

ESSAY

Immigrant Declarants and Loyal American Women: How Suffragists Helped Redefine the Rights of Citizens

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Abstract

As a result of the woman suffrage movement, citizenship and voting rights, though considered separate issues by the courts, became more intertwined in the mind of the average American. This interconnectedness was also a product of the concurrent movement to disfranchise immigrant declarant voters—immigrants who had filed their intention to become citizens but had not completed the naturalization process. This essay shows how suffragists pursued immigrant declarant disfranchisement as part of the woman suffrage movement, arguing that the same competitive political conditions that encouraged politicians to enfranchise primarily white, citizen women led them to disfranchise immigrant declarants. It analyzes suffragists' arguments at both the state and national levels that voting was a right of citizens who had met their wartime obligations to the nation, and maintains that woman suffrage and the votes of white women who supported the measures disfranchising immigrant declarants and limiting immigrant rights should be included in historians' understanding of the immigration restrictionist and nativist movements.

Keywords: Immigrant declarant voting; woman suffrage

Although many conceive of citizenship and voting rights as inextricably intertwined, at the turn of the twentieth century voting rights were neither restricted to citizens nor guaranteed to them. Citizens were routinely denied suffrage on account of race (Jim Crow voting restrictions), class (poll taxes), as well as gender (laws that only enfranchised men).¹ Concurrently, citizenship was not a requirement for voting in many states where resident immigrants who had filed their declarations of intent to become citizens (or “first papers”) could vote.² The nation's conceptions of voting and citizenship have changed so dramatically that early twentieth-century voting laws appear absurd to modern audiences. Those engaged in debates about woman suffrage participated in this continuous redefining of citizenship and voting rights.

The Supreme Court noted the disconnect between citizenship and voting rights in *Minor v. Happersett* (1875). When voting registrar Reese Happersett prevented Virginia Minor from registering to vote, she sued him. The court identified the main

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question as “whether all citizens are necessarily voters,” and then concluded: “Certainly, if the courts can consider any question settled, this is one. For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage.” In its decision, the court explicitly mentioned noncitizen suffrage:

Besides this, citizenship has not in all cases been made a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the right of suffrage. Thus, in Missouri, persons of foreign birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, may under certain circumstances vote. The same provision is to be found in the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas.³

Voting by resident immigrants dates back to the colonial era, and by the nineteenth century it was remarkably widespread.⁴ Wisconsin legislated voting on “first papers” in 1848, and midwestern states in competition with Wisconsin for migrants followed suit.⁵ The practice spread to the South and West after the Civil War, and by the 1870s, twenty-two states or territories allowed it.⁶ Immigrant declarant voting was often crucial to supporting machine politics, and it became intricately tied to referendums on woman suffrage in Texas and Arkansas. Suffragists in these two campaigns used nativist strategies targeting immigrant declarant voting, strategies learned in earlier state campaigns like South Dakota’s, where suffrage amendments and resident immigrant voting restrictions had passed together—which was not a coincidence.

Voting rights movements, including the woman suffrage movement, should be seen as moments when multiple groups’ voting rights were in flux, as was the question of who counted as members of society or as full citizens.⁷ According to Dawn Langan Teele, both political competition and the mobilization of women were crucial to suffrage victories. “The conditions under which reform was likeliest was when politics was highly competitive and when a political group with enough power to change the laws believed it could capture the majority of women’s votes,” Teele argues.⁸ Indeed, competition led some politicians to form alliances with suffragists in order to retain or increase their political power. However, the combination of competitive politics and a party with enough power to change voting laws was just as likely to result in disfranchising efforts. Some politicians embraced white woman suffrage in an effort to increase the voting power of their base while simultaneously arguing for disfranchising resident immigrants in an effort to decrease the voting power of their opposition’s base. The same circumstances and activism that persuaded politicians to enfranchise one group (white women) could just as easily persuade those in power to disfranchise another (resident immigrants).

Suffragists on the national and state levels argued for the disfranchisement of resident immigrants, deeming them disloyal, unable to meet the obligations of citizenship, and unworthy of its rights.⁹ Campaigns to enfranchise white women and disfranchise immigrant declarants were intertwined in South Dakota, Texas, and Arkansas. These campaigns help elucidate the changing meaning of citizenship, as well as how national suffragists altered their advice based on lessons learned in particular state campaigns.

Many histories of woman suffrage in the United States address immigrant voters and nativism within the movement. However, rarely do they make clear that immigrant declarants—not just naturalized citizens—exercised the vote in many states, and that suffragists campaigned to disfranchise them specifically.¹⁰ Eleanor Flexner, Ellen

Fitzpatrick, and Aileen Kraditor discuss suffragists' efforts to limit immigrant voting without mentioning campaigns to disfranchise resident immigrants.¹¹ Kraditor references "the proposal to *take the vote away from* some Americans—Negroes in the South and naturalized citizens in the North," either ignoring resident immigrant suffrage, or unaware of it.¹² Perhaps this failure to clearly differentiate between resident immigrant voting and naturalized immigrant voting is due to a lack of focus on the Midwest and the South, where resident immigrant voting was common, or perhaps it is because suffragists themselves rarely distinguished between naturalized and resident immigrant voters.¹³ Nonetheless, suffragists' efforts to disfranchise resident immigrants was a key part of their strategy in multiple states, at the direction of Carrie Chapman Catt and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA).

By the end of World War I, many Americans referred to voting as a right—at least as a right of white citizens, both male and female.¹⁴ At the same time, nativism gained ground in the United States against the backdrop of the Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910 and American involvement in WWI in 1917.¹⁵ During WWI, suffragists used the increasingly accepted idea of voting as a right—and specifically as a right of people who had fulfilled their obligation to the state—to argue for woman suffrage. They maintained that white, American-born women had met their wartime obligations as citizens, while resident immigrants had not.¹⁶

Business owners backed resident immigrant voting to incentivize migration to their states. Politicians supported it either to capitalize on the votes of immigrants already present in their jurisdiction or to encourage future immigration.¹⁷ For example, while no southern state allowed immigrant declarant voting before the Civil War, Republicans added it to the Reconstruction constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas.¹⁸ Republicans were thought to have included it in the 1869 Texas constitution to "catch the vote of the German immigrants" (who had largely voted against secession).¹⁹ Nationally, the practice had declined in popularity by 1900, when only eleven states still allowed it, and four of those states ended the practice before 1917.

