

that Brazilian democracy is fragile, and that an authoritarian retrogression may occur, but it is also true that it can last in its conservative form for many years to come, as long as the Right does not lose its control over the national political agenda. As Power reminds us, the 1964 coup happened when the Right lost this kind of control.

Labor and the State in Egypt, 1952–1994: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring. By Marsha Pripstein Posusney. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 327p. \$49.50 cloth, \$17.50 paper.

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Marsha Pripstein Posusney presents a well-documented but narrowly focused study based on her research in the United States and Egypt as a graduate student. Despite a typical left-of-center point of view, with all its articulation, terminology, and vocabulary, the book is well researched, thoroughly documented, and lucidly written.

In between a lengthy introduction and a brief conclusion, the book is divided into five chapters. The first three lay the groundwork for an explanation of Egypt's labor union, whose economic reform is covered in chapter 4. The fifth chapter discusses modalities of a new era in the relationship between labor and the state. Several case studies are presented in detail after the government reversed position and adopted a policy of privatization. The complicated interaction is lucidly covered between labor leadership and the Egyptian regime, the presidency and the ruling party, and some of the opposition groups, such as the Al-Wafd Party.

The author divides the period of study into three segments. The first extended from 1952 to approximately 1955 and was marked by confrontation between the revolutionary leadership and the labor movement. Strikes were outlawed, and labor was denied the right to establish a national trade union confederation. Following the coup led by Gamal Abdul Nasser against King Farouk in 1952, the revolutionary leadership meant to consolidate its power over Egyptian society, including labor.

The second period emerged gradually from the first and lasted until the socialist decree of July 1961 became effective. The size of Egypt's public sector became extensively large, and the vast majority of labor came under the control of the government, which thought of labor as a base for its legitimacy. In an attempt to create a strong linkage with labor, it was mandatory for any union officer to be a member of Egypt's only party, the Arab Socialist Union.

The third period started when Sadat succeeded Nasser and gradually consolidated power, achieved in 1971, and continued to the end of the author's research in the mid-1990s. In that period, the author discusses Egypt's labor movement within the context of its political economy and its political reform under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund. The author, however, does not realize the distinctive roles of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in their involvement with Egypt. She views them as one coherent institution with a specific agenda and targets as far as Egypt's economic liberalization is concerned.

The author addresses the effect on Egypt's labor movement during the third period of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP). The negative reaction of labor and its opposition to economic liberalization under ERSAP are emphasized. The book analyzes in detail the effect of privatization on unemployment in the short run. Yet, there is no coverage of the long-run consequences, that is, job creation through economic growth. The reforms

pushed Egypt's growth rates to 5–6% in the second half of the 1990s. The author's sympathy (p. 7) with labor opposition to reforms may color her evaluation.

The book draws certain conclusions that cannot be substantiated. The author states that the 1993 standby credit agreement "was Egypt's first positive review from the Fund after thirty years of relations" (p. 5), but in the 1970s there was another positive review, which led the Paris Club to reschedule Egypt's debt. Furthermore, there is a contradiction between that statement and another on page 210: "Egypt had signed with the IMF in May 1987." In several places the author describes Egypt's monarchy, overthrown by the 1952 revolution, as "British-backed." Yet, under the monarchy, Egypt unilaterally canceled the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and consecutive monarchical governments were adamant about getting British troops out of Egypt. On February 4, 1942, the British ambassador ordered a tank to destroy the fence of Abdeen Palace and gave King Farouk an ultimatum to change the cabinet. On July 23, 1952, British troops were stationed only miles away from Cairo and could have executed a rescue plan if King Farouk indeed had British backing.

The book relies on many secondary and tertiary sources, such as the Middle East Economic Survey, although the author could have reviewed primary sources when she was in Egypt researching her dissertation. Nevertheless, this is a good study of Egypt's labor movement since 1952. The complexities of its structure, institutions, and fluctuating relationship with Egypt's political leadership are presented in detail and well analyzed.

There is an extensive bibliography, and the book offers several case studies crucial for a deep understanding of Egypt's labor movement. Although the author's sympathies are evident, she gives a detailed account of how the labor movement was affected by the political environment in Egypt, especially the substantial changes from socialism to a market economy. The book fills a gap in the literature on Egypt's labor movement within the context of political change.

Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia. By Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. 223p. \$25.95.

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It is, of course, still too soon to say, but this has not stopped students of postcommunist transition from reaching some rather different conclusions. When reformers were in the saddle, the optimists held sway. Russian government policy was itself based upon their recommendations. Western governments supported Boris Yeltsin, even when he was unconstitutionally dissolving the Russian legislature. Inflation shot up, but (we had always been told) you could not cross a precipice in two steps. A massive program of privatization was launched in 1992 and pressed further in the years that followed. Yeltsin, the architect or at least the guarantor of change, won Russia's first presidential election in 1991 and won again in 1996 on the basis of a new and postcommunist constitution that invested him with far-reaching powers.

But the pessimists were already gaining ground. The 1993 election was a nasty surprise: Enthronement of a newly confected ruling party was expected, not the success of Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democrats. In 1995 it was the Communist candidates who came first, with Yeltsin supporters in a humiliating third place. More than this, the recipe for economic transformation was beginning to look a little suspect. There was no swift recovery, as in Poland, but a

steady and historically unprecedented fall in GDP and living standards. Social indicators declined in parallel; most notably, the population began to fall in 1992 and has been falling ever since. Industrial output was concentrated in even fewer factories than before; traditional industries held up better than electronics; and exports depended even more heavily than before on oil and gas. The collapse of the currency in August 1998, and of the Kirienko government, appeared to represent a final and devastating verdict on everything that had happened under the label of reform since the start of the decade.

