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ASPECTS OF ANCIENT ETYMOLOGIZING[1]

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σιωπὴ δ' ἄπορος ἑρμηνεὺς λόγων   (Eur. fr. 126 Nauck)

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Silence can create anxiety and the world of words is silent. The effort to break this silence is the motive for etymology. Etymologizing, therefore, in texts is a process characteristic of many different periods[2] and does not have a unique form of application. The plethora of cases[3] that appear in the Homeric text[4] shows an exceptional variety of patterns. The first work that deals with etymology, and uses it systematically, is Plato's *Cratylus*, which, by common consent, has been the traditional text on the subject ever since antiquity. Indeed, until the nineteenth century no great change occurred with regard to etymological techniques.[5] And this is because ancient etymologizing, as study of the texts shows, did not follow a set of rules nor was it set on a firm theoretical basis.[6] Even in its nomenclature there was no common consent. In the *Cratylus*, for instance, the word ἐτυμολογία/ικός does not appear. Its subject is the ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων ('the correctness of the names', *Crat.* 422d, 428e; also *Euthyd.* 277e) and their δύναμις ('force', e.g. *Crat.* 394b, c; 405e; 435d). These phrases would continue to be related to etymology for a long time as, for instance, [Athanasius'] writings show when he mentions: ἡ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ ὀνόματος ὀρθότης ('the correctness of the force of the name', *MPG*, 28 [spuria], 552).

In Latin, too, this δύναμις, the *uis nominis* or *uerbi*, is associated with etymology. Cicero, for example, applies the phrase **uis nominis** to etymology: . . . *multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. ea est autem, cum ex* **ui nominis** *argumentum elicitur, quam Graeci* ἐτυμολογίαν *appellant, id est uerbum ex uerbo ueriloquium* (*Top.* 35).[7] The phrase **uis nominis uel uerbi** continues into late antiquity, when Isidore of Seville in his *Origines* (1.29) along with the *origo*, refers to this *uis*: **Vis uerbi uel nominis per interpretationem colligitur** . . . *nam dum uideris unde ortum est nomen, citius* **uim** *eius intellegis*.[8]

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[2] W. Woodhead, *Etymologizing in Greek Literature from Homer to Philo Judaeus* (Toronto, 1928); E. Curtius, *European Literature and Latin Middles Ages* (London, 1953), 500; D. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1992); E. Tsitsibakou-Vasalos, 'Gradations of science. Modern etymology versus ancient', *Glotta* 74.1–2 (1997/8), 118, n. 4, for further bibliography.

[3] R. Maltby, in *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, s.v. *etymologia* (Oxford, 1996).

[4] Mainly: M. Sulzberger, '*ONOMA EΠΩΝΥΜΟΝ*: Les noms propres chez Homère et dans la mythologie grecque', *Rev. Ét. Grec.* 39 (1926), 381–447; L. P Rank, *Etymologiseering en Verwante Verschijnselen bij Homerus* (Utrecht, 1951); B. Louden, 'Categories of Homeric wordplay', *TAPA* 125 (1995), 27–46; Tsitsibakou-Vasalos (n. 2), 119–20, for further bibliography.

[5] R. Maltby, 'The limits of etymologising', *Aevum Antiquum* 6 (1993), 257–75; id. (n. 3).

[6] R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1968), 241.

[7] Similarly when Varro looks for natural allegories, in order to etymologize the name of Venus, he brings into his argument this *uis* (*Ling.* 5.61): *Igitur causa nascendi duplex: ignis et aqua. ideo ea nuptiis in limine adhibentur, quod conjunct<ur> hic, et mas ignis, quod ibi semen, aqua femina, quod fetus ab eius humore, et horum uinctionis* **uis** *Venus*.

[8] R. Maltby, 'The role of etymologies in Servius and Donatus', in the *Proceedings of the Cambridge Conference on Ancient Etymology* (forthcoming).

This phrase with its particular meaning also appears in Latin poetry. When Ovid talks about *ueiovis*[9] (*Fasti* 3.429ff.), he discusses the meaning of the prefix of the word *ue-* with examples:

> *uegrandia farra coloni*
> *quae male creuerunt, uescaque parua uocant*   (3.445–6)

He concludes, therefore, that

> ***uis** ea si **uerbi** est, cur non ego Veiovis aedem*
> *aedem non magni suspicer esse Jovis?*   (447–8)

Among the Latin words meaning etymology, a major term is the word *notatio*.[10] We have seen Cicero's phrase *multa ex **notatione** sumuntur . . .* in *Top.* 35.[11] The term is already used earlier in the same work, at 10: *tum **notatio**,*[12] *cum ex uerbi ui argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo.* Quintilian, who considers etymology as the field *quae verborum originem inquirit* (1.6.28), gives the information that Cicero's use of the term *notatio* was influenced by Aristotle: *a Cicerone dicta est notatio,*[13] *quia nomen eius apud Aristotelem inuenitur σύμβολον, quod est nota; nam uerbum ex uerbo ductum, id est ueriloquium,*[14] *ipse Cicero, qui finxit, reformidat.* Later on, Isidore of Seville, in defining etymology, goes back to the Aristotelian term, σύμβολον, and the Ciceronian *adnotatio* (*Orig.* 1.29).

The same term is found once again in Ovid's poetry (*Fasti* 1.7–8):

> *sacra recognosces annalibus eruta priscis,*
> *et quo sit merito quaeque **notata** dies.*[15]

There are, however, other terms, beyond the common ones, which are used with reference to etymology. The term *ratio* on occasion[16] is one, as, for instance, in Gellius (*NA* 1.25.12) when he investigates the etymology of the word *indutiae*: *indutiarum autem uocabulum qua sit **ratione** factum, . . . quaerimus.*[17] When discussing two possible etymological interpretations of the word *septentriones*, he has to make a choice *ex his duabus rationibus* (*NA* 2.21). Later still, Servius (*ad Georg.* 1.21) uses the term when he talks about the *libri pontificales* which *nomina deorum et **rationes** ipsorum nominum continent*;[18] Donatus too (*ad Adelph.* 26)[19] applies the term alongside that of *etymologia*: *nomina personarum in compendiis dumtaxat, habere debent rationem et etymologiam.*

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[9] R. Maltby, *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*, Arca 25 (Leeds, 1991), s.v. *Veiovis*. See also Gell. *NA* 5.12.9. On another occasion Ovid employs the same phrase. It is in Book 5, when, in etymologizing the word *lemures* (5.479–84), the poet concludes with the line *hic sensus uerbi, **uis** ea **uocis** erat.*

[10] See also Cicero's *enodo, enodatio, ND* 3.62.

[11] R. Maltby, 'Greek in Varro', in G. Calboli (ed.), *Papers on Grammar* 6 (Bologna, 2001), 193. See above, p. 478.

[12] See also Cic. *Fin.* 3.2.4, where the author explains the coining of new words in Latin: *Quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas res in quibus uersatur nominibus **notauit** nouis.*

[13] *Notatio*, however, is the opposite process to etymologizing.

[14] Quintilian follows closely Cicero in his *Topica* 35.

[15] But he does not omit the word *origo* (e.g. at 1.609–11 where he etymologizes the word *augurium*).

[16] Quintilian's application is interesting: *rationem praestat praecipue analogia, nonnunquam et etymologia* (1.6.1). A. Uhl, *Servius als Sprachlehler: zur Sprachrichtigkeit in der exegetischen Praxis des spätantiken Grammatikerunterrichts* (Göttingen, 1998), 484.