Resident immigrant voting gave suffragists the opportunity to make both justice and expediency arguments.²⁰ Immigrant disfranchisement allowed suffragists to contrast their own lack of rights as primarily native-born, white, female citizens with the fact that male resident immigrants—exempt from the obligations of citizens, including military service—could vote. This argument was strengthened by women publicly meeting the obligations of citizenship during WWI, while even German immigrants retained voting rights that women lacked. Concomitantly, politicians interested in using resident immigrant disfranchisement to weaken their opposition could be fairly certain that newly enfranchised white women would vote to do just that.

Complicating the issue of resident immigrant suffrage was the fact that the United States determined a married woman's citizenship status based on her husband's status alone. The 1855 Naturalization Act forced immigrant women to automatically assume the citizenship of their American husbands.²¹ After the Fourteenth Amendment established birthright citizenship in 1867, immigrant women received their husband's birthright citizenship. In 1907, Congress acted to automatically denaturalize any American woman who married a man lacking American citizenship.²² Women's desires did not affect their automatic change of citizenship upon marriage. If an American woman with birthright citizenship married a noncitizen man, she lost her birthright citizenship for life. If her husband became a naturalized citizen, she would gain his naturalized citizenship. To prove citizenship, women would present "a marriage certificate and their

husband's birth certificate or naturalization papers."²³ The 1907 Expatriation Act officially made women dependent citizens, though it had been operating unofficially for years. While most vestiges of coverture were diminishing, Candice Lewis Bredbenner argues that Congress's efforts to enforce derivative citizenship on married women "appeared to be a statutory reassertion of the single-identity theory of marriage."²⁴ However, Congress was acting in line with another prevailing trend: nativism. The Expatriation Act of 1907 was part of a set of laws aimed at curbing immigrants' rights and increasing federal authority over the issue. After the Supreme Court upheld the law in 1915, suffragists began working for women's independent citizenship, which they believed was crucial for woman suffrage.²⁵ Independent citizenship was one of the League of Women Voters' original goals at its founding.²⁶ The Women's Joint Congressional Committee worked for "removal of citizenship discrimination against American women who married aliens," which was partially achieved in the Cable Act of 1922.²⁷ Women's dependent citizenship meant that few women were enfranchised by laws enfranchising immigrant declarants. Married women could not file "first papers," and their citizenship did not change until their husbands completed the naturalization process.

In 1889, North and South Dakota were the final states to not require citizenship of voters in their constitutions. South Dakota had four unsuccessful woman suffrage campaigns in 1890, 1894, 1898, and 1914. Some of NAWSA's "twentieth-century generals," like Anna Howard Shaw and Carrie Chapman Catt, participated in the 1890 South Dakota campaign, where they "made a number of discoveries about elections, voters, and organizing, which they applied to future battles."²⁸ When the 1890 referendum—which Eleanor Flexner called "the South Dakota fiasco"—was lost, historian Sarah Egge contends that NAWSA "suffragists sharpened their nativist inclinations and deepened their belief that they must separate woman suffrage from temperance."²⁹ These two conclusions were intertwined as immigrant voters with cultural affinities for alcohol were presumed to have voted against both prohibition and woman suffrage.³⁰

NAWSA refused to aid South Dakota in its 1898 referendum "because it believed that temperance and 'backward' immigrant voters would mean certain defeat."³¹ Catt, by now president of NAWSA, closely watched the 1898 referendum in which the woman suffrage amendment was defeated by only 3,285 votes, a far cry from the 22,710-vote margin in the failed 1890 campaign but still not victory. The result solidified Catt's own nativism, "and so she steered NAWSA toward nativism as a powerful rhetorical weapon."³² This would have consequences for the suffrage movement on the national level and in future state campaigns under Catt's direction.

In March 1917, the South Dakota legislature passed yet another suffrage amendment, three years after the last failed referendum. Governor Peter Norbeck added a citizenship clause to the bill that, if enacted, would require all voters to be citizens. Suffragist propaganda for the amendment capitalized on nativism, while emphasizing women's war work as proof of their fitness for citizenship and suffrage. They contrasted patriotic female citizens with "enemy alien" voters, even blaming German immigrants for the failed 1914 referenda, "publishing a map that showed the counties in which voters had defeated woman suffrage, with their percentage of German population."³³ The campaign was successful, and the amendment passed with 64 percent of the vote. Egge argues that the "results also revealed how deeply South Dakotans embraced nativism. It sharply influenced their conceptions of citizenship, constricting it to those who were deemed loyal."³⁴ As women voters were presumed to support the same politicians and policies that immigrants were assumed to have voted against, resident immigrant disfranchisement made sense to pro-suffrage politicians and voters.

The success of South Dakota's fifth, exhausting suffrage campaign drew a mixed response from Catt: "The Lord be praised that South Dakota is out of the way," she said.³⁵ However, campaigning against resident immigrant suffrage while arguing that American-born white women had met the obligations of citizenship during WWI appeared to be a successful strategy. NAWSA blamed multiple failed suffrage campaigns on resident immigrant voters, and in particular on German immigrants hostile to both woman suffrage and prohibition.³⁶ By 1919, only four states continued to allow noncitizen voting: Indiana, Texas, Missouri, and Arkansas. That year, the Texas and Arkansas legislatures, both of which had already enfranchised women in primary elections, passed amendments to end noncitizen voting requiring public referenda.³⁷

Texas Democrats had implemented the all-white primary in 1902, establishing primary elections and restricting primary voters to white men, though enforcement of the all-white primary was left to local officials. The white primary and the poll tax, which was legislated in 1903, were the only two Jim Crow legal restrictions on Texas elections. In south Texas, political bosses saw that the white primary did not limit the votes of Mexican immigrants, whose poll taxes they regularly paid, often by debiting workers' paychecks.³⁸ While usually associated with cities in the northeast, machine politics was common in south Texas, where political bosses or *patrones* depended on resident immigrant voting.³⁹ The bosses performed political favors for powerful ranchers, who delivered the votes of the immigrant workers economically dependent on them; immigrant workers received some kindness or employment in exchange for their votes.⁴⁰ Bosses routinely paid the poll taxes of their supporters, even after the legislature made it illegal in 1912. They were also known to encourage ineligible immigrants to vote, to tamper with ballots, and to find workarounds to allow the illiterate or those only literate in Spanish to vote.⁴¹

