function of justice, this problem cannot arise. Rawls's principles are in the service of stable cooperation, and so are never to be satisfied at the expense of stability as he understands it. The only claims that can defeat stability even in principle are pretheoretical convictions about fairness.

Similarly, Taylor dismisses Rawls's stability-based argument for the difference principle as "by its nature a *secondary* defense" whose "plausibility hinges entirely on that of the primary defense" in terms of reciprocity (p. 225 n; Taylor's emphasis). Taylor is correct that an argument from stability is incomplete unless supplemented with claims about reciprocity. But this does not show that such arguments are secondary, since the same is true of arguments from reciprocity until these are supplemented with claims about stability. Unlike reciprocity arguments, stability arguments include empirical claims about what citizens characteristically *experience as* reciprocal and, hence, characteristically perpetuate from one generation to the next.

Relatedly, Taylor often accuses Rawls of a mistake he calls the "inference fallacy" (pp. 129, 154, 157, 159, 163), a label unfortunately combining vagueness with redundancy. This mistake is to infer the lexical priority of a consideration from its great instrumental import. The attribution of this mistake underlies the putative inability of Rawls's view to vindicate the normative priority of the right over the good, which is in turn crucial for motivating a more Kantian reconstruction of justice as fairness.

Taylor attributes this mistake to Rawls because he sees lexical priority of one principle to another as tantamount to claiming that it is "infinitely worse" (p. 144) to sacrifice satisfaction of the first for the sake of the second. But this is misleading, given Rawls's understanding of the function of justice. To reconcile citizens' reasonableness with their rationality, a conception of distributive justice must be simple enough for them to understand, and must deploy a currency public enough to accurately assess. Only within constraints like these does a principle take lexical priority over another; there is no independent characterization of some outcomes as worse than others, much less infinitely worse. Rawls relies instead on the claim that over generations, given human limits, departure from the lexical priorities he posits inhibits publicity or stability more than it enhances reciprocity. (The sheer number of attributions of this fallacy calls into question its fidelity to Rawls's reasoning. But Taylor is nothing if not confident, characterizing Rawls's defenses of the difference principle as a "cascade of failures" [p. 215]. This irreverence is tolerable, conjoined as it is with clear admiration for Rawls's work, but no doubt some will react negatively.)

The third part of the book is an attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of Rawls's later views. Taylor's conclusion is plausible, but the argument here is largely unpersuasive, and once again the culprit is a failure to appreciate Rawls's stability and publicity requirements. Much of the third part consists in articulating partially comprehensive doctrines taken from contemporary American political culture (such as "bourgeois competitive-individualism" [p. 254] and "romantic liberalism" [p. 270], and arguing that there are no public grounds sufficient to bring advocates of these positions into an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness.

While there is considerable interest in the doctrines Taylor identifies, his argument does not sufficiently engage Rawls's motivations. Overlapping consensus is not common ground among presently existing doctrines. If overlapping consensus on justice as fairness is possible, future citizens who grow up with justice as fairness will adopt doctrines they see as compatible for the right reasons with that conception. To the extent that the doctrines Taylor surveys manifestly contradict justice as fairness, Rawls's needed claim is that they will tend to lose adherents the closer society comes to realizing justice as fairness. This is an empirical claim, and may be false, but surveying contemporary views provides at best partial and indirect evidence against it.

Taylor displays considerable insight into Rawls's theory, and his Kantian reconstruction of justice as fairness is novel and significant. But whatever its merits, the view does not satisfy Rawls's ambition of enunciating social conditions in which citizens experience the exercise of rationality as congruent with sincere cooperation. Taylor's reconstruction of justice as fairness thus departs much more from Rawls's motivations than he acknowledges. His proposals are of great interest, worthy of discussion in competition with Rawls's. Adjudicating that competition requires more resources, however, than are provided in this volume.

Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. By Andrew Wedeman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. 272p. $75.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.
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— Mark W. Frazier, *The New School for Social Research*

Corruption is inherently difficult to measure. Gauging how corruption changes over time, how it interacts with economic growth and development, how it influences public policy, state capacity, and much else is highly dependent on how corruption is measured. In several recent studies of corruption in China, scholars have sorted through the evidence to adopt a conceptual approach that might be called "varieties of corruption." Some forms of corruption involve transactions in which agents take advantage of price differentials to supply more goods to consumers; in other forms, officials make windfall profits colluding to deliver public assets into private hands. Infrastructure projects, whether they are ever completed or not, offer lucrative opportunities for multiple parties. China's three decades of reforms have spawned all these forms of

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corruption and others. And yet, to date at least, corruption has not spiraled out of control or reversed China's impressive rates of economic growth.