[17] Cf. *NA* 1.18.1 where he makes use of the phrase *ratio etymologica*. See also 19.3.3.

[18] Cf. *Brevis Expositio*, in Verg. *G.* 1.21.   [19] Maltby (n. 8).

The terms δύναμις or its phrasal equivalent in Latin *uis uerbi* along with the Aristotelian term σύμβολον ('symbol') or the Latin *notatio* or *ratio*, and even the term *etymologia*/ἐτυμολογία itself, do not necessarily entail in and by themselves an obligatory search for the *origo*,[20] *stricto sensu*, of the words. What they, in fact, signify is the dynamics of a word in meaning(s) and its relation with other cluster(s) of meanings, as happens, for instance with the word *ratio*. In practical terms, an etymology does not necessarily interest itself with a *previous* form or meaning of a word but quite often is concerned with the σύγχρονον.[21] The search for the origin of a word, on the one hand, and the disclosure of its relation to other areas of meaning, on the other, may be two connected but not necessarily identical approaches. This becomes evident, for instance, from the two different etymological signs that appear repeatedly in the Greek texts: I mean the prepositional ἀπὸ τοῦ and παρὰ τό. The latter etymological sign points mainly to the relation of the etymologized word with another or with a group of other words and meanings. It points to the 'parallel' and the 'like' and not necessarily to the 'preceding' form and meaning. After all, likeness and *similitudo* were a distinct category of etymologizing even on the theoretical level.[22] It has to be emphasized here, however, that even though theoretically there are two basic ways of approach, one that concentrates on precedence and the other on synchronism and likeness, they continue to co-exist on a number of occasions. This, in turn, reveals that the distinction was not of great concern for the ancients; it was rather the designation of the words' meanings they were aiming at.

Varro, too, perceived synchronism as basic in etymology when he mentions the **cognatio**[23] . . . *uerbi, quae radices egerit extra fines suas . . . saepe enim ad limiten arboris radices sub vicini prodierunt segetem* (*Ling.* 5.13). He further refers to the *multa* **societas** *uerborum* when he examines the etymology of the *Uinalia* which *nec . . . sine uino expediri nec Curia Calabra sine calatione potest aperiri* (5.13). Obviously, the examples themselves that Varro discusses do not indicate which word derives from which but what the relation is between their meanings.

One may argue that this is a general trend in the ancient texts and goes to show that etymology does not necessarily and exclusively aim at finding a previous stage in a word-formation but is also directed towards the binding of the meaning of a certain word with cluster(s) of other meaning(s); in other words it is orientated towards the

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[20] Another standard Latin term for etymology, to the extent it is connected with the *origo* of words, is *causa*, e.g. Varro, *Ling.* 5.9; Gellius, *NA* 1.18.2, or *Brevis Expositio*, in Verg. *G.* 1.21. In such a case the introduction of the etymology is effected with a causal element, such as *quod*. Uhl (n. 16), 491–2. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 1.243 where etymology is considered as ἄνοδος. The same concept leads to the use of the Latin word *descendere*: Uhl (n. 16), 492–4 and n. 38; also 495ff.

[21] G. W. Most, *Cornutus and the Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report*, *ANRW* II.36.3 (1989), 2028, concerning Cornutus: 'words seem to refer not so much diachronically to an origin as rather synchronically to one another, and at the limit one ought to find that no word is isolated from the others but that all are bound together'.

The meaning of σύγχρονον seems to represent broader conceptions, in particular among Hellenistic philologists. M. Fantuzzi ('An Aristarchan reading of Apollonius' *Argonautica*', *Seminari Romani di cultura Greca*, 3.2 [2000], 313–24) and A. Rengakos ('Aristarchus and the Hellenistic poets', *Seminari Romani di cultura Greca*, 3.2 [2000], 325–35) have shown that Hellenistic philologists treated current Hellenistic poetry as in a way σύγχρονον with that of Homer's. Accordingly, with the text of Homer as their text of reference, they formed their qualitative criteria, not ceding to their contemporary poets the 'right' of ἕτερος χρόνος.

[22] Augustine, *de dialectica* 6; Maltby (n. 5), 263. A discussion with Dr A. Michalopoulos on this point was very useful.

[23] Actually, the very origin of the word suggests this.

ἑρμηνεία, the *interpretatio*. Orion (fifth century A.D.)[24] who compiled an etymological lexicon, considers ἑρμηνεία, *interpretatio* to be etymology's major goal:

᾿Ετυμολογία ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ὀνομασίας εὑρίσκειν τὴν αὐτοῦ <u>ἑρμηνείαν</u>. καὶ τὸ διὰ τὶ οὕτως ὀνομάζεται.

(The role of etymology is to find from the naming itself of the thing its interpretation and the reason why it is so named.)

[Athanasius][25] in his own definition sees things much in the same light:

᾿Ετυμολογία ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ ὀνόματος ὀρθότης, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νοὸς <u>ἑρμηνευομένη</u>.

(Etymology is the correctness of the force of the name interpreted from its own sense.)

In Latin also, Quintilian considers *interpretatio* as a basic constituent of etymology: *haec* [sc. *etymologia*] *habet aliquando usum necessarium, quotiens* <u>interpretatione res, de qua quaeritur, eget</u> (1.6.29). Much later, Isidore of Seville (*Orig.* 1.29)[26] in his definition of etymology using some terms already presented above, is on the same track: *Etymologia est origo uocabulorum, cum uis uerbi uel nominis per <u>interpretationem</u>[27] colligitur.*

The interpretation of a word implies mainly the exegetical and didactic element of etymology. Through it, the emphasis is on the meaning favoured by the interpreter.[28] This aspect is already existent in the Platonic *Cratylus*, where etymology aimed at the exegesis of a name[29] through the 'hidden *meanings* of the words'.[30] Besides, the name (ὄνομα) in the *Cratylus* was seen as a pedagogical instrument (ὄργανον, 388).[31] Centuries later, the pedagogical and didactic character of etymology seems to retain its importance, as we note in the epilogue of Cornutus' *Epidrome*.

οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες ἐγένοντο οἱ παλαιοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἱκανοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ <u>συμβόλων</u> καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι. διὰ πλειόνων δὲ καὶ ἐξεργαστικώτερον εἴρηται τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις φιλοσόφοις, ἐμοῦ νῦν ἐπιτετμημένως αὐτὰ παραδοῦναί σοι βουληθέντος· χρησίμη γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προχειρότης ἐστί. περὶ δὲ ἐκείνων καὶ περὶ τῆς θεραπείας τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκείως εἰς τιμὴν αὐτῶν γινομένων καὶ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τὸν ἐντελῆ λήψῃ λόγον οὕτω μόνον ὡς εἰς τὸ εὐσεβεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς τὸ δεισιδαιμονεῖν εἰσαγομένων τῶν νέων καὶ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι καὶ προσκυνεῖν καὶ ὀμνύειν κατὰ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβάλλουσι καιροῖς καθ᾿ ἥν ἁρμόττει συμμετρίαν <u>διδασκομένων</u>. (ch. 35, epilogue)[32]

[24] [excerpta e codice regio MMDCX. Duodenis scripto].
[25] Above, p. 478.   [26] See above, p. 514.
[27] It is for the same reason that the verb *interpretor* appears in the practice of etymologizing: e.g. Gell. *NA* 5.7.1: *Gauius Bassus . . . unde appellata 'persona' sit interpretatur*. Maltby (n. 8).
[28] I. Sluiter, 'Commentaries and the didactic tradition', in G. Most (ed.), *Commentaries— Kommentare, 'Aporemata'* 4 (Göttingen, 1999), 178; H. U. Gumbrecht, 'Fill up your margins! About commentary and *copia*', in Most (ibid.), 443: 'interpretation looks like the projection of a meaning that the interpreter has made up'.
[29] D. Sedley, 'The etymologies in Plato's *Cratylus*', *JRS* 118 (1998), 140–1.
[30] Ibid., 140.
[31] See also Aristotle, *de int.* 4.17a1–2, where, according to Sedley (n. 29), 141, n. 3 'is a clear reference to *Crat.* 388b–c'.
[32] Most (n. 21), 2020–1; H. G. Snyder, *Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World. Philosophers, Jews and Christians* (London and New York, 2000), 7.