German resident immigrant voting proved controversial during WWI. In Texas, where the two largest immigrant groups were Mexicans and Germans, the legislature considered resident immigrant disfranchisement in January 1917, even though a similar state amendment had failed at referendum in 1915 with only 31.9 percent of the vote.⁴² However, the backlash to immigrant declarant voting only increased one month later, when President Woodrow Wilson released the text of the Zimmerman telegram in which Germany sought an alliance with Mexico that would result in a Mexican invasion of the southern U.S. border.⁴³ Suffragists in Texas and the nation argued that woman suffrage would "clean up" politics and counter the machines.⁴⁴

After Democrats throughout the South effectively eliminated Black voting with violence, intimidation, literacy tests, white primaries, and poll taxes, their hold on political power was almost total, and as such, they had no incentive to enfranchise white women.⁴⁵ Historian Elna Green argues that many disfranchisers went on to play prominent roles in the anti-suffrage movement, as they viewed woman suffrage as a threat to white supremacy.⁴⁶ Although Texas was a one-party state, the conservative south Texas bosses and their allies vied for control of the state Democratic Party with progressive and prohibitionist Democrats. Both the legal exercise of voting rights by resident immigrants and election fraud angered progressive Democrats, including white woman suffragists. They sought to purify elections, in part by eliminating the votes of Black and Brown Texans. Progressive Democrats, often supportive of prohibition and occasionally of woman suffrage, considered immigrant voters to be racially inferior, uneducated, and too easily bought.⁴⁷ They fought to disfranchise resident immigrants and to disempower the political machines that relied upon their votes.

Texas suffragists capitalized on this split between conservative and progressive Democrats. They played an important role in the impeachment and removal of

conservative Governor James E. Ferguson in 1917, and negotiated primary suffrage for themselves in order to prevent the impeached governor from being reelected in 1918.⁴⁸ Ferguson “enjoyed strong support among opponents of prohibition, including the state’s substantial populations of German, Czech, and Mexican immigrants,” both declarant and naturalized. Progressive reformers argued that “he would get the wet vote—especially the manipulated Hispanic portion of it along the Mexican border, where political bosses ruled”—and they saw enfranchising white female citizens as a way to counter these votes.⁴⁹ The competitive political environment created an opportunity for suffragists to leverage their votes in exchange for primary woman suffrage.⁵⁰

The Texas legislature also passed a law ending resident immigrant primary suffrage, ensuring that the 1918 primary woman suffrage law would not enfranchise resident immigrant women. The 1918 Texas primary was the first Texas election in which white citizen women could vote, and the first in which resident immigrant men could not.⁵¹ Primary suffrage side-stepped anti-suffrage arguments that woman suffrage would increase Black voting: presumably, the same white primary that limited Black male voting would restrict Black female voting too.⁵² White southern politicians would block woman suffrage if it either was believed to substantially increase Black voting or actually did. White suffragists reassured politicians that “woman suffrage and black suffrage were unrelated.”⁵³ Primary suffrage was a safe way for politicians to test this argument.

That same year, the Texas Democrats unanimously adopted a suffrage plank, endorsing state and federal suffrage amendments. The platform, written by University of Texas Professor Alexander Caswell Ellis, a progressive Democrat, also advocated a citizenship requirement for voting, as Ellis put it, “Thus making our Texas ballot 100 percent Democratic and 100 percent American.”⁵⁴ Cynthia Orozco argues that Anglos in Texas “made little distinction ... between Mexico Texanos and Mexicans,” despite the reality of a substantial number of independent voters of Mexican origin. Orozco concludes that Anglos in Texas “racialized ‘Mexicans’ as ‘other,’ nonwhite, and non-American,” while they “appropriated the term ‘American’ for themselves, associating ‘Americanness’ with ‘whiteness.’”⁵⁵ In light of this, Professor Ellis’s use of the phrase “100% American”—a phrase later associated with the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s—accrues a racialized meaning.⁵⁶

WWI concluded in November of 1918, but nativist sentiment lingered; attacks on the limited political power of resident immigrants gained traction. In 1919, the Texas legislature passed the Thomason law, restricting voters who could receive assistance to those over the age of sixty, the physically disabled, or those who had been citizens for at least twenty-one years. It mandated that assistance be given in English only. Election officials could assist illiterate native-born whites, but were prohibited from assisting immigrants who struggled to read English.⁵⁷ Historian Evan Anders argues that the persistence of machine rule in south Texas after the restrictions only exacerbated the “association of Mexican-Americans with widespread corruption and reinforced the ethnic prejudices of the Anglo voters of the state.”⁵⁸

In 1919, progressive Democrats passed two state constitutional amendments subject to referenda: a prohibition amendment that would go into effect sooner than the federal amendment and a state woman suffrage amendment including a citizenship clause that would disfranchise resident immigrants. The intent was to reduce the power of conservative bosses in south Texas by eliminating a large bloc of their voters while enfranchising a large bloc of their opponents’ supporters. Ironically, the leaders of the Texas Equal Suffrage Association (TESA) in 1919 strategically (and only privately) opposed the state

suffrage amendment, which would require an exhausting statewide campaign and referendum. Texas suffragists had a reasonable expectation of being fully enfranchised soon through other means; they had achieved primary suffrage, which they could use to pressure state legislators to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment then working its way through Congress. Further, the prohibition amendment on the same ballot would strengthen the connection that most voters saw between prohibition and woman suffrage—something NAWSA and TESA tried to avoid, believing that it had doomed previous suffrage campaigns like South Dakota's. Finally, suffragists believed the state suffrage amendment was unnecessarily risky as anti-suffragists could use its defeat to argue against ratification of the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, which became the Nineteenth Amendment. All of this explains why the state amendment passed the Texas legislature unanimously: both pro- and anti-suffrage politicians believed that a suffrage referendum could work to their advantage.

