BUSINESS CYCLE EVIDENCE ON FIRM ENTRY

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Business cycle models with sticky prices and endogenous firm entry make novel predictions on the transmission of shocks through the extensive margin of investment. I test some of these predictions using a VAR with model-based sign restrictions. I find a positive and significant response of firm entry to expansionary shocks to productivity, aggregate spending, monetary policy, and entry costs. The estimated response to a monetary expansion does not support the monetary policy transmission mechanism proposed by the model. Insofar as firm startups require labor services, wage stickiness is needed to make the *signs* of the model responses consistent with the estimated ones. The *shapes* of the empirical responses suggest that congestion effects in entry make it harder for new firms to survive when the number of startups rises.

Keywords: Firm Entry, Business Cycles, VAR

1. INTRODUCTION

A growing theoretical literature advances endogenous firm entry as an important propagation and amplification mechanism of business cycles.[1] Such models make novel predictions on the transmission of shocks through the extensive investment margin. This paper uses VAR analysis to evaluate the predictions in Bilbiie et al. [(2007b); henceforth BGM]. My estimates show that for generating model responses of profits and firm entry that are consistent with the data, wage rigidities are important, as well as congestion externalities in entry.

I use a subset of the short-run impulse responses predicted by the sticky-price endogenous-entry DSGE model in BGM (2007b) as sign restrictions to identify shocks in a vector autoregression. The BGM model has been chosen as a benchmark model for this exercise, because it has been shown to perform at least as well as the standard real business cycle model in replicating the moments of key macroeconomic variables. See BGM (2007a). In addition, this model can explain the behavior of other variables such as firm entry, exit, and profits, which

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the model with a fixed number of firms cannot. The shocks considered here are shocks to productivity, aggregate spending, monetary policy, and entry costs. The variables in the VAR are output, inflation, interest rates, profits, and firm entry. The responses of firm entry are left unrestricted. The model evaluation exercise consists of comparing the estimated responses with the theoretical ones along two dimensions: their sign and their shape. I then discuss modifications and extensions that can reduce the discrepancies between the model and the data.

First, my findings indicate that firm entry responds significantly and positively to all identified expansionary shocks. This is consistent with the model responses to productivity, spending, and entry cost shocks. In particular, the type of investment investigated here, investment along the extensive margin, reacts positively to spending shocks both in the model and in the data. However, my results do not support the monetary transmission mechanism proposed by BGM (2007b). In the model, entry costs and share prices jointly determine the number of entrants in each period. If entry costs are modeled as labor costs and prices are sticky, a monetary expansion leads to a fall in the number of entrants. As the interest rate (the return on bonds) falls, because of a no-arbitrage condition across assets, today's share price rises relative to tomorrow's. At the same time, an increase in the real wage raises both marginal production costs (which in turn dampens the rise in the share price) and entry costs. On net, entry costs rise by more than share prices and thus entry contracts. In the data, however, monetary expansions appear to lead to a *rise* in profits and firm entry. Extending the model to allow for wage stickiness helps to reproduce this result; see also Rotemberg (2007). On impact, profits and firm entry then respond positively to monetary policy shocks. Specifying entry costs as a fixed number of consumption units, rather than effective labor units, generates an expansion in entry but a drop in current profits.

Second, the model cannot reproduce the shapes of the empirical impulse response functions. The response of firm entry to spending and monetary shocks is hump-shaped in the data, suggesting that, in addition to entry costs already accounted for in the model, other frictions prevent entrepreneurs from starting up new firms quickly in response to profit opportunities. One way to dampen the impact effect of monetary shocks on the number of entrants is to assume a congestion externality in entry. The higher the number of startups in any given period, the higher the entry costs that each potential entrant faces. A hump-shaped response function results if we assume that the survival probability for new firms depends negatively on the increase in the number of entrants.

Bergin and Corsetti (in press) focus on stabilization policy; in a VAR exercise, they use a recursive method to identify one type of shock (a monetary policy shock). They find that entry, as measured by an index of net business formation, reacts positively to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Uusküla (2008) uses long- and short-run zero restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks, as well as neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. He employs data on both entry and failures. His findings are largely consistent with the results presented here and the ones in Bergin and Corsetti (in press). In this paper, I identify a number of

shocks in a model-consistent way. My estimation exercise uses profit data. Firm profits play a crucial role in models with endogenous firm entry but have typically been neglected in model validation exercises.[2]

2. FIRM ENTRY OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE: UNCONDITIONAL MOMENTS

The number of firms varies over the business cycle. For the United States the cyclical properties of net entry have been documented by Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Devereux et al. (1996), and Campbell (1998). Bilbiie et al. (2007a) show that net entry and profits comove, and both are strongly procyclical. The cyclical components of U.S. (net) entry and real GDP over the sample period 1948q1–1995q3 comove. The correlation between output and net entry, measured as net business formation (NBF), is 0.71, whereas the correlation between output and new incorporations (NI) is 0.35. Similarly to capital investment, firm entry is more volatile than GDP over the cycle; the standard deviations of NBF and NI relative to that of output are 2.19 and 3.13, respectively.

3. DSGE MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS FIRM ENTRY

I extend the benchmark model in BGM (2007b) to allow for government spending shocks. In contrast to standard business cycle models with a variable capital stock and a fixed number of producers, this model abstracts from variations in capital and instead endogenises the number of firms. Investment is along the extensive margin. Profit opportunities over and above a sunk entry cost lead to firm entry. Goods markets are characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities as in Rotemberg (1982). A competitive firm bundles the goods into an aggregate final good as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).

