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PART I.—ORIGINAL ARTICLES.

Address; on Medico-Psychology. By W. A. F. Browne, Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland.

(*Read by the President at the Annual Meeting of the Medico-Psychological Association, held at Edinburgh, July* 31*st*, 1866.)

This is the first occasion upon which we have assembled under the title of the Medico-Psychological Association. The event appears to me auspicious both as inaugurating a more correct designation, and as pointing to a wider and more legitimate destiny. We can no longer be mistaken for a mere friendly club or a mutual defence society. We may now claim as among our objects the investigation of *all* subjects bearing upon the science of mind in connection with health and disease, as well as those which affect our personal interests or the interests of those committed to our charge.

We claim even a wider, almost a universal range for the science of Medico-Psychology, and we claim for it a distinct position in science. The difficulty is to assign and to restrain it within limits. The multiform phases of actual insanity will be confessed by all to fall legitimately within its province. The still larger and more proteiform affections, unequivocally morbid, but compatible with such an amount of health and work-a-day self-control as neither to violate law, nor decorum nor delicacy, may be tacitly conceded, and, at a certain stage, naturally and inevitably come within the same category. But it is held to be a corollary of the definition of medico-psychology now accepted, that all physical diseases, all changes in structure, have a psychical, and often a morbid psychical side; that to overlook the mental condition of

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the fever- or consumption-stricken patient because the disease is corporeal, would be as absurd as to disregard the bodily condition of the melancholic or of the general paralytic because the disease is mental.

It would not be enough, according to this estimate, for the psychologist to interpret delirium as an indication of cerebral disturbance, to allay fear or to sympathise with suffering—acts which might be performed by the humane and the uneducated; but it would be incumbent to connect the special mental condition with the particular changes going on in the organisation, to employ the mind as a medium of treatment, or, conversely, to act through the body upon the mind—and, in short, to embrace all the phenomena presented, and precisely in the same manner, as if they were of equal importance or demanded the same consideration.

A glance of the idiotic, imbecile, backward, hebete, criminal portions of our population will infallibly suggest the advantages of bringing such views to bear upon the education and training of the young, to such an extent, at least, as that the attempts to impart knowledge should be in harmony with the laws of health, and with the temper and temperament of the individual as affected by structure. For in the errors of education may lurk the poison which grows into insanity or eccentricity, and, in like manner, into sound training may be introduced the preservative against eventual latent mental incapacity.

The conservative mission of our science in anticipating, preventing, and modifying mental maladies is hitherto an unworked, and, it is matter for regret, a neglected problem. The laws of *hérédité*, moral and intellectual degeneration, and of intermarriage, constitute a science in themselves; and, perhaps, contain the basis of the future development and utility of prophylactic medicine. The importance of due attention to transmitted tendencies, not merely in connection with alienation, but with character and conduct, where no open interference of medicine or law could be thought of, and with other affections which are not brought within our cognisance, illustrate the usefulness of such an application of our science. There is a vast class of instances of mental unsoundness, perversity, obliquity, extravagance, which place the sufferer at nearly an equal distance from health and disease, from insanity and crime, and which, undoubtedly, depend upon physical causes, tend to modify other forms of disease, are the sources of incalculable social, domestic, and personal evil, and may originate the pronounced and palpable instances of alienation. The same observation applies when epidemics of mental disease, of theomania, or of suicidal impulse, arise, and even *now* agitate large communities, in the broad, bright sunshine of modern intelligence, and in what are styled, it may be ironically, the centres of civilisation. It

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cannot be doubted that the ravages of such moral plagues, although, like cholera or fever, they may select their victims from the predisposed and susceptive, must owe their origin to some common cause or causes, it may be political or religious commotion or excitement, or imitation, or social conditions, or atmospherical changes, which, if they cannot be counteracted, deserve to be studied. Even the mental phases, the panic, the temerity, the fatalism which so often accompany and aggravate the disasters of ordinary epidemics, claim our consideration.

We may obtain a better view of the fair proportions of the subject by clearing away the rubbish and obstructions which have gathered around it, and by showing what it is *not*. The mere custody and care of lunatics certainly do not constitute a man a psychologist. Even where the physical wants and diseases of the class are attended to, and where an intuitive penetration into character imparts a certain suavity and address to the management, there may not be even a remote or indistinct conception that it is the immortal part of our nature, the godlike attributes of reason and imagination, and even of *faith* itself, and their ultimate destiny in time, which are dealt with, and which are, as the case may be, ignorantly neglected, unconsciously tampered with, or rashly and ruthlessly invaded and disturbed. It is true that, in many well-constituted and well-prepared minds, the experience which grows from mere contact with and observation of the objects of care and solicitude—the actual shortcomings and failures which experimentalisation involves—suggest, obtrude, necessitate the origin and growth of a philosophy, an analysis of the laws of mind as influenced by disease, which, though crude, is invaluable as affording a basis for moral treatment, and for systematising the relations and responsibilities which connect the physician with his patient. It is beginning at the wrong end to learn the physiology from the pathology of mind; but it is better to do this than to stagger and stumble blindly on without a physiology at all.

