

## Reviews

**From Conflict to Recovery in Africa** edited by TONY ADDISON

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 268. £50.00.

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Tony Addison's edited volume *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa* begins the colossal task of examining the difficulties that African states encounter when they attempt conflict resolution, reconstruction, and economic reform simultaneously. Prepared by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU/WIDER), it represents a concerted effort at applied research and policy analysis. Contributors to the collection are both academics and development professionals; hence, the book offers meticulous detail in its case studies of five African countries. Given this perspective, it does not offer an extensive engagement with broader theories of political science or development economics. As such, it would be a more appropriate reading choice for university courses exploring the empirical side of these pressing issues.

The central focus of the authors is the set of problems encountered by states attempting to end war, reconstruct their economies, and reform them simultaneously. Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique constitute the core of the study. Each has had to attempt poverty-reducing development, at the same time as both recovering from war and preventing its return. Addison and the other authors concur that 'changing those economic policies which favour only a narrow elite (and which also harm the poor) is crucial in achieving a broad-based recovery from conflict' (p. 4). Nonetheless, the authors also point out that broad-based recovery does not necessarily guarantee lasting peace.

War poses a unique economic problem because incentives accrue to commerce (i.e. buying and selling scarce commodities), rather than production. Even when conflict ends, commerce remains more lucrative than production as long as uncertainty with respect to the peace framework exists. The political upshot of this problem is that uncertainty undermines the state and its institutions because war shortens the time horizons of state actors, and increases the incentives to corruption (p. 6). The authors argue that the policy solution to these related problems is to craft economic reforms in such a way that they achieve broad-based, as opposed to narrow, recovery from the conflict.

Addison's study details these themes in a section on reconstructing communities, with chapters on Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (two chapters). The next section considers the revitalisation of private sectors, with chapters on Angola, Mozambique (two chapters), and Ethiopia. The final section detailing the themes of the study concerns the transformation of states. It contains chapters on Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, and 'the African state' in general. A final chapter offers some additional insights into the manner of economic reconstruction, emphasising the importance of national (over and above international) actors in African recovery.

As a whole, *From Conflict to Recovery* represents a major contribution to the literature on peacekeeping and economic development in Africa. Its strength lies with its attention to the interconnection of these issues, as well as its in-depth exploration of a key group of states, which prevents the project from wandering too far off-course. In particular, Addison's contributions keep the collection coherent and focused. Its only weakness (if it is one) is that with such a strong applied research and policy focus, it does not attempt to extend the analysis theoretically beyond the region examined. Nonetheless, the topic is timely and significant in its own right.

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**Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: global–local networks of power** edited by T. CALLAGHY, R. KASSIMIR and R. LATHAM

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. 336. £47.50; £17.95 (pbk).

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This is an excellent collection, the result of a programme of research and collaboration hosted by the Social Science Research Council in the US. It provides a fascinating examination of the challenges posed by globalisation to traditional forms of international relations theory, as well as how theory relates to empirical studies carried out in sub-Saharan Africa. In so doing the contributors focus on the structures, processes and events produced at the intersection of the global and the local in sub-Saharan Africa. The core questions addressed by the book include: How do state and non-state, local and external forces interact to produce order and authority in different kinds of social and political space? What kinds of actors are involved? What strategies are involved? How stable and extensive and productive are various forms of order and authority? How do different types of order and authority relate to each other? Whose voices and claims are heard, and whose are silenced? Most theories of international relations separate out internal and external forces for analytical purposes, but this book attempts something different. The contributors have tried to move away from the binary opposition of global and local to look at the creation and impact of 'global formations' in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors argue that these global formations play a major role in creating, transforming and destroying forms of order and authority.