3.1. Competitive Bundler

The final good is a bundle of mass N_t of differentiated goods, indexed by ω. It is produced with the technology $C_t = [\int_0^{N_t} c_t(\omega)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} d\omega]^{\theta/(\theta-1)}$, where $\theta > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across goods. The demand for each individual good is $c_t(\omega) = [p_t(\omega)/P_t]^{-\theta} C_t$, where $p_t(\omega)$ is the price of good ω. The consumer price index (CPI), i.e., the minimum cost of producing one unit of the bundle C_t, is $P_t = [\int_0^{N_t} p_t(\omega)^{1-\theta} d\omega]^{1/(1-\theta)}$.

3.2. Government

The government consumes G_t units of the final good. Its budget constraint is $G_t = T_t$ for all t, where T_t denotes lump sum taxes. Exogenous spending shocks are modeled as changes in government consumption G_t. The arguments of this paper

go through if I instead assume multiplicative shocks to household consumption C_t.

3.3. Firm Entry

Entrants must meet a sunk cost one period in advance of producing and selling each firm-specific differentiated good. Setting up a new firm requires an exogenous number $f_{E,t}$ of effective labour units, $f_{E,t}/Z_t$ units of the labor bundle l_t, or $w_t f_{E,t}/Z_t$ units of consumption. The variable Z_t is exogenous and measures labor productivity; $w_t = W_t/P_t$ is the real wage. Shocks to entry costs, given by variations in $f_{E,t}$, are similar to investment-specific technology shocks in the standard DSGE model with physical capital. Let $N_{E,t}$ be the number of entrants in period t. The number of active firms in period $t+1$ is given by $N_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)(N_t + N_{E,t})$; a fraction δ of firms and entrants in any given period is hit by an exogenous exit shock. A zero-profit condition determines the number of entrants by aligning real firm value v_t with the entry cost, $v_t = w_t f_{E,t}/Z_t$.

3.4. Price Setting

Because I consider only symmetric equilibria, I can simplify the notation by dropping the firm-specific ω-subscript. The symmetry of prices implies that the consumer price index reduces to $P_t = N_t^{-1/(\theta-1)} p_t$, such that the firm price relative to the CPI can be written as $\rho_t (= p_t/P_t) = N_t^{1/(\theta-1)}$. Each firm produces a single good with the technology $y_t = Z_t l_{C,t}$, where $l_{C,t}$ is the amount of the labor bundle l_t used as an input into production. The total demand for each good y_t is found by summing the private demands over households and adding government demand to get $y_t = \rho_t^{-\theta} Y_t^C$, where $Y_t^C = C_t + G_t + \text{PAC}_t$ denotes aggregate consumption output and PAC_t are economywide price adjustment costs. The representative firm sets prices p_t to maximize the sum of current and expected future profits. Current profits are given by $d_t = \rho_t y_t - w_t l_{C,t} - \frac{\kappa_p}{2}\pi_t^2 \rho_t y_t$, where $\pi_t = p_t/p_{t-1} - 1$ is producer price inflation (PPI) and the term $\frac{\kappa_p}{2}\pi_t^2 \rho_t y_t$ captures price adjustment costs at the firm level. The flexible-price economy is obtained in the limit by letting the parameter $\kappa_p \geq 0$ go to zero. Expected future profits are given by the share price $v_t = E_t \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} [\beta(1-\delta)]^{s-t} (C_s/C_t)^{-1} d_s$. The firm's relative price is set as a markup μ_t over real marginal cost, $\rho_t = \mu_t \frac{w_t}{Z_t}$, whereas the (linearized) markup equation is[3]

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \beta(1-\delta) E_t\{\widehat{\pi}_{t+1}\} - \frac{\theta-1}{\kappa_p}\widehat{\mu}_t.$$

3.5. Preferences, Budget Constraint, and Intertemporal Optimization

The representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility $E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t$, where β is the subjective discount factor. Period utility is a positive function of consumption and a negative function of hours worked, $U_t =$

$\ln C_t - \chi L_t^{1+1/\varphi} / (1 + 1/\varphi)$, $\chi > 0$, and $\varphi \geq 0$ is the elasticity of hours with respect to the real wage. The household's flow budget constraint is

$$\frac{B_{t+1}}{P_t} + v_t (N_t + N_{E,t}) x_{t+1} + C_t + T_t = \frac{R_{t-1} B_t}{P_t} + (d_t + v_t) N_t x_t + w_t L_t$$

for all t. The household purchases nominal one-period bonds B_{t+1}, shares in the total stock of incumbent firms and entrants x_{t+1}, and consumption goods C_t. Further, lump-sum taxes are added to the expenditure side. The household receives gross interest income on bond holdings, dividends and a capital gain on share holdings, and wage income. R_t denotes the gross interest rate on bond holdings between t and $t+1$. The first-order optimality conditions for asset holdings are the usual consumption Euler equation and an equation expressing firm value (or the share price) as the present discounted value of future profits (or dividends):

$$C_t^{-1} = \beta R_t E_t \left\{ \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} C_{t+1}^{-1} \right\},$$

$$v_t = \beta (1 - \delta) E_t \left\{ \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-1} (d_{t+1} + v_{t+1}) \right\}.$$

The first-order condition for labor supply is $w_t = L_t^{1/\varphi} / C_t^{-1}$.