. . . the men of antiquity were no common men, but . . . they were competent to understand the
nature of the cosmos and were inclined to make philosophical statements about it through
symbols and enigmas. Although this has been said at greater length and in greater detail by the
older philosophers, it was my desire to hand them on to you in this condensed form in our days.
For a ready knowledge of these matters even to this brief extent is useful. But concerning the
myths and the service which is given the gods, and concerning those things which are suitably
done for honoring them, you will accept both the traditions of the fathers and the complete
explanation, but only thus far: that young men be introduced to piety but not to superstition,
and taught to sacrifice and to pray, to worship and to take oaths in proper fashion and
appropriate moderation in whatever situation may arise.   (trans. R. S. Hays)

Inevitably, the didactic nature of etymology led to the formation of various patterns
of etymologizing. When reading the scholia, and especially the Homeric scholia,[33] one
usually has the impression that the commentator and the scholiast interpreted a word
through its etymology for teaching purposes;[34] quite often this was not done explicitly,
but in an indirect and allusive way, thus challenging the pupil to grasp what was behind
his allusion, as we shall see more fully below.

THE ROLE OF THE SYNONYM IN ANCIENT ETYMOLOGIZING

The most common pattern of etymology and the most expected, according to our
modern perspective, is that in which we have an etymological sign obviously pointing
to an etymology. Cases, such as sch. ex. *Il.* 17.37b[2]: ἀρητόν: μισητὸν καὶ ἐπάρατον,
παρὰ τὸ ἀρά ('accursed': hateful and accursed like a curse) and ex. 37c: ἤτοι
βλαπτικόν, παρὰ τὴν ἀράν, τὴν βλάβην (that is, hateful, like a curse in its sense of
harm), or sch. Did. *Il.* 4.321b on ὀπάζω: ἀπὸ τοῦ κατόπιν ἐσχημάτισται ('make to
follow': is formed from 'behind') are clear in themselves.

The presence of an etymological sign, however, does not necessarily lead to an
explicit etymology, as on some occasions this may be alluded to through a synonym
(Arist., e.g. *Cat.* 1a, 3a, 3b). As the texts show, this is a very common pattern of
etymologizing, although it has an element of unexpectedness—at least for us. It has,
nevertheless, its own place in ancient scholarship as its position in the etymological
lexica makes quite clear. As a matter of fact, the presence of a pattern in an
etymological lexicon can prove, I believe, its validity. Orion's work—at least as it comes
down to us—is as good an example as any. In the lemma κάρα (head), for example
(81.19): ἀπὸ τοῦ τετριχῶσθαι (from being covered with hair) the etymological sign is
there, but the etymology is not at all clear. The reader then has to decode it. The
explanation decodified appears in the *Etym. Magn.*, 490.24: κάρα: ἡ κεφαλή. ἀπὸ τοῦ
κέρας (ὃ σημαίνει τὴν τρίχα). γίνεται κέρα καὶ κάρα, διὰ τὸ τετριχῶσθαι (κάρα:
'head' from κέρας [which means 'hair']; this becomes κέρα and κάρα because of the
fact that it is hairy) .

In cases where we have only one explanation through a synonym, things are not
always very difficult, especially when the author himself gives some information to
clarify the obscurities, as is the case with Orion's σιγαλόεν (141.10): τὸ ποικίλον.
οἷον[35] στιγαλόεν τι ὄν (σιγαλόεν 'of many colours' like something which is στιγαλόεν,

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[33] For the scholia on *Iliad*, see H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (Berlin, 1969–88)
and on *Odyssey*, see G. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam ex codicibus aucta et
emendata* (Oxford,1855).

[34] Cf. R. R. Schlunk, *The Homeric Scholia and the Aeneid. A Study of the Influence of Ancient
Homeric Literary Criticism on Vergil* (Ann Arbor, 1974), 6. Cf. also the terms διὰ συμβόλων καὶ
αἰνιγμάτων cited above.

[35] H. Peraki-Kyriakidou, 'Homer's etymologising in the *Aeneid*. Simile and the point of
concentration', in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Conference on Ancient Etymology* (forthcoming).

'tattooed'). The word ποικίλον here as a synonym together with the οἷον . . . phrase leads to an etymology from the verb στίζω.

Things, however, become, rather complicated when more than one explanation is offered. One such example is the lemma σκιά again from Orion (147.10): παρὰ τὸ συγκινεῖν καὶ συμπορεύεσθαι τινί. οὕτως Ἡρακλείδης (σκιά, 'shadow' like συγκινεῖν 'to move along with' and συμπορεύεσθαι 'to proceed together with one'). The etymological sign is present: παρὰ τὸ. But what is the etymology? One possibility is that Orion takes συγκινεῖν ('to move along with') directly as the etymology and the following συμπορεύεσθαι ('to proceed together') as a kind of synonym of συγκινεῖν.

Things may be entirely different, however, if we understand συγκινεῖν as a more or less clear etymology for the first part of the word σκ- and συμπορεύεσθαι is taken as an etymology of the ending -ιά in the word σκιά. In this instance the etymology of the end part of the word could be <ἰέναι <εἶμι. What this example shows is that in etymology the ending may function as a dynamic part of a word and claim its own distinct origin.[36] We shall not dwell on this but it is worth noting that the same etymological phenomenon appears also in Latin. Cicero, for example,[37] presents two different etymological views for the word *postliminium*: either the ending of the word -*liminium* may be a simple *productio* or the word is *iunctum* from *post* and *limen*. On account of the above, it would be futile to attempt a precise answer as to which of the two etymological approaches lay at the back of Orion's mind in the case of the word σκιά, as the patterns of ancient etymologizing are not well defined and their rules are rather obscure.

Orion, among many others, as we shall see, repeatedly applies the pattern of etymologizing through synonym, though sometimes without an etymological sign. But as his work is an etymological dictionary, the onus is upon us to find the concealed etymology. Let us take, for example, the lemma ἀμβροσία: ἡ τῶν θεῶν τροφή, ἧς βροτὸς οὐ μετέχει (ἀμβροσία 'ambrosia': the food of the gods, of which a mortal has no share', 19.11; see also 30.26). The ancient lexicographer places three basic elements in his interpretation of the word: (i) τροφή ('food'), (ii) βροτός ('mortal'), (iii) οὐ μετέχει ('has no share'). The only clearly related word is βροτός. The word τροφή, however, as a synonym of the word βρῶσις ('food') must lie behind (ἔγκειται—to use the ancient term) the explanation by overlapping with the word βροτός.[38] As to the privative ἀ-, its exegesis is not direct but is implied through the loose phrasing οὐ μετέχει.