But could we realise the absurdity of a pure metaphysician being entrusted with the study or reconstruction of the mind diseased, the anomaly would be as egregious and disastrous. It would be vain for such an expert to ponder over the states of consciousness as presented in himself, or to form his opinions or his course of practice upon abstract principles or the subjective analysis of intellect, emotion, or impulse; and, though the unwelcome facts might be forced upon his attention that his most delicate crux failed to detect the elements of which a morbid act was constituted, or that a tendency handed down through and by a long line of ancestors—

> "Through all the blood of all the Howards"—

perhaps, or that an attack of catarrh, or that a fit of indigestion

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introduced new and inappreciable relations into the mental phenomena, he would fail altogether in comprehending or combating the difficulty.

It is not with the view of exciting a smile that I ask you to conceive a disciple of the "pure reason" face to face with a furious maniac, or an animist, exorcising the demon delusions that spring from diseased lungs, liver, or ovaries.

Nor would the mere drug-worshipper fare more successfully. Perhaps the recognition of insanity as a bodily disease, while it conferred incalculable benefits upon the patient, contributed to divert the attention of the physician from the psychical side of the diagnosis; and while he trusted to opium and tartar emetic, he was tempted to forget the "dietetics of the soul," as Feuchtersleben designates our dealings with the moral nature. There is, however, the greater and more unpardonable fallacy in the proceedings of this class of prescribing, and over-prescribing, for the mental condition, of giving opium to cure mania, or iron to cure melancholia; worse than the old and inextinguishable error of treating a symptom, in place of the disease; in so far as the morbid operations of mind are further removed from the reach of remedies, and are actually the expressions of changes in consciousness, depending upon the influence of impressions conveyed through altered structure. Such a view does not exclude enlightened therapeutical treatment; it enhances its value, and gives not only a wider scope, but a more precise and intelligible aim, in its employment. If our knowledge of the physical changes upon which the different forms of alienation depend was more extensive and sound, the limits and effects of remedies might be as much relied upon as in other maladies; but even at the present stage of our science, when treatment is founded and judiciously conducted on the principle of restoring to health the organisation generally with which mind is connected and upon the normal state of which its soundness depends, success attends the attempt in a large proportion of cases. There is, consequently, ground for regret that the millifidianism which has gained a footing in the profession has contaminated the alienists, and that the consumption of drugs in asylum practice presents infinitesimal quantities, even where these are not exhibited in infinitesimal doses; that the active medication of the insane is relinquished so early, that large communities are consigned to the limbo of expectancy, and that so many of our brethren entrust their charges to the kind but somewhat dubious and unregulated influences of food, air, water, light. He who refuses the aid of medicine is as much a heretic to the true faith as he who doubts the efficacy of moral agents.

The pure hygienist—powerful handmaids and coadjutors although food and air, &c., must be confessed to be—is likewise one-sided and weak-sided, and restrained by self-imposed bonds. He who, with

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that potent instrument, a well-appointed, smoothly moving asylum at his command, contemplates, with self-complacency, exquisitely clean, well-arranged, well-aired, and well-lighted and heated wards; and has exhausted his resources when the meals are well served, the baths sufficiently frequent, and the routine of exercise and occupation meets no shock nor hindrance—who marshals his trades, and marches out his squadrons, and subjects all uninvalided patients to the same discipline—is, perhaps, a good superintendent and a splendid drill; but he has failed to embrace the entirety and the grandeur of his mission.

Even he who addresses the æsthetical and imaginative part of our nature—who seeks to reach the highest and purest qualities, and to evoke their influence in spreading calm and order in the agitated and confused spirit through our sense of the beautiful and symmetrical—though wise, is only partially wise, if he trusts exclusively to decoration, and music, and distraction; miles of walls may be covered with pictures and statues, his charges may be enabled to see scenes of natural beauty or the wonders of art, and every succeeding day and hour may have its appointed recreation and enjoyment; and asylum life may be rendered more cheerful and gay, and more devoid of care and duty, than home life; and still this humane system must be characterised as incomplete, and when weighed against the claims and necessities of the mind diseased, must be regarded as frivolous.

In short, the man of one remedy or class of remedies, or who elects such to the undue disparagement or disuse of others, is nearly as rash and in as great danger of defeat as he who fights his antagonist with one hand, or as the physician with no remedy at all, who consoles himself with the antiquated dogma that diseases have a tendency to cure themselves.

We do not undervalue these fellow-labourers; for, humble and limited although some of these approximations to medico-psychology may be, there is involved such an amount of force and dignity of character, such self-possession and self-denial, that neither the public nor our profession know of, think of, and, from their ignorance of the situation and the requirements necessary, cannot realise. There is, however, now no excuse for partial knowledge, since public instruction in medico-psychology may be obtained in conjunction with almost every medical curriculum in Britain.