3.6. Aggregate Resource Constraint

Aggregating the budget constraints over households, imposing the asset market equilibrium condition $\int_0^1 B_t(h) \, dh = 0$ for all t, and using the government budget constraint $T_t = G_t$ gives the aggregate accounting identity $C_t + G_t + v_t N_{E,t} + P A C_t = d_t N_t + w_t L_t$. Total expenditure on consumption (private plus public), investment in new firms, and the costs of adjusting prices must be equal to total income (dividend income plus labor income).

Labor is needed for the production activities of the existing firms ($N_t l_{C,t}$), as well as for firm startups ($N_{E,t} f_{E,t} / Z_t$). Using the production functions of the two sectors, total labor demand can be written as $L_t = \left(N_t y_t + N_{E,t} f_{E,t} \right) / Z_t$.

3.7. Monetary Policy

Monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. The monetary authority adjusts the interest rate in response to changes in PPI inflation,[4] the output gap, and last period's interest rate,

$$\widehat{R}_t = \tau_\pi \widehat{\pi}_t + \tau_Y \widehat{Y}_t^{\text{gap}} + \tau_R \widehat{R}_{t-1} + \eta_t^R,$$

where $\widehat{Y}_t^{\text{gap}} = \widehat{Y}_t - \widehat{Y}_t^f$ and $\widehat{Y}_t^f$ is defined as the level of output under the assumption of perfectly flexible prices, i.e., $\kappa_p = 0$. The variable η_t^R is a white noise shock.

TABLE 1. Data

Variable	Units, freq., seas. adj.	Series ID
Real gross domestic product, 1 decimal	Bill. Chn. 2000 $, Q, SAAR	GDPC1
Corporate profits with IVA and CCAdj	Bill. $, SAAR, Q	CPROFIT
3-month treasury bill: second mkt. rate	%, M	TB3MS
GDP: implicit price deflator	Index 2000 = 100, Q, SA	GDPDEF
Net business formation	Index 1967 = 100, M	—
New business incorporations	Thousands, M	—

Note: Data series are taken from the St. Louis Fed economic database, except for the data on firm entry. Net business formation (NBF) and new business incorporations (NI) are from the BEA's Survey of Current Business. These series have been discontinued; data run from January 1948 to September 1995 (for NBF) and to September 1996 (for NI). Inflation is measured as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator. The interest rate is the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Profits are deflated using the GDP deflator.

The choice of this interest rate rule is based on empirical considerations. BGM (2007b) show that in a cashless economy with an appropriate labor income subsidy that eliminates the markup distortion, it is optimal for monetary policy to stabilize firm prices p_t and let the number of firms fluctuate freely. If prices and wages are sticky, however, a tradeoff between price and wage inflation stabilization emerges, as in Erceg et al. (2000). A full discussion of optimal policy in the presence of endogenous firm entry is beyond the scope of this study.[5]

4. MODEL DYNAMICS

Impulse responses are obtained by linearizing the model around its deterministic steady state, which can be found in BGM (2007a), calibrating it, and solving for the policy functions numerically using a standard package. The linearized model equations are summarized in Table 2.

For details on the parameter values, see Table 3. I follow BGM (2007b)'s benchmark calibration in most cases. However, I set the inverse labor supply elasticity φ equal to 2, which is a standard choice in the literature. BGM (2007b) consider the special case where labor supply is fixed. They show that an expansionary productivity shock can lead to positive inflation if the shock is sufficiently persistent. By assuming a standard calibration, I exclude this possibility. In calibrating the persistence of the government spending shock ϕ_g and the steady state share of government spending in GDP Γ, I follow Devereux et al. (1996), setting $\phi_g = 0.973$ and $\Gamma = 0.21$. For the interest rate rule, I choose a degree of interest rate smoothing $\tau_R = 0.8$ and the values on inflation and on the output gap originally proposed by Taylor (1993).

CPI data do not account adequately for changes in consumption utility arising from more or fewer available goods. To compare the model with data, I strip out this variety effect on the price index. For any variable X_t in units of consumption, the data-consistent counterpart is obtained as $\widetilde{X}_t = P_t X_t / p_t = X_t / \rho_t$. The effect on the relative price ρ_t is removed, because ρ_t is always equal to 1 when changes