NAWSA President Catt wrote to TESA President Minnie Fisher Cunningham on hearing that the state amendment had passed against TESA's wishes. Knowing that Cunningham was likely not going to be able to get the election postponed as she had hoped, Catt offered another strategy, one she learned from South Dakota:

When we got the wire yesterday that the measure had gone through one House, Mrs. Shuler wrote immediately a special delivery letter to Mrs. Mahoney in Austin, sending her a copy of the South Dakota Bill. This granted the vote to citizens and because of its patriotic nature it was far easier to carry the amendment. You see no one could vote against suffrage without at the same time voting to give the vote to unnaturalized Germans. I think it would work about as well in Texas. ... If you cannot get [the amendment] rescinded toward the end of the session then by all means leave no stone unturned to get it amended with these citizenship clauses in it.⁵⁹

Catt believed that the citizenship clause could be the key to winning woman suffrage in Texas. Unbeknownst to her, the legislature submitted the suffrage amendment alongside a citizenship amendment, and the two were intertwined: if the woman suffrage amendment passed, noncitizen suffrage would cease. If the woman suffrage amendment failed, noncitizen suffrage would continue.⁶⁰ Cunningham followed Catt's advice and made the citizenship clause the focus of TESA's 1919 campaign. TESA propaganda focused on "alien enemies" voting while "loyal American women" remained disfranchised. Catt specifically mentioned German immigrants in her writing, yet Texan suffragists focused on Mexican immigrants, likely because of the racialization and othering of Mexican-origin peoples, especially in Texas.⁶¹

The election date was set for May 24, 1919, leaving twelve weeks to campaign.⁶² Cunningham emphasized the citizenship clause: "Our amendment is designed not only to enfranchise the loyal American women of this state, but to disfranchise the alien enemies in our midst, and the aliens have such an advantage over us in that they can vote on the Amendment while we, the women, cannot."⁶³ Cunningham argued that this handicap required women to "lay aside our natural differences in asking and call loudly for help from the American men of this state."⁶⁴ She hoped that prejudice against immigrants could allay prejudice against white women publicly making claims for political rights. "Are you an American Citizen?" read one TESA flyer, concluding, "If you believe in America and American citizenship, vote and work for the adoption of Suffrage Amendment on May 24."⁶⁵

Cunningham believed that this claim would resonate with voters concerned about allegedly disloyal resident immigrants voting during WWI, especially as Texas absolutely disfranchised servicemen for the length of their service until 1954.⁶⁶ While other states tentatively built absentee voter processes allowing servicemen in training camps or deployed overseas to vote during WWI, Texas continued disfranchising those meeting the highest obligations of citizenship.⁶⁷ Texas suffragists contrasted resident immigrant voting and serviceman disfranchisement. One of Cunningham's circulars argued that it "was found during the war to be a serious menace when the alien enemy was exempt from military service but could vote, while Americans went into the Army and were, therefore disfranchised. It is no less serious, these reconstruction days."⁶⁸ While Governor William Hobby argued that women deserved the vote for their war service, Cunningham declared that resident immigrants deserved disfranchisement for their lack of war service, despite the fact that immigrant labor had kept the nation and the military fed.

Cunningham recruited veterans.⁶⁹ At her request, Major Richard F. Burgess sent Cunningham an official statement for her use arguing that "the millions of American women who served their country with equal fidelity at home, should remove the last doubt in the mind of anyone that the extension of the equal right of suffrage is a long-deferred act of simple justice."⁷⁰ Realizing that few discharged servicemen would return in time to vote, suffragists used their own war work to encourage men in Texas to support suffrage in the absence of those servicemen still abroad.⁷¹ TESA's Jane McCallum wrote to newspaper editors:

[S]ee that the foreign and near-foreign men in Texas, most of whom were exempted from military service, do not, in the absence of our soldier boys, vote themselves into power, and at the same times disfranchise the mothers, wives, sisters and sweethearts who have stood behind these boys unreservedly, unflinchingly and without counting the cost.⁷²

McCallum advised local suffragists to get pro-suffrage letters from soldiers printed in their local newspapers on Mother's Day in 1919.⁷³

Both Catt and Cunningham believed that arguing against resident immigrant suffrage in the hyperpatriotic WWI era with its increasingly ugly nativist streak was a winning strategy. It fit the prevailing attitudes of progressives in the state and nation, while also playing on racial biases against Mexicans. Responding to the effort to disfranchise a substantial portion of their base of power, conservative bosses James Wells and Archie Parr focused their efforts against the suffrage amendment, which could be far more damaging to boss rule than prohibition alone.⁷⁴ Wells's wife, Pauline, led the Texas Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (TAOWS), a branch of the national organization that she established in Houston in March 1916. TAOWS distributed more than 100,000 pieces of anti-suffrage literature during the 1919 campaign.⁷⁵

With women disfranchised, TESA resorted to encouraging women to "let your husband know how you feel about it so that he will help you to get the vote."⁷⁶ While the prohibition amendment passed, the suffrage amendment failed by 25,120 votes, or 45.9 percent of the vote.⁷⁷ Resident immigrant suffrage remained, but citizen women retained primary suffrage.

TESA's propaganda blamed the failure of the state suffrage amendment on multiple factors, including "the fact that woman suffrage was bound up with the exclusion of the large alien vote in the state, and could not be voted for on its merit."⁷⁸ Cunningham

wrote to one legislator that he should not have been surprised that the amendment failed as it was, “handicapped with an alien exclusion rider and by some oversight of our friends and machinations of our enemies, rushed to the vote while approximately 200,000 American men were out of the electorate in the United States Army. There are in this state nearly 150,000 men of voting age (United States Census 1910) foreign born.”⁷⁹ Cunningham primarily blamed the amendment’s defeat on German immigrants in central Texas, where the amendment was voted down in large numbers, but her biographers Judith McArthur and Harold L. Smith conclude, “she knew reality to be more complex.”⁸⁰

When the strategy to link woman suffrage with the citizen voting clause failed, suffragists also blamed resident immigrants, recently naturalized voters, and Black Texans. Professor Ellis’s assessment of the election helped suffragists frame their loss.⁸¹ This justification was crucial, as anti-suffragists argued that the failed referendum meant that Texas should not ratify the Anthony Amendment during a special session only one month later. In an argument reminiscent of that made by South Dakota suffragists, Ellis used the 1919 state election returns to argue that the defeat was primarily due to German immigrant voters in Central Texas, whom he claimed were aided in some places by Mexican immigrant and Black voters.⁸² TESA issued flyers using nativist and racist arguments to explain the amendment’s defeat, and urging pro-suffrage Democrats to “not violate their platform and personal pledges at [the] behest of a majority made by Negro and Republican votes.” Cunningham and Ellis acted to maintain the support of progressive Democrats, who were scared by the failed referendum. Citing numbers gathered by Ellis, the flyer argued, “twenty German counties gave 41,836 anti-suffrage, pro-alien votes,” and “twenty Negro counties gave 27,195 anti-suffrage, pro-alien votes,” clearly pitting racial and immigrant others against white woman suffrage.⁸³

