

The Piaget-Inhelder chapters are a re-hash of Piaget's earlier work on the thinking of children, particularly the notion of 'conservation'. The prose demonstrates again that Flavell explains Piaget better than Piaget explains Piaget. The most original focus in this section is an attempt to investigate 'mental images' as aspects of operations rather than as perceptual curios.

Gréco's contribution is the most coherent in that he attempts a historical comparison of European and American approaches to thinking and argues against stimulus-response models and similar forms of intellectual impoverishment. His analysis of the Tolman-Hull learning by 'ideas' versus learning by 'trial and error' argument is neat and sharp.

The two major shortcomings of the work are that it is a collection of assorted review notes rather than a book, and that it mistakes formality for theory. There is a constant recourse to sensible but fundamentally arbitrary categorizations—'intellectual operations are *operative* or *figurative* and the *operative* are sub-divided into *sensory-motor*, *internalized actions* and *operations attributable to intelligence*'. Fair enough, but this is the intellectual equivalent of Mr. Heinz's 57 varieties. Lacking an articulated theory, the going consumer demands of the day will endlessly add and subtract varieties to no particular end.

D. BANNISTER.

A HARD READ

Fear of Failure. By ROBERT C. BIRNEY. Harvey Burdick & Richard C. Teevan. D. van Nostrand and Company, Ltd., 1969. Pp. 280. Price 75s.

My first reaction to this book was a sharp in-drawing of breath at the immensity of the subject. What could academic psychology usefully say about a topic so central to clinical psychiatry? 'Fear of Failure' is certainly a hard read, but for anyone who perseveres there are interesting leads for psychiatric research and therapy—I mean behavioural modification.

The authors have programmed a research on fear of failure (FF), which they regard as a basic personality attribute; their programme is an extension of existing programmes on need for achievement (n Ach) initiated by McClelland *et al.*, in the book 'The Achievement Motive' (1953). Study is directed to a number of areas in which fear of failure may be manifest. These include laboratory tasks such as level of aspiration (LA), real-life tasks such as public speaking, and projective tests, especially a modified TAT with a valid and reliable scoring system designed to elicit 'hostile press' (HP). This is a measure of environmental malevolence experienced

on selected TAT cards, which relates to fear of failure.

Although the point is not explained in psychiatric terms, it seems likely that HP relates to the paranoid personality style, so that, in expanding the authors' work, an external criterion (the paranoid spectrum—from paranoid personality to paranoid schizophrenia) could be introduced. In an unusually interesting chapter, experiments are summarized which show that persons high on HP tend to have parents who punished them for inadequacies during their childhood and failed to reward achievement. Could this be one factor in the aetiology of the paranoid illnesses, classically 'reactive' rather than 'process' disorders? The possibility of individual therapy arises in terms of child psychiatric practice if disordered upbringing of this type is detected early. This is noted by the authors, but family therapy is another possibility. A further link-up may be found with L. C. Wynne's experiments on faulty communications within the family of schizophrenics.

There are irritating idiosyncrasies of style, not least of which is the use of an incredible number of abbreviations, such as N Ach, LA, FF, HP, and many more. As with so much psychological research, there are endless, deadly serious comparisons and discussions of theoretical concepts, none of which are more than bright ideas. There is also the limitation imposed by ignorance of theoretical and practical psychiatry. The sampling of persons—sorry, subjects—for the various researches, lays the authors wide open to the jibe that personality psychology in the U.S.A. is the psychology of Sophomores.

Despite these comments, this book merits study by research-minded psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, who may themselves derive bright ideas for further investigation.

SIDNEY CROWN.

JUNGIAN CHILD PSYCHIATRY

Children as Individuals. By MICHAEL FORDHAM. Hodder and Stoughton. 1969. Pp. 223. Price 42s.

Although this is nominally a revised edition of the author's *The Life of Childhood*, published in 1944, the revision is so radical that it is virtually a new book. Dr. Fordham is not only one of the most prominent but also one of the most readable analytical psychologists in this country. He differs from many other Jungians and certainly from Jung himself in his deep and long-standing interest in children and their problems. It is remarkable that whereas Freud's

researches led him further and further back into childhood for explanations of the psychology and psychopathology of the adult, Jung's interest moved in the other direction, that is, to the latter half of life, with its full maturity and eventual involution. It seems significant that Jung was so much impressed by 'opposites'. Other issues where he took up a position 'opposite' to Freud's were: prospective versus retrospective, purpose versus cause, spiritual and mythical versus sexual, typology versus universality—and no doubt many others. Dr. Fordham, however, is different, and has always seemed one of the more Freudian Jungians, even if he feels more affinity with the standpoint of Melanie Klein than with that of Freud. It is interesting that his new title is 'Children as Individuals', for he certainly treats them as such.

