completely as she describes. Although the author is surely right that workers' relationship to the firm cannot be reduced to pure instrumentality, it cannot be reduced to mere expression either. She admits as much, though then discounts workers' instrumentality throughout the book. Laborers no doubt seek to find meaning in their work, but they also seek to get paid, and many will prioritize these elements differently, with some willing to sacrifice the intrinsic value they get for the other, action-independent ends they seek.

To illustrate this argument, consider worker cooperatives and nonprofit corporations (about which Ferreras says strangely little). These are firms where capital has no seat at the decision-making table, and yet we see them make deeply instrumental decisions often, if not most of the time: Nonprofits must tend to their bottom lines if they want to win grants and secure loans; worker cooperatives must choose the best marketing strategies in order to best their competition; and so forth. Instrumental rationality is not imposed solely by shareholders, but by the condition of modern commerce itself. Expressive rationality and instrumental rationality both inhabit the firm, yes, but not with each represented by one stakeholder group independently. Both instrumental and expressive rationalities can be found in messy disarray among shareholders and workers alike.

Once this is recognized, Ferreras's categorical call for economic bicameralism loses some normative force. "Expressive rationality" is meant to imply that the desire for democratic control already exists among workers, a desire that must merely be institutionally recognized. Surely, some workers want more control than they currently have, and they ought to be able to attain it. But given their instrumental motivations, some will also be willing to sacrifice such control to gain means (wages, free time, etc.) for other ends they seek. Given this, why should we see control as the *sine qua non* of legitimacy? Note here that Ferreras's claim that shareholders hold illegitimate rule over workers misses the fact that shareholders *do not actually rule* as much as it might seem. Instead, we find that shareholders tend to see more instrumental value in being passive investors than in expending the energy to actively participate. We cannot assume away the possibility that workers might have comparable considerations.

None of this discounts the significant merits of Ferreras's contribution. Aside from offering a useful historical and comparative survey of the different ways in which work is organized, the book's core insight—that a conceptual and normative account of the firm must recognize the importance of both expressive and instrumental rationality—is fundamentally sound and important. What weight we ought to accord these competing logics in the governance of the firm may not be answered completely in this work, but Ferreras has done a great service by posing the question and illuminating the stakes involved.

Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar. By Matthew J. Walton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 244p. $105.00 cloth, $29.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718001871

— Tun Myint, *Carleton College*

Myanmar (also known as Burma) stands today as having had the world's longest civil war, which was followed by a nominal political transition from military authoritarianism to democracy. However, whether Myanmar actually becomes a more democratic polity and society will depend on peacebuilding processes among diverse ethnic groups. In some ways, Myanmar's path to Hobbesian peace under Leviathan can be seen as the longest struggle to consolidate state power in Southeast Asia. Myanmar is ethnically and culturally the second most diverse country in Southeast Asia, with 135 ethnic groups, following Indonesia. Myanmar now openly faces enduring ethnic conflicts and wars, as well as ethno-religious conflicts between Arakan nationalist Buddhist communities and Muslim communities in Rakhine State. Numerous international observers have described the brutal crackdown on Rohingya Muslims by the Burmese quasi-military government composed of Buddhist Burmese and ethnic leaders, including 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as a textbook case of ethnic cleansing. Myanmar also faces land-grab conflicts, and conflict within Buddhist communities with the rise of nationalist groups. Under these social and political conditions, Myanmar's uncertain transition from military authoritarianism toward democracy has drawn much-needed scholarly attention.

Against this backdrop, Matthew J. Walton's *Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar* attempts to unravel the critical and contentious role of Theravada Buddhism in Burmese politics and political thought. Walton does this through the lenses of elites in both the Buddhist community, or *Sangha*, and political establishments within power politics. His main argument is "that, in order to understand the political dynamics of contemporary Myanmar, it is necessary to understand the interpretations of Buddhist concepts that underlay much of modern Burmese political thought" (p. 3). Walton also adds that perhaps this discourse and argument might help delineate the framework of Burmese Buddhism (p. 9). He describes his intended audience as "individuals situated outside that tradition and its specific moral tradition" (p. 21). By specifying his audience in this way, he makes clear that one of his purposes in writing the book is "to insist that there is such a thing as Burmese political thinking and that often it does not neatly overlap with common Western political concepts" (pp. 129–30).

