

finances proposed by the editors of *ATL*. In a sharp critique, S. argues convincingly that this text tells us nothing of value about fifth-century Athenian finances. He is also alert to the insidious process whereby restorations of incomplete epigraphic texts, often proposed *exempli gratia*, come to be treated as more or less certain.

Space precludes detailed examination of S.'s individual arguments, but his reconstruction is certainly both plausible and an improvement on that offered in *ATL*. On several critical points he candidly admits that he is forced to speculate: we simply do not know how much money there was in the treasury of Athena in 450, or where the 3,000 talents mentioned in Kallias Decree A came from, or how much the Athenians spent on the Sicilian Expedition. Given the nature of our sources, it would be unreasonable to ask more of a reconstruction than plausibility and internal coherence. Whether or not its more speculative suggestions ultimately carry conviction, this thorough and well-argued book will be required reading for anyone with a serious interest in the Athenian empire.

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### ATHENIAN DECEPTIONS

J. HESK: *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*. Pp. viii + 336. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Cased, £40. ISBN: 0-521-64322-8.

This stimulating book is billed as 'the first full-length study of the representation of deceit and lies in classical Athens'. The wording is carefully chosen: a comprehensive study of deception and dishonesty at Athens would require a far greater scope, as Hesk acknowledges (e.g. pp. 274–5, for Euripides), and while he offers a *tour d'horizon* of many significant aspects, H. is principally interested in 'representations and evaluations of deception (*apatē*), lies (*pseudē*) and trickery (*dolos*) in Athenian texts' (p. 7, italics original), and in the ways in which these concepts are manipulated and negotiated in Athenian public discourse. In his Prologue, H. usefully summarizes the argument of the volume and justifies his methodology, the scope of the study, and the relevance of parallels from modern Britain and America—the introduction is headed by quotations concerning Colonel Oliver North which foreground questions about the relationship between deceit and democracy today.

The first chapter presents the characterization of deceit and dishonesty as un-Athenian, first in an ideological antithesis between the Athenian hoplite, who always fights fairly, and the Spartans, who school their young men in military trickery, then in Demosthenes' presentation in *Against Leptines* of honesty as a national characteristic of Athenians, supported by some consideration of sanctions for deceiving the demos, and finally in a discussion of Euripides' *Andromache* in which the Spartans are characterized as fundamentally deceitful. However, H. also sees Peleus' invective against the unjustified pre-eminence of *stratēgoi* throughout Greece (*Andr.* 693–705) as a passage which could have had uncomfortable resonances for an Athenian audience, since 'deception and Athenian generalship are not necessarily incompatible' (p. 83). This provides a link to the next chapter, which considers under what circumstances the Athenians regarded military deception as justifiable. Starting from Vidal-Naquet's classic identification of such trickery as ephebic and improper for citizens, based on the myth of the 'Black Hunter', H. argues that other texts, notably

Lycurgus' account of Codrus (*Leoc.* 84–7), put a positive civic value on such ruses; at the same time, the continuing questioning of military deceit, particularly the suggestion that it is motivated by cowardice, rules out a simple evolution of outlook in parallel with changes in military practice and suggests instead that military deceit was a negotiable concept which could be manipulated according to context. Yet the concept of justifiable deceit raises its own difficulties, and H. argues that the dialogue between Cyrus and Cambyses in the *Cyropaideia* (1.6.26–41) highlights the tensions between the fundamental need to educate the young in honesty and the benefits of learning how to use deceit against legitimate objects, and consequent problems in defining those objects. This again forms a bridge to the succeeding chapter, which confronts the issue of the 'noble lie' (trailed by allusion to Popper in the Prologue, pp. 1–3), and the relationship between the political use of deceit and constitutional form. Although dubious about defences of Plato's position, H. shows that he grounds it in 'common-sense' perceptions in contemporary Athens, and that while the standard position in rhetorical contexts is that deceit is antithetical to and dangerous for democracy, even Demosthenes can float the idea of an 'appropriate fiction' (20.119) when this is tactically advantageous. Two literary studies pursue this theme: the *Sisyphus* fragment hints at the dangers of explicitly identifying beneficial lies, while recognition of Athens' conditional acceptance of noble lies for military and political reasons requires the audience to take seriously Odysseus' position in the *Philoctetes*.