TABLE 2. Linearized benchmark model equations

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="center">Endogenous variables</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{\rho}_t = \frac{1}{\theta-1}\widehat{N}_t$</td><td>Price index</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{d}_t = (\theta - 1)\widehat{\mu}_t + \widehat{\rho}_t + \widehat{y}_t$</td><td>Firm profits</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{\rho}_t = \widehat{\mu}_t + \widehat{w}_t - \widehat{Z}_t$</td><td>Price setting</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{\pi}_t = \beta(1 - \delta)E_t\{\widehat{\pi}_{t+1}\} - \frac{\theta-1}{\kappa_p}\widehat{\mu}_t$</td><td>Markup</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{y}_t = -\theta\widehat{\rho}_t + \widehat{Y}_t^C$</td><td>Firm output</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{Y}_t^C = (1 - \Gamma)(\widehat{C}_t + \widehat{G}_t)$</td><td>Consumption output</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{N}_t = (1 - \delta)\widehat{N}_{t-1} + \delta\widehat{N}_{E,t-1}$</td><td>Number of producers</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{v}_t = \widehat{w}_t + \widehat{f}_{E,t} - \widehat{Z}_t$</td><td>Free entry</td></tr>
<tr><td>$-\widehat{C}_t = \widehat{R}_t - E_t\{\widehat{\pi}_{t+1}^C + \widehat{C}_{t+1}\}$</td><td>FOC bonds</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{v}_t = E_t\{(\widehat{C}_t - \widehat{C}_{t+1}) + \frac{1-\delta}{1+r}\widehat{v}_{t+1} + \frac{r+\delta}{1+r}\widehat{d}_{t+1}\}$</td><td>FOC shares</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{w}_t = \frac{1}{\varphi}\widehat{L}_t + \widehat{C}_t$</td><td>FOC labor</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{Y^C}{Y}\widehat{Y}_t^C + \frac{vN_E}{Y}(\widehat{v}_t + \widehat{N}_{E,t})$</td><td>Aggregate expenditure</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{dN}{Y}(\widehat{N}_t + \widehat{d}_t) + \frac{wL}{Y}(\widehat{w}_t + \widehat{L}_t)$</td><td>Aggregate income</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{L}_t = \frac{L_C}{L}(\widehat{N}_t + \widehat{y}_t - \widehat{Z}_t) + \frac{L_E}{L}(\widehat{N}_{E,t} + \widehat{f}_{E,t} - \widehat{Z}_t)$</td><td>Labor market clearing</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{R}_t = \tau_\pi\widehat{\pi}_t + \tau_Y\widehat{Y}_t^{gap} + \tau_R\widehat{R}_{t-1} + \eta_t^R$</td><td>Interest rate rule</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{\rho}_t - \widehat{\rho}_{t-1} = \widehat{\pi}_t - \widehat{\pi}_t^C$</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="center">Exogenous variables</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{Z}_t = \phi_z\widehat{Z}_{t-1} + \eta_t^z$</td><td>Productivity shock</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{G}_t = \phi_g\widehat{G}_{t-1} + \eta_t^g$</td><td>Exogenous spending shock</td></tr>
<tr><td>$\widehat{f}_{E,t} = \phi_{fe}\widehat{f}_{E,t-1} + \eta_t^{ze}$</td><td>Entry cost shock</td></tr>
<tr><td>η_t^R</td><td>Monetary policy shock</td></tr>
</table>

Note: Let π_t^C denote CPI inflation, $\pi_t^C = P_t/P_{t-1} - 1$. CPI and PPI inflation are related to the firms' relative price through $\widehat{\rho}_t - \widehat{\rho}_{t-1} = \widehat{\pi}_t - \widehat{\pi}_t^C$. Potential output Y_t^f is defined as the level of output under perfectly flexible prices, i.e. for $\kappa_p = 0$. I assume $\eta_t \sim N(0, 1)$ for the exogenous shock processes.

in the number of goods are disregarded. Because ρ_t is predetermined with respect to all shocks, the impact effect on the data-consistent variables does not differ from that on the welfare-based variables. In general, the transition dynamics of the data-consistent variables is qualitatively similar to the dynamics of the welfare-based variables. Figure 1 displays the model impulse responses of the variables $\widetilde{Y}_t$, $\widetilde{\pi}_t$, R_t, $\widetilde{D}_t$, and $N_{E,t}$, which are the ones used in the empirical analysis.

4.1. Productivity Shocks

A rise in productivity has a direct impact on the firm's pricing decision. Each firm will lower its price in response to the fall in marginal costs. As the number of producers (and also the relative price ρ_t) is predetermined, this results in an equiproportionate drop in the aggregate price level. The real wage rises as the price level falls, representing a spillover from the production sector to the investment

TABLE 3. Benchmark calibration

|		
β	0.99	Discount factor
φ	2	Inverse labor supply elasticity
θ	3.8	Elasticity of substitution (goods)
δ	0.025	Firm exit rate
ϕ	3	Elasticity of substitution (labour)
κ_p	77	Rotemberg price stickiness
τ_π	0.2*1.5	Interest rate rule coefficient on inflation
τ_Y	0.2*0.5/4	Interest rate rule coefficient on output gap
τ_R	0.8	Interest rate smoothing
Γ	0.21	Steady state share of government consumption
ϕ_{fe}	1	Persistence entry cost shock
ϕ_z	0.979	Persistence productivity shock
ϕ_g	0.973	Persistence spending shock

FIGURE 1. Theoretical impulse responses (DSGE model).

sector. On one hand, the increase in the real wage implies a rise in entry costs, which has a negative effect on entry. On the other hand, the demand for each existing good increases due to a rise in aggregate consumption demand. This has a positive effect on profits, which encourages entry. For my parameter values, this second effect dominates and firm entry is positive on impact. Output rises

and inflation falls in response to a productivity shock. The decrease in inflation dominates the increase in the output gap in the interest rate rule, resulting in a monetary policy expansion. Because of price adjustment costs, firms lower their prices less than they would in a perfectly flexible economy, so that the markup rises.

4.2. Exogenous Spending Shocks

On impact, an exogenous spending shock reduces private consumption and raises hours worked because the negative wealth effect of increased taxation. The expansion of aggregate demand causes output to rise. The resulting rise in inflation induces the central bank to raise the interest rate. The markup reacts countercyclically. Because the number of producers is fixed initially, the rise in aggregate demand pushes up firm output and profits. If the shock is highly persistent ($\phi_g = 0.973$), profit opportunities are expected to remain present far into the future, drawing firms into the market today. Note that this prediction is reversed, whereas the responses of the other variables are qualitatively unchanged, if the spending shock is less persistent, e.g., $\phi_g = 0.9$. Then the present discounted value of future profits is too low compared with today's entry cost, so that entry drops.