We are disposed to include in the same category those who conceived that they were curators of the health of the body, and left the mind to its own devices; those who neither courted nor could conceive intercommunion, nor friendship, nor confidence between the physician and his charges; nor who understood the sanatory influence of the healthy over the disordered, of the clear and educated over the ignorant and clouded intelligence, or of sympathy in bring-

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ing back the erring sentiments to calm and sobriety. These contracted modes of action have passed away, or are rapidly passing away, not so much because we have become wiser philosophers or better physicians, but because we have been brought experimentally into contact with the diseases we have to treat—because we now regard the condition as a disease, and not as a superstition, or an abstraction or a bugbear, and because our treatment is founded upon a more just estimate of the laws of the nervous system.

In referring the origin of these opinions to a comparatively recent date which are now recognised as the basis of medico-psychology, my course has not been dictated by any supposition that the philosophers of antiquity were ignorant of the laws of mind. They are, perhaps, open to the animadversion that each individual was a school, a system, a philosophy to himself;—a result, it is probable, of their depending more upon reflection than upon observation—of having devoted their inquiries more to subtleties and to verbal abstractions than to the analysis of mental phenomena; and, above all, they may be arraigned of having neglected or omitted the study of insanity, either because it did not come legitimately within the sphere of their inquiry, or that it did not subserve as a mean of illustrating the objects to which that inquiry was directed. They described as divination or possession what was not "dreamed of in their philosophy," but was actually, and what is now, admitted to be departures from the ordinary laws of healthy mind; and to the malign influence of this theory may be attributed the cruel persecutions and punishments to which certain classes of madmen have been exposed down almost to our own time. There are, of course, many illustrious exceptions to this condemnation. Aretæus seems to have anticipated the views prevalent during last century; to have accurately described the two grand categories, mania and melancholia, under which even now many practical men would place all mental diseases; tracing them to vitiation of the humours and fluids; secondly, to have distinguished, with great ingenuity and delicacy, these typical forms from transitory conditions, such as delirium, intoxication, and natural depression; and, lastly, to have been the originator of moral treatment, although a foe to pictorial ornamentation.

In a still nobler mind there appears to have been a foreshadowing of convictions which have coloured or interpenetrated the doctrines and school so long in the ascendant in Germany, and which has still its representatives. "This internal physician, this councillor and aid, is the power itself which, in every individual being, binds and holds together, in a suitable manner, the finite and the infinite—the soul. It cannot have the knowledge which it evinces from its body, of whose existence and life it is the cause; nor from experience which it has had in common with the body, for that knowledge, in fact, preceded this experience, and in the first instance made

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it possible." So spake Plato. I quote from Feuchtersleben, and so, twenty centuries afterwards, spoke Stahl, very nearly in the same words.

The views of alienation will correspond to and be a reflexion from the popular or established opinions and creeds of the time. They will be somatic or psychological as materialistic or idealistic opinions prevail. All, however, will be disposed to admit that Plato and Aretæus represent two great schools, lines of thought, or modes of belief, which run through all history, and may, under certain modifications, be as distinctly traceable in the present as in any former age.

Out of the incubation of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries there sprang, after many abortive attempts, in full and mature development, the doctrine of the Vitalists. The proposition of Van Helmont was, that all changes, structural or functional, in the body, whether resulting from its own spontaneous action, or from the effects of food, remedies, &c., are under the guidance and governance of a specific agent connected with, but distinct from, the living system. This agent is either an abstract principle or power distinct from matter, or matter so endowed with new qualities and energies as to be entitled to be regarded as an entity. Stahl designated this archæus, or intelligent but unconscious principle, Anima, and recognised it as building up the system, as detecting the presence of all noxious or destructive influences and disorders, and as providing against their effects by exciting such conservative molecular and other changes in the body as may counteract or repair the injury threatened or inflicted.

Dr. Stahl, says Cullen, "has explicitly founded his system on the supposition that the power of nature is entirely in the rational soul. The soul acts independently of the state of the body, and that without any physical necessity from that state: the soul acts purely in consequence of its intelligence perceiving the tendency of noxious powers threatening or of disorders arising in the system, immediately excites motions in the body as are suited to obviate the hurtful or pernicious consequences which might otherwise take place."—Vol. i, p. 6, Preface to Cullen's 'First Series' (Gregory's edition), 1829.

But, in addition to the recognition of this principle, which manifests the attributes of what may be called instinctive reason, and is now dignified by the name of cœnesthesis, or common feeling, and is referred to the ganglionic system, but especially to the phrenic focus; Stahl undoubtedly founded the German psychological school in advocating the dogma that morality, independent of external influences (more or less accidental), is the principle of order in the corporeal and intellectual life, and stands in the same relation to mental integrity and development that the anima does to nutrition and growth; and, on the other hand, that immorality is the sole

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cause of perturbation and disease. And to this point may be traced back, in modern times at least, the application of moral agents as remedies.

Heinroth, who forms the next link in this series, held that man lives, as far as he is man, by reason; that the highest point of human activity is gradual progression: that the first degree of this is sense, or individualism; the second is where the individuality, the *me*, is placed in opposition to the phenomena outside of it.