Chapter 4 discusses the manner in which Athenian speakers handled the 'rhetoric of anti-rhetoric': one could admit to being a clever speaker, but not a teacher or logographer, rôles linked to dishonest sophistry and wizardry and the desire to win at all costs as a demonstration of cleverness. Within a basic ethos of suspicion of rhetoric, individual speakers creatively manipulated stock positions to present themselves as experts in uncovering their opponents' lies—even physiognomy could be characterized as dishonest. The final chapter pursues the deployment of anti-rhetorical strategies in Thucydides' account of the Mytilene debate, Aristophanic comedy (especially *Acharnians*) and Euripides (particularly *Hippolytus*), and shows how anti-rhetoric becomes suspect itself, to the point that it becomes impossible to find firm principles on which to decide whom to trust. Yet if this aporetic conclusion is somewhat discouraging ('it is all rather unsettling', p. 272, cf. p. 246), H. insists in his epilogue that 'the struggle to determine which *logos* is lying to us' (p. 298) remains vital to contemporary democracy.

There is much to enjoy here: H. is theoretically sophisticated, his arguments are careful and precise, and he is skilful in refining and nuancing established positions. He is also generally duly sensitive to context, especially in dealing with rhetorical strategies (e.g. pp. 106, 168–9, 229–30), and his handling of particular source passages is deft and illuminating (the treatments of the *Cyropaideia* and *Philoctetes* mentioned above are notable examples). Occasionally the argument could be sharpened: in forensic rhetoric, the natural presumption is that (at least) one side is lying, and each litigant will naturally try to prove this of his opponent, but such is not necessarily the case in the assembly, and Cleon's labelling of his opponents as dishonest is a deliberate and provocative choice, while a young or inexperienced speaker might well prefer simply to claim that previous speakers have not found the best policy (e.g. Dem. 4.1, Thrasymachus F1). Although H. is careful to mark off explicitly issues which he opts not to cover, there are times when he omits matters which might merit attention: for example, if one accepts the (questionable) characterization of naval manoeuvres as 'deceptive' (pp. 27–8 and n. 26), could not the same thing be predicated of hoplite warfare? At what point do tactics like the Theban formations at Delium and Leuctra

become unsporting? Again, given that it was beyond the pale to be a logographer, why did the Athenians allow their clients to use a system which arguably institutionalized deceit? Nevertheless, if H. has left questions unanswered, it is a merit of this complex and subtle study that it leaves one wanting to continue the debate.

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## THE DELPHIC AMPHICTIONY

P. SÁNCHEZ: *L'Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes. Recherches sur son rôle historique des origines au IIe siècle de notre ère.* (*Historia Einzelschriften* 148.) Pp. 574, maps. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001. Cased, DM 196. ISBN: 3-515-07785-5.

The Delphic Amphictiony held a unique place in Greek history from earliest times right down to the Roman conquest. Its importance devolves primarily, but not exclusively, from the fact that it found itself in charge of the most famous oracular shrine in the ancient world. Its significance is reflected in the literature from all periods of Greek history, and its wealth guaranteed that it would leave to posterity an abundance of inscribed information. Until the appearance of Sánchez's remarkable book, we have not had a comprehensive and up-to-date study of the Amphictiony.

S.'s history pulls together all the major evidence, both literary and epigraphical, and surveys a full range of modern theories regarding the nature and functioning of the Amphictiony. The result is a critical study that lacks nothing in scope or depth of analysis, one that promises to be the standard reference work for years to come. This is especially true thanks to the book's meticulous organization and generous use of sub-headings.

Despite the abundance of surviving evidence, there is disagreement among scholars regarding some of the most fundamental things regarding the functioning of the Council. Inscriptions indicate that the *hieromnemes* voted at the meetings of the Amphictiony. *Hieromnemes* are rarely mentioned in the literature, however, which usually speaks of *pylagoroi* or *agoratroi* instead. There is little doubt that all of these officials represented the member states in some way. In two appendixes, S. attempts to explain the relationship between the Council of the Amphictiony and its members. In Appendix I (pp. 496–509), he concludes that *pylagoroi* and *agoratroi* are synonymous terms for elected delegates who went to the Council to argue cases before it, but did not vote except in the rarest of emergencies. In the second appendix (pp. 510–15), he addresses the relationship between member communities and the Council. Important matters would first be broached at the Council. After consultation at home, the *hieromnemes* would return to the Council and pass the appropriate motion. This act brought the question to an end; the member communities did not formally ratify the Council's decisions.

I have spoken of member states, but S. shows that that expression actually misrepresents the case of most of the members. He speaks of 'peuples membres' throughout the book. The reason is that the Amphictiony began as an organization of peoples who sent delegates from the cities within their territories on a rotating basis. Even Athens and Sparta claimed membership not in their own right as city-states but as members of the larger communities of Ionians and Dorians.

The history of the Amphictiony begins in the archaic period and fades after the