4.3. Monetary Policy Shocks

An expansionary monetary policy shock is modeled as an exogenous drop in the interest rate. This creates a boost to consumption and output. Given that flexible-wage output has not changed, the output gap becomes positive. However, price adjustment is imperfect and the markup contracts. In the shock period, the increased consumption demand induces firms to raise their output, which they sell at a markup over the predetermined relative price ρ_t. As firms raise prices, inflation becomes positive. On net, the reduction of the markup pulls profits down. With sticky prices and flexible wages, a monetary expansion leads to a fall in the number of entrants. As the interest rate (the return on bonds) falls, the expected return on shares also falls to eliminate arbitrage across assets. The expected return on shares is reduced by a rise in today's share price relative to tomorrow's. However, the expansion of aggregate demand also raises the real wage and thus entry costs, as nominal wages are fully flexible but prices are sticky. On balance, firm entry contracts.

One qualification of this result applies. In the benchmark model, the entry variable $N_{E,t}$ is assumed not to deviate too far from its steady state level. In particular, we assume that $N_{E,t} > 0$ throughout. Due to the irreversibility of investment, entry cannot turn negative and thus entry would not contract in response to a monetary expansion if the economy started off from a zero-entry state. With $N_{E,t} = 0$ before the shock, the zero-profit condition is no longer binding; the firm value is lower than the sunk entry cost. Under these conditions, it is possible that a rise in firm value is not matched by a rise in the entry cost and that entry increases as a result.

TABLE 4. Signs of impulse responses predicted by benchmark DSGE model

	Output	Inflation	Interest rate	Profits	Firm entry
Productivity	↑	↓	↓	↑	↑
Spending	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Monetary	↑	↑	↓	↓	↓
Entry cost	↑	↑	↑	↓	↑

4.4. Entry Cost Shocks

Similarly to an investment-specific productivity shock, a drop in entry costs does not affect the productivity of existing firms, but makes investment in new ones more attractive. Consumption falls initially in order to finance the entry of new firms. Hours rise to accommodate the increased labour demand of entrants. As aggregate consumption demand falls, each incumbent sees his or her firm-specific demand curve shift inward, such that firm output drops. Because relative prices (ρ_t), are unchanged initially, lower firm output also implies lower (real) profits. An entry cost shock leads to a positive output gap (driven by an expansion in firm startups), inflation, and a drop in the markup, which induces monetary tightening by the central bank.

Table 4 summarizes the signs of the short-run impulse responses predicted by the model.

5. VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION WITH SIGN RESTRICTIONS

My aim is to study the dynamic effects of exogenous shocks on firm entry in the data and compare them to those predicted by the theory. For this purpose, I estimate a vector autoregression with a subset of the model variables:

$$X_t = c + \sum_{j=1}^{p} A_j X_{t-j} + B\varepsilon_t, \tag{1}$$

where c is a vector of constants and linear trends, X_t is an $n \times 1$ vector of variables, A_j are coefficient matrices, and ε_t are normally distributed, mutually and serially uncorrelated innovations with unit variance, i.e., $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, I)$.

5.1. Choice of Variables and Identification

The variables in X_t chosen from the model must satisfy two conditions. First, they must be empirically observable; i.e., the variables that are expressed in real terms must be deflated by the PPI equivalent in the model, which is p_t (rather than the welfare-based price index P_t). Second, their short-run responses to the exogenous shocks must be sufficiently different from each other to allow the identification of each shock.

TABLE 5. Signs of impulse responses used for VAR identification

	Output	Inflation	Interest rate	Profits	Firm entry
Productivity	↑	↓			
Spending	↑	↑	↑	↑	
Monetary	↑	↑	↓		
Entry cost	↑	↑	↑		↓

Note: By construction, the identification method rules out the price puzzle. I set the sign restriction horizon to one year for all variables.

Given these considerations, I select real GDP, inflation, the interest rate, and aggregate real profits. My identification scheme is presented in Table 5. I consider shocks that increase output (temporarily) and I look at the impulse responses of the other three variables in relation to the output response. First, I identify a productivity shock by its negative effect on inflation. Second, of shocks that lead to positive inflation, I single out monetary shocks as those that reduce the nominal interest rate. Finally, of shocks that raise inflation and the interest rate, I distinguish entry cost shocks from exogenous spending shocks by looking at their effect on aggregate profits. An entry cost shock reduces profits, whereas a spending shock raises profits. I want to identify entry cost shocks separately for two reasons. First, these shocks are specific to models with endogenous firm entry, which is the focus of the paper. Second, in standard DSGE models with a variable capital stock and a fixed number of firms, investment-specific technology shocks are an important source of business cycle fluctuations [Fisher (2006)]. The responses of firm entry to the various shocks are intentionally left unrestricted and are therefore fully determined by the data. In addition, the response of the nominal interest rate and profits to a productivity shock and the response of profits to a monetary shock are left unrestricted. The estimated response can then be compared with the one implied by the DSGE model.

I set $X_t = (\widetilde{Y}_t, \widetilde{\pi}_t, R_t, \widetilde{D}_t, N_{E,t})$ in the VAR model (1), where $\widetilde{Y}_t$ is real output, inflation $\widetilde{\pi}_t$ is measured as the percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator, the interest rate R_t is the 3-month Treasury bill rate, $\widetilde{D}_t$ are corporate profits, and for $N_{E,t}$ I use net entry given by the net business formation index.[6] A description of the data is given in the Appendix. Output, profits, and net entry are logged and multiplied by 100. These three variables have a strong upward trend. I do not carry out any stationarity-inducing transformations, nor do I impose any cointegrating relationships between the variables. Instead, I estimate the VAR in levels. Following Sims et al. (1990), this is a valid and consistent estimation method even in the presence of unit roots and cointegrating vectors. It is also preferable, because more harm is done by imposing false stationarity-inducing transformation and cointegrating relationships than by imposing none at all. My sample period covers 1948q1 to 1995q3. Given that I work with quarterly data, the VAR lag length p is set to four.