Even when counties with substantial Mexican resident immigrants voted for woman suffrage, white suffragists used nativist and racist assumptions to explain away their support. In south Texas, the amendment narrowly passed in seven out of the twelve most southeastern counties, which suffragists believed were unwinnable because of their racialized perceptions of all peoples of Mexican descent as controlled by the *patrones*.⁸⁴ Anglo populations were growing in south Texas, and resident immigrants voted in fewer numbers in 1919 than in previous years due to harsher naturalization, voting laws, and increased migration out of south Texas in response to anti-Mexican violence. Ellis explained the success of the amendment in south Texas by arguing that the new literacy law was working.⁸⁵

Catt sympathized, writing to Cunningham, “I should say you had the most ticklish job and the most crucial problem of any of the states at this moment.”⁸⁶ The ratification battle lasted six eventful days, but in the end, Cunningham and TESA were successful. Progressive and moderate Democrats ratified the Nineteenth Amendment on June 28, 1919, over the opposition of conservative Democrats who called it an example of federal intrusion on states’ rights.

The Texas case reveals that when one group’s access to the ballot was in flux, all groups’ voting rights were subject to alteration. In a competitive political environment, nativist and racist rhetoric was a powerful weapon helping politicians disfranchise groups who threatened to remove them from power. In 1921, in their first state election as full voters, white Texas women helped pass a state constitutional amendment finally disfranchising immigrant declarants. This citizenship amendment also allowed spouses to pay each other’s poll taxes, effectively making it easier for white women to vote. Both

measures were seen as strengthening the power of reform Democrats. Motivated by the Black women who sued for the right to register to vote under the primary suffrage law, the few who were actually allowed to register, and others who had voted in general elections after the Nineteenth Amendment was passed, the Texas legislature strengthened the white primary in 1923 by legislating it instead of leaving it to the Democratic Party to enforce.⁸⁷ However, legislating the white primary proved to be its Achilles' heel. By overstepping its bounds, the state of Texas opened itself to the constitutional challenge that eventually brought down the white primary in 1944.

Similar events played out in Arkansas, another state with immigrant declarant voting and the only other state with primary woman suffrage. Arkansas's immigrant population included German and eastern European immigrants whose Catholicism was feared or hated by Protestant citizens.⁸⁸ In 1917, the Arkansas legislature debated a primary woman suffrage bill that was originally written in Texas, where its passage was delayed by the impeachment of Governor Ferguson. Arkansas Representative Henry Stevens argued that primary suffrage would increase Black voting, but that the reality of the white primary mitigated that attack. The vote was so close it was likely decided by two anti-suffrage representatives being unable to vote while on suspension for bribery. According to historian A. Elizabeth Taylor, the "commendable record of [Arkansan] women during the First World War helped to refute the traditional complaint that women should not vote because they could not serve in the armed forces."⁸⁹ Arkansas passed the bill, and more than 40,000 women voted in the 1918 primary. The state Democratic Party then added a full woman suffrage plank to its platform that year. As Taylor surmised, "the primary bill had the effect of converting many anti-suffrage congressmen." In January 1919, the Arkansas legislature passed a state suffrage amendment that would go to referendum in 1920.⁹⁰

Before that referendum took place, the legislature ratified the Nineteenth Amendment seventy-four to fifteen in July 1919, making Arkansas the second of four southern states to ratify. In August 1920, Tennessee ratified, making the Nineteenth Amendment officially part of the U.S. Constitution. This left Arkansas in the unusual position of holding a referendum on a state woman suffrage amendment after the federal woman suffrage amendment was enacted. Like Texas, the Arkansas suffrage amendment contained a citizenship clause. If enacted, resident immigrant suffrage would end. If it failed, resident immigrant suffrage would remain under state law, but woman suffrage would also remain due to federal law. Due to the quirk of timing, women could vote in the Arkansas referendum.

The Arkansas constitution contained the "silent vote" clause, meaning that the amendment needed a majority of all votes cast in the election, not just a simple majority of those who voted on the amendment itself. If a voter did not vote on constitutional amendments when casting a ballot, they effectively voted against the amendments. A similar clause nearly defeated the Oklahoma state suffrage amendment in November 1918. Oklahoma allowed servicemen to vote when stationed on bases throughout the state. The Oklahoma Election Board chairman intentionally sent ballots without amendments printed on them to those bases. Every single ballot cast by the 4,197 Oklahoman servicemen on those bases effectively counted as a vote against the suffrage amendment, regardless of the voter's intent of the servicemen, because the amendment did not appear on their ballots.⁹¹

In the Arkansas referendum in November 1920, the amendment to disfranchise resident immigrants and enfranchise women on the state level passed 87,237 to 49,757 but failed to overcome the silent vote. The speaker declared the amendment lost and the

Arkansas Supreme Court upheld that ruling in 1920. However, after a curious turn of events, the court reversed its original opinion on Apr. 12, 1926, eliminating the silent clause and declaring that the amendment had passed. The attorney general confirmed that he considered it “legally adopted and is now in full force and effect.” Political scientist Leon Aylsworth wrote in 1931 that because of the court’s reversal, “For the first time in over a hundred years, a national election was held in 1928 in which no alien in any state had the right to cast a vote for a candidate for any office—national, state, or local.”⁹² The era of resident immigrant voting officially ended with the enactment of Arkansas’s state suffrage amendment.⁹³

Acknowledging the efforts of suffragists to disfranchise immigrant declarants offers a view of white woman suffrage as part of a nativist effort to restrict immigration and immigrant rights in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Not content with eliminating immigrant declarant voting in 1921, Texans like Representative John C. Box joined other restrictionists in attempting to have Mexicans labeled as racially ineligible for citizenship, which would also have barred them from immigrating under the 1924 Immigration Act.⁹⁴ Woman suffrage and the votes of white women who supported these measures should be included in our understanding of the restrictionist and nativist movements.