Between these intermediate stages, and in the essence of *me*, grows up the third term, conscience, which is at this point nothing more than the germ of a higher power, which is derived from a still more elevated source. Health, again, is the equilibrium or harmony of our thoughts and our desires, accompanied by the pleasure which attends the complete exercise of a function. Disease is the destruction of this unity in the suspension of one or more of the vital forces; and its origin cannot be found in the body, but in reason. We suffer, we fear, and the result is passion, which, as a disorder of sensibility, reacts upon the other faculties; throws reason into grievous errors, influences the will, leads to extravagance and dangerous delusions, and crime; which, however, Heinroth attempts to distinguish from derangement.

To this disturbance of the spirit, or diathesis, all insanity is traced; and somatic accidents, violent impressions—even education itself—are regarded as prejudicial or destructive to mental health and serenity by and through this medium. This theory has in the process of condensation, and in the attempt to eliminate obscurity and vagueness, been stripped of much of its attractiveness. And, moreover, it would be unfair to measure Heinroth's precepts of moral treatment by such cloudy magniloquence as "the neutralisation of sensibility is a new product, madness," nor even by the epitome now presented.

The precepts themselves form a code of moral management:—

I. Combat excitement or depression by recalling them within their just limits.

II. If imagination suffer, abandoning itself to reveries and unrealities, have recourse to sensible impressions and lively revulsions.

III. When reason is perverted, it must be combated, not by direct arguments or syllogisms, which irritate the patient, but by indirect appeals through other powers—by tact and discrimination.

IV. If sensibility be blunted, it may be roused by joy or pain.

V. In partial insanity, utilise the healthy faculties in treating and guiding those diseased through the influence of occupation, education, and amusement.

The philosophy of Ideler may be summed up in the propositions—
I. The knowledge of insanity should originate in that of the pheno-

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mena of the normal psychical state. II. Psychology stands in the same relation to mental affections that anatomy and physiology do to physical diseases. III. The want of correspondence between morbid appearances and symptoms opposes the supposition that mental diseases originate in organic changes. IV. Derangement is not a symptom—it is a result of the moral organisation, in a state of change, of the unequal growth and unequal rapidity of growth in the individual faculties. Here is reproduced the equilibrium supposed by his predecessors necessary to health. Ideler is better known, however, as the pupil and biographer and the incarnation of the genius of Langerman, who is said, epigramatically, to have written no book, but to have left a living book in his disciple behind him. Their conjoined doctrine was, that the lunatic mistakes the real end of life, and subverts the true subordination which should regulate the relations of the faculties, not by an error of logic, but by the unhealthy exercise of the will, and of the desires which precede volition; states which together regulate all human acts; in other words, by the emancipation of these powers from conscience.—Secondly, that the great objects of the psychologists should not be reason, attention, but the moral forces or character; or the tendencies, sentiments, and general dispositions of the mind, and of the passions, either singly or in relation.—Thirdly, that the passions, or the product of sensibility, act as the stimulators of our activity; morality merely modifies or moderates their development. In their predominance and disproportion insanity consists. Joy is an index and measure of activity; pain is the proof of an ungratified tendency. Pain is to the tendencies of the soul what vice is to morality. If passion gives time for the exercise of reason, vice follows—if not madness. Spontaneity determines the action of reason and of passion, which may resist, or modify, or nullify its power. A symptomatic insanity is admitted, as in fever, but the origin of genuine idiopathic mental disease must be sought for in passion, *l'état maladif*, and in disturbance of the primitive instincts.—Lastly, not merely the intellect and sentiments, but even the physical forces, mould themselves upon the type of passion; an assertion which may be accepted as the modern phasis of Stahlianism.*

One whose name and fame still cling to the walls of our university may be regarded as having passed the boundary line—or, perhaps, more correctly, as forming the connecting link between the animists and the modified doctrine which now prevails. Robert Whytt is claimed, and with apparent reason, as a partisan of their respective opinions by the animists, the semi-animists, and the medico-psychologists. No higher tribute could be paid to his memory, or to the judiciousness and moderation, or anticipative soundness of his views.

* "Etudes Historiques sur l'Alienation mentale," par Ch. Lasègne et Aug. Morel,' t. iii et v, 'Ann. Médico-Psychologiques,' 1844.

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He was a physiologist of modern convictions, living and distinguished in past time. With the Stahlians, he held that impressions conveyed to the nervous centres excited, by a "physiological necessity" and according to certain laws indicating design and plan and purpose, animal movements—in other words, vital functions, such as digestion, nutrition, circulation; and this without reason, attention, or consciousness. It is very possible that he did not identify this "*physiological necessity*" with a psyche or anima; but he apparently viewed it as different from the rational intelligence—as never rising into consciousness, as self-acting, and as productive of results in the construction, maintenance, or reproduction of that machine, or organisation, upon the integrity and health of which mentalisation depends. His most recent and distinguished biographer seems to be conscious of this; for, while vindicating Whytt from the allegation of Haller that he was a semi-animist, he writes, "There is still room in modern science for a psyche: when the inquirer, not content with mere law, seeks the causes of organic phenomena, he cannot dispense with such an active force. As human intelligence is required to combine and regulate the natural forces which man avails himself of to produce his own works upon earth, so with all the new-found activity of matter derived from the interchange of such forces as light, heat, aggregation, affinity, electricity, polarity, a psyche is indispensable to direct the order and course of these forces in the development and working of organic bodies. Deduct the effects of all these natural forces in the development and working of organic bodies, and the residual force found to be necessary constitutes the psyche—a force just as essential in a protococcus as in the human frame. If it be otherwise sought for, it is nowhere else to be met with, except in the potentialities existing in the reproductive cells derived from the first parent or the first parents of every species in the organic world." He adds further, "such a psyche as is held essential by many modern physiologists—such a psyche as was upheld with much force of argument by the present Professor of Anatomy, in a discourse which he has not yet published, delivered to the Royal Medical Society.*

