

same globalizing forces that aid terrorist groups also aid law enforcement officials. The authors have to deduce the likely effects of globalization at times, especially with regard to such implications as national security doctrines, but they begin too often with dated theoretical claims and then stretch the logic of these claims too far.

Overall, *Globalization and the National Security State* is a quite useful, contrarian approach to a literature that touts, unblinkingly, the benefits of examining the world through the lens of ever-increasing global change. As the core concept develops more precision, this type of study could be an important addition to general theories of international relations. As it is, the book is a welcome addition to classroom debates in advanced international relations courses.

**Secessionism: Identity, Interest, and Strategy.** By Jason Sorens. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012. 232p. \$95.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592712003921

— Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, *University of Maryland*

Armed conflict over secession has become the most common type of conflict in the international system since 1980. Jason Sorens's book is an ambitious attempt to explain why secessionist movements occur, why they sometimes turn violent, and what can be done to prevent secessionist rebellion.

*Secessionism* attempts to build a positive theory of secession based on three factors: identity, interest, and strategy. In practice, this book addresses contexts in which ethno-nationalist identity is already established, and although the author devotes some time to discussing identity, he does not really endeavor to add to the debate over identity creation or the principles of nationalism more broadly.

Instead, the crux of the book's arguments center on defining when it is in the interest of minority groups to seek secession, and how the strategic environment between states and minorities influences both minority group choices and state actions toward them. Sorens makes two central arguments along these lines, which culminate in the quite novel conclusion that states should constitutionalize secession. First, minorities will seek secession when they see net benefits to doing so (and Sorens then elaborates the conditions under which that is likely). Second, the credibility problem inherent in government/minority group interaction (wherein the minority cannot trust the government to favor them in the future) will lead these disputes down the road to armed conflict via the security dilemma.

These two arguments both underpin a relatively radical recommendation that comes out of the study—that governments should create a clear, legal path to secession in order to deter secessionism. Sorens argues that a right to

secession (at least informally within a state) will decrease the need for secession by minority groups and lessen the chance we will see it. This argument is rooted in both the literature on the security dilemma and that on political institutions. The author argues that autonomy for minority groups (i.e., institutionalizing their self-government) will only work well when this “exit” option exists. This conclusion is a contribution to the literature on the effects of decentralization (e.g., see Dawn Brancati, *Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization*, 2009).

The scope of the book is ambitious, including tests of many hypotheses related to a number of different empirical questions. As such, one of the key difficulties of the work is its relative complexity. Chapter 1 presents a positive theory of secessionism, but the subsequent development of the hypotheses often does not link back clearly to an overarching argument. A central idea underpinning the theoretical story is that minority groups are forward looking and concerned about whether the government will mistreat them in the future. Yet only some of the hypotheses seem explicitly linked to this idea.

The bulk of the evidence provided in the book is quantitative, and the strength of these analyses varies throughout the book. Sorens provides three related analyses of secessionism, one on the level of support for secessionism (Chapter 2), one on support for secessionist parties in advanced democracies (Chapter 3), and one on instances of rebellion (Chapter 4). Much of what we see in these analyses has been found in other studies. The most important finding for Sorens's argument is on quasi-legal secession, which he defines as instances of “governments that have explicitly ruled out military suppression of democratic secession” (p. 7). In such cases, there are lower levels of support for secession and lower risk of rebellion.

The finding on legalizing secession is at odds with the ways in which we assume that governments think about secession, and indeed, how the international community has conceived of a right to secession. Conventional wisdom is that such rights would open the door for the disintegration of states. Sorens suggests the opposite. Yet his analyses as a whole do not support the assertion that legalizing or constitutionalizing secession is a clear path to avoiding conflict. According to the appendix, there are only 12 cases of this happening and in only nine countries (p. 167).

The assessment of the role of autonomy (both economic and political) in democracies (Chapter 3) adds to the debate over accommodating minority groups. Importantly, economic and political self-rule appears to have contrasting effects on support for secessionist parties. Yet the analyses of the effects of autonomy combine a variety of into indices that can be difficult to interpret and that do not allow for an examination of the effects of specific policies.