One example of these global formations are the 'transterritorial deployments' detailed in Latham's chapter, which examines the proliferation of networks that provide a global–local link up through humanitarian intervention, international economic processes, military incursions and development work. African rulers must share their internationally constituted national territories with global organisations, ranging from NGOs to transnational corporations. This then allows rulers to rely on external forces to produce order and rule. In addition, the chapter by Barnett details how the volume looks at the proliferation of sites of authority – moving away from a state-based conception of authority to one where such an attribute is held by international organisations, NGOs and so on. This change in the location of authority has also contributed to the 'technisation' of problems within sub-Saharan Africa (including environment, development

humanitarian relief and so on), thereby legitimising their governance from outside the continent.

The strength of this book is the attempt to interweave new directions in international relations theory with local level case studies, revealing the usefulness and the weaknesses of meta-narratives in international relations. For that reason, this provides a core reading for all scholars interested in Africa and the global system.

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**‘Letting them Die’: why HIV/AIDS prevention programmes fail**

by CATHERINE CAMPBELL

Oxford: James Currey/The International African Institute, 2003. Pp. 214.  
£12.99 (pbk).

DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X04230191

This is an important book which has been let down by its publisher and editor. It is an enduring complaint among academic authors that publishers do not want to sell books, only to publish them safely – and this one proves that rule. Why ever print in tiny type and then pack it so closely onto the page that tired eyes have difficulty focusing?

Cathy Campbell has produced a book at times reminiscent of Oscar Lewis’s *La Vida*. Chapter 4, ‘Selling Sex in the Time of AIDS: Sexuality & HIV-Transmission among Sex Workers’, takes us on a journey into the hell of life on the literal periphery of South African society, the edge of a mining community where life is Hobbesian, sex takes about three minutes and may be followed by a man’s violent demands for his money back. This is not only the edge of a mining community, it is also the edge of human society.

Around such harrowing materials – and a tribute to the author and her colleagues (particularly the Outreach Coordinator Zodwa Mzaidume) – is woven the complex story of the Summertown HIV-Prevention Project set up in the 1990s by Brian Williams and his team. This is a project aimed at changing behaviour among sex workers, adolescents, mine workers and all sections of a poor community in South Africa. The book discusses a central question: why do HIV prevention programmes fail? This is so important because almost 30 years into this global epidemic, we do not have many clues as to the answer. We know that condoms are used – sometimes; that people change behaviour – sometimes; that Uganda has reduced the rate of growth of its epidemic. But we do not really understand the how and why of any of this or why powerful international forces – not least the current US administration – are ready to spend vast amounts of money on initiatives that claim to know the answers while smuggling in moral agendas which will achieve little.

*Letting them Die* engages with complex questions: how the project is structured as between different ‘stakeholders’; what the term ‘stakeholder’ can possibly mean and how it works in agency discourses; what it means to say that ‘political will’ is needed; whether and how the idea of ‘social capital’ is useful and whether ‘social capital’ is part of the problem and if so which ‘type’; what is the balance of influence between the broader ‘structural’ factors and ‘individual’ decisions in

determining the risks that people take with their bodies? It also reports on how interagency and interpersonal processes and competitions prevent research from being done as well as it might be.

Cathy Campbell is a social psychologist; she presents the book as a contribution to the development of a 'critical social psychology'. The book contributes much more generally than that; it is an addition to the limited critical literature on HIV/AIDS and beyond into 'development'. It engages far beyond the normal bounds of social psychology, going into questions of project design and politics. It could have been a great book and should be widely read. But very oddly in an era of marketing, spin and presentation, it is sorely let down by poor publication, unsatisfactory structure and opaque style. The question for this reviewer is: why do publishers do so little? Do they really care?

Despite these shortcomings, this is an important contribution. Hopefully Cathy Campbell's next despatch from Summertown will take the story further, and tell us more about whether and how the survivors of these events really do 'reconstruct their life worlds'.

TONY BARNETT

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**Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa: the dynamics of struggle and resistance** by GRAHAM HARRISON

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Pp. 190. £16.99 (pbk).

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This book approaches its topic from an important angle: a central concern with the *dynamics of struggle and resistance*. This necessitates a methodological approach which can identify causal relations between economic, political and cultural aspects of social relations, and locate these within historically specific conditions and trajectories which transcend the analytical dichotomies of domestic and international. Harrison's analysis meets these requirements with sensitivity, drawing on a wide range of literature and making thoughtful and effective use of empirical material.