The author then lays out the conceptual framework of his argument through analysis of: 1) the Burmese notion of the moral universe based on Theravada Buddhism and Burmese cosmology (Chaps. 1 and 2); 2) Burmese notions of human nature and how it relates to the Burmese moral universe based on two classical Buddhist texts, the Agganna sutta and Cakkavatti sutta, which are sermons or discourses of the Buddha (Chap. 3); 3) Burmese notions of political freedom and order based on the moral universe and human nature by way of political elites' discourse on freedom and order during the British colonial era and the postcolonial era (Chap. 4); 4) how the contemporary meaning and actions of politics are intricately tied to the "building blocks" of the Burmese moral universe, human nature, politics, political freedom, and order (Chaps. 5 and 6); and finally 5) how democracy and the politics of democratic transition cannot avoid their "roots in Buddhist concepts" as underlying forces in the polity (Chap. 6 and Conclusion).

Walton shows how the Burmese moral universe is largely defined through the Buddhist concepts of self and nonself, *kan or kamma* (the framework of action and outcomes), *lawki* (the worldly realm, or the realm pertaining to the present world), and *lawkouttara* (the realm free from being subject to kan, or a realm free from worldly desires and attachments). The dynamic relationship between lawki realm activities and lawkouttara realm aspirations in life regulate the nature and dynamics of kan. A Buddhist Burmese person, therefore, ought to take both of these concepts into consideration when facing moral choices to act in this life. This struggle in the Buddhist Burmese mind ultimately should influence how Buddhists engage or disengage in politics, or take part in perceptively good and bad deeds that define the essence of one's kan (Chap. 3). For example, one of the reasons why military dictators claimed to discontinue their authoritarian exercise of power over the population, or why former President U Thein Sein ordained himself as a monk after his party lost the election in 2015, can be explained through such an analytical lens. Walton thus posits the characteristics of the Burmese Buddhist moral universe as the foundational landscape of Burmese political thought. He argues that this moral universe plays a fundamental role in the definition of politics, political participation, political freedom, political order, and eventually in the conception of "democracy" in Myanmar, itself. He also proposes that all of these concepts do not neatly overlap with Western concepts.

Walton's argument has three important implications. The first is that the existence of the individual in Burmese political and social life is simultaneously driven by both self and surrounding others through the Theravadan Buddhist concept of *kamma* (in Sanskrit) or the Burmese concept of *kan*, which ought to define the framework of an individual's action and inaction. The second important implication of Walton's study is to separate politics as a moral practice from politics as a rational practice, and posit that, ideally, Burmese political thought treats politics within what the author calls a "moral universe" framed under Buddhist concepts. The third implication is that to study and understand Burmese political thought and life (and to understand other distinct forms of political life in the world), it is critical for scholars to be aware of not only the usefulness but also the limitations of Western theoretical and philosophical concepts, because often there are not overlapping concepts that can neatly be translated and applied in non-Western contexts.

Having said that, Walton (or his publisher) was a little too eager to claim this as "the first book to provide a broad overview of the ways in which Buddhist ideas influenced political thinking and politics in Myanmar" (on the first unnumbered page and the back cover of the book). There have been several historical works, as well as a number of recent scholarly analyses of Burmese society since the early 1700s that offer more comprehensive and in-depth interpretations of Buddhism's influence on Burmese political and social life. These include the authors of several notable books cited by Walton, such as Melford E. Spiro's *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes* (1970), and Emanuel Sarkisyanz's *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (1965). These earlier scholarly works explore how Buddhist ideas and Burmese cosmology continue to influence politics in Myanmar (see also Mya Maung, "Cultural Value and Economic Change in Burma," 1964; Tun Myint, "Roots of Democracy in Burma," in Aurelian Craiutu and Sheldon Geller, eds., *Tocqueville and Global Democratic Revolution in 21st Century*, 2009, and "Buddhist Political Thought," in Michael T. Gibbons et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, 2014). Scholars who are interested in more insight on the notion of power in Myanmar will also benefit from reading Guillaume Rozenberg's two books, *Renunciation of Power: The Quest for Sainthood in Contemporary Burma* (2010) and *The Immortal: Faces of the Incredible in Buddhist Burma* (2015). Lastly, scholars who are interested in Buddhist political theory will benefit from reading Matthew J. Moore's more accessible broad overview on the topic in *Buddhism and Political Theory* (2016).

In short, Walton's book is a bit thin in its literature review on Myanmar and Buddhism, in that Walton omits or ignores several important books and articles that directly address the tenets of the Burmese Buddhist moral universe, such as the concepts of intention, action, karma (kan), Burmese cosmology, tradition, and the day-to-day thinking of people in contemporary Myanmar.

