dialogue (*JHS* 119 [1999], 1–16). Nevertheless, it is delightful to see a new publication of this relatively neglected Platonic dialogue.

Trinity College Dublin ISABELLE TORRANCE

H.-G. Nesselrath: *Platon und die Erfindung von Atlantis*. (Lectio Teubneriana 11.) Pp. 62. Munich and Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2002. Cased, €18. ISBN: 3-598-77560-1.

The monograph, no. 11 in the Lectio Teubneriana series, originated as a public lecture on the celebrated Atlantis narratives in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Critias.* Professor Nesselrath, who has already treated Theopompus' adaptation of the myth, here examines the delusions of Atlantis-searchers and the likely sources and purpose of Plato's fiction. That it *is* fiction he has no doubt, and he has little difficulty in showing that the quest is quite simply impossible: all searchers compromise the data by adjusting details, whether of location, or size, or date, and in so doing lose the right to call what they find 'Plato's Atlantis' (p. 16). (This section draws substantially on P. Jordan, *The Atlantis Syndrome* [Stroud, 2001].) He also tackles the 'chain of transmission', arguing that the silence of contemporaries, especially Isocrates (p. 21), shows that the myth was either unknown or not taken seriously. His treatment of Plato's sources is equally convincing: they run from Carthaginian sea-tales in Herodotus to cities recently lost in Greece to flood and tidal-wave, and the obvious paradigms of Persia vs. Greece and Carthage vs. Syracuse. The argument becomes somewhat shakier when we come to context. Ignoring obvious connexions with Syracuse, the author focuses on a tradition in Proclus that Plato was accused of plagiarizing the institutions of his *Republic* from Egypt, and devised the 'Ur-Athen' myth in response. (How would an unconvincing fiction satisfy critics?) Also not quite cogent is the suggestion that the fate of the aggressive sea-power Atlantis served as a warning to contemporary Athens—hardly a threat to anyone after the collapse of the second confederacy. In the final section he deals very sensibly with the mystery of Plato's failure to finish. By the time he reached *Critias* 121c the narrative had got out of hand, shifting attention to the hubris of Atlantis and changing the role of 'Ur-Athen' from the historical expression of the ideal to the instrument of divine justice. It could no longer serve Plato's purpose, so he abandoned it and embarked on the *Laws.* Perhaps a few loose ends: Plato's attitude to myth and its relation to truth had clearly changed (*Tim.* 22c–d; cf. *Politicus* 269b, *Laws* 3.677a–d); the author should have noted (pp. 22–3) that it is Socrates himself (*Tim.* 26e) who endorses the truth of Critias' *logos*; curiously, no attempt is made to examine the role of the *Timaeus* in the plan, or the discrepancies over the ideal state between *Timaeus*/*Critias* and the *Republic.* These, however, are minor flaws in a valuable and entertaining discussion.

University of Kent CHRISTOPHER CHAFFIN

J. J. Cleary, G. M. Gurtler (edd.): *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Volume XVII, 2001*. Pp. xx + 291. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2002. Paper, US$46. ISBN: 90-04-12687-2 (90-04-12688-0 hbk).

One of the pleasures of reading this stimulating volume is that it gives one a sense of the range of topics in ancient philosophy that scholars are currently pursuing. After a discussion of the new Empedocles papyrus, we move into Plato's mereology, current debates in Aristotle's ethics and logic, Hellenistic psychotherapy, and Neoplatonic commentaries on henology, all of which are illuminated wherever possible by modern philosophical perspectives. Harte's reflections on mereology are a fine example of this virtue, providing a fresh analysis of the famous argument at *Theaetetus* 203–6 about knowable complexes comprised of unknowable elements, in the light of David Lewis's theories. Similarly bracing analysis is to be found in Crivelli's discussion of whether Aristotelian logic can accommodate empty terms, focusing on *Topics* 4.6, *Categories* 4, and *De Interpretatione* 8. C. argues that Aristotle can accommodate them, and in a way that is perfectly consistent with his general correspondence theory of truth. This conclusion leads C. into a comparison with Russellian logic. Still on Aristotle, Jennifer Whiting turns to the ethics