5.2. Methodology

In the following, I briefly outline the estimation method in Peersman (2005); more details can be found in that paper. There are two steps to this procedure.

In the first step, I run the unrestricted VAR in (1) to obtain estimates of the reduced form coefficients $\beta = [c, A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_p]$ and the error covariance matrix Σ. Given an uninformative prior, the joint posterior distribution for β and Σ belongs to the Normal–Wishart family. From the reduced form residuals u_t with covariance matrix Σ, I construct structural innovations $\varepsilon_t = B^{-1} u_t$. An orthogonal decomposition of the residuals amounts to finding a matrix B that satisfies $\Sigma = BB'$ and computing the innovations ε_t. Many such decompositions exist, because for any orthonormal matrix Q (i.e., $QQ' = I$), $\Sigma = BQQ'B'$ is a valid decomposition of Σ. I take joint draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients and from the space of decompositions given by Q.

In the second step I proceed as follows. Given the orthogonal innovations ε_t, the associated impulse responses are compared with the priors given by the sign restrictions in Table 5. I accept a draw if out of the five orthogonal shocks, I identify exactly four distinct fundamental shocks; the fifth shock is interpreted as an unspecified exogenous process in the data absent from the model. Otherwise, the draw is rejected.

Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until 1,000 valid decompositions have been found. Inference statements are based on the distribution given by these valid draws. I order the points on the impulse response functions and report the median, as well as the 16th and 84th percentile confidence bands.

6. VAR RESULTS

The estimated impulse response functions are displayed in Figure 2. I find significant positive impulse responses of firm entry to all identified shocks, though at different horizons. Productivity shocks as well as reductions in entry costs have significant effects on entry in the long run, that is, three years after the shock. Monetary policy shocks lead to a gradual build-up in the number of firms. The response of entry is significant only at medium-run horizons. Consistent with money neutrality, there is no significant long-run response. Notice also that the response is hump-shaped, which is consistent with the evidence of the recursive VAR in Bergin and Corsetti (in press). Both the sign and the shape of the impulse response function are clearly at odds with the predictions of the DSGE model. Finally, exogenous spending shocks have a positive and significant impact effect on firm entry, lasting about a year. This suggests that there exists a complementarity in the data between aggregate demand and entry, consistent with the model. In comparison, the standard DSGE models with physical capital predict a decline or an insignificant response of investment to a government spending shock [see Galí et al. (2007)], whereas in the data, the effect is significantly positive, as shown in Peersman and Straub (2007).

FIGURE 2. Estimated impulse responses (VAR model).

As an additional check of the theoretical model, I consider the other unrestricted impulse responses. I find that the response of the interest rate to a productivity shock, although negative in the model, is insignificant in the data. Profits react positively to productivity shocks at short horizons; the long-run effect is insignificant. Following a monetary policy expansion, profits increase in a hump-shaped fashion, first becoming significantly positive, followed by a significantly negative response at longer horizons. This pattern suggests that at first, the rise in aggregate consumption demand drives up the profits of existing firms. The increase in profitability induces new firm startups, but with some delay. Firm entry leads to some expenditure switching from old to new goods, thereby reducing the profits of incumbent firms. Again, the profit response in the data does not resemble the one in the model.

Turning to the variance decompositions in Table 6, it is worth noting that shocks to entry costs do not explain a large proportion of the variability of firm entry and output. Spending shocks play a much bigger role. This is consistent with the observation that overall, profits are procyclical in the data, whereas in the model, entry cost shocks give rise to countercyclical movements in profits. It might also reflect the fact that entry costs depend to a large extent on institutional arrangements, which are slow to change. As I show below, the negative effect of entry cost shocks on profits is not robust to the way such costs are modeled. This

TABLE 6. Estimated variance decomposition (VAR model)

	Productivity			Spending			Monetary			Entry cost		
	Lower	Median	Upper	Lower	Median	Upper	Lower	Median	Upper	Lower	Median	Upper
Output												
0	9%	31%	67%	12%	43%	74%	1%	10%	33%	1%	7%	23%
4	5%	17%	40%	21%	53%	78%	4%	14%	35%	2%	6%	15%
8	6%	20%	44%	16%	46%	74%	4%	16%	40%	2%	5%	13%
20	10%	27%	52%	15%	38%	64%	5%	16%	38%	3%	7%	18%
Entry												
0	0%	4%	21%	6%	45%	91%	0%	3%	16%	0%	7%	31%
4	1%	5%	22%	5%	40%	84%	1%	6%	27%	1%	5%	18%
8	1%	7%	23%	6%	33%	76%	2%	10%	35%	2%	6%	18%
20	3%	12%	28%	7%	28%	64%	4%	16%	40%	3%	8%	20%

Note: This table shows median variance decompositions, together with 16th and 84th percentile error bands for different time horizons expressed in quarters.

casts some doubt on whether the shock identified actually reflects a reduction in entry costs. In addition, Table 6 reveals that on impact, the four identified shocks explain over 90% of the variance in output but less than 60% of the variance in entry. This suggests that the entry measure is subject to a considerable amount of noise that is picked up by the unidentified shock.

7. MODIFICATIONS OF THE BENCHMARK MODEL

In this section I consider several extensions and modifications to the theory that can reconcile the model impulse reponses with the estimated ones.