While we most fully admit, however, that the mind of Whytt was the bridge between the theory of a vital unconscious reason, and those of unconscious cerebration and reflex action of the brain; if he did not, according to Brown-Séquard, initiate or foreshadow them; and, in addition to this, and more important than this, that he advocated, and in his own experience carried into effect, the study of vital and mental phenomena as affected by and observed through organisation, in opposition to all purely chemical and mathematical philosophies,—we cannot resist the conviction that, even as con-

* 'Transactions, Royal Society Edin.,' vol. xxiii, part i, pp. 107-8.

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veyed in the following lucid and definite words of Dr. Sellers, and still more palpably in those of Whytt himself, there is a very distinct adumbration of animism, and to which I do not object: "That the peripheral extremity of an afferent nerve being affected by an impression, there results a corresponding condition of the nervous centre, whence, 'in accordance with the constitution of the living frame,' a motor influence is determined through afferent nervous filaments to particular organs which are thrown into movement."*

It is highly probable that this determination of certain messages to particular obedient organs, which act unconsciously for a useful end, and this without any act or interference or cognisance of mind, would have been accepted by Van Helmont and Stahl as an instalment, if not as a fair and accurate exposition, of their cherished dogma. Even the theory suggested by the word *co-ordination,* now in such constant use, involves a similar conclusion. This consideration has been largely insisted upon, because in it is, in my conviction, contained the true theory of the relation between our physical and psychical nature—that the power which regulates must be different from, independent of, superior to the forces regulated.

Running parallel to, mingling at various points, and ultimately merging into one confluence with the school which we have described, was that of which Friederich and Jacobi were the representatives, which held—1. That the spiritualists erroneously regarded exorcism and superstitious ceremonies as among the rational means of moral treatment.

2. That the doctrine of the spiritualists is immoral, as placing disease, and consequently the eventuality of destruction, in the soul, which is one and indivisible.

3. That it is false, as it confounds moral error, delinquency, with the mental state of lunatics. The untenability of such a proposition being demonstrated by the facts—

(1) That large numbers of criminals have not been unsound of mind.

(2) Children are insane before they can distinguish right from wrong.

(3) Upright individuals have been attacked with insanity.

4. That mental diseases originate as often in physical as in moral causes.

5. That they are cured by physical remedies.

6. That our moral nature is superadded to the functions of matter.

About the opening of this century, the opinions of writers and thinkers upon this subject were capable of being divided into three classes :

* 'Phil. Trans.,' ut supra, p. 124.

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I. Where the mental operations were regarded as the functions of matter, and mental diseases as bodily diseases.

II. Where the mind was held to have existence independent of the body, and its diseases as resulting from the want or loss of equilibrium, or of due culture in its powers, or as the effects of immorality or crime. And,

III. Where an independent operation or life of mind was believed in, and where its derangements were represented as partly psychical and partly corporeal.*

These represented, in fact, the schools into which physiologists were divided. The recent establishment of sounder and broader views, the result of more accurate observation, and, above all, of the careful *practical* study of mental disease by educated men, have lessened the distance between these conflicting opinions, and have so diminished the difficulties by which they were separated, that mind is now admitted as having an independent existence, but to be so intimately connected with organisation that its operations may be facilitated, impeded, or abrogated through this connection; and that mental diseases are the consequences of the disturbance of that nervous power or influence which, under present circumstances, connects mind and matter. Even Friederich, whom we have cited as the champion of the pure somatic school, is detected by Feuchtersleben in propounding as "one of the arguments for the somatic nature of all mental derangements, that the mind is an independent indivisible energy, and incapable of becoming diseased."

And we may triumphantly point to Griesinger, the pathologist, as holding similar opinions: "Entre ces deux actes fondamentaux de la vie physique il s'entrepose toujours quelque chose excité par sensation, un troisième élément, etc. Cette sphère, c'est l'intelligence."—Pp. 28, 29.

Even the doctrines of Gall and many of the phrenologists, by a route which seemed to end in materialism, led to the same proposition. The assertion that the brain was the organ of the faculties of the mind, by and through which it acted, involved its distinct existence, as well as the proposition which constitutes the basis of medico-psychology.

The course of thought among German psychologists has been introduced and pursued, because if it did not actually form the channel through which all that is true and valuable of the philosophies of early times has descended to us, it certainly has contributed many of the materials of which modern belief has been built up and composed; and this whether we regard the firm and substantial observations of the pathologists, or the more subtle and

* 'Feuchtersleben,' p. 68.

