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Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Barbara Vetter
Barbara Vetter*
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen, 91054 Erlangen, Germany.
*
Email: barbara.vetter@fau.de
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Abstract

Williamsonian modal epistemology (WME) is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson's own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in Williamson's own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language.

Keywords

Modalitymodal epistemologymodal semanticscounterfactuals
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 766 - 795
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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