Sometimes it is quite common in the scholia to find first the etymologically related words and then their synonyms, or vice versa, as, for instance, sch. ex. (Ariston.?) *Il.* 2.654 ἀγερώχων: ἄγαν γέρας ἐχόντων, ἐντίμων (ἀγερώχων 'noble' having a great reward [γέρας], honoured'), or at sch. ex. *Il.* 14.183e μορόεντα: ἐκπεπονημένα τῇ

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[36] Another example is schl. D/(?) *Il.* 4.315a on γῆρας . . . ὁμοίϊον ('distressing old age'): τὸ ὁμοίως πᾶσι χαλεπὸν / καὶ κοινῇ ἐπερχόμενον ('similarly difficult for everyone and coming upon them in common') where no etymological sign is present (see below). It is fairly obvious, however, that the word ὁμοίϊον is etymologized also from ὁμοῦ ('together'), as is implied from the πᾶσι and κοινῇ, and from the participle ἐπερχόμενον of εἶμι ('to go') for the ending -ιον.

[37] Cic., *Top.* 36–7: 'Multa igitur in disputando notatione eliciuntur ex uerbo, ut cum quaeritur postliminium quid sit—non dico quae sint postlimini; nam id caderet in diuisionem, quae talis est: Postliminio redeunt haec: homo, nauis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa quae frenos recipere solet—; sed cum ipsius postlimini uis quaeritur et uerbum ipsum notatur; in quo Seruius noster, ut opinor, nihil putat esse notandum nisi post, et liminium illud *productionem* esse uerbi uult, ut in finitimo, legitimo, aeditimo non plus inesse timum quam in meditullio tullium; Scaeuola autem P.F. *iunctum* putat esse uerbum, ut sit in eo et post et limen.'

[38] This implied etymology establishes a further link with the word βροτός.

κατασκευῇ καὶ μεμεριμνημένα τῇ τέχνῃ (μορόεντα 'wrought with much pain': made with much effort in its preparation and crafted with much care μεμεριμνημένα). Here, the reader's task is simpler, as the scholiast has provided the relevant synonym along with the etymology.[39]

Since synonymy is an accepted pattern of etymologizing in the etymological lexica, its presence in the scholia is to be expected, especially in the Homeric scholia where a great variety of patterns may be more easily encountered, due to their volume. Let us take, for example, the word ἠλεός on sch. Porph. *Il.* 15.128b[1]: ἢ παρὰ τὴν ἄλην, ἢ ὃν πάντες ἀλεόμεθα, ἢ παρὰ τὸ θερμόν (ἠλεός, deranged: either like wandering [ἄλην], or one which we all avoid [ἀλεόμεθα], or like warmth [παρὰ τὸ θερμόν]. The etymological sign παρὰ τὸ certainly implies an etymology. The reader is invited to relate the word θερμόν ('warmth') with ἕλη (the sun's heat, εἵλη, LSJ). In another instance, the scholion on the name Θοώτης (sch. Ariston. *Il.* 12.342a[1]) states: ἀπὸ τοῦ ταχύνειν (from 'to hurry'), where the infinitive ταχύνειν obviously points to the verb θέω ('to run'). Again at sch. Hrd. *Il.* 12.193a in explaining the name Ἰαμενός the scholiast refers to Ptolemaeus Ascalonites' view: ὁ δὲ Ἀσκαλωνίτης φησίν (52)· «ἐὰν μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰάσεως, ψιλωτέον, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς δασυντέον» (Ascalonites says: 'If it is from ἴασις, "healing", it has to have a smooth breathing but if it comes from ὁρμή, "onrush", it has to have a rough breathing'). The second part again obviously leads to a second etymology: ὁρμή apparently functions as a synonym of a cognate from the verb ἵημι ('to send'), like ἕσις ('aiming'), as in the *Cratylus* (411d): ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἕσις (thought is an 'aiming' of the new).[40]

On other occasions, the etymological sign may be absent. When, for example, the scholiast interprets the word δυσηλεγής (sch. ex. *Il.* 20.154) he writes: δυσηλεγέος· κακοκοιμήτου. οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὸν κοιμηθῆναι δίχα πολλῶν θανάτων. ἢ κακὰς φροντίδας ἔχοντος (δυσηλεγέος 'grievous': bringing bad sleep, for it is impossible for him to sleep apart from many deaths, or having bitter cares). On a first reading the two interpretations do not involve any etymology and nothing externally indicates any specific "etymological intention". Behind these two approaches, however, lie two different etymologies. In the first case (κακοκοιμήτου) the word is etymologized from δυσ- + λέχομαι ('lie down', LSJ), whereas in the second (κακὰς φροντίδας ἔχοντος) from δυσ- + ἀλέγω ('have a care', LSJ).[41] In another instance again, at sch. ex. *Il.* 5.812b ἀκήριον: ἄψυχον, ἀσθενές. σημαίνει δὲ καὶ ὑγιὲς καὶ ἄνοσον καὶ ἀθάνατον (ἀκήριον, 'unharmed': 'without life', 'without strength'; it means 'healthy', 'without disease' and 'immortal'), the two meanings of the word no doubt correspond to two different etymologies: for the former <ἀ- priv. + κέαρ, κῆρ, τό (heart), whereas for the latter <ἀ- priv. + κήρ, ἡ (doom/death).

The degree of difficulty in the recognition of the etymology when no etymological sign is present varies. A rather complicated case where, once again, it appears that an interpretation is attempted on the basis of an etymology that the scholiast has in mind, is at sch. Ariston. *Il.* 14.154a: <στᾶσ' ἐξ Οὐλύμποιο ἀπὸ ῥίου: ὅτι ὄρος ὁ Ὄλυμπος,

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[39] We should always be very careful, however, lest there is a different etymology implicitly proposed in this 'other' part of the scholion.

[40] Or at 420a.

[41] The fact that the scholiast points to two or more different etymologies does not mean necessarily that the scholion has two different sources for the derivation of the word; it is a well-testified process of ancient etymologizing—adopted and developed mainly by the Stoics—to give various derivations of one and the same word: Varro, *Ling.* 9.1 = *SVF* 2.151 (Arnim) and Gellius, *NA* 11.12 = *SVF* 2.152 (Arnim); S. Kyriakidis, *Narrative Structure and Poetics in the Aeneid. The Frame of Book 6* (Bari, 1998), 168–9 and n. 22.

καὶ ῥία ἔχει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ῥίων ἐπιθεωροῦσιν (standing on a peak of Olympus: because Olympus is a mountain and it has peaks, and from the peaks they observe). A first reading of the scholion does not disclose any 'etymological intent'. At this stage the scholiast is, perhaps, simply relating the word ῥίον ('peak') with the word ὄρος ('mountain') (even this, however, is not at all clear).[42] But another scholion on a different occasion adds an etymology to this one. At sch. ex. *Il.* 14.225b we have <ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο:> ὡς ἐπὶ ὄρους. παρὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἤ ῥέεσθαι (the peak [ῥίον] of Olympus: as of a mountain [ὄρους] like to see [ὁρᾶν] or to flow [ῥέεσθαι]). The ἐπιθεωροῦσιν, therefore, of the former instance most probably functions as a synonym, pointing to an etymology from ὁρᾶν.