The first chapter sets out an analytical framework located in political economy and the contradictions of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, with careful discussion of the interaction between structure and agency, and the problem of eurocentrism in the analysis of African societies. Harrison confronts rather than ignores the conceptual challenge of analysing processes of struggle and resistance – forms of agency – within changing local and international structures of economic and political power. The subsequent chapters engage in detail with several major topics in African politics, including analysis of rural–urban and peasant–state relations; the politics of debt and structural adjustment and struggles within or against the social crises of adjusted economies; struggles for and processes of democratisation; questions of culture, youth and violence; and the interaction of class and identity in urban contexts. In each case debates in the existing literature are subject to thoughtful and critical discussion. Harrison introduces several important and often difficult conceptual problems, such as how to analyse and evaluate processes of 'democratic' political change, the reproduction of state power in rural areas, and changing modes of identity construction

and contention. These are discussed in a clear and accessible style which captures the significance of a broad theoretical literature through recourse to concrete illustration. In this way theoretical discussion is never allowed to become the end in itself, but is always tied to the ultimate objective of shedding light on social realities and ongoing struggles of African peoples. The penultimate chapter employs the lessons of earlier chapters in a closer analysis of trajectories of change in three countries: Mozambique, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. Harrison moves beyond traditional 'top-down' accounts of political change which focus on macro-political events and actors, by adding the detail of popular struggles, thus 'writing in' the dynamics of political struggle to the construction of historical change. The three case studies are selected to illustrate both diversity and contrasting features of lusophone, anglophone and francophone Africa, as well as common aspects of modern social change in Africa from colonialism to the present era.

The book combines an authoritative and wide-ranging survey of existing literature with an original and well-developed conceptual approach to African politics as resistance and struggle, thus overcoming the sense of pessimism in much academic and popular treatment of African politics, without succumbing to populist or ahistorical celebration of any and all forms of agency. The bibliography is extensive, and each chapter concludes with a useful pointer to further reading. This is a welcome addition to the teaching material on African politics and international relations.

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**Africa's Stalled Development: international causes and cures** by

DAVID K. LEONARD and SCOTT STRAUS

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Pp. 159. US\$42.00; £17.95 (pbk).

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Leonard and Straus seek to offer a structural explanation of Africa's stalled development by claiming to go 'outside the box of conventional alternatives' to explain what they see as the major obstacle to African development: personal rule. By personal rule they refer to the fact that little distinction is made between the ruler and the state: the ruler's personal decisions supersede statutory law and precedence, and politics is beholden not to formal procedures but to personal decisions. In their view the personal rule paradigm is powerful in descriptive terms, but is adept at explaining the source of this phenomenon and how it is sustained. In order to analyse this problem Leonard and Straus warn against cultural explanations based on social pathologies, in that there are historical and structural reasons why the continent's development project has stalled in the post-colonial era. The strength of this explanation is the fact that it is embedded in African production relations and the continent's historical but lopsided relationship with the international system. They observe:

We argue that personal rule does not primarily grow out of a particular African culture, nor is it a response to Africa's ethnic heterogeneity ... Rather, these features commonly associated with personal rule are maintained by the weakness of African states, which itself is a legacy of colonial institutions; by an international system that rewards statehood in name but not in practice, which also contributes to the weakness of African states; and by a particularly narrow economic

structure that depends on the export of goods generated in enclaves, in particular natural resources. (p. 104)

The crucial point about personal rule is that it contributes to weak states by undermining the government's ability to function effectively, by institutionalising patronage and driving out public investment, thus abandoning any long-range plans for the common good. Personal rule is antithetical to the smooth operation of rational legal bureaucracies, particularly the latter's capacity to predict and calculate profit and loss. Economic activities are fraught with uncertainty, resulting in 'weak infrastructure, high inflation, and taxes based more on distributional and loyalty concerns' (p. 5), which all add to the cost of doing business for local and international investors.