All books attempting to be comprehensive and to provide a broad overview of political phenomena suffer weaknesses in critical and in-depth analysis of theoretical foundations. *Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718001871 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Myanmar is mainly interpretative and descriptive. The book is theoretically less rigorous in its critical interpretation of why and how contemporary Burmese notions of human nature are distinctly similar to, yet different from, important Buddhist teachings. For example, a major weakness of the book is its omission of the way in which *power* is perceived in Burmese political thought, and how it can be interpreted using Buddhist concepts in Myanmar, sometimes in ways that contort and transmogrify Buddhism's basic teachings. Nevertheless, this work is valuable in that Walton amplifies points made by earlier scholars of Myanmar that Burmese politics and political thought have distinct roots in Buddhist concepts of the moral universe, cosmology, and experience. It also inevitably raises the question of how any Burmese Buddhist concepts could ever be used to justify the actions of successive military governments, which cracked down violently on people's protests in 1988, Buddhist monks' protests in 2007, and the crimes against Rohingya people in Rakhine State.

Alexander Hamilton and the Development of American Law. By Kate Elizabeth Brown. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. 320p. $34.95 cloth.

A Politician Thinking: The Creative Mind of James Madison. By Jack N. Rakove. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017. 240p. $29.95 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718001706

— Clement Fatovic, *Florida International University*

The American Founding is the gift that keeps on giving. Generations of historians, political scientists, and popular writers have mined this seemingly bottomless quarry to investigate the sources of American political thought, to trace the development of American ideas and institutions over time, and to glean lessons for the present. Given how much of the Founding has already been surveyed, one might be forgiven for thinking that there is little left to unearth. Fortunately, both Kate Elizabeth Brown's *Alexander Hamilton and the Development of American Law* and Jack N. Rakove's *A Politician Thinking* provide fresh insights into two founders who have already attracted a great deal of attention. However, they do so by taking very different approaches to their respective subjects. Whereas Brown maps out territory that has gone largely unexplored in Hamilton scholarship and leads to striking new discoveries, Rakove excavates terrain that has already been well traversed by students of Madison in order to reach a deeper understanding of his mode of reasoning. The result in the first case is a panoramic view of Hamilton's achievements that offers glimpses at his lasting influence on American law. The result in the second is a cross-sectional view of major shifts in Madison's thinking that reveals the process through which he arrived at his ideas.

Brown's meticulously researched book will be of interest to scholars of American political thought, Hamilton specialists, and students of American political development. The author presents plentiful evidence to support her proposition that "Hamilton deserves to be remembered as a father of American law" (p. 2). Despite the political losses that he and other Federalists suffered at the hands of Jeffersonian Republicans, she contends that Hamilton ultimately prevailed over his rivals in establishing a system of law that structured norms of legal interpretation, encouraged interbranch cooperation, shaped relations between the federal and state governments, and informed judicial reasoning well into the nineteenth century. So far-reaching was his influence that even attorneys working for the Jefferson and Jackson administrations invoked his ideas on the discretionary powers of the executive, and lawyers on both sides of court cases—including *McCulloch v. Maryland*—relied on them.

Brown's examination of Hamilton's careers as a lawyer and an administrator expertly guides the reader through technical points of law concerning real property, admiralty, marine insurance, and commerce. One of the rewards of this tour through his work as secretary of the treasury and as an attorney is a wealth of new information about Hamilton's behind-the-scenes activities, from his staging of court cases to his handling of petitions involving various financial claims against the federal government originating from the Revolutionary War. Brown provides a richly detailed account of the day-to-day decisions facing a conscientious administrator who exploited silences and gaps in the law to develop standardized and reasonable administrative rules and practices that would guide his subordinates in the Treasury Department, whether they involved the collection of customs fees or the inspection of distilleries. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Hamilton was single-mindedly focused on expanding executive power. A revealing episode described by Brown involves a customs inspector who petitioned Washington for a pardon after he unwittingly violated a recently passed customs law stipulating that informants were entitled to receive half of any fines owed to the federal government. The account of this incident illustrates how diligently Hamilton sought to balance competing interests (including the property rights of the informant, justice toward the customs officer who acted in ignorance of the law, and the need to uphold the president's pardon power) in a manner consistent with statutory and constitutional law.

In addition to expanding knowledge of Hamilton's efforts to establish a more coherent system of law, Brown deepens and complicates our understanding of Hamilton's views on the relationship between the branches of the federal government and between the states and the federal