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plastic experience derived from consciousness. The prevalent opinions are a union, a harmonisation, a compromise, perhaps, between the materialists and the vitalists; and the general consensus of living medico-psychologists in Europe who have thought out the subject, or thought upon it at all, after making ample allowance for individualisations and idiosyncrasies, may be represented as consisting of convictions that the mind, whatever its nature may be, is intimately connected with, but is not a property of, nervous structure; that its laws, and the relations of those states of consciousness which are named faculties, feelings, instincts, can only be studied and understood in relation to, and as influenced by, the conditions of organisation; that its disorders and diseases must be recognised as expressions of arrested or undue development, or of molecular or other changes—even healthy changes—or of degeneration and destruction of structure; that the remedies when material act by influencing these changes towards health, and thus establishing the normal relation between mind and nervous matter; and when moral, or acting more directly on the intelligence and feelings, they stimulate or repress, or alter, as the case may be, the functional process upon which healthy mentalisation depends. It may be further observed, that this analysis would not express the prevailing doctrine did it limit the relations subsisting between mind and matter to the cerebro-spinal axis. The great characteristic of current opinion appears to be, that wherever there is nerve, *there* is psychical function, actual or potential, which may act dynamically, or through the influence of nutrition, or rise through pain or morbid activity into the range of consciousness. This is the stage at which the archæus of our predecessors ceases its specific instinctive operation, and comes within human cognisance. The nervous influence of the great mass of physiologists, the cœnesthesis of Feuchtersleben, the law of others which is represented as acting altogether irrespectively if not independently of intelligence, becomes part and parcel, and permanently so, of our intelligent being, and furnishes materials for thought—or, more correctly, thought itself. Such propositions as this, and more especially that every mental process must be judged of and treated in reference to the nervous structure and frame in general, and their functions, enormously increase the domain and importance of psychology. If it discloses the innumerable sources of mental disturbance, and that the boasted supremacy of mind is a fable—that it is really dependent for its activity, and integrity, and responsibility, upon the laws and health of the general economy,—it further demonstrates that no circumstance, no impression internal or external, which through these laws reaches our instinctive or conscious nature, but is accompanied with molecular changes, and cannot and should not be excluded from our philosophy. The construction of an asylum—the dietary, the clothing of the insane—the laws under which

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they are disposed of and managed—are in this view as rightfully, if not as much, within the province of medico-psychology as the relation of reason to volition; of the evils of concentration, monoidealism, or excitement upon the circulation in the brain; or as the effects of sleep, amusement, religious teaching, in bringing about the equilibrium of the faculties.

We are not open to accusation that the co-ordination of these fragments, and the formation of a consistent and what promises to be a mature view of the whole subject has been late in development. The causes of the delay are to be found *first* in the late period at which the insane were subjected to close and clinical observation, and regarded through any other medium than that of superstition and fear; and, secondly, in there being no body of observers specially prepared or devoted to the investigation, or, indeed, as having power and opportunity to devote themselves.

It is not asserted that to the German school or to any particular class of authorities we exclusively owe the principles upon which our science and treatment are founded or regulated. Such views grow up under all systems, and without system, in every class of minds. Every practical man, even he who boasts of his freedom from the shackles of hypothesis and the vagaries of speculation, has a theory; and wherever *that* is true and sound, or to the extent to which it is true and sound, and has led to a judicious and humane course, it may be confidently claimed as a contribution to the science which its possessor may scorn.

Pinel was an actor rather than a thinker. His writings contain, however, valuable clinical observations. He records his inability to trace mental disease to lesions in the nervous structure, and yet he calls mania "an act of the living principle which must change organisation;" but his habits of thinking and his treatment, though far from heroic, and, in fact, a protest against the sanguinary and exhaustive processes of his contemporaries, were in keeping with the principles then and ever since triumphant in France. His fame depends greatly on reposing unbounded and loyal faith in the law of love and kindness as a mean of cure, amelioration, and management. It would be vain to connect this revelation with the philosophy of his countryman Descartes, or with the lurid dawn of that sun of liberty which was supposed to have disclosed for the first time the destiny of our race; suffice it that Pinel burst the fetters, levelled the oubliettes, proclaimed humanity, and established rational paternal ministrations as the right of the insane, because they remained men although they were mad, and were susceptible of cure or of improvement, though labouring under the greatest and most grievous, but not the most incurable, of diseases. He was born in 1742, the contemporary of Langerman, born 1768; and they may be regarded as types of the mental tone and tendencies of the races to which they respectively

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belonged, and which were ultimately to converge and culminate into a more catholic creed. Langerman is rich and recondite in the metaphysical and ethical aspects of alienation; Pinel is perspicuous, practical, philanthropical, but not psychological.

