

demonstrates the validity of key hypotheses. It is difficult to overstate the richness of the analysis, even in well-mined areas like the enfranchisement of women in the United States. In the U.S. case, for example, Teele collects a few key original measures—such as the strength of urban political machines and Woman’s Christian Temperance Union membership—thereby expanding the data on women’s suffrage in ways that will aid future scholars of this period.

In each of these cases, Teele discusses how her general theory operates within the country’s specific historical context. In the United Kingdom, she argues that universal suffrage was extended because of a strategic alliance created between the National Union (one of the women’s suffrage organizations) and the Labour Party. Although most stories of women’s enfranchisement in the United Kingdom focus on the Pankhursts and their dramatic protests, Teele argues instead that the key to suffrage was the lesser-known National Union, which provided important resources to the Labour Party at a crucial time when they were beginning to contest more parliamentary seats. This alliance led the Labour Party to focus on universal adult suffrage rather than manhood suffrage, which they were able to promote during the grand coalition in World War I. Although many historical accounts of women’s enfranchisement also highlight the role of Liberal politicians, Teele shows that Liberals were not strongly committed to this policy.

According to Teele, France represents the opposite case, in which political elites had little incentive to enfranchise women, despite a clear willingness to engage in other reforms that advanced democracy. Radicals were wary of women voters—believing they would vote for the monarchy and the church—and women’s organizations did little to contest that assumption. France’s fragile history with democratic institutions that devolved into dictatorships heightened this concern. But using an astute analysis of the 1919 vote on womanhood suffrage, Teele demonstrates that Radical deputies in highly competitive and religious districts were the ones who abandoned women’s enfranchisement.

Teele’s analysis of the United States leverages the ability of individual states to determine women’s enfranchisement. She begins by demonstrating that, although more states under Republican Party control adopted suffrage than those under Democratic control, this simply reflected Republican domination of the political map during the period. Third-party competition played a significant role: women were enfranchised where the major political parties faced stiff competition and hoped women would bolster their party strength. Important to women’s enfranchisement was the activity of suffrage activists who strategically organized in reaction to salient political cleavages of race, ethnicity, nativity, and class by building the movement across these lines and framing the suffrage issue to encourage parties to see women voters as a stalwart of the status quo. Although the argument that political competition makes a difference is not new in the United

States (e.g., Corrine McConaughy, *The Woman Suffrage Movement in America: A Reassessment*, 2013), Teele’s focus on the difficulties of gaining suffrage in the Northeast where political machines held sway provides a fresh perspective on this well-studied case and adds a new level of generalizability to her comparative perspective.

There are places, however, where additional analysis would have strengthened her argument. In the French case, Teele does not dive deeply into the reasons why suffrage activists did not mobilize across political cleavages, although such cross-cleavage mobilization was strategically important in the other cases. In the U.S. case, she emphasizes that progressive culture or Prohibition forces did not influence women’s enfranchisement, but she devotes less space to examining the role of third parties like the Progressives in creating political competition. Moreover, despite efforts to trace the historical phases of the U.S. suffrage movement from the mid-1800s onward, the story of the strategic activities of the women’s movement in pushing for the Nineteenth Amendment or in increasing political competition is absent. But in the end these are minor points in an otherwise careful and convincing analysis.

In this review I emphasized Teele’s contributions to the comparative literature on democratization, because scholars in that area are most in need of her perspective and yet are least likely to use her work. But Teele also has much to say to gender scholars of women’s representation or women’s movements. Her ability to incorporate the cleavage literature into a gender analysis and her sensitivity to gender’s intersectionality with race and class are exemplary. She also strikes the perfect balance between those of us who take a more movement-oriented approach and those who focus on political elites, showing the multiple ways that political elites’ decision-making might be influenced by movement mobilization.

Teele concludes her book by noting the generalizability of her theory to other extensions of the franchise, such as to blacks in South Africa and the United States, and by calling on comparative scholars working on democratization to take off their narrow blinders and expand their definitions and theories of democratization to incorporate the enfranchisement not just of women, but also of other excluded groups. Democratization scholars would do well to heed this call, particularly because Teele’s book demonstrates so successfully how doing so can enrich our understanding of the democratization process.

Revolution and Reaction: The Diffusion of Authoritarianism in Latin America. By Kurt Weyland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 320p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592719004389

— Andreas Schedler, *CIDE, Mexico City*
andreas.schedler@cide.edu

Today, when we are living through renewed democratic anxieties around the globe, is a perfect moment for

revisiting and rethinking historical experiences of democratic crisis and breakdown. Combining diffusion theory with cognitive psychology, Kurt Weyland's *Revolution and Reaction* offers a fresh look at the serial breakdown of Latin American democracies in the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution.

