themselves are vulnerable to these same large-scale social and economic forces" (p. 103). He then reminds us that such critics—for example, Ivan Illich and Michel Foucault—are often themselves professionals: "This suggests that there are internal resources available for a new, more democratic mode of professionalism" (p. 103).

Dzur knows that elites can fail us. He thus considers a set of civic reforms of the professions, ranging from the provision of character training centered on the emulation of exemplary civic professionals, to the clarification of the principles that ought to guide professional decisions, to the establishment of better incentives and regulations, if necessary backed up by the threat of legal sanction. Dzur argues that such measures make a difference, and are indeed consistent with traditional public service strictures regarded as "social trusteeship." But he also sees that they are nonetheless insufficient, which leads him to pose a question inspired by the writings of Dewey: "What," after all, "is it to serve the public good without an adequate understanding of the public?" (p. 274). Dzur's answer is that public service makes sense only if there exists a real public that wants to be heard concerning consequential decisions that impact their lives. Lacey, the pessimist, would likely fear a slippery slope from this notion of public voice to "delusions" of participatory democracy. But Dzur is no "participationist." His optimism and respect for human capacities (in contrast to Lacey's anxieties about our proclivities) are supremely *realistic,* based on the idea that humans are indeed flawed, and that for this very reason, properly conceived ideals are necessary to motivate us to work for moderate, not final, goals. In advocating for a vision of deliberative, democratic, professional practice, Dzur situates himself between "liberal and pluralist democratic" theorists (such as Robert Dahl, John Rawls, and William Riker) and "communitarian, republican, and participatory democratic theorists" (such as Ben Barber, Carole Pateman, Frank Michelman, and Michael Sandel) (pp. 24–25).

On a less theoretical level, to keep his argument for public–professional deliberation from seeming just plain wrongheaded (would you want *your* doctor to consult your neighbors before diagnosing your illness?), Dzur presents informal case studies in bioethics, public journalism, and restorative justice. Here, we see professionals such as Cole Campbell, editor of the *Virginia-Pilot* in 1993, clustering reporters "into teams oriented around readers' issue interests such as public life, education, criminal justice, public safety," and holding "community conversations" in which "public listening" as well as speaking allow reporters and the public to seek meaning beyond information (pp. 146–47). These examples demonstrate that professionals need not always treat us as clients, patients, wards, and dependents, and that given proper professional training and acculturation, more equalized discussions and engagements are possible. Dzur quotes Harry Boyte, whose "public work" also informs this book: "'Professionals must,' as Boyte says, 'put themselves back into the mix of interests and views that comprise a diverse group of people,' 'attend to the larger public meanings and purposes of the discipline or profession,' and create 'settings for interactive civic learning'" (p. 256). In the same vein, Bruce Jennings advises bioethicists to share "the responsibility of building reflective moral spaces for public debate," and to "'participate in it [such debate] as well'" (p. 242).

Dzur's belief in deliberative democracy suits professional/public collaborations, and one can imagine that it might moderate Lacey's fear of participatory inclusiveness. At the same time, Dzur is no more credulous than Lacey regarding the possibilities of mass public deliberation. But, drawing on the writings of Jürgen Habermas, Dzur recognizes that bureaucratization and professionalization are always in danger of shrinking the sphere of democratic politics, privileging elites, suppressing the forms of contestation essential to combat injustice, and—by separating deliberation from action and its responsibilities—transforming citizens into clients (pp. 35–36). Democracy is not just instrumental, not just a (particularly messy, contentious, inefficient) way of getting things done, or of discussing together what ought to be done by someone else. Activists and thinkers from John Dewey and Jane Addams through Students for a Democratic Society and members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee are needed reminders that democracy in action is also an end in itself, a way of living, and not only problem solving, together.

The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and its Critics. By Robert Faulkner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 288p. $30.00.
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— Andrew Sabl, *University of California at Los Angeles*

Robert Faulkner's subject is a certain kind of politician: the one with what ancient Greeks called *megalopsuchia,* greatness of soul (or the Latinate "magnanimity"). In politics, this greatness takes the form of "honorable" or "noble ambition." Faulkner analyzes the treatment of this greatness and ambition by classical philosophers and historians (Thucidides, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) while attacking its neglect by contemporary theorists who ignore or bury the concept (John Rawls, instigated by Kant); get it wrong (Douglass Adair, whose focus on the fame motive shifts attention from noble duties to fickle reputations); or relativize it, whether benignly (Hannah Arendt) or not (Nietzsche). Faulkner believes that free, republican regimes must study the great souled, not just to know our likely enemies but also to discern our likely saviors and friends and ensure that they stay such.