The successor of Pinel was more of an observer than a philosopher, and he was more of a philanthropist than either of these. The writings of Esquirol even now form an inexhaustible treasure-house of carefully noted facts, and when published new to the profession, because the insane had scarcely until his time been submitted to the observation of scientific men, and were placed in circumstances calculated to change and aggravate the character of their malady, and to render them dangerous and formidable, and to suggest grotesque and erroneous ideas of their condition. The achievements of Esquirol consisted in feeling in his gentle and Christian heart, and developing in his practice, what Pinel had hoped and initiated, but much more than he had dreamed of. To his personal manners and example, as much as to the principles he had laid down, are to be traced the rational views of insanity which now prevail. His life was a long clinique, instigated and animated by charity and sympathy. He built up no theory of his own; but, so far as he theorised at all, he may be claimed by the present generation as holding their opinions. His immediate representatives, pupils, and admirers have now for twenty-three years embodied and developed these opinions in the 'Annales Medico-Psychologiques.' Our science is of long and tardy growth; our name is due to the school and the invaluable series of papers to which we are now referring. From the prefatory address or profession of faith by Cerise, in which the mixed or psycho-somatic view is expiscated until now, with such deviation and diversity as are inseparable from free discussion and the co-operation of different minds, the same principles may be traced. This may be, in part, attributable to the work having been conducted by the same editors; but it is much more due to the general acceptance and predominance of the principles themselves. How far this splendid record of the thoughts and deeds of a section of our department may have exerted an influence upon the convictions and literature of the profession in this country, it would be presumptuous in me to say; but we may pass on to another topic with the remark that such an example is deserving of all honour and of imitation.

The study of the literature of our department has become absolutely imperative, were it for nothing else than to prevent rediscoveries and the prosecution of inquiries long since exhausted.

American literature appears to justify the supposition that our fellow-labourers in that country concur in the theory which now prevails in Europe. No systematic works have reached us from the United States since those by Caldwell, Brigham, and Ray; and, in

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speaking of American literature, reference is made to the 'Journal of Insanity,' and to those valuable contributions which appear in the form of annual reports from different asylums. These papers, adopting a practice introduced but not generally followed in this country, contain to a great extent the personal experience and reflections of the writer. Although, being addressed to many non-professional readers for the very purpose of dispelling gross and grievous errors, and of substituting sound and benevolent views, they are so far popularised as to be freed from many unnecessary technicalities; they preserve the dignity of the subject, and in no degree derogate from the professional position of the writer, and contain a body of important information and philosophical induction so valuable, that the ephemeral nature of the vehicle to which they are committed is to be lamented. The monographs of Drs. Ray, Butler, Kilbride, Chipley, &c., are of the highest order.

An examination of our own authorities, from the anticipative essay of Beattie, published a century since, to the last profound analysis by Professor Laycock, although they may be found to incline less or more to one side or other, will justify the conclusion that the psycho-somatic theory is here, as elsewhere, in the ascendant. Two illustrations may suffice. Of the classifications now in use, one is founded upon the mental phenomena as indications or symptoms of mental disease; another refers mental diseases to the supposed organic cause, and names them accordingly, but describes them by the mental phenomena; and in a third, the attempt is made to distinguish and arrange the morbid affections according to the primitive instincts and powers involved. But in *all* the correlation of the psychical and somatic aspects are either taken for granted or designedly recognised. The prevalence and sincerity of this belief may be further exemplified in the principles which guide our therapeia. Morphia is prescribed to produce sleep, and thereby to lessen mental activity and to economise force, to check the metamorphosis of nervous tissue, to facilitate nutrition, and, in these ways, to induce healthy mental action. Cannabis Indica is resorted to in melancholia as producing the same result, by reversing the order of the process. Happy and joyous thoughts, and dreams, and even delusions, are suggested. Artificial and temporary convalescence, a lucid interval, are created; active and healthy nervation ensues; the effect on nutrition and sanguifaction is such, that anæmia, generally the origin of the moral suffering and other psychical phenomena, are removed. All moral means, again, act perhaps through their influence upon structure, or, at all events, less by direct operation on the intellect and emotions than by stimulating the nervous structure to that degree of activity which is necessary to the normal exercise of the faculties. And, in contradistinction to this, the shower-bath, counter-irritation, occupation, prove chiefly beneficial

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by appeals to fear, suffering, and the sense of discipline. Iron, iodine, bromine, all important agents in the removal of insanity, are supposed to reach the mind through the blood; whereas joy and other moral impressions reach the blood through the mind.

These are considerations which point emphatically to medical men, as the only class who have even partially embraced such principles, and who are entitled to be autocratic in their exposition and application.

Among those who have contributed largely and lovingly to the promotion of medico-psychology, and to its organisation into the form which it has latterly assumed, but have passed away since we last met, must be remembered I. Jean Parchappe de Vinay. Prepared by having passed through and distinguished himself in the offices of lecturer, practitioner, medical superintendent for thirteen years, he was elevated to the position of inspector-general of the insane and of prisons; a combination which, though natural and appropriate in itself, has not yet found a place in the British mind. The elevation was, in one sense, a bauble dignity, as barren as the cross of the legion of honour with which it was accompanied, as he left ample emoluments and a large practice at the call of government. He is described, by those familiar with his life, as simple and industrious in his habits—as a learned physician, a profound philosopher, an able administrator, and master of the most minute details. We, however, know him chiefly as the author of 'Treatises on the Brain, its Structure, Functions, and Diseases;' in which he advocated the psycho-somatic doctrine, and discriminated the cerebral changes found in the bodies of the insane, into those connected with and those unconnected with the mental disease; as the architect of several of the asylums recently erected in France; and as the patron, protector, and friend of those who, as he once was, are placed in the trying circumstances inseparable from the due discharge of the duties of a medical superintendent.