From the scholia on the *Odyssey*, where there are numerous examples of the same type, we can choose one at random, at sch. QV *Od.* 9.325 ὄργυιαν: ἐκτεταμένων τῶν χειρῶν τὸ διάστημα ὄργυια λέγεται (ὄργυιαν, fathom: the distance of the outstretched arms is called ὄργυια 'fathom'). At first glance again there is nothing to denote an etymology. But the phrase ἐκτεταμένων τῶν χειρῶν includes the synonym of the words ὀρέγω (to stretch) + γυῖον (limb).

In Latin scholia, also, the synonym has its appropriate place in etymologizing in its own right. It appears either with or without an etymological sign. There is, however, a vast difference between Greek and Latin scholia; it is not only a matter of bulk— Greek scholia seem to be more imaginative and multi-faceted, having a longer tradition in hermeneutics and the art of grammar. Yet, we can still locate similar or identical phenomena. On *Aen.* 1.45, for example, Servius writes for the word *scopulus*: *aut a speculando dictus est, aut a tegimento navium*, ἀπὸ τοῦ σκεπάζειν. It is evident that the first etymology, for which there is a clear sign, is quite possibly the verb *speculor* itself;[43] but it is also feasible that this verb stands as a synonym to the verb σκοπέω. If this is so, then we should think that the reason why Servius lists the Greek word, as he clearly does, in the second case (σκεπάζειν), is because the Greek word in the latter instance might come to mind less readily[44] while, in the first case, the etymology <σκοπέω is widely accepted (for example, by Apollonius the Sophist,[45] in the scholia to the *Iliad*,[46] and in ancient poetry[47]). The Latin reader might perhaps be expected to recall it without difficulty.

Let us take another interesting case in which the commentator follows the technique of the poet he is commenting upon. In *Aen.* 2 describing the two snakes that have come across the sea to Athena's sacred statue, Vergil writes: *sub pedibusque deae* **clipei**que sub *orbe* **teguntur** (2.227). The word *clipeus* is explained by Servius on another occasion (at *Aen.* 2.389) *clipeos: quibus* **latemus**, ἀπὸ τοῦ κλέπτειν[48] τὸ σῶμα (from concealing the body).[49] Lydus expands the explanation to ἀπὸ τοῦ κλέπτειν καὶ καλύπτειν (Lyd.

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[42] Cf. *Etym. Gud.*, p. 493.6: ῥίον, τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ ὄρους ('peak', the top of the mountain).

[43] Maltby (n. 9), s.v. *scopulus*.

[44] See also e.g. *ad Aen.* 8.403 and implicitly *ad Aen.* 4.705.

[45] 143.1 Bekker: σκόπελος: ἀκρωτήριον ἀφ' ἧς ἔστι περισκέψασθαι, σκοπῆσαι ('look-out place': peak from which it is possible to look around, to observe).

[46] Sch ex. *Il.* 2.396: <σκοπέλῳ> ἀφ' οὗ ἐστιν ἅλις σκοπεῖν ('look-out place': from which it is possible to have a good view).

[47] J. J. O' Hara, *True Names. Vergil and the Alexandrian Tradition of Etymological Wordplay* (Michigan, 1996), 119; Kyriakidis (n. 41), 62–3; A. Michalopoulos, *Ancient Etymologies in Ovid's Metamorphoses. A Commented Lexicon* (Leeds, 2001), 156.

[48] We should recall here that in the Latin scholia when synonyms point to etymologies they often concern Greek words.

[49] See also, *ad Aen.* 7.686 and 8.447. M. Paschalis, *Virgil's Aeneid. Semantic Relations and Proper Names* (Oxford, 1997), 141–2.

Mag. 1.10, 163 W).[50] All these four verbs—*teguntur*, *latemus*, κλέπτειν, and καλύπτειν—have similar meaning, that of concealment. The two Latin verbs can therefore, be considered as interchangeable synonyms to the Greek etymologies of the word *clipeus*. Servius, reading *Aen.* 2.227, obviously recognizes Vergil's etymologizing through synonym in the phrase *clipei . . . teguntur*, even though the verb refers to *dracones* and not to the statue itself bearing the *clipeus*. But this practice of transferring the etymology to another subject has already been noted and it is what Tsitsibakou-Vasalos[51] calls 'transference of etymology'. Following the Roman poet's technique in his comment on this verse, Servius repeats this etymologizing of *clipeus*, this time with the synonym verb *lateo*: *clipeique sub orbe: ut maxima pars in spiram collecta ante pedes sit. colla uero cum capitibus erectis post clipeum, id est inter scutum et simulacrum deae **latebant***: *ut est in templo urbis Romae*. The presence of the verbal form *latebant* can hardly be accidental when we consider the other etymological attempts of the commentator and in particular his phrasing on *Aen.* 2.389, cited above.

The use of synonyms in the etymological process of the ancients had been already established in the *Cratylus*, where on several occasions they substitute for the etymology. When we look at *Crat.* 419c: ἀχθηδὼν δέ, καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει (ἀχθηδὼν 'annoyance' it is clear to everyone that the name imitates the weight of the motion) and attempt a listing of the etymologies Socrates seems to allude to, which would be the words? The word φορά ('motion') seems to lead to ἄγω ('carry': ἀχθηδών), but at the same time the weight (βάρος) refers directly to ἄχθος ('burden') by the phenomenon of overlapping etymologies.[52] Parallel to it the phrase ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα takes us to the sphere of mimesis and onomatopoeia. Indeed, the sound of ἀχθηδὼν reminds us of the sound made by a heavy falling object.

In the same Platonic dialogue, the multiple functions of Apollo are, according to Socrates, hidden under the same name. The purpose of the passage is to show the various but concurrent hypostases of one and the same god. Apollo has four fields of power (405a): τὴν μουσικήν (music), τὴν μαντικήν (prophecy), τὴν ἰατρικὴν (medicine), and τὴν τοξικήν (archery). Socrates believes that these powers of the god are well combined (εὐάρμοστον, 'well combined') in his name, since the name is the common denominator of all the different and yet converging identities.

Σω. Εὐάρμοστον μὲν οὖν, ἅτε μουσικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ αἱ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ <u>λουτρὰ</u> τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις, πάντα ἕν τι ταῦτα δύναιτ᾽ ἄν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν. ἢ οὔ;
Ἑρμ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὁ καθαίρων θεὸς καὶ ὁ <u>ἀπολούων</u> τε καὶ <u>ἀπολύων</u> τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οὗτος ἂν εἴη;   (405a–b)

Soc. His name is well combined, because he is a musical god. For firstly purification and purgations both in medicine and in prophecy, and fumigations with medicinal and prophetic

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[50] Maltby (n. 9), s.v. *clipeus*.
[51] E. Tsitsibakou-Vasalos, 'Aphrodite in Homer and the Homeric hymns. Poetic etymology', in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Conference on Ancient Etymology* (forthcoming).
[52] The term used of cases where one element in the lemma is explained from two or more different words.

drugs, and the baths and sprinklings connected with such things all have the single function of making a man pure in body and soul, do they not?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But this would be the god who purifies and washes away (ἀπολούων) and releases from such evils (ἀπολύων).