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Faulkner's accounts of the ancient authors defy summary, like most properly close readings, but still merit praise. His treatment of *megalopsuchia* in Aristotle's *Ethics* will instruct even those who think they have read the famous passages with care; his care is greater. The reasons why the great are reluctant to acknowledge debts to others (p. 42) are particularly striking: Briefly put, the desire for independence may seem closer to ingratitude than it is. The chapter on the *Education of Cyrus,* Xenophon's masterpiece, vindicates Faulkner's thesis that this is a more realistic work on political success than Machiavelli's *Prince*—precisely because Xenophon treats apprehensions of justice, evil, and tragedy as insights into reality, rather than distractions from it (p. 130). Faulkner's treatments of the two Platonic *Alcibiades* dialogues (possibly, some would say probably, not written by Plato himself—as Faulkner acknowledges but rightly puts to one side as beside the substantive point) are perhaps a bit less searching, but they still will play their intended role as apt reminders to those whose ambition for power is not matched by knowledge of how to use it well.

The critical chapters are somewhat less successful. Criticizing Rawls for not respecting the qualities of extraordinary politicians is certainly justified, but a bit too easy. Rawls's defenders would by and large cheerfully grant that his "ideal theory" abstracts from the preconditions of real politics, including its reliance on unpredictable qualities of character: So much the worse, in their view, for "nonideal" politics. A respectful critique of Adair for slighting the difference between fame and duty would have profited from a closer treatment of the literature since antiquity—at once deep and ironic—on how the search for fame can distract from virtue. In particular, a book that argues, in effect, that the love of praise should take second place to that of duty or praiseworthiness would have done well to consider Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments.* Faulkner's reading of Arendt, again respectful, is on the mark in questioning her attempt to separate greatness from all character qualities, but errs in portraying her as favoring "political beginning as such" (p. 213); for, as readers of Arendt will know, the need to institutionalize and constitutionalize revolutionary innovations is the central theme of her *On Revolution.*

The book displays, to an unusual degree, the cardinal Straussian virtue: a determination to learn, through close reading, from thinkers who tell us unaccustomed things. Absent this virtue, political theorists can resort only to congratulating one another for asserting shared prejudices with ever-greater zeal. On the other hand, the common flaws and idiosyncratic assumptions of that school are also evident. This book simply disregards the non-Straussian secondary literature, which on the subject of *megalopsuchia* is hardly lacking. Its attitude towards democracy is only moderately favorable; while Faulkner certainly prefers "rather democratic" republics over dictatorships (p. 199; cf. 178), what counts as a laudably moderate democracy apparently includes the Athenian regime of the Five Thousand, a broad-based oligarchy with a middle-class property qualification for political rights (p. 76). His attack on "the doctrine of equal dignity"—not just equal political dignity but equal *moral* dignity (p. 23; cf. 15, 21, 66, 202, 205)—seems excessive and unnecessary, partly because he skates over (pp. 203–4) the ubiquitous distinction between the equal *respect* that modern democracy assumes and equal *esteem,* a doctrine preached by few and practiced by none.

The author's praise for the "gentleman-statesman" and his apparent lack of disapproval toward some famous or infamous glosses on what that figure looks like (for Aristotle, the magnanimous man, being serious, must have a "deep voice" [p. 39]), while *de rigeur* in some circles, will raise legitimate doubts in others. In general, whether women might be great is left unclear; the only ones mentioned are Margaret Thatcher (as an aside, p. 5) and Panthea, a Xenophon character who displays greatness only by choosing a great man to love (pp. 153–57). That grand politics has in most times and places been a man's game is obvious, but Faulkner might have paused a bit longer to note the questions of justice that this raises, as well as whether the presence of women might affect the analysis of magnanimity. (If the answer is "not at all," that too would be an interesting claim, and certainly a shock to Xenophon and Aristotle.) In short, while Faulkner's aristocratic and traditionalist assumptions are mild by the standard of his Straussian compatriots—he allots genuine if "lesser" respect to nongreat figures like union leaders, businessmen, and civil servants (p. 207), and seeks to mix the "good and true" with the "strong and great" (p. 242)—they will unfortunately lead many outside that school to neglect a larger argument that would in many respects instruct them.

This book not merely advocates greatness but seeks to tame it—through a rehabilitation of the "mirrors to princes," in which philosophers aimed at flattering the great while redirecting the modes and objects of their ambitions. Faulkner suggests that it takes a great philosopher to both counsel and correct a great politician, and that the philosopher, in turn, shows his or her own insight by taking as raw material not common opinion but the opinion of the great (pp. 26, 31, 36, 38, 40, and especially 55: "greatness of soul is to defer somewhat to greatness of mind"). The mirror aims at turning the great away from mere ambition toward something better: toward respect for justice, toward legislation and founding rather than conquest (pp. 52, 91), or, not surprisingly, toward philosophy and away from politics altogether: "the true crown is within" (p. 35; cf. 52, 173–74).