In *Double Paradox,* Andrew Wedeman offers a systematic and carefully documented argument to show how reforms and corruption have coevolved. Through an innovative use of existing data, Wedeman argues convincingly that during the very periods in which the economy took off, the predominant form of corruption was "degenerative corruption," similar to that found in "kleptocracies" with low and usually negative GDP growth. Thus, the book's title: a primary paradox of rapid growth with increasing corruption, and a secondary paradox of growth amid a form of corruption that is most often associated with plunder. Recent studies have also noted this transition in the modes of corruption in China from the 1980s to the 1990s. Wedeman's central contribution lies with his claim that corruption in China has attained more or less manageable levels. It has reached a steady state in which officials enrich themselves on transactions that "have fed off the growing economy rather than on the economy's vitals" (p. 141).

The keys to resolving the two paradoxes lie with the timing of reform and with the institutional capacity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The first stage of reform, primarily in the 1980s, generated opportunities for rent seeking thorough price arbitrage. It was crucial that corruption followed in the wake of reforms, emerging in step with the dual price system and creating rent-seeking opportunities for officials. While there is ample evidence of official corruption before the reforms, Wedeman argues that corruption involved relatively low-priced exchanges for access to scarce resources in the planned economy. As such, corruption did not serve as a barrier to reforms. But with the acceleration of restructuring in the state and collective sectors in the 1990s, corruption began to resemble plunder, involving the conversion of public assets (factories, land, equipment, etc.) acquired at artificially low prices by well-connected buyers who could then lease or sell at far higher prices. The boom in infrastructure spending also created vast opportunities for graft and bribery. With the one-off transformation of public assets into private hands now concluded, and infrastructure spending leveling off in its intensity, the author claims that corruption is now primarily transactive rather than predatory: "Corrupt officials are ultimately cashing in on new value created by reform rather than feeding off the existing stock of value" (p. 8).

The important institutional factor in China's sustainable corruption is the ability of the CCP's anticorruption agency and the government's formal prosecutorial bodies to provide at least a credible threat to officials who engage in corruption. Wedeman's claim that enforcement efforts by party and government agencies have controlled the growth in corruption is an important challenge to the work of scholars such as Minxin Pei (*China's Trapped Transition,* 2006), who have argued precisely the opposite: that weakening enforcement against corruption has led to the rise of "local mafia states" and has jeopardized state capacity. This leads to one of the most significant implications of the book. If Wedeman's claim is valid, then corruption in China has reached a manageable equilibrium in the absence of political reforms that many say are necessary conditions for coping with it: media liberalization, judicial independence, and autonomous anticorruption commissions.

The empirical foundations for Wedeman's claims are drawn from a wide array of official sources. Given the limitations of this data, which the author acknowledges, the discussion in Chapters 4 through 6 makes effective use of information contained in provincial gazetteers issued by the law-enforcement agencies (most commonly, the provincial-level People's Procuratorate), as well as an original data set of 4,040 corruption cases found in media reports from 1978 to 2007. While these sources are not comprehensive in terms of allowing analysts to know the actual rate of corruption—which by definition is an elusive figure anywhere in the world—the evidence does allow Wedeman to come up with tentative measures of variation over time in the forms, amounts, duration, and ranks of officials involved in corruption.

In two chapters that precede the discussion of the Chinese case, the author also provides compelling and meticulously researched comparisons of developmental and degenerative corruption in other countries. The discussion illuminates the relationships among crucial variables of GDP growth, the goals and behavior of political elites vis-à-vis economic activity, and the forms that corruption takes as a result. He illustrates developmental corruption by means of an analysis of South Korea and Taiwan, showing how the foundations of corruption lie in an exchange between politicians and business elites with a mutual interest in conservative economic policies. By great contrast, degenerative corruption resembles actual state-led plunder of physical assets and natural resources, as illustrated by several cases from Africa and Latin America.

In a concluding chapter, Wedeman offers nineteenth-century America as a case seen as broadly but analytically similar to that of China. Both cases share traits of high levels of corruption by local officials who took advantage of massive and rapid structural transformations in the economy, as well as a boom in infrastructure spending. Some readers will find it difficult to agree with the claim that "[i]n some sense, China is now slowly moving toward a type of progressive era" (p. 193). It is still too early to tell, but if this analysis is correct, then corruption would at least stay contained within manageable bounds for the foreseeable future.