Shliefer and Treisman are optimists, and ones who through their direct involvement in Russian events are well placed to present a plausible account from this progovernment perspective. But this is a second-edition optimism, more cautious: No longer are reforms simply bound to succeed, the question is whether they exceeded reasonable expectations and whether they were politically feasible at the time. In this reading, the reformers enjoyed some remarkable early successes, particularly the privatization of most of state industry in 1992–94. Then they outmaneuvered a coalition of speculative banks and subsidized enterprises to get inflation down to more reasonable levels in 1995. They managed to achieve these successes by winning over key opponents and marginalizing others. But after Yeltsin's reelection in 1996 the reformers encountered stiffer resistance among the industrial barons that privatization had created and among regional governors. So tax reforms slowed down, and public finances weakened.

Perhaps the leading merit of the carefully crafted analysis in *Without a Map* is the emphasis placed upon political constraints of this kind and upon the stakeholders who together constituted the proreform and antireform coalitions. There were four in particular: industrial ministries, industrial directors, workers, and regional and local governments. To run an enterprise in 1990s Russia, it was necessary to bring together most of these stakeholders, and certainly the last three (the role of industrial ministries weakened as enterprises gained the right to elect their own management). Somewhat confusingly, there were five stakeholders in the "system of federal tax collection and economic control that existed in Russia in the 1990s" (pp. 137–8): the federal government, regional governors and legislatures, local governments, enterprises, and state tax officials. Still more confusingly, "four sets of actors dominated Russia's politics in the 1990s" (p. 178): regional governments, the central political leadership, the central bank, and the powerful firms that dominated natural resource extraction.

The value of *Without a Map* lies more in the detailed exploration of the role of these stakeholders than in the larger discussion of reform. It exaggerates the extent of the changes that have occurred. Private enterprises, certainly, accounted for 88% of the total by 1998, but they were responsible for no more than one-quarter of industrial output and one-third of the workforce (mixed forms of ownership were rather more important). Privatization was in any case largely a paper transaction, given that the second and most favored option in the legislation was an employee-management buyout. Vouchers were distributed, but they brought few benefits to ordinary people, and the general view (84% in a representative U.S. Information Agency survey) was that the whole exercise had mainly benefited the mafia and members of the CPSU nomenklatura. Agriculture was little affected, and by the late 1990s no more than 2% of output came from private commercial farms.

Shliefer and Treisman were "unable to find a single study that does not show positive effects of privatization on restruc-

turing in Russia" (p. 36). Joseph Blasi and his colleagues, in a study frequently cited in *Without a Map*, conclude that managers were just as keen as their Soviet predecessors to retain state subsidies, cheap credits, and protection from foreign competition (*Kremlin Capitalism*, 1997). More recent findings suggest that privatization "failed to bring any significant change in the way Russian companies were managed" and "had very little (if any) effect on gross output and average output per employee" (Vladimir Tikhomirov, "The Second Collapse, of the Russian Economy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 [March 2000]: 222). There is certainly little evidence in macroeconomic performance of the dynamic effects that privatization was supposed to have had: National income plunged to half its previous level under the guidance of the reformers, investment fell even more sharply, and growing numbers of workers lost their employment.

For a political scientist, one surprise of *Without a Map* is that so little attention is given to the electoral legitimation of the policies of the Yeltsin government. The parliament, for instance, was "hostile to market reforms from the start" (p. viii), but at least it had been popularly elected, whereas Gaidar owed his position to a presidential decree. Yeltsin himself was elected in summer 1991, but with a Communist running-mate, and there was no indication that he would shortly embark upon a fundamental change in the economic and social system. There was some indication in the spring 1993 referendum that Russian voters broadly supported the new leadership and its policies, but this was after the event. Promarket reformers received little support in the elections of December 1993 and even less in December 1995. Is it surprising that there were "constraints" in implementing policies that were not approved by the Russian people at a general election and that clearly reduced many of them to destitution?

Shliefer and Treisman are impatient with the idea that there may be special countries or that Russian cultural or historical circumstances may have made a difference to economic strategy. The only conclusion is that opposition to the reformers was misconceived and often politically motivated. But the objections to the Yeltsin-Gaidar strategy—from a group of critics that included Nobel laureates—were not necessarily in terms of the Russian soul but in terms of Russian objective conditions. As James Tobin and others argued at the time, there should have been more attention to competition than privatization and a more gradual approach toward the process of change rather than a continuation of the radical measures that had led to a "deep crisis" (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, July 1, 1996). Indeed, one wonders why the whole process is labeled reform at all; it would beg fewer questions to speak of it as the (attempted) construction of capitalism, even if the outcome was neither reform nor a functioning market economy.

Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces. By Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 292p. \$57.50.

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This relatively slim volume (187 pages of text) provides a useful and valuable guide to an often overlooked aspect of the post-Cold War international transitions: that of the vital transition of militaries from communism to democracy. Ulrich makes a good case that militaries, with their control of the instruments of violence, also need to be studied, if only because they can block or hinder the democratization pro-