Faulkner's goal of diverting tyrants is admirable, his treatment, subtle. (That moralizing at the ambitious may only drive them in the direction of crusades [pp. 108 ff] is a fine and original point.) But the whole enterprise of

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talking cures for tyrants is oddly unmodern. Recent political theory has by no means neglected greatness. It has merely swapped methods of addressing it, trading the philosophical mirrors that aspire to "limitations within the soul" (p. 186) for more reliable, that is, external, remedies: constitutions, institutional checks on arbitrary power backed up by popular accountability, and an educated public opinion. Faulkner claims that the "dangers to free politics that grand ambition often poses" were "provided against by a Plato or Aristotle" (p. 199). But Plato and Aristotle provided nothing of the sort; they merely *argued* against the dangers. To *provide* against them would have required institutionalizing mechanisms to bind the great from outside their own souls. But that is precisely what this book refuses to countenance. The great are to be given wise trainers but no reins.

In treating Machiavelli, Bacon, and occasionally Hobbes as the exemplars of "enlightenment" (or, less problematically, "modern") philosophy (pp. 9, 10, 18, 130, 178, 182, 221), Faulkner comes to judge mostly negatively the modern aspiration to tame politics through scientific knowledge, rather than qualities of soul. But this early modern trio lacked knowledge of modern constitutional and representative regimes, let alone mass-democratic ones. To take them as the paradigm moderns is to attack the aspiration to political knowledge without examining the actual knowledge to which it led. Generations of political theorists who have reflected on *both* souls and carefully gathered political experience—Hume, Adams, Publius, Tocqueville, Mill, and Weber, and their contemporary heirs—have discovered and propagated institutions unknowable to the Greeks. These include independent legislatures and judiciaries, the free press, uniform systems of private property and public provision, professional armies and police forces, and not least, the public prison, with impartial administration and limited terms. By ignoring how such institutions check and channel greatness, Faulkner ends up treating modern greatness like an absurdist play: all character, no scenery.

Faulkner approvingly cites Plutarch: "[T]he Athenian democracy could not live with Alicibiades . . . and it could not live without him" (p. 59). True. But that was Athens. A modern constitutional democracy, by design, can do both.

Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship. By Eric Gregory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 384p. $45.00.
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— Peter Augustine Lawler, *Berry College*

The purpose of this self-consciously ambitious, wonderfully comprehensive, and often judicious scholarly book is not to recover the thought of the "historical" St. Augustine for our time. Eric Gregory is not particularly attuned to what Augustine really said, and he sometimes, in fact, lets the reader in on what Augustine should have said, typically from a contemporary liberal point of view. Nor is he in pursuit of theological truth or even the fundamental truth about who we are as human persons. He limits himself, for the most part, to the impact that certain parts of Augustine's writings have had on twentieth-century political theorists. He takes for granted that liberal democracy is superior to pre-modern, paternalistic, or theocratic or non-rights-based forms of political life, and he presents himself as certain—without presenting supporting public policy analysis—that existing liberal democracies could be improved by "a kind of Augustinian *civic virtue*" that "might in turn encourage a more ambitious political practice" (p. 8). His basic thesis is that liberal concern for justice, understood as the protection of equal rights, is compatible with the loving and virtuous or charitable political pursuit of an "actual society" that is more just, egalitarian, and caring (p. 14). He claims that liberal democracy as it now exists, particularly in the U.S., is depressingly inegalitarian and depersonalizing or far too dominated by the apathetic indifference or materialistic self-absorption characteristic of capitalism. So, the new direction or "distinctive interest" of Gregory's reconstruction of the Augustinian tradition is "in relating love of God and love for neighbor in politics" in order to develop "a *political* ethic of care" (p. 176–77).

Gregory proclaims that his ambition is to reconcile those who write in the Augustinian tradition today with modern—meaning contemporary—liberals. He writes to build a coalition on behalf of a combination of liberal justice and Augustinian love by purporting to show the Augustinians and liberals that, on the level of politics, there's nothing over which they fundamentally disagree. Now that history has pulverized the utopian illusions of socialism or communism, it is, in fact, fairly hard to find scholars who do not want to perpetuate or accelerate the liberal devotion to personal autonomy and have government exhibit a more aggressive concern for the weak and the vulnerable. An exception here, Gregory presents, is the small group of radically orthodox or fairly Augustinian thinkers who believe that modern autonomy and Christian love are incompatible. To them he sensibly argues that there is no current alternative to liberal democracy, and he adds, much more questionably, that under the flag of his liberal/Augustianian coalition, the liberal quest for justice can be animated by the virtue of charity—or personal action based on love of particular persons—much more than it has been so far. The radically orthodox share Gregory's criticism of the *faux* realists who depend on "a demythologized notion of original sin" (p. 9), but they will, I believe, remain more than skeptical about the plausibility of Gregory's own demythologized notion of the virtue of charity.

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