In this discussion synonyms to the etymologies are employed again. For example, along with κάθαρσις (purification)/καθαίρω (purify)—words which incidentally we find in later texts and in the scholia in similar context concerning the god[53]—we have the words ἀπολούω (wash away) and ἀπολύω (release). Plato's aim was not meticulous research into etymologies, as we have said, but rather the encompassing process of identifying the various interpretative possibilities a word could offer.[54]

All the above cases, and hundreds more, show that synonyms are often used for the interpretation of a word or part of it or in various other combinations, sometimes pointing to overlapping etymologies. Ancient authors were not always concerned with the probability or improbability of an etymology they suggested; nor were they interested in identifying in an exact and formal way—according to our mode of thought—the etymologies of a word. Their main purpose was to designate the range of meaning(s) a word possessed or the broadening of this space by relating it to other cluster(s) of meaning(s);[55] it was a 'movement towards plenitude and perfection of meaning', according to Hinds.[56] The concept that a name is a bearer of different meanings and expresses things totally incongruous in themselves has nothing to do with modern etymology and cognitive linguistics, whose purpose is to trace the one initial meaning and the origins of a word. To quote Stanford:

This freedom was sometimes made a charter for licence, as is generously shown by the London scholiast on Dionysius (*Grammatici Graeci*, Hilgard I, 3, 458): δεῖ δὲ ἐτυμολογεῖν ὡς ἂν ἕκαστος κατὰ ἰδίαν ἐπιβουλὴν κινούμενος ἅπτηται τοῦ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν σημαινομένου [One has to etymologize according to the way in which each person, moved by his own reasoning, approaches the meaning of a word; my translation].[57]

Most,[58] in his study of Cornutus' text, sees this practice of multiple—not necessarily interchangeable—etymologies in the text of the Stoic philosopher and comes to the conclusion that this pattern is based on the idea that 'no word is isolated from others but that all are bound together'.

At this point we have to note that the etymology, whether direct or through a synonym, in the scholia or in the etymological dictionaries, may sometimes appear with a particularly loose explanation. Let us look at a very simple example, sch. ex. *Il.* 22.49a[1]:

ἀλλ εἰ μὲν ζώουσι <μετὰ στρατῷ> ἐλεεινὴ καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια τοῦ πατρός· ᾔδει γὰρ ὁ Ἕκτωρ περὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἴσως ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠλέησεν.

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[53] E. Vasalos and H. Kyriakidou, *A Lexicon of Etymologies in the Homeric Scholia* (forthcoming), s.v. Ἀπόλλων.

[54] Sedley (n. 29), 142, n. 11.   [55] Peraki-Kyriakidou (n. 35), 3.

[56] S. Hinds, 'Venus, Varro and the *vates*: exploring the limits of etymologising interpretation', unpublished paper (Leeds, 1996), 9.

[57] W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (New York and London, repr. 1972), 34ff.; quotation from 40–1.

[58] Most (n. 21), 2028.

but if they are still alive \<in the (enemy) camp\>: the father's ignorance is pitiful (ἐλεεινὴ); because Hector knew about the killing of the brothers and probably for this reason felt pity for him (ἠλέησεν).[59]

It might be supposed that this loose exegesis has no etymological intention, a point we shall discuss below. The experience gained from reading the scholia, however, shows that the commentators use etymologizing not only to explain words but also in order to create focal points in their interpretation, much as poets did in their poetry. Through this process they are in a position to emphasize certain elements of their interpretation as they think fit.[60] The repetition of a meaning through etymologizing, highlights the *poles* around which the comment turns. This pattern may seem not to be easily detectable, and it has its difficulties indeed, but it appears in poetry from the time of Homer. A characteristic example is the word νήπιος, which the epic poet very often places at the beginning of his hexameters[61] and then *insists*[62] upon its meaning—through various synonymous phrases[63]—thus giving a special interpretative weight to the word. One example is at *Il.* 2.38: νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἤδη ἅ ῥα Ζεὺς μήδετο ἔργα (fool that he was, he did not know even what Zeus was planning) or at 5.406: νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδε κατὰ φρένα Τυδέος υἱός/ὅττι . . ., etc. (fool that he is, for Tydeus' son does not even know this in his mind, that . . .). In these, the phrases designating the word νήπιος show that within them ἔγκεινται (lie) as constitutive parts νη- priv. + ἔπος/εἰπεῖν (*Etym. Gud.* 408.48, *Etym. Magn.* 604.15). In this way (and through various other synonymic phrases) the poet insists on the explanation of the word.

   This pattern of etymologizing through synonyms or synonymic phrases, which we witness at work in Homer, is particularly common in the instances when an adjective modifies a noun, 'the oldest kind of poetic etymologising'.[64] A careful look at the Homeric text will disclose that etymologizing through synonyms has a very wide application, and created a lasting tradition. The same pattern of etymologizing by synonym also appears extensively in Latin poetry. The case can be illustrated with an abundance of examples. On many of these occasions, synonyms are once again to Greek words rather than to Latin. In Vergil's *Aeneid* when Dido dies (4.705) the poet has the phrase in *uentos uita recessit*. Here the word *uentos* seems to have been placed as a synonym to *anima*, which is not included in the text. Servius (ad loc.) recognizes it as a possibility: *dicendo 'in uentos' aut eos sequitur qui animam aërem dicunt, hoc est 'in materiam suam rediit' aut . . .* According to the sources *animus/anima* comes from the Greek ἄνεμος.[65] *Ventus* therefore, seems to be a synonym to the Greek word ἄνεμος, the origin of the Latin words *animus/anima*.[66]

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   [59] This is a pattern appearing much more often in the Greek scholia than in Latin, which are more strict and structurally constrained.
   [60] Peraki-Kyriakidou (n. 35).
   [61] G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad*: *A Commentary. Books 1–4* (Cambridge, 1985), on line 2.38.
   [62] J. Griffin, 'Homeric pathos and objectivity', *CQ* 70 (1976), 165–6.
   [63] This technique also contributes 'to the importance of what is being described, or what is about to be described': N. J. Richardson, 'Literary criticism in the exegetical scholia to the *Iliad*: a sketch', *CQ* 30 (1980), 276; also 283.
   [64] O'Hara (n. 47), 64 and n. 320.
   [65] Maltby (n. 9), s.vv. *anima/animus*; Michalopoulos (n. 47), 27ff.
   [66] At sch. ex. *Il.* 15.192–3 the scholiast recognizes the relation between ψυχή, at the Underworld and the air: ὁ δὲ Ἀϊδωνεὺς παρὰ τὸ ἄω τὸ πνέω. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει, αἳ εἰσι πνεῦμα . . . (Aidoneus like 'to blow' [ἄω], in the sense 'breathe' [πνέω] for he does not only keep together the spirits, which are breath . . .)

Unlike the above construction, there is also a pattern in which both synonyms appear within the text. Ovid, *Met.* 7.107–8 is one such case:

> *ubi terrena silices **fornace** soluti*
> *concipiunt **ignem** liquidarum adspergine aquarum*

Here the simile contains both *fornax* and *ignis* which are related, according to Isidore (*Orig.* 19.6.6): *fornax . . . ab igne uocata*; φῶς *enim ignis est*.[67]

This pattern had a long application in poetry, both Greek and Latin,[68] and it owes its lasting effect partly to the need of the poet, or the scholar, to focus on the meaning of a word through its etymology and/or a synonym to the etymologically related word. The range of the meaning may fluctuate, more or less, according to context and its fluctuation creates focal points in the narrative. Through this practice, the poet orientates the audience to read his text in the way he wishes it to.[69] To take this thought one step further, it is the poet who actually interprets what he himself says.[70]

ETYMOLOGICAL INTENTION?