The same competitive political conditions that encouraged politicians to enfranchise primarily white, citizen women led those same politicians to disfranchise resident immigrants. WWI allowed women to demand suffrage based on fulfilling their obligations as citizens through war work, while arguing that resident immigrants failed to meet these obligations and were therefore unworthy of voting rights. National suffragists embraced this nativist strategy. Americans’ conception of voting as a right of citizens changed dramatically in the early twentieth century. This process of change continued well after 1920, accelerated by the modern civil rights movements and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and continues today. While courts define the right to vote largely as the right to equal protection with other voters, most Americans continue to equate citizenship with voting and indeed to define voting as the most fundamental right of citizens.⁹⁵

Notes

1 Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 4, 10; Sara Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship in the Midwest, 1870–1920* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2018), 8–9.

2 The legal term was “resident legal alien.” I use the terms “resident immigrant” or “immigrant declarant” to differentiate these voters from naturalized citizens.

3 *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).

4 Gerald M. Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?,” *Michigan Law Review* 75, no. 5 (1977): 1097.

5 Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protection,” 1098.

6 Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protection, 1099; Leon E. Aylsworth, “The Passing of Alien Suffrage,” *The American Political Science Review* 25 (Feb. 1931): 114; Shklar, *American Citizenship*, 4–5.

7 Sometimes this was unintentional. By ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment, Texas accidentally invalidated its poll tax, because as written, it only applied to men. Only six weeks before the 1920 presidential election, the legislature applied the poll tax to female voters. State of Texas, 36th Legislature, 4th Called Session, Sept. 21–22, 1920, Journal of the House of Representatives, 4–14, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, https://lrl.texas.gov/collections/journals/journalsHouse36_4.cfm; State of Texas, 36th Legislature, 4th Called Session, Sept. 21–22, 1920, Journal of the Senate, 4–14, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, https://lrl.texas.gov/collections/journals/journalsSenate36_4.cfm (accessed June 27, 2020).

- 8 Dawn Langan Teele, *Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women's Vote* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 6–7, 116. See also Elna C. Green, *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 180–81.
- 9 For examples, see the pro-suffrage cartoon “Four Voters,” *Life Magazine*, Oct. 16, 1913, showing a suffragist in a white dress contrasted with caricatures of a Black man, a working-class white man drinking beer, and an anarchist wielding a bomb.
- 10 Suffrage historians’ studies that differentiate between them include Judith N. McArthur, “Minnie Fisher Cunningham’s Back Door Lobby in Texas: Political Maneuverings in a One-Party State” in *One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement*, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Troutdale, OR: NewSage Press, 1995), 315–32; Judith N. McArthur and Harold Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham: A Suffragist’s Life in Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*.
- 11 Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1959] 1996), 211, 297; Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1965] 1981), 123, 125, 130–33.
- 12 Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement*, 137 (emphasis in original).
- 13 Louise Michele Newman discusses “naturalized immigrants [who] gained power in [northern] urban areas” and efforts to disfranchise them through “immigration restriction and eugenic regulations.” Louise Michele Newman, *White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 59; Marjorie Spruill Wheeler argues that white suffragists, “angry at the ease with which immigrant men were enfranchised . . . increasingly employed racist and nativist rhetoric and tactics.” Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, “Introduction: A Short History of the Woman Suffrage Movement in America” in Wheeler, *One Woman, One Vote*, 13. See also Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, *New Women of the New South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 115–16, 131. Linda Kerber summarizes Susan B. Anthony’s argument that “sex was a characteristic markedly different from youth or being an alien. Although aliens could not vote, an individual alien man could choose to become a naturalized citizen.” Linda Kerber, “‘Ourselves and Our Daughters Forever’: Women and the Constitution, 1787–1876” in Wheeler, *One Woman, One Vote*, 34.
- 14 Christopher Cappozola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 6; Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 16–17; Kimberly Jensen, *Mobilizing Minerva: American Women in the First World War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), vii, 12.
- 15 Katherine Benton-Cohen, *Inventing the Immigration Problem: The Dillingham Commission and Its Legacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
- 16 See also arguments for the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, H.R. 6355, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. Natalia Molina argues that “in practice, it was interpreted . . . more as a form of forced assimilation in which citizenship was extended in name only.” Natalia Molina, “‘In a Race All Their Own’: The Quest to Make Mexicans Ineligible for U.S. Citizenship,” *Pacific Historical Review* 79 (May 2010): 179.
- 17 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 9–10.
- 18 Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protection,” 1116–17.
- 19 Greg Cantrell, “‘Our Very Pronounced Theory of Equal Rights to All’: Race, Citizenship, and Populism in the South Texas Borderlands,” *Journal of American History* 100 (Dec. 2013): 677; Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 (1869).
- 20 Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement*.
- 21 Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 15; Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 10. This pre-sumes that the immigrant woman was racially eligible for citizenship. See Martha Menchaca, *Naturalizing Mexican Immigrants: A Texas History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 207.
- 22 Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 4.
- 23 Menchaca, *Naturalizing Mexican Immigrants*, 208.
- 24 Coverture was the legal process in which women suffered civil death upon marriage and became one legal entity with their husbands. Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 5.
- 25 Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 6.