Leonard and Straus reject such fanciful and ethnocentric explanations as Goran Hyden's 'economy of affection' of peasant economies, Chabal & Daloz's cultural determinism, and those based on the New Barbarism thesis of Robert Kaplan. According to Leonard and Straus such analyses of personal rule are premised on causal circularity and always run into a theoretical cul-de-sac. For them the 'historical and political economy of personal rule' is embedded in 'enclave economies' as well as 'Africa's relationship with the world outside the continent, in particular the West', which help to foster weak states (p. 8). These two concepts form the basis of their heuristic paradigm of Africa's arrested development. However, they are quick to warn any rash critics that their approach is not an attempt to reinvent the now discredited dependency model of the 'West versus the rest of us' or 'proletarian and bourgeois nations', explanations which deny African leadership a sense of agency.

However, their main thesis is that 'Africa's interactions with the international system perpetuate the negative dynamics that are at the heart of the continent's problems – even when, as with the case with foreign aid and technical assistance, world actors are trying to help' (p. 104). Furthermore, personal rule is itself a legacy of colonial institutions and an international system that rewards statehood in name but not in practice, which in turn contributes to the weakness of the African state. These are all sanctioned by a production system that 'depends on the export of goods generated in enclaves, in particular natural resources' (p. 104). Echoing Kwame Appiah's theme in his *In my Father's House*, Leonard and Straus note that the colonial state institutions failed to transform the African landscape, or to penetrate African culture, though there were trappings of modernity: a titular modern bureaucracy, a dualistic legal system (governing citizens and subjects), and a monetised enclave-based market economy. The source of statehood remained extraverted, limiting the impact of the colonial state and its apparatuses. The situation did not change with self-rule, as the new governing classes continue to operate weak states, whose means of reproduction were based on external legitimacy, whilst domestic sources of statehood remained secondary, thus strengthening the new oligarchy. In short, political independence changed neither the basis of statehood (which is not rooted in domestic relations), nor the nature of enclave production. Both statehood and enclave production continued to be sustained by the international system.

Enclave economic structure is reflected in Africa's traditional exports: mineral extraction and estate agriculture. Enclave economies are 'rentier' and are 'disconnected from the overall economic productivity of the general population' (p. 13),

with revenue generation being confined to a domestic enclave and a major external market. Leonard and Straus note that in enclave economies the 'elites gain little from any deep, growing, economic prosperity of the mass of the population'. The political essence of this line of production is that it enables elites to collect rents – bribes, taxes – and engage in other prebendal activities – 'without having to contribute to the general productivity of society'. In their view, these rents are simply converted into patronage, which in turn militates against the emergence of 'capable states, broad-based legitimacy, or national communities' (p. 104). Enclave economies do not foster the development of the infrastructure and institutional capacity for broad-based markets; instead, states collect rent and patronage.

The Leonard and Straus thesis reads very much like the neo-Marxist thesis of Geoffrey Kay on merchant capital, this time without the labour theory of value. It was capital's progeny, merchant capital, which discovered the Third World and retained its independent existence whilst simultaneously accumulating profit for capital, thus preventing the emergence of an autonomous capitalist mode in the Third World. More significantly, due to the fact that merchant capital in the Third World intercedes only after production, it is relieved of any imperative to revolutionise productive forces in the Third World, thereby triggering the development of underdevelopment (a terminology that Leonard & Straus, as neo-liberals, may not recognise). Furthermore, the fact that value created in the Third World is constantly drained by the activities of merchant capital through the sphere of circulation, not only constantly denudes these formations of potentially investible capital, but it also leads to the reproduction of arrested development.

Clearly, there is a lot that could be read into this new paradigm, if it is stripped of its neo-liberal fixation. This fascination becomes clear in their attempt to explicate civil conflicts in Africa, where they abandon a sustained structural argument in favour of the Collier 'greed not grievance' explanation. These critical comments apart, this text is the most serious attempt since the impasse debate got a hold on development studies, to explain Africa's stalled development.

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