The 'etymological intention' of the ancient writer[71] is a topic we have already seen in passing. But how can we be certain that etymological intention is present when a synonym is given as an interpretation of a word, in those cases where no etymological sign is offered? A positive answer is inevitable when the work concerned is an etymological lexicon.

When we do not have to deal with a lexicon, however, but with a text of scholia instead, or a philosophical treatise, etc., then we should define as clearly as possible the bounds of what the ancients considered as etymologizing. But what does 'etymological intention' consist of? As we have seen above, the main purpose of etymology was the interpretation of the word(s) involved. Synonyms were a means to the same goal.[72] Etymology and synonymy, therefore, should not be regarded as parallel but rather as converging towards their common aim.[73] Synonymy and etymology were at times very close. The scholion cited below highlights the notion that the formation of a word was in a way regulated by the formation of its synonym: sch. Hrd. *Il.* 12.137b

(βόας) αὔας: βαρυτονοῦσιν οἱ πλείους. Νικίας (fr. 15b) δὲ ὀξύνει διὰ τὸ μεταφραζόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ξηράς ὀξύνεται. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πρὸς μεταφραζόμενα τὰς λέξεις τονοῦν.

of dry (bull's hides): most people stress the penultimate (sc. αὔας), but Nicias (fr. 15b) uses a final acute accent (sc. αὐάς) because of its interpretation, since ξηράς ('dry') also has a final acute accent. But it has been said about such things that one should not accent words according to their interpretation.

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[67] Maltby (n. 9), s.v. *fornax*; Michalopoulos (n. 47), 81.

[68] The widespread use of this pattern in Latin poetry is well presented by O'Hara (n. 47) and Paschalis (n. 49), *passim* for Virgil, and Michalopoulos (n. 47) *passim* for Ovid's *Met*. See also F. Cairns, *Tibullus. A Hellenistic Poet at Rome* (Cambridge, 1979), 101ff.

[69] Peraki-Kyriakidou (n. 35).

[70] Porphyrius' well-known phrase for Homer, though for the external interpreter: Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν (*Qu. Hom.* 56.4); Pfeiffer (n. 6), 3.

[71] See above, p. 478.

[72] H. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998), §1095.

Neither the scholion nor the phenomenon should be a rare case, as the phrase περὶ τῶν τοιούτων suggests that this was not an isolated instance.

Besides, as we have already seen in the texts, the synonym is very often placed against a certain linguistic background that is pointing to a word etymologically relevant to the one interpreted. As exact synonyms do not exist in reality, the placement of one instead of another may point to a different etymology, thus indicating more than anything else the *uoluntas* of the writer.[74]

We cannot, therefore, talk about 'etymological intention' as an independent state, since etymology and synonymy constitute two means leading to interpretation and explanation; we should rather talk from the start about 'exegetical intention' of revealing the truth (ἀλήθειαν, *Crat. passim*) through etymology and/or synonymy.

WHY NOT κριτικὸς ἅμα καὶ ποιητής? THE SCHOLAR AND THE POET: THE 'PROCESS OF IDENTIFICATION'[75]

Synonymy is a form of *uariatio* which was at the centre of literary interests in the Hellenistic age;[76] it is also a form of allusion, which in those days as a literary practice became an art in itself. But any form of allusion entails a kind of background knowledge on which a 'textual community'[77] formed around the texts they were commenting upon could operate. This literary group or textual community, like any intellectual élite, had prestige (*auctoritas*) and power in the society in which they lived.[78] The allusion may now serve a didactic or pedagogical role. The scholiast, like a teacher, that is, alludes to something and the reader, like a student, is asked to understand this by 'decoding' the message contained in the allusion. In other words, the allusion entails an 'unclarity' that, as Sluiter notes with reference to Aristotle,[79] served a 'pedagogical goal, viz. to separate the serious student from the unsuitable ones, a goal he [sc. Aristotle] shared with the later professors of philosophy'.[80] All this leads us to surmise that the scholiast in a way 'played' with the words and challenged the reader/student in a way not much different from that of the poet.[81] This is what we experience with the text of Callimachus or, in an extreme case, with that of Lycophron, who expected his reader to decode his text.

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[73] This is strengthened further by the common terminology used in either of the processes. Alexander the Rhetor (*De Figuris*, 30, 14, Spengel) writes: συνωνυμία δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν τῷ χαρακτῆρι διαφόροις ὀνόμασι, τῇ <u>δυνάμει</u> δὲ αὐτὸ δηλοῦσι, χρώμεθα πλείοσιν, ἐν μὲν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ βουλόμενοι δηλοῦν (synonymy is when we use several names of different character indicating the same thing as to its force, when we want to indicate one and the same thing).

[74] Lausberg (n. 72), §651: 'Repetition of the word-meaning with a change of word-form serves to reinforce the *uoluntas* behind the statement. . . . what is meant by the speaker (the *uoluntas* behind the statement) is given shape, defined and variously illuminated by means of several synonymous terms. The synonymity of the words used, therefore, certainly does not display complete (semantically superfluous) equivalence in the content of the words. Rather it includes semantic differences, the emphasis of which can be intended by the speaker.' See also §542.

[75] The term is borrowed from Sluiter (n. 28), 178.

[76] On this, e.g. M. Fantuzzi, 'Il Sistema Letterario della Poesia Alessandrina', in G. Cambiano, L. Canfora, and D. Lanza (edd.), *Lo Spazio Letterario della Grecia Antica* 1 (1993), tomo II, 33.

[77] Snyder (n. 32), 10; also G. Most, 'Preface', in G. Most (ed.), *Editing Texts/Texte edieren*, *'Aporemata'* 2 (Göttingen, 1998), vii; S. Goldhill, 'Wipe your glosses' in Most (n. 28), 381.

[78] D. J. Thompson, 'Literacy and power in Ptolemaic Egypt', in A. Bowman and G. Woolf (edd.), *Literacy and Power in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1994), 79, 82; Most (n. 28), ix ff.; Sluiter (n. 28), 173; Snyder (n. 32), 3.

[79] Sluiter (n. 28), 180.   [80] Ibid. See also Most (n. 28), x.   [81] See also Sluiter (n. 28), 180.

The scholiast was, in effect, a critic but quite often used elements of poetic discourse in order to communicate. In a sense then, he was κριτικὸς ἅμα καὶ ποιητής,[82] if we may reverse Strabo's phrase about Philetas ποιητὴς ἅμα καὶ κριτικός (14.657). A man of letters, a lexicographer, a grammaticus, or a writer and a poet are the different faces of the unifying intellectual phenomenon of the Hellenistic period. Callimachus, in his exemplary combination of that intellectual ideal, presents 'a complete unity of the creative poet and the reflective scholar'.[83] The importance he assigned to the role of each individual word characterizes his whole work. Scholia are often subject to the same logic. In them, too, the focus is often on the small lexical unit, the word or the phrase;[84] the total is broken down to smaller entities.