Ripe in years and wisdom, Sir A. Morrison recently died. Though of a generation that has passed or is rapidly passing away, and designated by one of his biographers as a patriarch—and though living in the quiet suitable to the twilight of years—he never severed the ties which connected him with our department. It must have been among his latest acts to endow a lectureship in connection with the Royal College of Physicians, now held by our honorary member Dr. Sellers. He has other claims upon our memory and respect. He was, perhaps, the first who, in this country, delivered a course of lectures upon mental science. His attention was chiefly directed to the physiognomy of insanity; and, I believe, these lectures, and the drawings by which they were illustrated, now form a large portion of his work upon this subject. The physician of two large hospitals for the insane, and personally and practically acquainted with the

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imperfections of the human instruments by which those who minister to the insane are compelled to work out their plans of treatment, he founded an association for the purpose of rewarding by honours and prizes the long-tried and faithful among the attendants in asylums, and thus to hold out encouragements to candidates of a higher order of qualifications.

John Conolly displayed, within the university of this town, and in the arena of the Royal Medical Society—dear to many of those who hear me—those predilections and preferences which ultimately determined his destiny, and gave him a position of nearly equal rank among physicians and philanthropists. His thesis was on Insanity, and formed the foundation of that work by which he is most popularly known. A physician in increasing practice, one of the editors and originators of the 'British and Foreign Medical Review and Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine,' and a teacher in a University, John Conolly, I know, never felt that he had secured his true position, or that he had found a fair field for the exercise of his head and heart, until he was appointed medical superintendent of Hanwell. It is not affirmed that he made personal sacrifices in order to accept this distinction; but, like that of many other great and good men, his life was one of much sacrifice and much suffering. It is not my province here, however much it may be my inclination, to speak of more of his good deeds than of the assistance he afforded in the grand revolution effected in the management, and of the effects of his teaching in the propagation of sound views in the treatment, of the insane and of the idiotic. I cannot refrain from claiming him as an advocate—and as a philosophical advocate—of a medico-psychology founded upon induction. His ideas, it is true, seemed to have passed through his heart, and his feelings to have raised and rarefied his intellect. Perhaps it is because of the elegance and popular attractions of his style that his habits of thinking have been regarded as less logical than illustrative; but his "Indications of Insanity" show a familiarity with the laws of the human mind, and especially with the peculiarities and subtle defects by which it is disturbed and unhinged, requiring great perspicacity and penetration, as well as careful analysis.

Sensitive in his rectitude, gentle and genial, he was to all men conciliating and courteous; to his friends, and I judge after an experience of thirty years, he was almost chivalrously faithful and generous; and the insane he positively loved.

It would be trite to say merely that these men, "though dead, yet speak." We repeat their very words, we think their very thoughts; are, or ought to be, animated by their very spirit; and so far as we carry into our daily work lofty aspirations as to science and duty, but humble pretensions as to ourselves, a severe and self-sacrificing sense of the peculiar nature of our professional obliga-

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tions, and sympathy for those committed to our care, we shall best do honour to their memory, and best serve our country, our profession, and our God.

The Insane Colony of Gheel Revisited. By JOHN WEBSTER, M.D., F.R.S.

(Read at the Annual Meeting of the Medico-Psychological Association, held in Edinburgh, July 31st, 1866.)

NEARLY ten years ago I visited the very ancient establishment above named, whereof notes appeared in Dr. Winslow's 'Journal of Psychological Medicine' for 1857, and which, I was led to believe, by the discussion that ensued, rendered this interesting institution better known in Great Britain than heretofore. Since that period, various professional and other travellers, as well English as foreign, have paid visits to Gheel, and also subsequently published valuable reports, with remarks on improvements recently accomplished. Being anxious to inspect a second time this colony, and observe the ameliorations which Dr. Bulkens, its able medical superintendent, had effected, I again visited Gheel during May last; and thinking some account thereof may interest members of the distinguished Society I have the honour to address, my present communication has been drawn up, trusting, at least, it may excite some attention from philanthropists and psychological physicians.

However, I would first briefly notice the ancient legend whereon the reputation of that far-famed retreat for insane persons is asserted to rest, and which, I hope, will not prove wholly uninteresting, although likely familiar to members of this learned Association. According to tradition, late in the sixth century, Dymphna, a daughter of an Irish king, was converted to Christianity by an anchorite named Gerebert. The father of this young lady felt greatly enraged at her conversion; and being also enamoured of his own child, threatened dire vengeance. As the noviciate remained obstinate to parental authority, accompanied by her spiritual adviser she fled across the ocean, and ultimately arrived at Gheel, in which remote district of western Europe, Dymphna then resolved to dedicate herself in future to devotion and celibacy, along with St. Gerebert.

But the old pagan sovereign having subsequently discovered the fugitives' retreat, followed in their track, and insisted upon his daughter again changing her adopted faith; but to such proposal she still refused compliance. This continued obstinacy made the savage monarch so furious, that at one blow with a sword he cut

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