7.1. Fixed Entry Costs

Here, entry costs are modeled as labor costs and, as such, vary together with the real wage. The real wage, in turn, inherits the dynamics of the nominal wage because prices are sticky. This makes entry costs quite responsive to shocks. On impact, a monetary policy shock raises the real wage and thus the share price through the free entry condition. There is a positive effect on firm profits through increased demand and a negative effect through reduction in the markup. The second effect dominates and firm profits decrease, which has a negative effect on current firm value. The value of future profits must rise to bring about the necessary net increase in the current share price. This happens through a contraction in firm entry.

Replacing the sunk cost $w_t f_{E,t}/Z_t$ with an exogenous fixed entry cost in units of consumption, denoted by $f_{E,t}^C$, and adding $f_{E,t}^C$ to consumption output, overturns this last result. See Figure 3. In that case, consumption and firm output rise, whereas entry costs and the share price are unchanged. As a consequence, the number of entrants increases.

BGM (2007b) also study this modification of the model. They note that fixed entry costs help to bring the model responses in line with the estimated responses. However, the negative response of profits, driven by a decline in the markup, is inconsistent with the evidence presented here and also with the main finding in Christiano et al. (1997). Finally, the alternative specification makes an entry cost shock look very similar to a spending shock by boosting aggregate profits (not shown). In terms of my sign restrictions, the two shocks become indistinguishable. The other signs reported in Table 4 are unchanged.


FIGURE 3. Fixed entry costs. *Note*: With this specification, entry cost shocks lead to an increase in aggregate profits (not shown). The other impulse response signs are as in Table 4.

7.2. Fixed Entry Costs and Sticky Wages

Recall that the benchmark calibration assumes perfect wage flexibility. If we add the assumption of wage stickiness, we can generate an impact response of *both* firm entry and profits to monetary policy shocks with the correct sign. Suppose that the labor input into the production of goods and new firms is defined as a bundle over the differentiated labor types, indexed by h. It is produced with the technology $l_t = [\int_0^1 l_t(h)^{(\phi-1)/\phi} dh]^{\phi/(\phi-1)}$, where $\phi > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across labor types. Symmetric firm demand for labor type h is given by $l_t(h) = [W_t(h)/W_t]^{-\phi} l_t$, where $W_t(h)$ is the wage received by worker h. The economywide wage index, the minimum cost of producing one unit of the labor bundle l_t, is $W_t = [\int_0^1 W_t(h)^{1-\phi} dh]^{1/(1-\phi)}$. The worker has to pay a Rotemberg-style wage adjustment cost WAC_t, which is added to the expenditure side of his budget constraint (and to the aggregate resource constraint). It is given by $WAC_t = \kappa_w/2(\frac{W_t}{W_{t-1}} - 1)^2 W_t/P_t$. Each worker has monopoly power in supplying a differentiated labor type, which allows him to set his optimal wage. The first-order condition for the wage rate results in the (linearized) wage inflation equation

$$\widehat{\omega}_t = \beta E_t \{\widehat{\omega}_{t+1}\} + \frac{\phi-1}{\kappa_w}\left(\frac{1}{\varphi}\widehat{L}_t + \widehat{C}_t - \widehat{w}_t\right),$$

where $\widehat{\omega}_t = \ln(W_t/W_{t-1})$. Wages become perfectly flexible as the parameter $\kappa_w \geq 0$ approaches zero. Note that the wage inflation equation is not affected by the introduction of endogenous firm entry; it is analogous to the one in Erceg et al. (2000). The wage rigidity dampens the response of the real wage. Therefore, marginal costs do not rise as much and aggregate profits respond positively to a monetary expansion. Figure 4 shows that entry increases sharply (by over 80%) on impact.

7.3. Fixed Entry Costs, Sticky Wages, and Congestion Externalities in Entry

An additional modification that may help here is to specify the entry cost as an increasing function of total firm entry, as in Das and Das (1996) and Berentsen and Waller (2007). Let the entry cost for an individual firm be $f_{E,t}^C \Theta(N_{E,t})$, where


FIGURE 4. Fixed entry costs and sticky wages. *Note*: With this specification, entry cost shocks lead to an increase in aggregate profits (not shown). The other impulse response signs are as in Table 4.

FIGURE 5. Fixed entry costs, sticky wages, and congestion externality in entry. *Note*: With this specification, entry cost shocks lead to an increase in aggregate profits (not shown). The other impulse response signs are as in Table 4.

$\Theta(\cdot) = 1$ if and only if $N_{E,t} = N_E$; $\Theta'(N_E)$ is constant and strictly positive. The new free entry condition becomes $\widehat{v}_t = \widehat{f}^C_{E,t} + \Theta'(N_E)\,\widehat{N}_{E,t}$. The idea behind this specification is that more firm startups raise entry costs by creating a congestion externality. This could be due to an imperfectly elastic supply of a factor specific to product innovation, such as human resources involved in research and development or advertising. As an example, Das and Das (1996) point to advertising costs that entrants must incur to make consumers aware of new products. The effect of this externality is to reduce the impact response of firm entry, which helps to bring the model closer to the data. Figure 7.3 displays the impulse responses of my five variables to a monetary policy shock for the parameter values $\Theta'(N_E) = 2$ and $\kappa_w = 77$.