- 26 “The Official Program of the Committee on American Citizenship of the League of Women Voters,” by Mrs. Frederick P. Bagley, chairman, in Minnie Fisher Cunningham Papers, box 7, folder 29, University of Houston Libraries Special Collections (hereafter cited as MFC Papers).
- 27 Nancy F. Cott, “Across the Great Divide: Women in Politics Before and After 1920” in Wheeler, *One Woman, One Vote*, 366. The Cable Act allowed women to remain citizens only if the noncitizen immigrant they married was racially eligible for citizenship and only if they continued living on U.S. soil.
- 28 Jennifer M. Ross-Nazzari, *Winning the West for Women: The Life of Suffragist Emma Smith Devoe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 36.
- 29 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 229–30; Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 105.
- 30 Conversely, Kraditor argues: “New York City, home of a large immigrant population, that made victory possible” in the 1917 state campaign. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement*, 144.
- 31 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 106; See also Lori Ann Lahlum and Molly P. Rozum, *Equality at the Ballot Box: Votes for Women on the Northern Great Plains* (Pierre: South Dakota Historical Society Press, 2019).
- 32 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 96, 115.
- 33 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 165–68. The legal term “enemy alien” refers to an immigrant whose country of origin is at war with the United States.
- 34 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 169–70.
- 35 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 305.
- 36 Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship*, 16; Billie Barnes Jensen, “Colorado Woman Suffrage Campaigns of the 1870s,” *Journal of the West* 12 (Apr. 1973); Rebecca J. Mead, *How the Vote Was Won: Woman Suffrage in the Western United States, 1868–1914* (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 57–58, 64, 67–68.
- 37 Aylsworth, “The Passing of Alien Suffrage,” 114–16. See also Cantrell, “Our Very Pronounced Theory of Equal Rights to All,” 663–90; State of Texas, 34th Legislature, Regular Session, April 5, 1915, House Joint Resolution no. 1, “Proposed Amendment to the State Constitution Providing that Under Certain Circumstances a Voter May Vote in Precincts Other than His Place of Residence,” 289–91, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, https://rl.texas.gov/scanned/sessionLaws/34-0/HJR_1.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).
- 38 Cynthia E. Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 35.
- 39 Teele, *Forging the Franchise*, 111; Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed*, 21.
- 40 Evan Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas: The Progressive Era* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 272; Rachel Michelle Gunter, “‘Without Us, It Is Ferguson with a Plurality’: Woman Suffrage and Anti-Ferguson Politics” in *Impeached: The Removal of Texas Governor James E. Ferguson*, eds. Jessica Brannon-Wranosky and Bruce A. Glasrud (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2017), 86.
- 41 Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed*, 34–35; Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 269.
- 42 “Bill Before Legislature to Prevent Mexicans Voting: Amendment is Proposed by El Pasoans at Austin,” *El Paso Morning Times*, Jan. 30, 1917, Texas Digital Newspaper Program, University of North Texas Libraries Portal to Texas History, <https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metaph198631/m1/1/> (accessed June 27, 2020). On the failed 1915 referendum, see State of Texas, House Joint Resolution no. 1.
- 43 Katherine Kuehler Walters, “World War I” in *Handbook of Texas Online*, www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qdw01 (accessed June 27, 2020).
- 44 Teele, *Forging the Franchise*, 111.
- 45 Dawn Langan Teele argues: “Incumbents will be reluctant to enlarge the set of electors if they already have enough support to maintain power.” Teele, *Forging the Franchise*, 32, 46, 85. On efforts to enfranchise white women as part of Jim Crow, see Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, “The Woman Suffrage Movement in the South” in *Votes for Women! The Woman Suffrage Movement in Tennessee, the South, and the Nation*, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1995), 39; and Wheeler, *New Women of the New South*, 115.
- 46 Green, *Southern Strategies*, xii–xv.
- 47 For reformers describing ideal voters, see Darlene Clark Hine, *Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 82; Debbie Mauldin Cottrell, *Pioneer Woman Educator: The Progressive Spirit of Annie Webb Blanton* (College Station: Texas A&M

University Press, 1993), 49; Cantrell, “Our Very Pronounced Theory of Equal Rights to All,” 663–90; and Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed*, 35.

48 Ferguson resigned before being removed and ran for governor in 1918 encouraging his supporters to elect judges who would allow him to serve. He lost the Democratic gubernatorial primary after women were enfranchised in a quid pro quo deal—primary suffrage in exchange for voting against Ferguson. After the courts ruled that Ferguson could not legally hold office, his wife ran, becoming the first female governor of Texas in 1922. See Gunter, “Without Us, It Is Ferguson with a Plurality”; McArthur, “Minnie Fisher Cunningham’s Back Door Lobby in Texas,” 17–18, 297, 320, 322; McArthur and Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham*, 52–53; and “How Did Texas Women Win Partial Suffrage in a One-Party Southern State in 1918?,” documents selected and interpreted by Judith N. McArthur (State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, 2006), *Women and Social Movements in the United States, 1600–2000* database, <https://documents.alexanderstreet.com/c/1000637373> (accessed July 7, 2020).

49 McArthur, “Minnie Fisher Cunningham’s Back Door Lobby in Texas,” 320, 322.

50 Primary suffrage, allowing women to vote in primary elections only, could be achieved through a simple act of the legislature and was an easier victory than full suffrage, which required an amendment to the state constitution. Suffragists also hoped to use primary suffrage to pressure politicians into enacting full woman suffrage.

51 State of Texas, 35th Legislature, 4th Called Session, April 2, 1918, House Bill no. 107, chapter 60, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/sessionLaws/35-4/HB_107_CH_60.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).

52 McArthur, “Minnie Fisher Cunningham’s Back Door Lobby in Texas,” 324–25.

53 Spruill Wheeler, *New Women of the New South*, 16, 322–23.

54 MFC to Crane, Aug. 8, 1918, MFC Papers, box 5, folder 1; “Democratic Platform Adopted Unanimously at Waco 1918,” A. Caswell Ellis Papers, box 2P92, “Suffrage” folder, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter cited as ACE Papers).

55 Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed*, 27, 37.

56 Thomas R. Pegram, *One Hundred Percent American: The Rebirth and Decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011); Jensen, *Mobilizing Minerva*, vii.

57 Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 273.

58 Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 291–92.

59 Catt to MFC, Jan. 23, 1919, Jane Y. McCallum Papers, box 21, folder 5, Austin History Center, Austin Public Library (hereafter cited as McCallum Papers).

60 State of Texas, 36th Legislature, Regular Session, January 16, 1919, Journal of the House of Representatives, letter from Governor W. P. Hobby, 54–56, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/Housejournals/36/01161919_3_46.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).

61 Menchaca, *Naturalizing Mexican Immigrants*, 218; See also McArthur and Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham*, 61; McArthur, “Minnie Fisher Cunningham’s Back Door Lobby in Texas,” 321.

62 MFC Circular to Senatorial District Chairmen, Feb. 27, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 21, folder 1.

63 MFC Circular to State Advisory Committee Member Dexter Harrison, Apr. 21, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 21, folder 1.

64 MFC Circular to Senatorial District Chairmen, Feb. 27, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 21, folder 1.

65 TESA Flyer, “Are you an American Citizen,” MFC Papers, box 8, folder 11.

66 State of Texas, 53rd Legislature, Regular Session, June 8, 1953, House Joint Resolution no. 10, “Constitutional Amendment—Armed Forces—Right to Vote,” 1176–77, Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, http://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/sessionLaws/53-0/HJR_10.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020); Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 (1845); William F. Weeks, reporter, *Debates of the Texas Convention, 1845* (Houston, TX: J. W. Cruger, 1846), 159.