The basic story is well known: the Cuban Revolution gave way to a twin process of diffusion and "counter-diffusion." It sparked a wave of imitative guerrilla movements that were extinguished through brutal repression, and it provoked a dramatic radicalization of left-wing politics that was suffocated by ruthless military regimes.

At the macrolevel, the self-reinforcing dynamic of political polarization that led to democratic breakdown is well understood. In the face of revolutionary threats, conservatives unleashed counterrevolutionary repression. However, as Weyland contends, the microfoundations of these democratic tragedies remain puzzling. Conservative threat perceptions were exaggerated, he argues, and their repressive responses excessive. Deviating from "standard rationality," both were manifestations of "bounded rationality." To explain these deviations, Weyland relies on insights from cognitive psychology. Overestimations of threat, he suggests, arose from informational shortcuts (the heuristics of availability and representativeness), and repressive overreactions from human risk sensitivity (asymmetric loss aversion). Transferring the findings of experimental psychology to the comparative study of political history bears great promise, yet also raises numerous questions. Here I address three of them.

First, what do we know about actors' actual threat estimates? As Weyland insists, "the unlikely success of the Cuban Revolution" induced both revolutionaries and reactionaries to "overestimate the likelihood" (p. 245) of its replication elsewhere. The "hope on the left" was "exorbitant" (p. 11), "unfounded" (40), and "illusionary" (p. 82), whereas the "perplexity and fear on the right" (p. 11) were "excessive" (p. 5), "unrealistic" (p. 126), and "disproportionate, sometimes bordering on paranoia" (p. 38). The book, however, does not offer a systematic analysis of "objective" threats (as the baseline of realism). And from its thin documentation of primary and secondary sources on threat perceptions (especially pp. 77–88 and 126–27), it is not clear whether actors actually assigned "a high likelihood" (p. 245) of success to radical left-wing politics. It is clear, however, that they saw "the possibility" (p. 117) of success. The "stunning power grab by a minority of radical revolutionaries" (p. 244) in Cuba had redefined the parameters of the possible. In the eyes of revolutionaries, "a new society was possible" (p. 11). For reactionaries, it enlarged the set of "worst-case scenarios" (p. 115). Both sides could have discounted the "infinitesimal chances of success" (p. 87) of radical mobilization but

apparently fell prey to another form of bounded rationality: the "possibility effect" that leads actors to either ignore or overweight improbable outcomes (see Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow*, chap. 29, 2011).

Second, assuming we know political actors' probability judgments, how do we know whether they represent "distortions arising from inferential heuristics" (p. 78) or inferences arising from intellectual distortions? Inferential heuristics steer our judgments in unconscious, unthinking ways. Judgmental mistakes, however, may well arise from certain ways of thinking. For instance, how do we know whether "exaggerated perceptions of similarities" between Cuba and the rest of Latin America indeed "derived from the representativeness heuristic" (p. 80)? In cognitive psychology, this heuristic leads people to form judgments about the probable behavior of "representative" individuals on the basis of simple stereotypes about the social group to which they belong (see Kahneman, chap. 15).

If the "heuristic of representativeness" indeed shaped actor perceptions of the Cuban Revolution, it did so in a twisted way. Rather than observing a typical group member and expecting stereotypical behavior from her, actors observed atypical behavior (revolution) by one member (Cuba) and attributed the same potential deviance to all others. Indeed, the possible replicability of the Cuban Revolution derived from the island's regional "representativeness." Yet, did its perceived similarity to other Latin American countries stem from irreflexive inferences based on "apparent, superficial similarities" (p. 47) or from reasoned inferences based on genuine, deep similarities?

In general, when assessing political threats, actors seek to respond to this question: How likely are our adversaries to harm us? The answer depends on both their adversaries' willingness and their capacities to do harm. It involves complex predictive inferences under troubling uncertainties (to which the author, unfortunately, pays little attention). In drawing their lessons from Cuba, did left-wing and right-wing radicals misjudge their respective intentions and capabilities? Most likely so. However, their central, shared misjudgment concerned the willingness of ordinary citizens to support revolutionary movements, which both sides generously overestimated.

As Kurt Weyland himself asserts, "according to rationalist accounts, Latin America's stark social inequality would have predicted overwhelming support for bold redistributive change" (p. 245) by the majority of poor citizens. This prediction, shared by both revolutionaries and reactionaries, turned out to be wrong. While shedding doubt on the rationality of citizens, it suggests that both revolutionaries and reactionaries were entirely rational, albeit guided by mistaken political theories. They acted on the theoretical assumption that grievances cause rebellions. We know today that they do not. So, radicals

on both sides appear to have been bad political scientists, but does that reveal them as passive victims of inferential biases?