7.4. Sticky Wages and Endogenous Survival Probability

In addition to the signs of the estimated impulse responses, we can also consider their shapes and compare them with the model. The responses of firm entry to monetary policy and spending shocks are clearly hump-shaped in the data, pointing to some sort of rigidity in entry not captured by the model. The same phenomenon is well known for investment in physical capital in the standard DSGE model. To overcome this problem, Christiano et al. (2005) introduce investment adjustment costs as a function of the change in investment. A similar representation of adjustment costs, applied to firm entry, delivers the desired hump-shaped responses and is chosen here for analytical convenience. Suppose the number of firms in period $t + 1$ is given by the surviving producers from last period and a fraction of the new entrants, where the size of this fraction is governed by the function $F(\cdot)$:

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)[N_t + F(N_{E,t}, N_{E,t-1})]. \tag{2}$$

$F(\cdot)$ is defined as $F(N_{E,t}, N_{E,t-1}) = [1 - S(N_{E,t}/N_{E,t-1})]N_{E,t}$. This specification introduces an endogenous survival probability for new firms that depends negatively on the change in the number of startups. $S(\cdot)$ has the following steady state properties. $S(1) = S'(1) = 0$, $S''(1)$ is constant and strictly positive. Thus the free entry condition equates the current entry cost $w_t f_{E,t}/Z_t$ to the expected value of

FIGURE 6. Sticky wages and endogenous survival probability.

a new firm,

$$\frac{w_t f_{E,t}}{Z_t} = v_t F_{1,t} + \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} v_{t+1} F_{2,t+1} \right\}. \tag{3}$$

In the special case of zero adjustment costs, $S(\cdot) = 0$ and $F(N_{E,t}, N_{E,t-1}) = N_{E,t}$. Then $F_{1,t} = 1$, $F_{2,t+1} = 0$, and (3) reduces to the benchmark free entry condition. In linearized form, the law of motion for the number of firms and the new free entry condition are

$$\widehat{N}_{t+1} = (1-\delta)\widehat{N}_t + \delta\widehat{N}_{E,t} + (1-\delta)\frac{S''(1)}{N}\widehat{N}_{E,t-1},$$

$$\widehat{w}_t + \widehat{f}_{E,t} - \widehat{Z}_t = \widehat{v}_t - S''(1)[(\widehat{N}_{E,t} - \widehat{N}_{E,t-1}) - \beta E_t\{\widehat{N}_{E,t+1} - \widehat{N}_{E,t}\}].$$

Setting $\kappa_w = 77$ and $S''(1) = 2.5$ results in the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock shown in Figure 6.

The results presented here are consistent with findings in the industrial organization literature. Gort and Klepper (1982) identify different stages in the time path of net entry. They present evidence that the introduction of a product is rarely followed by rapid entry, as the benchmark BGM model with frictionless entry would suggest. Instead, the net entry rate appears to accelerate initially and to decelerate thereafter. The eventual deceleration of net entry is ascribed to an accumulation of specialized knowlegde of new products ("learning by doing"), which is unavailable to potential entrants and acts as a barrier to entry. In addition, the pool of potential entrants shrinks over time. Gort and Klepper (1982) conclude that the adjustment cost hypothesis is consistent with some of the empirical evidence.

8. CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of the driving forces of firm entry over the business cycle, with a view of testing the monetary transmission process through the extensive investment margin. Using model-based sign restrictions, I identify four shocks in a VAR. These are shocks to productivity, aggregate spending, monetary policy, and entry costs. Firm entry is allowed to respond freely to these shocks. I compare the empirical and theoretical impulse responses in terms of their sign and shape. Wherever the model fares badly, I propose modifications and extensions that can bring it closer to the data. One notable finding in favor

of the model is that of a positive effect of an increase in aggregate spending on entry, both in the model and in the data. This shows that aggregate spending shocks lead to adjustments in investment along the extensive margin. However, firm entry and profits also respond positively to monetary policy shocks. This is inconsistent with the view that entry costs reflect wage costs, and that real wages respond strongly to changes in aggregate demand. Introducing wage stickiness helps to produce responses of profits and entry with the right sign. As aggregate demand increases, a dampened real wage response implies that production costs as well as entry costs rise by less than in the flexible-wage economy, allowing profits and firm entry to expand. As for the estimated dynamics, the hump in the empirical impulse response functions of firm entry, which is typically also found for intensive-margin investment, suggests that other rigidities are present in the data that impede a speedy adjustment of firm creation. These rigidities might reflect a congestion externality whereby an increase in firm startups lowers the expected survival probability for would-be entrepreneurs. Rethinking the way that entry costs and survival rates are modeled thus remains high on the research agenda.

NOTES

1. See Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Devereux et al. (1996), Campbell (1998), Bilbiie et al. (2007a, 2007b), Bergin and Corsetti (in press), and Jaimovich and Floetotto (in press), among others.

2. Christiano et al. (1997) is a notable exception.

3. A circumflex above a variable denotes its deviation from steady state.

4. I suppose here that the central bank does not observe the welfare-based price index P_t, but instead measures inflation as the change in average prices p_t. The sign predictions used for my VAR identification are unaffected if instead I assume that the central bank observes P_t.

5. For models in which firm entry does matter for monetary policy, see Berentsen and Waller (2007) and Lewis (2008).

6. Notice that the true measure of net entry in the theoretical model corresponds to the variable $(1 - \delta)N_{E,t} - \delta N_t$. Given that the stock of firms N_t is predetermined, this variable reacts in proportion to $N_{E,t}$ on impact. The slow adjustment in N_t implies that the two measures of entry do not diverge too much. Simulations show that the divergence between the two series is of order of magnitude 10^{-3}, reflecting the small value of the firm exit rate δ.

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