67 On absentee balloting in WWI, see “West Virginia May Allow Soldier Vote: Amendment to Election Law Being Agitated in Behalf of the Soldiers,” *Brownwood Bulletin* (Brownwood, TX) 17, no. 246, July 31, 1918, and “Soldier Ballot May Decide N.Y. Election,” *The Daily Herald* (Weatherford, TX) 18, no. 257, Oct. 27, 1917, both accessed through University of North Texas Libraries Portal to Texas History, <https://texashistory.unt.edu> (accessed June 27, 2020).

68 MFC to TESA County Chairwomen, Feb. 1919, MFC Papers, box 2, folder 48.

69 MFC to Judge P. O. Beard, Chairman of Harrison County Suffrage Campaign Committee in Marshall, TX, May 16, 1919, MFC Papers, box 3, folder 7.

- 70 Major Richard F. Burges to MFC, Letter and Telegram, May 12, 1919, MFC Papers, box 3, folder 2; letter MFC to Burges, May 15, 1919, MFC Papers, box 3, folder 2; Richard Burges to Jane McCallum, Apr. 29, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 6, folder 3.
- 71 Suffragists successfully lobbied Texas to allow WWI veterans to vote on honorable discharge papers instead of poll tax receipts; Cunningham privately admitted that suffragists did so out of concern that Mexican soldiers would cross the border to vote in south Texas if voting requirements for soldiers were lax. See MFC to CCC, May 5, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 20, folder 1.
- 72 Jane McCallum to Editor, *The Times of Brownsville*, *The Recorder of Greenville*, *The News of Loraine*, *The News of Orange Grove*, and *The Messenger* of May, Mar. 13, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 5, folder 20.
- 73 McCallum to County Chairmen, Apr. 22, 1919 and Apr. 24, 1919, McCallum Papers, box 5, folder 12.
- 74 Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 273–74.
- 75 Debbie Mauldin Cottrell, “Texas Association Opposed To Woman Suffrage” in *Handbook of Texas Online*, www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/vbvtw (accessed June 27, 2020).
- 76 Ruthe Winegarten and Judith N. McArthur, eds., *Citizens at Last: The Woman Suffrage Movement in Texas* (Austin, TX: Ellen C. Temple, 1987), 187.
- 77 Winegarten and McArthur, ed., *Citizens at Last*, 183; State of Texas, 36th Legislature, Regular Session, May 24, 1919, “Proposing an amendment providing that every person, male or female, subject to no constitutional disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years shall be deemed a qualified elector,” Legislative Reference Library of Texas, Austin, TX, <https://lrl.texas.gov/legis/billSearch/amendmentdetails.cfm?legSession=36-0&billtypeDetail=SJR&billNumberDetail=7&billSuffixDetail=&amendmentID=85> (accessed June 27, 2020); Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 274.
- 78 Winegarten and McArthur, *Citizens at Last*, 200.
- 79 MFC to Captain Henry Sackett, June 20, 1919, MFC Papers, box 2, folder 28.
- 80 McArthur and Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham*, 83.
- 81 Winegarten and McArthur, *Citizens at Last*, 149.
- 82 Anders, *Boss Rule in South Texas*, 274–77; McArthur and Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham*, 81–83. Ellis’s calculations have not been verified by scholars; it is possible that he manipulated the numbers.
- 83 “Many Factors Contributed to the Apparent Defeat of Suffrage,” flyer, MFC Papers, box 8, folder 11; McArthur and Smith, *Minnie Fisher Cunningham*, 83.
- 84 Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed*, 27, 39.
- 85 “Many Factors Contributed to the Apparent Defeat of Suffrage.”
- 86 Catt to MFC, June 23, 1919, MFC Papers, box 1, folder 9.
- 87 T. N. Jones to MFC, July 15, 1918, McCallum Papers, box 20, folder 5; Mrs. LF Benckenstein to MFC, July 17–18, 1918, McCallum Papers, box 20, folder 5; MFC to T. N. Jones, July 13, 1918, McCallum Papers box 20, folder 5.
- 88 Byrd Gibbens, “Strangers in the Arkansas Delta: Ethnic Groups and Nationalities (150–83), in *The Arkansas Delta: Land of Paradox*, eds. Jeannie Wayne and Willard B. Gatewood (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1993).
- 89 A. Elizabeth Taylor, “The Woman Suffrage Movement in Arkansas,” *Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 15 (Spring 1956): 40.
- 90 Taylor, “The Woman Suffrage Movement in Arkansas,” 42, 44–46, 48, 150.
- 91 Mattie Louise Ivie, “Woman Suffrage in Oklahoma, 1890–1918” (PhD diss., Oklahoma College for Women, 1957), 59–60; Diane Brown, “How Women Got the Vote in Oklahoma,” League of Women Voters of Oklahoma, 1978, 1990, <https://my.lwv.org/sites/default/files/howwomengotvote.pdf> (accessed June 27, 2020).
- 92 Aylsworth, “The Passing of Alien Suffrage,” 114–16.
- 93 The Indiana legislature passed a partial suffrage law in 1917, which the state supreme court struck down, alongside a state suffrage amendment, which required second passage by the next legislature and a referendum to be enacted. Indiana suffragists then lobbied the state legislature to ratify the Anthony Amendment; Indiana was the twenty-sixth state to do so. See Anita Morgan, “‘An Act of Tardy Justice’: The Story of Women’s Suffrage in Indiana,” *Indiana Woman’s Suffrage Centennial*, 2019 <http://indianasuffrage100.org/indiana-womens-suffrage-history> (accessed June 27, 2020). Indiana restricted suffrage to “fully naturalized citizens” in 1921. See Charles Kettleborough, “Amendments to State Constitutions 1919–21,” *American Political Science Review* 16 (May 1992): 251. Missouri suffragists won presidential suffrage in 1919 and pressured their legislature to ratify the Anthony Amendment. Missouri was the eleventh state

to ratify. See “Missouri and the 19th Amendment,” National Park Service, July 4, 1919, www.nps.gov/articles/missouri-and-the-19th-amendment.htm, last updated Aug. 9, 2019. Missouri ended immigrant declarant voting in 1924. See Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protections,” 1099–100.

94 Natalia Molina, *How Race Is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of Racial Scripts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 43–48; Molina, “In a Race All Their Own,” 170, 179, 186–88.

95 Rosberg, “Aliens and Equal Protections,” 1108, 1134.

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