The introductory chapters deal with clinical material related especially to play, dreams, and pictures. Much of this is straightforward and will be familiar to most of those who do clinical work with children; but in addition there are interesting Jungian insights regarding such concepts as opposites, mandalas, archetypes etc. The following chapters are more theoretical and serve to expound the author's concepts of ego, archetype, and self, of the process of maturation, and of identity formation. Dr. Fordham very properly follows up this account of individual development with a chapter discussing the mutual interactions of child and family.

Chapter 9 deals with analytical psychotherapy and makes it clear that this involves a preliminary 'family diagnosis' and attention to parental neurosis, though not necessarily treatment for it. The actual technique with the child is well illustrated by two patients whose treatment is described in some detail. A further case is described in the concluding chapter to illustrate the theme of symbol formation.

There is a bibliography of 9 pages; the majority of authors cited are psychoanalysts, a fact which confirms the impression that Dr. Fordham's sympathies are by no means exclusively Jungian.

W. H. GILLESPIE.

FAR FROM THE CLINICAL BATTLE FRONT

Psychiatry and Philosophy. By ERWIN W. STRAUS, MAURICE NATANSON and HENRI EY. Edited by MAURICE NATANSON. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. 1969. Pp. 161. Price DM 32.

Although the three essays which make up this book were written in 1963, they touch upon questions which increasingly occupy the minds of thoughtful psychiatrists, namely 'what is mental illness?'

Titled and discussed in more formal language than, for example Thomas Szasz's *The Myth of Mental Illness*, philosophy and psychiatry, or the philosophy of psychiatry, reflects the fundamental questioning of psychiatric concepts and the 'whatness' of mental illness. This represents a counter-current to the bland assumption that human unhappiness or social abnormality means some kind of mental illness, and should be susceptible to treatment like other illnesses.

Erwin Straus's essay is titled *Psychiatry and Philosophy*. Maurice Natanson follows immediately with *Philosophy and Psychiatry*. The philosophic roots here are those of phenomenology and existentialism, and consequently have the merits and defects of these branches of philosophy. The existentialism stems largely from the ponderous and uphill philosophy of Heidegger. It is interesting as philosophy, but it all seems far away from the clinical battle front.

Perhaps the most interesting essay for clinicians is the last one by Henri Ey—*Outline of an Organodynamic Conception of the Structure, Nosography and Pathogenesis of Mental Diseases*. This develops a description of mental illness from, among others, the work of Hughlings Jackson in neurology.

As the Preface to the book, by Straus and Natanson observes, 'the role of philosophy in the advancement of science is to make trouble; to challenge fundamental assumptions, to insist on rigour, and to demand some order of synoptic responsibility.' This sort of thing is good for unphilosophical psychiatrists and biological scientists generally, but unfortunately they are unlikely to read this book.

H. M. FLANAGAN.

ARE THESE ANTHOLOGIES WORTHWHILE?

Social Psychiatry; Volume I. Edited by ARI KIEV. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., for Science House, New York, Inc. 1970. Price 80s.

The contributors to this collection of reprinted papers are (in order of appearance): J. Ruesch, N. W. Bell and J. Spiegel, M. Shepherd and B. Cooper, M. L. Kohn, A. Hock, R. Moses and L. Terrespolsky, P. Paumelle and S. Lebovici, Warren Dunham, T. Plaut, D. M. Englehart and N. Freedman, Kathleen Jones, D. Michael, J. Z. Hes, M. Fried, C. Rule, Eliot Slater (on Lorenz), and H. F. Harlow. The contributions are arranged in five sections, Social Psychiatry: Definitions and Parameters; Epidemiology; Community Psychiatry; Social Problems; and Animal Studies. The editor provides an introduction to the book and a short introductory note to each section.

Are these anthologies of reprints worthwhile? As reference books they are too personal (it can hardly