Moreover, the statistical analyses provide evidence of correlation between permitting secessionist parties (Chapter 2) and quasi-legal secession (Chapter 5), but there is limited exploration of the mechanisms thought to underpin these relationships. The small amount of case study evidence is primarily anecdotal without following a clear methodology that would allow us to better assess the role being played by these factors (see Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005). In particular, the discussion of policy changes related to autonomy (p. 102) provides interesting details on two cases, but not a systematic comparison that allows us to evaluate theoretical mechanisms.

Several additional criticisms can be made. While the strategic aspect of the author's approach is one of its strengths, there is limited attention to the interaction between governments and minority groups as a dynamic process. The quantitative analyses tend to focus on static factors, and importantly, the over-time changes that occur in minorities' orientation toward independence as a viable option are glossed over (see p. 10 for a categorization of minorities based on their goals).

Moreover, there is a theoretical delinking of *support for secession* and *organizing to achieve secession* (see Hypothesis 5b). It is argued that banning secessionism will increase latent support for it but decrease mobilization. This is quite difficult to test empirically since latent support is presumably largely unobservable. There is also little attention paid to the ways that mobilization occurs beyond identification of a "collective action problem." Empirically, nationalist mobilization can come from elites or from the masses, and it would have been nice to see with more clarity how the theory predicts that mobilization will occur under different circumstances.

The role of repression is also largely absent from the considerations of minority groups. If states that commit not to fight wars over secession can make minorities feel more secure, should a commitment not to repress or abuse the group have a similar effect? There is a tacit assumption in the book that the path to security for minority groups lies in legalizing secessions and making institutional accommodations to these groups. This is certainly one potential path, but it would have been nice to see it placed in context with others, whether those be alternative institutional solutions, international guarantees, or commitments to minority and human rights conventions.

All in all, this book raises an important criticism of the conventional wisdom concerning how governments should deal with the potential for secession, and it asks us to think more critically about the link between the desires of minorities and what they might be induced to settle for short of secession. This is a thought-provoking read for anyone interested in secession.

**Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations.** Edited by Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer. New York: Routledge, 2010. 336p. \$150.00 cloth, \$47.95 paper.

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— Valerie M. Hudson, *Texas A&M University*

Philosophers of science have been skeptical that the social sciences can boast of any truly scientific progress. This skepticism is heightened, if anything, when speaking of political science and international relations. While international relations might be argued to have a set of more or less dominant approaches, an "approach" is not a research program in the Lakatosian sense (Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, 1980). There is no significant accumulation of empirical explanation by its normal scientists, and there is no revolutionary movement that promises to explain all that has been accounted for before. In fact, more has heretofore not been explainable.

Perhaps that is about to change. In other work, Amelia Hadfield and I have pointed to three efforts that aspire to move beyond the status quo in the direction of greater empirical content and greater exposure to sincere falsifiability (Valerie Hudson and Amelia Hadfield, "Neoclassical Realism and Behavioral IR as Recent Attempts to Bridge the IR-Structure/FPA-Agent Theoretical Divide: Walking Towards, or Past, the Other?," paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 1–5 April 2012). The most organized of those three efforts is that of Stephen Walker, his former students, and their current students. The edited volume *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis*, which combines new material as well as previously published journal articles, is the definitive statement on the current status of this research program. It is well worth reading, even if one does not intend to join the Walker School, for it raises the bar for setting the objectives and organizing the activity of scholarship in international relations and foreign policy analysis (FPA).

The Walker School terms its efforts part of the neobehavioral movement in IR. The "neo" derives from the fact that the Walker School builds upon older manifestations of behaviorism: behavioral IR and behavioral FPA. They "employ both the concepts of rationality and power and the concepts of beliefs, emotions, and motivations" (p. 7). Noting that behavioral IR and behavioral FPA have been either cast as rivals or assumed to inhabit separate intellectual spheres entirely, the Walker School is determined to move beyond this stalemate. Their work can be characterized simultaneously as realist, rationalist, and cognitivist. Power politics, rational choice, and political psychology must be allied, argues Walker and his colleagues. As physicists have found, things look very different from a microscopic versus a macroscopic point