolutionary statesmen were testifying to the absence of any such overarching law and jurisdiction, not just in the colonies but pre-eminently in Europe itself. Only later, when the discourse on sovereignty passed into the mouths of common lawyers, would conquest become an unspeakable justification. (p. 13)

It is important to clarify that Hunter does not suggest that seizure of native land was abandoned as a result of the passage from *jus gentium* to a common-law type of justification. American jurists now defined conquest and pre-emptive purchase as 'unjusticiable'. At that point, a resort to the law of nations might have implied collective indigenous right to land, and hence circumscribed sovereignty; this was unthinkable.

Tim Rowse's 'The identity of indigenous political thought' is a daringly anti-essentialist endeavour, whose pertinence is wider than the volume's purpose. Rowse objects, and proceeds to offer an amply demonstrated alternative, that 'Trying to identify the indigeneity of ideas suggests that there are criteria for judging to be "truly indigenous" based on their continuity with pre-contact traditions, their political intentions and effects' (p. 95). He suggests instead eschewing the ahistorical jargon of genuine authenticity. Rowse contextually reads the texts of four native thinkers – Peter Jones, Charles Eastman, Apirana Ngata, and William Cooper – whose lives spanned the period from the 1830s to the 1930s in North America and Australasia. He interprets their arguments on their own terms in their own contexts. He insists on taking seriously 'the self-proclaimed indigeneity of [the] authors', and is unperturbed by the fact that 'They presented themselves as Christians, as "civilized" and even as "white" ... They are interesting because they connected the fortunes of their people to certain human universals of evidently Western provenance' (p. 95)

Those who presuppose that indigenous thinkers must adhere to their pre-contact *Weltanschauung* to be authentically indigenous, understand them as strategic and mimetic when they did not do so. Rowse rejects this essentialism. His approach is, methodologically, the most thought-provoking contribution to the volume because it fundamentally offers an abashed and fresh way of thinking about the dialectic tension between the particular and the universal, a way in which the thinkers whom he reads were to the settler

societies what the mirror was to Snow White's stepmother. Take Charles Eastman (1858–1939), a Sioux whose father converted to Christianity. He wrote to the American settler society in 1915: 'You are suffering from a civic disease, and we are affected by it. When you are cured, and not until then, we may hope to be thoroughly well men' (p. 100). This statement would not have been inappropriate for other 'native' figures such as the French Jew Bernard Lazare in the *fin-de-siècle* Third Republic or Martin Luther King in the racist US of his time.

In 'Economy, change and self-determination: a central Australian case', Diane Austin-Broos turns to the material base of an indigenous community – the Western Arrente people in central Australia – in the settler context. The foundation of her piece is empirical; her research consists in an interesting combination of historical documentary evidence and ethnographic data. On that basis she raises questions relating to the economic base. Ontologically, she asks whether, in accounts of indigenous self-determination under settler sovereignty, the economy should 'precede' law and governance. She goes on to submit that invasion had two transformative points of impact upon Arrente economy. One was 'European things and practices including new foods, animals and tools. The other was [settler] pastoralism's impact on a desert environment watered by periodic rains but also subject to periodic drought. In particular, a drought in the 1920s denuded the land and made a hunter-gatherer economy difficult to return to, especially in the context of settlement' (p. 109). Resorting to Heidegger, she submits that 'These two impacts were mutually reinforcing; they redefined the Arrente's experience and their sense of being in the world' (p. 109).

Politically, Austin-Broos questions the prevalent assumptions: one is that what is called (economic) development is viewed as being perforce assimilationist (and assimilation is the final stage of the elimination of the natives by the settler project) 'and, therefore, as something antithetical to the rights involved in self-determination. Alternatively, this dilemma is avoided by the assumption that only local forms of development based on land rights are appropriate for Indigenous peoples' (p. 108). She complicates these assumptions by offering possible answers to two questions: 'But is greater participation in an Australian economy inevitably assimilationist? And does an economy built on land rights obviate the need for remote Aboriginal people to engage more fully with the education that rural enterprise now requires?' (p. 108).

In conclusion, the great merit of this volume is perhaps evinced by the fact that it stimulates one to think of cases that are not included in it. Take Palestine/Israel: what is called the two-state solution, hypothetically assuming that it is at all possible, would offer the conflict's indigenous side national sovereignty, however circumscribed. The common-state solution would inevitably mean forsaking full-fledged sovereignty, at least some degree of fusion with the settler society, and a fundamental shift to the struggle for an equitable political framework. What path should the native Palestinians take?

The family: a world history

By Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. *New Oxford World History*. Pp. 160. 20 b/w illustrations, 3 maps, 1 chart. Hardback £47.99, ISBN 978-0-19-530476-3; paperback £12.99, ISBN 978-0-19-533814-0.

Reviewed by Hong-Ming Liang
College of St Scholastica, USA
E-mail: hliang@css.edu

doi:10.1017/S1740022813000582

This is a concise and well-organized survey of how families, broadly understood, have shaped and been shaped by historical forces from the beginning of recorded history to the present. This book is a part of The New Oxford World History series, which seeks to explore the connectedness and interactions demonstrated throughout the totality of the human experience. Given the stated objectives of the series, the authors of *The family*, Professors Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner, have successfully achieved these goals. This relatively slim volume surveys a lengthy timeframe while providing informative case studies in each of the chapters drawn from a variety of geographical locales. The approach allows the reader to understand the familiar patterns played by family units across time and around the world, while also clearly seeing the complications, the differences, and the unique changes emerging from locality to locality, from time to time.

Maynes and Waltner's overarching thesis is that the family is a historical construct rather than something that is 'natural'. Moreover, they assert that the family has been as much an agent of historical change as an entity impacted by historical forces. The notion that the family, just like the

nation-state, is a historical, human construct may strike many scholars as unremarkable – but for many teaching undergraduate survey courses in world history and global studies, this is perhaps one of the most critical, and difficult, ideas to convey to students. In a very real sense, the fundamental power of 'the family' arises precisely because it has convinced so many that it is a natural, static unit, that it has been created since the beginning of time, and that it has remained unchanged through thousands of years of history. The volume's thesis, consistently argued throughout, and backed up with evidence from across the globe, is therefore an important contribution, particularly for those who care about undergraduate teaching.

There are seven main chapters in *The Family*, with a brief preface and an epilogue. The first chapter covers the history of the family up to 5000 BCE, the second to 1000 CE. Chapter Three considers the emergence of politics and kinship c.3000 BCE to 1450 CE. Chapters Four and Five discuss early modern families (1400–1750) and global markets and families (1600–1850). Chapters Six and Seven address the impact of revolutionary times on families (1750–1920) and of the era of state population management on families (1880 to the present).

Each of these chapters is amply supplied with case studies from around the world. As the work progresses, one can clearly see the major underlying themes and categories of analysis. Some of the main examples from this study are: changing gender roles, influence by and towards religion, the impact upon state formation and political legitimacy, the role played by agricultural development and industrialization, the complex interactions between familial practices and race and nationality, and the impact upon and by family upon colonization, imperial expansions, and ultimately globalization. On the issue of gender roles, for example, Maynes and Waltner argue convincingly that different locales, responding to different historical contingencies, made very different choices. On the lengthy and complicated relationship between familial ties and politics, there is clearly a broad patterns of states attempting to co-opt familial structures and ties, though familial and kinship practices have also had a strong impact on how political authority has been shaped and communicated throughout world history.

This book is suitable for an undergraduate course, or an advanced high school class. It is also useful for instructors on all levels preparing a survey