with a view to yoking together the apparently opposing views of Irwin, whose rationalist account of virtues requires their justification by 'extra'-ethical argument, and McDowell, who holds that any justification for Aristotelian virtues is inseparable from the upbringing of his intended audience and cannot be used to persuade the moral sceptic. Using as a model an interpretation of how each philosopher might apply their perspectives to the ascent towards the beautiful in the Symposium—an ascent which the subject is rationally compelled to make on the Irwin view, but which would be informed throughout by evaluative judgements already internal to his belief set on the McDowell view, Whiting argues that both men can be reconciled insofar as Irwin is theorizing about the method of acquiring virtue while McDowell is focusing on its nature. Curd examines some of the most controversial issues in Empedoclean scholarship in light of the new evidence provided by the Strasbourg papyrus. Although many scholars now agree that his religion and natural philosophy are related, Strife still prevails over the debate and whether it can be used to settle the 'one poem or two' question. After a sober and informative review of the evidence C. concludes that the papyrus confirms the view that physical doctrines and religious doctrines are inextricably related in Empedoclean thought. But we did not need the papyrus to provide such evidence. According to C., the fusion of religious and physical speculation was a characteristic feature of much Presocratic thought. The papyrus, then, confirms, but does not substantially alter, our view of Empedocles *oeuvre*. Still on the theme of strife, Graver examines a dispute between the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans about the techniques required to minimize mental pains. As with Curd's article, the arguments here are characterized by close scholarly attention to the texts, in particular G.'s attempts to clarify whether the pain of grief, for example, can be helped by rehearsing it in advance (as the Cyrenaics held), or whether one should distract oneself, since by rehearsing it one is only adding to the misfortune (as the Epicureans held). Meanwhile, Plato receives attention from two scholars in the field. Fussi gives us a reading of the Gorgias that challenges its received philosophical content with a consideration of its dramatic themes. Although Socrates' avowed position is that rhetoric is not, in Fussi's word, 'omnipotent', the dialogue also establishes that philosophical argument is not omnipotent either: Callicles is not persuaded out of his position. Fussi interprets this as Plato's challenge to Socratic intellectualism. Socrates cannot hope to challenge Callicles adequately without neutralizing the power of the emotions that drive him to his moral scepticism: but this can only be accomplished by rhetorical devices. Rachel Barney focuses on the *Republic*, and whether there is any moral nostalgia in Plato's construction of various alternative city states: is there some hankering after the past alongside Plato's revolutionary tendencies. Barney argues that the City of Pigs cannot be used as such evidence because a city without rational rule cannot be self-regulating and moderate in its desires and therefore cannot sustain itself. And this is not just a consequence of the fact there is no City of Pigs: *Rep. 9* (571b–572c) suggests that the unruly desires that characterize such a state are disclosed in dreams. Barney infers that we therefore all have such desires, which suggests that such a city is closer to realization than Plato's elaborate genre play on the theme might suggest: hence he is no nostalgic. Finally Narbonne gives us a sense of how invigorating the Neoplatonists' commentaries on their master can be, in an exploration of the Neoplatonist reception of the Form of the Good as 'beyond being'. N. argues that Plato is trying to express a concept that he cannot formulate, but the Neoplatonists make progress in this area by moving (via the *Parmenides*) from the question of what there is to the question of what the One is. By construing the expression 'The One' as lacking ontological commitment, they get a sense of something that is 'beyond being' while still maintaining a theory about the characteristic activity of its referent—unifying—which captures the causal efficacy the Form is supposed to have for Plato. N. is perhaps too ready to concede the controversial nature of this interpretation, for it does explain how it is that the goodness of both cities and souls resides in their unity.

Girton College, Cambridge F. SHEFFIELD

O. POWELL: *Galen:* On the Properties of Foodstuffs *(*De alimentorum facultatibus*). Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. With a foreword by J. Wilkins. Pp. xxvi + 206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Cased, £40/US$55. ISBN: 0-521-81242-9.

It is not uncommon for two books covering similar ground to appear in quick succession. Whereas Owen Powell (hereafter P.) translates and comments on only one work, *On the*