The high-profile corruption cases that Wedeman analyzes in a chapter on anticorruption measures suggest just

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one of two possible conclusions. For the author, the downfall of Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu, and the cracking of the Xiamen smuggling empire, suggest the capacity and willingness of the party and its anticorruption agencies to act against high officials. Moreover, the 2009 campaign in Chongqing to break up the dense ties between law enforcement and organized crime—a campaign led by Bo Xilai and his chief law-enforcement officer Wang Lijun—is provided as further evidence of enhanced anticorruption capabilities. The sudden and shocking fallout between Bo and Wang in early 2012 came after this book had gone to press, but it highlighted a different interpretation of "successful" anticorruption cases. The behavior exposed in such cases may in fact represent the new normal, and that among the political elite, those who are "caught" attaining vast sums of wealth are only those who have fallen victims to shifting political winds and factional alignments.

Through its systematic treatment of existing evidence, *Double Paradox* makes an important contribution to our understanding of the sources and forms of corruption in China and its embeddedness with economic reforms. It will serve as a landmark study in the debate over corruption's effects on growth and state capacity, in China and beyond.

POLITICAL THEORY

Nathaniel Hawthorne as Political Philosopher: Revolutionary Principles Domesticated and Personalized. By John E. Alvis. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012. 291p. $49.95.

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— Thomas E. Schneider, *University of Saint Francis*

A characteristic shortcoming of studies that address political-philosophic themes in the work of literary writers is that readers learn much more about the writers than they do about politics. They will usually gain new appreciation for a writer's work and, often enough, for the scholar who interprets that work. Still, they may find themselves thinking that the philosophical takeaway is rather meager. This caveat applies in some measure to *Nathaniel Hawthorne as Political Philosopher.*

The larger part of the book consists, unsurprisingly, of interpretations of Hawthorne's works—to be sure, with an eye to questions of political-philosophic interest. But John Alvis has done something more by including sections given over to his own reflections on the American Declaration of Independence (the "Revolutionary Principles" of the subtitle). His interpretations show the cross-pollinating effects of two distinct bodies of scholarly literature. (The book includes a bibliographic essay in two parts, one devoted to the Declaration of Independence and the other to Hawthorne.) As Alvis concedes, his interest in the Declaration for its own sake is one feature that makes his book unusual among studies of its kind, but it does recommend the work to political scientists. Another unusual feature is his willingness to aver that he views the Declaration in a positive light, as expressing the principles of "a founding uncommonly well devised" and worthy of being defended (p. 4).

Why Hawthorne? Alvis identifies him with a set of mid-nineteenth-century writers—James Fenimore Cooper and Herman Melville are also named—who "took upon themselves the project of defining America, the polity" (p. 1). For reasons that might well have been spelled out in greater detail, he finds Hawthorne's work to be most suitable for examination: "[S]uch ambivalences as one encounters in Hawthorne's fiction owe to his honest confrontations with certain tensions inseparable from the principles he attributes to his countrymen past and present, tensions identical with those one can perceive in Jefferson's Declaration" (p. 3). So far as I have been able to discover from Alvis's presentation, Hawthorne nowhere directly refers to the Declaration in his published work, except in a book written for children where the reference appears in a straightforward historical context. Moreover, the decision to focus on the Declaration implies an estimate of its importance for later generations of Americans that accords better with Abraham Lincoln's speeches of the 1850s than with views current in Hawthorne's own Democratic Party. Lincoln had to make an argument for the continuing importance of the Declaration because so many Americans were inclined to deny it. (Though not narrowly partisan in his politics, Hawthorne did write a campaign biography for his friend and Bowdoin College classmate Franklin Pierce, in which he defended Pierce's temporizing policy toward slavery.) On the strength of a somewhat shaky premise, Alvis is willing to "try the chances of mutual illumination" by examining Hawthorne's work in conjunction with that state paper (p. 5).

The author gives detailed consideration to a number of Hawthorne's short stories and to his three "impaired romances" (*The Blithedale Romance, The House of the Seven Gables,* and *The Marble Faun*), as well as to his masterpiece, *The Scarlet Letter.* As Alvis regards the last-named work as Hawthorne's "definitive statement upon matters moral and political" (p. 206), however, I pass directly to the parts of the book that treat *The Scarlet Letter.* Here, I must find fault with one point in Alvis's interpretation.

Readers of the novel will remember the scene in which Hester Prynne, the wearer of the scarlet letter, contrives to meet her lover Arthur Dimmesdale in the forest some seven years after the birth of their daughter had made it impossible to conceal her adultery. There she tries to

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