Third, how do varying threat expectations translate into political action? In Weyland's account, all actors embraced exaggerated expectations of revolutionary success. In addition, conservatives responded in exaggerated ways to these expectations. Combating "the specter of communist revolution [they] employed full, often excessive force." They "overreacted and committed unspeakable atrocities" (p. 71), enacting "clearly disproportionate" "large-scale repression" (p. 154). Weyland explains their "unscrupulous determination to employ brutal force" (p. 115) by a simple cognitive mechanism: asymmetric loss aversion (see pp. 48–50).

Because "individuals subjectively weight losses much more heavily than gains of equal objective magnitude" (p. 246), the author posits that conservatives valued their prospective losses much more than either revolutionaries or poor citizens valued the prospective gains of radical politics. In his account, these variations in the intensity of actor preferences explain both the repressive excesses of the conservative coalition and their ultimate victory (see pp. 245–46). Except for the scant plausibility of a pure preference-based account of regime outcomes, this argument omits plausible alternative explanations for "excessive" repression, such as deterrence, preemption, vengeance, and ideological intolerance. Too, the idea of asymmetric loss aversion offers an implausible account of left-wing preferences. Revolutionaries did not play lotteries but faced "mixed" choices in which both victory and defeat were on the table. Why did conservatives respond with "striking brutality and unnecessary overkill" to the risks of losing their property while "radicals were eager to risk their lives" (p. 84) in the pursuit of collective benefits?

Overall, Kurt Weyland's innovative enterprise of understanding the cognitive psychology of political threat perceptions pushes the comparative study of democratic crises in a fruitful direction: the micrological study of escalating threats and threat perceptions between political actors. Of course, the research path his work opens up is long and winding. We still have a fair way to travel if we wish to develop both a full theory of political threat perceptions and systematic methodologies for studying them.

Empire of Hope: The Sentimental Politics of Japanese Decline. By David Leheny. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. 246p. \$39.95 cloth.
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— Robin M. LeBlanc, *Washington and Lee University*
leblancr@wlu.edu

I am a specialist in Japanese politics, but I was in Lexington, Virginia when the Japanese triple disasters of March 2011—the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear

reactor meltdowns—happened. At the time, I had a habit of waking up each morning to the Japanese public NHK television news that I got through a special subscription to a satellite channel and watched on an aging TV. I remember that about two weeks after the disaster, when I was spending most of my free time following its aftermath on satellite NHK, I burst into uncontrollable tears watching a feature about a couple who had lost their home and neighbors but were able to see photos of their lost dog on a recovered version of the data from their waterlogged computer's hard drive. The story was about a technically adept volunteer helping survivors recover their digital records. I canceled my subscription to the Japanese channel and moved the old TV out of my bedroom.

I share this moment because it is what came home to me—and it came hard—as I read the last part of David Leheny's *Empire of Hope: The Sentimental Politics of Japanese Decline*. Using a qualitative analysis of public texts such as political leaders' speeches, academic reports, and popular film, Leheny's book examines affective discourse about community in a range of unexpected cases. These cases include, among others, the fraught US and Japanese negotiations over raising the training ship *Ehime Maru*, whose accidental sinking by the US Navy killed nine Japanese crew members; the Japanese state's efforts to promote the nation's international stature through a "soft power" Cool Japan initiative; and the wild popularity of Caramel Box, a theater group that promotes nostalgic tales of individual strength and the triumph of good Japanese values in times of adversity. Leheny argues that often, rather than responding to tragedies such as the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* or the unrelenting social erosion produced by Japan's slow but unabated economic decline with political demands or concrete policy changes, political and pop culture leaders resort to an aesthetics of community that encourages Japanese to turn away from real suffering toward a nostalgic celebration of what is presented as a unique emotional culture.

Readers of *The Empire of Hope* will find themselves pulled along through compelling and well-written stories about the Japanese popular obsession with helping Vietnamese attached twins, those who suffer from exposure to Agent Orange used by the United States during the Vietnam War, or official attempts to the use the toy Hello Kitty to prop up Japan's global position. The book does a nice job of demonstrating what affective politics is without bogging us down in theoretical jargon. But at its start, *The Empire of Hope* was a challenge for me. I could see how each of the distinct stories highlights a use of affective politics to paste over failed policy and intense human costs. But I was unsure whether these cases, when put together, made a coherent argument about either Japan's international relations or domestic politics.