We have already said that there was a didactic purpose in etymology.[85] On a major scale the same is also true for the scholia.[86] The scholiast used his text in order to instruct[87] and to explain (poetic) works. In this effort he was functioning in a similar way as the poet who also 'taught' (διδάσκε)—to use a term applied in ancient drama— his own work (see Hdt 1.23 [for Arion], 6.21 [Phrynichus]; Pl. *Phdr.* 245a). By this I mean that what the scholiast discovers as the operating mode of an author's work (for example, Homer's), he also attempts to present in his own work. Sluiter furnishes us with a number of examples from scholia where Homer is considered as an instructor (διδάσκει . . .).[88] At sch. ex. *Il.* 24.334–8, where it is explained that Homer, like an instructor, provides an answer in a case where the text needs one: ἀπήλλαξεν ὁ ποιητής ζητήσεως ἡμᾶς, προσθεὶς τὴν αἰτίαν, διὰ τί . . . (the poet relieved us from the need to investigate by adding the reason why . . .). But providing satisfying answers to questions raised is part of the task and part of the technique of the scholiast as well as of the teacher.

The critic, therefore, functions in various ways similarly to his model—the author— and, as Sluiter notes, 'Commentators tend to see themselves as successors in the same didactic tradition as their source texts';[89] in other words, there is a 'symmetry between the work of the author and that of his commentator'.[90]

It must be made clear here that the critic's readership did not consist of children but of young students in their late 'teens'. The situation would be similar to that of the Μουσεῖον in Alexandria where Homeric scholarship was cultivated and great commentators worked. Blum is quite clear as to the standard reached in the Museum: it 'had the same rank as the Academy or the Peripatos. Its members did not give their pupils a high school education, as it were, but a higher education; their pupils were not

[82] E.g. R. F. Thomas, 'Virgil's *Georgics* and the art of reference', *HSCP* 90 (1986) = *Reading Virgil and his Texts. Studies in Intertextuality* (Ann Arbor, 1999), 114–15.

[83] Pfeiffer (n. 6), 124.

[84] Glossography goes back at least to the fifth century: F. Montanari, 'L' erudizione, la filologia et la grammatica', in Gambiano et al. (n. 76), 250f., 259.

[85] Above, pp. 481–2. Servius, according to Maltby ([n. 8], 3), often etymologized Vergil's words 'not so much to criticise Vergil for . . . improper uses, after all, as he frequently says, poets are allowed a certain licence in these matters, but rather to ensure that these poetic uses are not followed by his own pupils in their own prose writing'.

[86] Sluiter (n. 28), 173.

[87] For example, R. Blum, *Kallimachos. The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography*, trans. H. H. Wellisch (Madison, 1991), 50.

[88] Sluiter (n. 28), 176ff.

[89] Ibid., 178; or 179: 'The institutionalization of teaching helped to make the commentators look on their source authors as models of teachers, more precisely, the kind of teachers they themselves are.'

[90] Ibid., 186–7, esp. 187. See also Goldhill (n. 77), 381.

boys but young men, such as Aristophanes, the pupil of Kallimachos'.[91] At a later stage and within a different cultural environment an instance of an advanced student was Persius, who at the age of sixteen had the Stoic Cornutus as his teacher (Pers. *Sat.* 6). The examples can easily be multiplied, and are no more than an indication of the way a number of people looked at education.

In antiquity, scholarship on the one hand and poetry on the other formed two overlapping circles.[93] This situation is partly explained by the fact that a number of poets were also critics. Philetas and possibly Zenodotus are two early cases of men of letters who combined in themselves the qualities of poet and critic.[94] Alexander Aetolus,[95] Lycophron,[96] or Apollonius Rhodius also developed a dual intellectual activity.[97] Prompted by Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Alexander Aetolus engaged himself with the διόρθωσις of tragedies, Lycophron of comedies, and Zenodotus undertook the edition of the Homeric works among other texts. The διόρθωσις[98] was an exacting task that demanded a scholarly knowledge of the text and not merely a one-sided reading.[99]

Didactics was not, however, separate from aesthetics, which is also served by poetry. Reading of the Homeric scholia, at least as they have been edited by Erbse, clearly shows that the ancient commentators, especially those of the *exegetica*, were particularly well-versed even in matters of aesthetics; besides they were not at all inept at what we call today 'literary criticism'.[92]

Now the scholiast obviously emphasizes a point or passes something else in silence; all along, however, he interprets 'his' poet, he tends, that is, to create a view for him, which might be a projection[100] in written form of his own way of seeing things, his own interests, and finally of his own personality.[101] When the scholiast, therefore, etymologized a word either directly or through a synonym, he did not necessarily rely on an etymological tradition;[102] but often enough, in his own particular way, he imposed a 'meaning' on a word and thus directed his reader to understand the word the way he did. This subjective approach is a characteristic feature of poetry, as well as of the didactic art, and is common both to poets and teachers/scholiasts.[103] The intention of

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[91] 'Aristoteles was about seventeen when he became Plato's pupil. An exception were the sons of princes who enjoyed an education by famous scholars. Alexander of Macedonia was about thirteen when Aristotle became his teacher at the age of forty-one': Blum (n. 87), 122, n. 71, 127. For further cases Pfeiffer (n. 6), 92, 98.

[92] For the character of the scholia, see also Richardson (n. 63), 265–87; K. Snipes, 'Literary interpretation in the Homeric scholia: the similes of the *Iliad*', *AJP* 109.2 (1988), 198, 221–2.

[93] In this field of work, A. Rengakos, 'Homerische Wörter bei Kallimachos', *ZPE* 94 (1992), 21–47; *Der Homertext und die hellenistischen Dichter* (Stuttgart, 1993); *Apollonios Rhodios und die antike Homererklärung* (Munich, 1994) investigates the 'philological' dimension of Hellenistic poetry.

[94] Blum (n. 87), 98.

[95] E. Magnelli, *Alexandri Aetoli Testimonia et Fragmenta* (Firenze,1999), 12ff.

[96] For Lycophron's *Alexandra*, Pfeiffer (n. 6), 120, has this to say: 'The language of this poem is full of rare and strange vocables, especially epic and tragic glosses; . . . This penchant for glosses is characteristic also of the treatise Περὶ κωμῳδίας.'

[97] Blum (n. 87), 98, 127.

[98] F. Montanari, 'Zenodotus, Aristarchus and the *ekdosis* of Homer', in Most (n. 77), 1–2.

[99] For example, Blum (n. 87), 111.   [100] See above n. 28.

[101] Here, of course, I refer to the first commentator and not to his copyist.

[102] On the way the scholiasts were concerned with tradition, see Th. Papadopoulou, 'Tradition and invention in the Greek tragic scholia: some examples of terminology', *SIFC* 3rd ser. 16.2 (1998), 202–32.

[103] For the relation of interpretation/commentary, see Gumbrecht (n. 28), 444ff.

a reader (because all these are readers first of all) or even a spectator, to attribute to an object (word/text or work of art) qualities and characteristics, and thus interpret it, through his own intellectual experiences, is as old as human nature. This intention, however, reconceptualizes things and brings about a change in meaning. As Craig-Martin succintly put it, in the text accompanying his work consisting of a glass of water but entitled *An Oak Tree, 1973*, exhibited at Tate Modern, 'intention . . . precipitates the change'.[104]

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[104] M. Craig-Martin, in Clive Phillpot and Andrea Tarsin (edd.), *Live in Your Head. Concept and Experiment in Britain 1965–75* (London: Whitechapel, 2000), 66–7.